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AUTHOR:

HAMILTON, THOMAS

TITLE:

ANNALS OF THE
PENINSULAR ...

PLACE:

EDINBURGH

DATE:

1829

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

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
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
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
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


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ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS,

FROM
MDCCCVIII TO MDCCCXIV.

BY THE AUTHOR OF CYRIL THORNTON.

Thomas Hamilton 1789-1842

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, EDINBURGH: AND
T. CADELL, STRAND, LONDON.
MDCCCXXIX.

EDINBURGH: PRINTED BY J. JOHNSTONE.

PREFACE.

IN offering the following volumes to the Public, the Author would by no means be understood as courting any competition with the more able and elaborate works of his contemporaries. To all the British historians of the Peninsular War, he has been largely indebted, and it would ill become him to speak of their labours, otherwise than with respect. The works of Colonel Jones, and Colonel Napier, display a very high degree of talent and ingenuity; and that of Mr. Southey, considered as a vast magazine of facts, laboriously collected, and embodied in a narrative of uniform clearness, may be considered as a valuable addition to our literature.

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Yet, admitting the merit of these writers, it appeared to the author, that their accounts of the Peninsular War were calculated rather for the closet of the professional student, than for the great mass of the public, who are little likely to feel interested in any dry or lengthened detail of accessory incidents, or to enter very deeply into the intricacies of military discussion; and that there was still wanting a work which should introduce to the intimate acquaintance of the great body of the people, the events of one of the most memorable periods in the history of their country, which should diffuse and imprint, more widely and more deeply, a fitting pride in the great achievements of the British arms, and render Englishmen more familiar with the circumstances of the most splendid and important triumph ever gained by the supporters of liberty, justice, and the rights of man, in opposing the gigantic usurpation of wild and profligate ambition.

To furnish such a work has been the object of the author of these Annals. That he has succeeded he cannot flatter himself; yet he trusts that he has at least deserved the credit of having detailed the occurrences of the war with fairness and impartiality; and that he has, in no instance, made his work subservient to the dictates of national bigotry or unworthy prejudice.

To any peculiar qualifications for the task he has undertaken, the author of these volumes makes no pretension. A few years of his early life were spent in the army—when he had the good fortune to be present in some of the great battles which it has now fallen to him to describe. He was thus enabled to acquire, by personal observation, a knowledge of many important localities, which he trusts will occasionally be found to have produced a beneficial influence on his narrative. Of any other advantages he is unaware; and the circumstance of the present work being given anony-

mously to the world, may be taken as an acknowledgment that the opinions which it contains could derive nothing of authority from the name of its author. Were it otherwise, however, he would prefer that these opinions should stand or fall without extrinsic support ; and he is aware of none which he is not prepared to relinquish, whenever, by more able reasoners, they shall be shown to be erroneous.

In a work embracing so vast a variety of detail, it is scarcely possible to hope that complete accuracy has been attained. The author trusts, however, that he will be found to have fallen into few important errors ; and he submits the present work to the judgment of the public, not with confidence certainly, but with no wish to deprecate the severity of any censure to which it may be found liable.

Toulouse, 2d September, 1829.

NOTE.

IN the first volume will be found references to an Appendix which does not exist. It has been omitted, on the ground that the documents referred to were easy of access, and not sufficiently important to warrant the addition of another volume, which the introduction of an Appendix would have rendered necessary.

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Vol. 3, page 127, line 2d, for "western" read eastern.

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ANNALS

OF THE

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.



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
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




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ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT.

THE Annals of neighbouring nations seldom pre- CHAP. I.
sent a contrast more striking, than that exhibited
by the History of France and Spain, for the
twenty years preceding the commencement of
the Peninsular War. During that period, France
had become the theatre of a vast and terrible
revolution; the whole fabric of her government
had been overthrown; society had been re-
duced to its original elements; and, amid tor-
rents of blood shed on field and scaffold, she

CHAP. I. had passed from despotism to anarchy, and from anarchy had again subsided into despotism.

These mighty changes had not flowed slowly onward, borne as it were on the progressive current of events, into gradual and almost imperceptible development. They had at once burst on the world, in all the suddenness and terror of the earthquake or the tornado. Their causes, it is true, had been long in operation, but they had wrought in secrecy and silence; and mankind stood aghast at a catastrophe so unlooked-for and appalling, whose overwhelming force and magnitude seemed to set all human efforts to impede its progress at defiance.

It was impossible that the consequences of so tremendous a convulsion should be confined to France: they were felt in every zone and region of the earth. Kings trembled on their thrones, and nobles in their palaces; while nations, partaking of the endemic delirium of the hour, were prepared to burst the chains which had hitherto enthralled them, and hail the advent of that political millennium, which they imagined had already dawned in hurricane and tempest.

All the governments of Europe became par-

takers, in a large degree, of the general alarm; CHAP. I. and endeavoured, with natural anxiety, to avoid being drawn into a vortex so wide and overwhelming. In community of interest they found a common bond of union; and war was resorted to, as the only means of escape from those dangers, the near approach of which they had witnessed with dismay. A general confederacy of the European monarchies was formed against France, and the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne, was the avowed end to which the hostilities of the alliance were directed.

To such an interference in her domestic government, it was not to be expected that France would tamely submit. Though torn by the strife of faction, and distracted by internal convulsion, she displayed, in her relations with foreign powers, a vigour, a fearlessness, and a promptitude to repel or retaliate aggression, which the feebleness and insecurity of her government at home gave little reason to expect. In the war which followed, the star of France prevailed, and that of the Allies grew dim before it. The energies of the Republic, under the guidance of the great military leaders whom the revolution had called from obscur-

CHAP. I. ity to stations of prominence and command, were directed against her enemies with decided vigour and success. The league was soon broken; one by one the members of the Alliance were encountered and overthrown; and, on the return of peace, France, triumphant at all points, remained undisputed mistress of a large accession of territory, and of an almost overwhelming influence in the whole political relations of continental Europe.

Great Britain alone remained among her enemies, unhumbled and unsubdued. Mistress of the sea, while the arms of France were everywhere triumphant on land, it seemed as if earth and ocean were divided against each other, in vast and interminable conflict. While the boundaries of their respective elements seemed to assign to either belligerent his peculiar sphere of triumph, and to prescribe the limits of his sway, there existed few points of contact on which the strength of these mighty combatants could be matched in final and decisive struggle. Each seemed armed against his enemy in mail of impenetrable proof; and France having succeeded in compelling the continental powers to withdraw from their alliance with England, the

war gradually degenerated on both sides, into a CHAP. I. war of petty enterprises, attended only by comparatively unimportant results.

In the meantime, the power of France, which, from the period of the Revolution, had been progressively increasing, had become apparently consolidated by time and conquest. Her government had at length assumed a form of sufficient permanence and consistency, to warrant an expectation, on the part of England, that the national faith, if solemnly pledged by treaty, would not, as heretofore, be sacrificed to popular clamour, or be disregarded amid the strife of contending factions. It was, at least, obvious to all reasonable observers, that whatever changes the internal government of France might yet be destined to undergo, these could proceed only from within, and could neither be accelerated nor retarded by hostile aggression from without. Both parties had, in truth, become tired of a contest which occasioned a continued outpouring of blood and treasure, but which held out to neither, any prospect of a brilliant or advantageous result. Pacific overtures were made and accepted; and, by the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, the sword was again returned to its scabbard, and the

1803.

CHAP. I. world, for a brief interval, enjoyed tranquillity and repose.

While France had thus become the theatre, not only of a political, but of a mighty moral revolution, and was exercising an irresistible control on the destinies of Europe, Spain had partaken in nothing of the intellectual vigour and advancement which had long exerted a silent but powerful influence on the surrounding nations. The moral energy, the proud and chivalrous gallantry, the spirit of heroic enterprise, by which, in the better and brighter ages of her history, her character was so strongly marked, had, for centuries, been gradually on the decline; and the Spanish people, long habituated to despotism both political and religious, were still surrounded by an atmosphere of bigotry and darkness, which the light, dawning in the intellectual horizon of other nations, had been unable to penetrate. In the case of Spain, ignorance and misgovernment had produced their natural effect; and, notwithstanding the formidable magnitude of her physical resources, she had gradually fallen from the prominent station she once held in the foremost rank of European nations, to that of a secondary power.

During the greater part of the reign of Charles CHAP. I. the Third, the government of Spain had followed the true policy, dictated at once by her geographical position, and her deficiency in offensive power, in withdrawing, as much as possible, from all participation in the contests in which the other nations of Europe were embroiled. Bounded by France on the north, and on the east and south by the sea, the acquisition of Portugal and Gibraltar were the only projects of European aggrandizement to which the ambition of her rulers could be rationally extended; and, in the execution of such schemes of conquest, she could not but be aware that the whole maritime and military force of England would be exerted in opposition to her views. England, therefore, she had been accustomed to regard as the chief obstacle to the success of her ambition; and, actuated by dislike, heightened perhaps by difference of religion, commercial jealousies, and the great naval superiority of Britain, the government of Spain had been uniformly more prompt to engage in hostilities with that power, than any other with whom, in the occasional jarring of interest or policy, she might be brought into collision. France, on the other hand,

CHAP. I. was naturally indicated, by her power and proximity, either as the most powerful ally of Spain, or her most formidable enemy. Through France alone was the Spanish territory vulnerable to the rest of Europe; while no alliance with other powers could afford protection from her hostility.

Under the ministry of Florida Blanca, Spain, instigated by France, had taken part in the war between Great Britain and her colonies, and made a vigorous attempt to regain the fortress of Gibraltar. In this she failed; and, after a protracted war, in which her best energies had been exhausted with inadequate effect, she at length retired from a contest, of which the only favourable result was the restoration of Minorca and the Floridas.

1783. Immediately before the breaking out of the French Revolution, Charles the Fourth, by the death of his father, had succeeded to the throne of Spain. Alarmed, in common with other sovereigns, at the new and startling doctrines, both political and religious, of which the revolutionary government proclaimed itself at once the partisan and the apostle, Charles acceded to the general confederacy then forming in Europe,

and declared war against France. In the hostilities which followed, Spain was eminently unsuccessful, and compelled to act only on the defensive. The army of the Republic crossed the Pyrenees, reduced the fortresses of San Fernando de Figueras and St. Sebastian, and, after defeating the Spanish force in several engagements, became masters of the Biscayan provinces and the kingdom of Navarre. Charles, who saw with dismay the whole northern portion of his kingdom already in possession of the enemy, hastened to supplicate for peace. The prayer of the Spanish monarch was granted by the Republic; and, by the treaty of Basle, Charles was again restored to the sovereignty of his conquered provinces, on condition of his relinquishing to France the Spanish portion of St. Domingo.

1795.
July 22.

Once more at peace, and relieved from the fear of present invasion, the government of Spain lost no time in disbanding her armies, and resigning herself to the enjoyment of an insecure and defenceless repose. While the whole population of France were training to the use of arms, the Spanish monarch, by a sort of inexplicable fatuity, was depressing the military spirit of his people, and depriving himself of all means of prompt

CHAP. I. and efficacious resistance to future encroachment or invasion. No measures were taken to strengthen his northern frontier, or to repair the fortresses which had become dilapidated by the operations of the late war; and all the precautions necessary for the future security of his kingdom were neglected. The dreamy tranquillity of Charles, however, was not destined to be of long duration. Having placed himself at the mercy of France, he was speedily called on to take part in the war which that country was again waging against England. The consequence was that the naval power of Spain was encountered and overthrown, that her commerce was ruined, her treasury drained of its resources, and the intercourse with her colonies rendered precarious and uncertain.

The peace of Amiens, which had been regarded by either party as little more than a temporary cessation of hostilities, was, as if by mutual consent, soon broken. France and England, the rival and gigantic powers into whose hands were committed the destinies of the world, had again unsheathed the sword; and it depended on the issue of the approaching conflict, whether the chains, by which Europe was already encircled,

CHAP. I. should be riveted or snapped in twain. In such circumstances, it was the natural policy of Spain to have remained neutral. In common with the other weaker countries of Europe, she would gladly have kept aloof from a contest which involved the certainty of immediate sacrifice, while its eventual advantages were only distant and contingent. In a war, however, of such a character, and with objects so vast as the liberation or subjection of the world, it was not to be expected that the rights of neutral powers should be held sacred and inviolate. To remain neutral was, in truth, to encounter all the hazards and sacrifices of war, without participation of its benefits; and the minor states of Europe soon found themselves absorbed in the eddies of a whirlpool, and carried involuntarily forward by an impetus, at once rapid and resistless.

It was not long before the eyes of Spain were opened to the bold and decisive policy of the beligerents. While yet at peace with both parties, Oct. 5. four Spanish frigates, loaded with treasure from America, were captured by an English squadron, without any declaration of war. By this flagrant act of national piracy, Spain was at once driven into the arms of France, and war against

CHAP. I. Great Britain immediately declared. She saw that, for a mean and unwarrantable purpose, she had been made the object not merely of robbery but of insult; and the unprincipled aggression of England drew from the whole Spanish nation a burst of indignant hatred, which the policy of France led her, by every means, to cherish and prolong.

1805. The throne of France was now filled by Napoleon; and the ascendancy of his master-mind contributed to rivet yet more strongly the fetters by which Spain was already shackled. The tone at first assumed by the new Emperor, was intended to lull the Spanish government into still deeper security; and it succeeded. Assurances of friendship, and promises of support, were made with a profusion, and an apparent warmth which seemed to warrant their sincerity; and they were received by Charles, with a credulity quite in harmony with the general imbecility of his character.

The minister to whose hands the reins of government had long been intrusted, was Don Manuel Godoy; and surely never was there a servant less qualified by character and talents, to compensate for the deficiencies of his master.

CHAP. I. Raised by the illicit attachment of the Queen from the situation of a private gentleman to the highest rank and office of the state, he brought to the task of governing a great nation, a narrow and uncultivated mind, a grovelling and selfish spirit. He was a man alike devoid of principle and firmness; and the only proof of talent exhibited in his unfortunate career, must be sought in the ascendancy, which, under every change of circumstance, he appears to have maintained over the minds of Charles and his consort. By their favour he was first created Duc d'Alcudia, and afterwards, in honour of the treaty of Basle, which he had been chiefly instrumental in concluding, Principe de la Paz. To his hands were committed the direction and patronage of all the departments of the state. Every honour in the power of the monarch to bestow was lavished on the favourite. By his marriage with Marie Therese de Bourbon, the niece of Charles, he was elevated to the rank of royalty; and the state and magnificence of his establishment were such as had never before been affected by a subject.

Some men there are, who, when called on by events to figure in a new and higher sphere of

CHAP. I. 1805. action than that for which they were originally destined, experience a proportionate expansion of intellect and power—in whom new energies are elicited by the dangers and the difficulties, which, perhaps by a wise dispensation, are fated to surround and darken the paths of glory and ambition. Such a man was *not* Godoy. In him power called only into development the baser and more grovelling passions of his nature, while all the higher impulses by which humanity is graced and ennobled, slept on in undisturbed repose. Under the sway of such a person it was impossible that Spain should prosper. The honour of the country was sacrificed, her vital interests were disregarded, and the whole functions of the government of a great nation were made to converge towards a single point—the gratification of an unprincipled favourite.

It is scarcely impossible to conceive a court more thoroughly dissolute and degraded than that of Madrid under the administration of Godoy. Those only received his favours who pandered to his vices; and all in any degree distinguished by wisdom, virtue, or patriotism, were treated with contumely and neglect. It has been said that he was corrupted by France; yet, there are many

portions of his public conduct and policy at variance with such a supposition. Godoy's was not a lofty ambition: the rank, the wealth, the power he already enjoyed, afforded ample means of sordid gratification, and engrossed the capacities of his nature. France had no bribe of magnitude sufficient to secure the services of a man whose highest aspirations were already sated, to whom future glory, when weighed against present enjoyment, was but as dust in the balance.

For some benefits, however, and these of no trifling magnitude, it is but justice to confess that Spain has been indebted to the administration of Godoy. He increased and accelerated the impulse of the national industry by patronage and encouragement. He extended his protection to artists and men of science; and it was in a great measure through his influence and exertions that vaccination became general in Spain, and was subsequently communicated to her possessions in America. Under his administration the Inquisition lost its terrors; works of national utility were encouraged and promoted; and vigorous and judicious measures were adopted to prevent the dissemination of infectious disease.

CHAP. I. Let the censures of the historian, therefore, on the
1805. character of Godoy be severe but discriminating.

While he displays the darker and more prominent features of his character in their true colours, let him also do justice to those better qualities, by which, in other circumstances, it might have been brightened and redeemed.

Of Charles it would be yet greater injustice to speak in terms of unmitigated reproach. None of the elements of greatness were mingled in his composition, and his virtues and his vices were alike those of an imbecile intellect. Naturally timid and irresolute, yet of a character in which was mingled much of kindness and benevolence, Charles, had his lot been cast in calmer and more peaceful times, might have reigned in tranquil insignificance, by no means unfavourably distinguished among the tenants of the Spanish throne. But his powers were prodigiously disproportioned to the task imposed on him by the irresistible progress of events. With favouring breezes, and on a summer sea, he might have guided the vessel of the state prosperously on her voyage; but when the elements were abroad in their discord, it required another and more powerful arm, to steer her safely into port.

It was impossible for any minister to be more CHAP. I.
generally unpopular than Godoy. The ancient 1805.
nobility regarded him as an upstart; and were alike indignant at his elevation and jealous of his power. By the people at large he was considered the source of all the misfortunes and the degradation by which, since his accession to power, the Spanish name and arms had been stained and humbled. The party thus opposed to the favourite, though strong in numbers were yet stronger in the rank and influence of their leader. Ferdinand Prince of Asturias, the heir-apparent to the throne, had naturally regarded the elevation of Godoy with indignation and disgust. His sentiments were no sooner known than the party opposed to the minister rallied round him as their leader. Under any other than a despotic government it would have been impossible for Godoy to have retained his situation in opposition to the public voice. He must at once have been driven into retirement with ignominy and disgrace. But it is not the least disadvantage of an absolute and unmitigated monarchy, that it is cut off from all sympathy and communion with the people; that the governors and the governed are not "bound, each to each, by natural sympathy;" that the

CHAP. I. portents of approaching eclipse are unseen or disregarded, till the earth is shrouded in darkness, and monarchs are "perplexed by fear of change," which it is no longer in their power to avert.

1805.

1806. In 1806 the disorders of the government had at length reached their height: the army, unpaid and without equipment, was clamorous and undisciplined; the navy, which in the preceding reign was formidable, both in point of numbers and efficiency, had been annihilated at Trafalgar; the finances were deranged; the treasury exhausted; and commerce, by the war with England, almost utterly destroyed. Spain had in truth become a mere dependent on France; and the French ruler, far from compassionating her difficulties, still continued to exact fresh sacrifices, and compliances more humble.

Godoy was now fully aware of the perils of his situation; and, could Spain, by any peaceful effort of diplomacy, have been detached from her dangerous and inglorious dependence on France, he would gladly have again raised her from thralldom, and have unbound the ignoble shackles from her limbs. But the difficulties of his situation had become far beyond his feeble powers to overcome. On the one hand, the neg-

lect of all warlike preparation on the part of Spain, the dilapidated state of her frontier fortresses, the total want of the munitions necessary for the defence of her territory if subjected to invasion, withheld him from openly adopting any measure which might incur the hostility of France. On the other hand, from the advanced age of the king, and the aversion of the heir-apparent, he could not but contemplate the probability of a speedy termination to his power. He naturally feared the hostility of an injured people, and dreaded the arrival of the moment when, no longer protected by the shield of regal authority, he should be left the defenceless object of popular indignation.

Stimulated by such fears, Godoy felt it necessary to conciliate public opinion, by the adoption of some immediate measure in unison with the general feeling of the nation. He accordingly proceeded to concert with the Russian and Portuguese ambassadors at Madrid, a plan of combined aggression on the territory of France. The details of this project it is now curious to contemplate. It was proposed that hostile preparations should be made simultaneously at numerous and distant points, and should be conducted

CHAP. I.
1806.

CHAP. I. with such secrecy as to elude the observation of
 1806. Napoleon, then actively engaged in the war with Prussia. Spain and Portugal were to unite their forces against the common enemy. Arrangements were to be made for assembling a large army in the ports of Great Britain, which, on a given signal, was to be landed on the north of Spain. The operations on land were to be supported by a naval armament of overwhelming magnitude; and, by a simultaneous movement in the north of Europe, Russia was to advance to the relief of Germany, with her whole military power.

In such circumstances, before the armies of Napoleon, engaged in distant operations, could be concentrated for the defence of the kingdom, the allies were unexpectedly to cross the Pyrenees, and, marching direct for Paris, to gain possession of the capital. By these measures it was conceived, that a sudden and decisive blow would be struck in the vital part where France was at once most vulnerable and defenceless.

Such were the projects of the Prince of Peace; and small as the chance might be of maturing, under any circumstances, a scheme so widely ramified, and depending on so many contingencies

for its completion, without exciting the suspicions of Napoleon, all hope of success was at once blighted by his own rashness and precipitation.

Before any of the necessary arrangements had been made, nay even before the powers most interested had been apprized of the part allotted to them in the projected scheme of hostilities, a proclamation was issued by Godoy, exhorting all loyal Spaniards to take arms, and rally round the throne of their sovereign. Circular letters were written to the bishops and civil functionaries of the provinces, urging them to excite the ardour of the people in the cause of their country. The nation, thus called on to defend their sovereign, could perceive no new danger which threatened his throne. The manifesto indicated no enemy against whom they were to arm. They were told of no insult or aggression which it had become necessary to repress or to revenge. The dangers of which it spoke were too indefinite and shadowy to rouse the fears or passions of the people. Its motives and its ends were alike veiled in an obscurity they were unable to penetrate. The nation wondered and were silent.

The astonishment excited by this warlike demonstration was not confined to Spain. Europe was

CHAP. I. 1806. unprepared for the loud note of gratuitous defiance so suddenly sounded from Madrid. No alliance had been formed, no treaty concluded, no preparation made for any combined attack on the power of France. Even the ministers of Spain at the foreign courts, were left wholly in the dark as to the views and projects of Godoy. The Russian and Portuguese ambassadors on the appearance of this unseasonable proclamation, lost no time in attempting to vindicate themselves from the suspicion of a connivance, which could not fail to draw down upon their governments the indignation of Napoleon. They denied being privy to its contents, and carefully avoided committing themselves, by any future negotiations, to the discretion of a man so manifestly deficient in all the qualities of a statesman.

It was upon the field of Jena that Napoleon received this proclamation—with what feelings may readily be conceived. That which to Europe appeared vague and mysterious, to him was abundantly intelligible. He at once appreciated the policy of Charles and his minister; and then it was, as he afterwards declared, that he first resolved on the subjugation of the Peninsula.

CHAP. I. 1807. In the meanwhile, the French Ambassador at Madrid presented an indignant remonstrance on the perfidious and vacillating policy of the Spanish government; and Godoy, anxious to escape if possible from the consequences of his rashness, replied by humble assurances that the warlike preparations called for by the proclamation, were intended as a mere defensive measure against the Emperor of Morocco, who, instigated by the intrigues, and emboldened by the protection of England, might possibly attempt a descent on Andalusia. Napoleon, still engaged in a contest which required a concentration of his resources, deemed it politic to receive this lame and improbable explanation as satisfactory. His vows of vengeance slept; but they were soon destined to awake from slumber.

August. The peace of Tilsit, which speedily followed these events, left the French Emperor at full liberty to pursue his ambitious projects with regard to the Peninsula. He assembled a large army on the Garonne, and weakened the defensive powers of Spain, by exacting still larger drafts from her army than she had yet been called on to furnish. Sixteen thousand of her best-disciplined troops, under the command

CHAP. I. of the Marquis de Romana, were marched into
1807. the north of Germany, and another division were employed in the occupation of Etruria. While matters were thus silently but rapidly verging toward the catastrophe, Napoleon continued to express his approbation of the conduct of Charles, and to lavish testimonies of his favour on Godoy. Whether the Spanish monarch and his minion were really deceived by these hollow appearances of esteem, it would boot little to ascertain. They were already in the net of the spoiler, and so involved in its multiplied convolutions that escape was impossible.

No submission, however abject, no resistance, however prompt and energetic, could possibly have rescued Spain. It is not improbable that the fall of the Bourbons had already been decreed. Accustomed as Napoleon had been to the enjoyments of gratified ambition, he felt perhaps a new excitement to his pride in the idea that the plebeian brows of a scion of his house, should be graced by one of the highest and most ancient crowns of Europe. It was yet something to a spirit like his, to raise to the level of the noblest of the earth all those whose veins were filled with blood kindred to his own. It was

yet more than this, by a striking act of violent
and decisive volition, to prove to Europe, that
henceforward her law was to be found in the
arbitrary fiat of her master. But it was most
of all to beat down, and trample in the dust; the
descendants of an hundred kings; to display the
full measure of his contempt for those hereditary
prejudices, before which the world had hitherto
bent in reverence and submission; to stand forth
in the indefeasible dignity of his own majestic
spirit, with all the moral and intrinsic attributes
of sovereignty concentrated in his person, as the
man, marked out by nature, whose brow could
alone support the diadem, or whose arm could
wield the sceptre of the world.

Whether the course of Napoleon, with regard
to Spain, was influenced by the instigations of
an ambition so wild and reckless, is one of
those problems probably never destined to be
solved. It is at least certain, there were other
motives, and those of cogency more powerful
and immediate, to urge him forward on that
course of policy which was to terminate in the
deposition of the Bourbons.

In deciding on the immediate annexation of
Spain, as an appanage of his empire, Napoleon,

CHAP. I. by many of the political reasoners of the day, has
1807. been held guilty, not only of an unprincipled outrage on the law of nations, but of being influenced in his proceedings towards that power, by the mere blind and vague stimulus of conquest. "Spain," say such reasoners, "feeble and inoffensive, was already in his power. Her troops had fought in the same ranks with his own; her resources had been drained to enrich his treasury, and were still at his command. What then had he to gain by outraging the feelings of a people so little capable of disturbing his security, or by deposing a dynasty which he could bend so easily to all the purposes of his ambition?"

The answer is, *much*. Over such a monarch as Charles, and such a minister as Godoy, Napoleon well knew he could exercise no ascendancy but that of fear. While his armies continued to advance, as they had hitherto done, in the career of conquest, he had nothing to dread from Spain, and he had dreaded nothing. But he also well knew, that, should the tide of battle change, should the flood of success, on which he had hitherto floated on from attack to victory—from victory to conquest, ebb again from beneath him, Spain would be among the first of the

surrounding nations to unsheath the sword, and raise the battle-cry on his declining fortunes. The proclamation of Godoy had given sufficient indication of her future policy, should adverse contingencies occur to shake the stability of his government, or weaken its power.

Had the views of Napoleon, therefore, been directed merely to the present, he could have beheld, in the degraded state of the Peninsula, nothing to excite his alarm. But, regarding the future security of a widely extended empire, he could scarcely fail to consider the acquisition of Spain, as a measure essential to its permanence. The vast increase of territory which France had acquired by conquest, in Italy, and beyond the Rhine, rendered it necessary to her safety, that the circuit of her dominion should be proportionably enlarged in those quarters from which, by a sudden and unexpected invasion, an army might advance into the very centre of the kingdom. On this subject the reasoning of General Foy appears unanswerable:—"Spain presses on France," says that able—would we could likewise add impartial and unprejudiced—writer, "in a way which differs wholly from every other pressure. Surrounded by the sea, and in contact only with a feeble neigh-

CHAP. I. bour, Spain has nothing to fear from any lateral
1807. aggression, and, should she become the enemy
of France, can bear down with all her strength
on the northern frontier.—Napoleon knew, that
behind the Pyrenees a generous nation had
preserved its energy, and had not sunk into de-
gradation, even under the long oppression of a
government inglorious abroad and despotic at
home. He knew all that might be expected
from the people, and especially from the peo-
ple of the south, when governed in unison
with their passions, and within the sphere of
their moral impressions. A man might arise
who would regenerate Spain; a prince might
reign, who would suffer it to be regenerated; a
palace revolution, a popular tumult, might give
the impulse. It was not written in the book of
fate, that Spain should be always ruled by a weak
king, a shameless queen, and a contemptible fav-
ourite. While the eagles of France were flying
to the banks of the Danube, and urging their
course towards the Vistula, an enemy was at
her gates on the south. The empire, which is
so deeply vulnerable on one point, is strong no
where. The increase of territory ought to be
effected by concentric additions, and simultane-

ously on all sides. The French armies, when CHAP. I.
fighting in Poland, Bohemia, and Austria, might
be turned by an enemy's army which present- 1807,
ed itself on the frontier of the Pyrenees, be-
cause that army would be the nearest to Paris.
The centre of a kingdom is, in fact, the arc
and buttress of its military power. Was not,
then, the absolute and firmly-guaranteed sub-
mission of Spain, a natural and necessary con-
sequence of the extension of France beyond her
natural limits, the Alps and the Rhine? Such
were the thoughts suggested to Napoleon by the
idle proclamation of Godoy."

The first step taken by Napoleon towards the
completion of his project, was to induce Charles,
through the agency of his minister, to become a
party to a secret treaty which was signed at Fon- App. No. 1.
tainebleau. By this instrument the partition of Oct. 27.
Portugal was agreed on. The province Entre
Minho et Douro was to be erected into a sepa-
rate sovereignty for the king of Etruria, whose
Italian dominions were to be ceded to France.
The Alentejo and Algarva were allotted as the
reward of Godoy, to whom they were convey-
ed as a separate and independent principality.
It was likewise stipulated that the sovereignty

CHAP. I. of the other provinces of Portugal should rest in
1807. abeyance, till the termination of the war; then to be restored conditionally to the House of Braganza, or otherwise disposed of, as the pleasure of the contracting powers might dictate. It was further agreed, that the colonies of Portugal should be divided between the sovereigns, on the principle of an equal partition.

Such were the more prominent features of the treaty of Fontainebleau; and on the same day on which it was concluded, a convention was likewise signed, for carrying it into effect. By this it was arranged, that a body of twenty-five thousand French infantry, and three thousand cavalry, should enter Spain, and marching directly on Lisbon, were there to be reinforced by the junction of a Spanish army of twelve thousand men. The troops of Charles were at the same time to take possession of the province Entre Minho et Douro, and the city of Oporto; while a third division was to reduce and hold in occupation the provinces south of the Tagus. It was likewise provided by the convention, that the French troops should, on their march, be furnished with all necessary supplies, at the expense of the Spanish government.

App. No. 2.

Though the contracting powers appear to have contemplated little probable opposition, to this scheme of iniquitous spoliation, yet, in order to repel any possible attempts of the English to obstruct its execution, it was agreed that an army of reserve of forty thousand men, should assemble at Bayonne, ready to march to the defence of any point which might be menaced with attack.

The secrecy with which they were concluded is not one of the least remarkable circumstances connected with the treaty and convention of Fontainebleau. The negotiations on the part of Spain were conducted by Don Eugenio Izquierdo, a person uninvested with any public character, but enjoying the full confidence of Godoy. Of the powers intrusted to Izquierdo by the King and his minister, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris was kept in profound ignorance. All the diplomatic arrangements connected with the treaty, were concluded without his knowledge; nor was it till several of the stipulations had been carried into effect that he first became acquainted with its existence. The instructions which Izquierdo received personally from the King, preparatory to his departure, are sufficiently illustrative both of the feeble character of Charles and his

CHAP. I.
1807.

CHAP. I. unbounded reliance on Godoy, to merit record.
1807.

"*Manuel es tu protector*," said the monarch,
"*tras quando te diga ; por medio suyo debes servir me.*"*

Of Portugal it is now time to speak. Engaged in the peaceful prosecution of an extended commerce, and relying for security on the faith of a treaty of neutrality—the advantages of which were purchased by a large annual tribute to France,—her government had abstained, as much as possible, from mingling in the dissensions of the more powerful nations of Europe. Towards Spain, she had been guilty of no offence ; and connected with that power by public alliance, and multiplied intermarriages with the reigning family, the Prince of Brazil imagined that if not entirely secure from insult or partial injustice, his territory was at least safe from glaring outrage and spoliation. He certainly did not, and could not anticipate, that the inoffensive policy of his government, could be followed, on the part of his allies, by an act of power so flagrant and un-

* "*Manuel Godoy is thy protector. Do what he orders thee. It is through him that thou must serve me.*" These are the very words of Charles, given in the correspondence of Izquierdo.

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justifiable as that contemplated by the stipulations of the treaty of Fontainebleau.

The peace of Tilsit had scarcely been concluded, when the French and Spanish ambassadors at Lisbon united in a formal demand, that the App. No. 3. ports of the kingdom should be instantly closed against England, that the ships then in harbour should be seized, and the property of all British subjects confiscated. It was likewise intimated to the government of Portugal, that, in case the requisition of the ambassadors was not followed by an immediate compliance, a speedy declaration of war by both powers would be the inevitable consequence.

The Prince Regent, unwilling to become the instrument of injustice towards an old and faithful ally, endeavoured, by a temporizing policy, to avert the necessity of immediate acquiescence in this unprincipled demand. He signified to the Court of France his readiness to prevent all future intercourse with England, but objected to the more violent measures prescribed for his App. No. 4. adoption. Aware, perhaps, how little weight would be attached by those whom he addressed, to any collateral appeal to justice or the law of nations, the Prince Regent urged, as

CHAP. I. the chief motive for the line of policy he was
1807. anxious to pursue, the fact that a Portuguese
squadron was then cruizing in the Mediterranean, and the prudence of maintaining terms
with England till it had returned to port.

The feebleness of Portugal, however, rendered all the remonstrances of her government ineffectual. To the confederated power of France and Spain, it was evident she could offer no effectual resistance; and Napoleon, without waiting for the result of her decision, directed an immediate seizure of all Portuguese vessels in the ports of France and Holland. Under these circumstances, notice was given to the English residents in Portugal of the precarious situation in which they stood; and they were warned, by a timely retreat, to escape from the rigorous measures to which, in the urgency of the crisis, it might be found necessary to have recourse.

In the meanwhile, preparations for the invasion of Portugal were proceeding without abatement or delay. An army of twenty-five thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry, under the title of the Army of the Gironde, had assembled at Bayonne, and waited only for an order to advance. The government of Portugal was

at once intimidated and overawed; and the Prince Regent, anxious, by every possible concession, to dissipate the darkening cloud which appeared ready to burst in thunder over his devoted kingdom, was at length compelled to sacrifice principle to safety, and purchase, even the chance of impunity, by injustice. His acquiescence in the measures prescribed for his adoption was intimated to the Courts of France and Spain; the property and persons of all subjects of England were seized, and a proclamation was issued prohibiting all commercial intercourse between the countries.

These extorted sacrifices of the Prince Regent, produced no favourable change in his own fortunes or those of Portugal. The dismemberment of the kingdom had already been determined, and the humiliating compliances of the government, tended rather to accelerate than retard the natural progress of events.

Such were the relations of France and the Peninsula, when the family differences which had long existed between Charles and the Prince of Asturias at length approached to an open rupture. The latter was hostile to Godoy, and naturally indignant at the disgraceful causes of his

CHAP. I. 1807. favour. The party opposed to the minister, emboldened by the accession of so powerful an auxiliary, had been active in establishing intrigues for the overthrow of the favourite, while Ferdinand endeavoured to strengthen the cause which he espoused, by securing in its favour the influence of Beauharnois, the French ambassador at Madrid. Through the latter a secret communication from the Prince was transmitted to Napoleon, in which he solicited the honour of an alliance with the imperial family of France. He entreated also that Napoleon would interfere to regulate the internal disorders of the government, and conveyed assurances, that to him alone could Spain look for deliverance from the evils under which she had long been suffering.

Oct. 11. To the solicitations of the Prince no answer was returned; and Godoy having shortly afterwards become acquainted with the particulars of the transaction, Ferdinand, on the 28th of October, App. No. 5. was arrested at the Escorial, and confined in the monastery of St. Laurence. On the 30th, a proclamation appeared charging him with high treason, in having organized a conspiracy for the purpose of dethroning the King. In a letter addressed to Napoleon, written on the 29th,

Charles made an additional charge against his son, of contemplating the assassination of the Queen. CHAP. I. 1807.

The people, however, considered these accusations as originating solely in the machinations of Godoy; and this persuasion tended if possible still further to aggravate the hatred with which both his person and ministry were regarded by the nation. Godoy, alarmed at the tempestuous demonstrations of popular feeling, and aware of the evident perils which surrounded him, resolved, as usual, to retrace his steps, and become the instrument of reconciliation between the father and son. Ferdinand was accordingly induced to address a letter to the King, expressive of his contrition, and imputing the errors of his conduct to the influence and evil counsels of the Dukes del Infantado and San Carlos. This submission of the Prince produced the desired effect. Charles issued a second proclamation, extending pardon to his son, but stating that he had denounced the names of those principally concerned in the conspiracy, and directing a select commission of the council of Castile to assemble immediately for the trial of the offenders. By this tribunal the partisans of the Prince were acquitted of all App. No. 6. Nov. 5.

CHAP. I. treasonable intention ; but being professedly hos-
 1807. tile to the administration of Godoy, through his
 influence they were severally banished from
 the capital, by the arbitrary edict of the Sove-
 reign.

Oct. 29. The letter which was addressed to Napoleon
 by the King, on the imprisonment of the Prince
 of Asturias, was not more fortunate than that of
 his son, in eliciting a reply. It conveyed ex-
 pressions of surprise, on the part of Charles, that
 the Emperor had not thought proper to consult
 him, in a matter so deeply interesting as the
 projected marriage of the heir-apparent. The
 remonstrance of his ally appears to have been
 treated by Napoleon with contemptuous neglect;
 and the ominous silence of the French ruler, was
 regarded by Godoy as a symptom of alienation
 from his interests, the consequences of which he
 was not prepared to encounter. His apprehen-
 sions were still further excited by a communica-
 tion from Murat, with whom he was on terms
 of confidential intercourse, informing him, that
 though the wishes of the Emperor prompted him
 to support his authority, yet the popularity of
 Ferdinand, and the near relation to himself in
 which that prince would be placed by the intend-

ed alliance with his family, rendered it impossible CHAP I.
 that he should take any prominent or open part 1807.
 in opposition to his interest or wishes.

Godoy already felt that his power was in the
 wane. Without the support of Napoleon, he
 was too conscious of his own feebleness and un-
 popularity, not to be aware that he must soon
 fall before the covert intrigues and open assaults
 of his enemies. Anxious, therefore, to adopt
 whatever measures might tend to ingratiate him
 with his protector, he prevailed on Charles to
 address another letter to the Emperor, solicit-
 ing his consent to the alliance of the Prince of
 Asturias with a branch of his august family.
 Even this second communication produced no
 immediate reply; and leaving the Spanish Mon-
 arch and his minister in a state of painful solici-
 tude, Napoleon set out for Italy.

While at Milan, he at length condescended to Nov. 15.
 answer the King of Spain's letters. His com-
 munication contained assurances that he was en-
 tirely ignorant of the circumstances connected
 with the conspiracy of Ferdinand; and stated
 that his first intelligence of the transaction had
 been derived from the letter of the King. He
 denied likewise having received any proposal

CHAP. I. from the Prince for an alliance with his family,
 1807. but expressed his sanction and approbation of the
 contemplated arrangement.

Such is a rapid and imperfect sketch of some
 of the more important events which preceded the
 hostile invasion of the Peninsula.

CHAPTER II.

INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

THE humiliating compliances of the Portu- CHAP. II.
 guese Government produced no beneficial con-
 sequences on the fortunes of the nation. Early in November, the army of the Gironde, com-
 1807. manded by Marshal Junot, who had formerly been
 ambassador at Lisbon, received orders to cross
 the Pyrenees, and advance on Salamanca. While
 thus threatening the territory of Portugal, the
 French Commander, so far from accompanying
 his advance with any profession of hostility, pro-
 claimed his sole object to be the emancipation
 of her government from the yoke of England,
 and to enable it to assume the attitude of an in-
 dependent power. Disposed as the Prince Re-
 gent might be, to yield ready credence to such
 flattering assurances, the return of his ambas-

CHAP. II. 1807. sadors, who had been dismissed from Paris and Madrid, could not but appear an alarming indication of the hostile purpose for which the armament had been assembled.

The arrival in the Tagus of a Russian squadron, consisting of nine sail of the line and two frigates, contributed still farther to heighten the embarrassment of the government. The appearance of this formidable force, at a juncture so critical, appears to have been a coincidence entirely accidental, and unconnected, in any manner, with the operations by which the integrity of Portugal was then so imminently threatened. But it carried with it at least the appearance of design, and was naturally regarded, both by England and Portugal, as forming part of the great scheme of events, by which Napoleon was endeavouring to realize the gigantic projects of his ambition.

The injuries which foreign coercion had compelled the Portuguese government to inflict on England, had not excited the hostility of that power. The British government saw too plainly the magnitude of the dangers by which Portugal was surrounded, to resent a policy which had been forced on her rulers by difficulties

with which it was impossible to contend. But there are certain limits to forbearance, which cannot be overpassed without sacrifice of honour; and it was distinctly intimated, that, although the exclusion of British vessels from the ports, and the expulsion of British subjects from the territory of Portugal, had not, under all the circumstances, been regarded as a hostile proceeding, any further act of aggression would be treated as a declaration of war, and give rise to immediate reprisals.

In order to give greater authority to this representation, a squadron, commanded by Sir Sydney Smith, was sent to cruize off the Tagus; and, on the appearance of another proclamation, directing the seizure of the persons, and the confiscation of the property of all English residents in Portugal, Lord Strangford, the British Envoy, immediately quitted Lisbon, and retired on board the ship of the Admiral.

In such a state of things, the arrival of the Russian fleet could scarcely fail to add embarrassment and complexity to the difficulties by which the government of Portugal was environed. It was regarded by England as connected with the hostile proceedings of Napoleon; and

CHAP. II.
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CHAP. II. Lisbon was immediately declared in a state of
1807. rigorous blockade, and every effort was exerted to prevent all naval communication with the Tagus.

The army of the Gironde had already reached Alcantara, where, according to the stipulations of the convention, it was joined by the Spanish contingent. The sufferings of the troops, during the march from Salamanca, are described by the French officers to have been dreadful. The weather was stormy and inclement, and the roads, from the melting of the snow, rendered almost impassable. In proportion as the army advanced, its difficulties appeared to accumulate. The Spanish government was unprepared for the promptitude and rapidity of the march of the French army ; and no magazines had been formed for its supply. The want of provision introduced disorder into the ranks. The starving soldiers quitted their battalions, and roamed about the country in search of plunder ; and when the van of the army reached Alcantara, it was in a state of utter wretchedness and destitution.

Nov. 17. From Alcantara, Marshal Junot issued a proclamation to the Portuguese nation, declaring, that his only object in entering their territory,

Thiebault,
p. 19.

was to emancipate the government from the yoke of England. It called on the people to receive their invaders as friends engaged in hostilities against one common enemy, and denounced the severest punishments on all who should take arms on his approach.

On the 19th of November, the army passed the frontier, and moved onward to Lisbon by the route of Castello Branco. On the 23d, the vanguard reached Abrantes, and the government had found itself utterly unable to organize any effective system of defence. The rapid advance of the enemy had taken the Prince Regent by surprise. None of the fortresses of his kingdom had been garrisoned or provisioned, and no proclamation of the government had given notice to the people in what light their invaders were to be regarded. Deceived, till too late, by the hope that hostilities might still be averted by a submissive compliance with the dictates of the Emperor, all defensive precautions had been neglected. It was only when the French army were within four days' march of the capital, that the Prince Regent received intelligence of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and became at length aware of the full extent and bearing of his danger.

CHAP. II.
1807.

App. No. 7.

CHAP. II. While yet undecided as to the course most
 1807. advisable amid the instant perils which surrounded him, a flag of truce entered the Tagus, and the Prince Regent received assurances from Lord Strangford, that, notwithstanding the demonstrations of hostility to which his government had been compelled to resort, the British Admiral would readily co-operate in any measures that might contribute to the security of the Royal Family. These assurances were relied on; and, influenced by the counsels of the ambassador, he determined at once to quit the kingdom and embark for Brazil. No time was to be lost in carrying this resolution into effect. The enemy were already at the gates; and having nominated a council of regency, the Prince Regent, accompanied by the Queen and the other members of his family, embarked amid the tears of the suffering people whom necessity had compelled him to abandon.

Nov. 27.

The French took possession of Lisbon without opposition. The suddenness of the events by which the independence of the country had been sacrificed, seems to have cast the nation into a stupor from which it required some time to emerge. Junot, a man neither harsh in dis-

position nor repulsive in manner, appears at first to have studied the arts of popularity, not without partial success. On his entry into the city he was met by a deputation from the authorities, who presented an address congratulating him on his arrival, and soliciting his protection for the capital. Nothing, we are assured, could be more wretched than the appearance of the triumphant army by which the subjection of a kingdom had been thus rapidly achieved. Piquets of the Portuguese Royal Guard acted as guides to the French troops, and conducted them to their quarters. The imaginations of the people had been excited by the achievements of the heroes of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, and they had expected to gaze on a race of beings superior in all noble and personal attributes to the rest of mankind. How then were they astonished to behold a long line of limping, emaciated, and ragged soldiers, enfeebled by incessant marching and privation, and devoid even of the ordinary appurtenances of military pomp, enter their city with lagging pace and in disorderly ranks! How rapidly the vision of glory must have vanished from their eyes!

Junot at first endeavoured to conciliate the

CHAP. II.
 1807.

Foy,
 v. ii. p. 401.

CHAP. II. inhabitants by professions of friendly intention,
 1807. and of a deep anxiety for the welfare and prosperity of the kingdom. The customary forms of government were observed in all his public decrees, and a politic respect was shewn to the prejudices and peculiar observances of the people. By such conduct, he succeeded in lulling for a time the more obtrusive demonstrations of innate hostility which pervaded the great mass of the population, and Lisbon remained for several weeks in a state of sullen though tranquil quiescence.

When Junot, however, had succeeded in reorganizing his army, broken down and enfeebled by the severity and privations of their hurried march; when he beheld the fortresses of the kingdom tenanted by French garrisons, the native population deprived of their arms, and many of those who by their talents and popularity were likely to incite resistance to his authority, despatched on a mission of compliment to Napoleon, he thought it no longer necessary to dissemble. He at once threw aside the mask under which he had hitherto disguised the tyrannical designs of his master, and publicly proclaimed that Portugal was no

longer to be considered an independent power, CHAP. II.
 but a mere appanage of France. It was declared, 1808
 that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign. By abandoning the country, it had forfeited all App. No. 8.
 right to the allegiance of the people; and in the style of emphatic command peculiar to Napoleon, the nation were informed, that "the Emperor *willed* that Portugal should thereafter be governed in his name, by the General-in-chief of his army." By another exercise of imperial despotism the estates of the crown were confiscated, and heavy contributions imposed on the country at large. The reins of supreme authority were then publicly assumed by Junot, and the ancient insignia of the kingdom displaced by those of France.

The cause of the invaders, contaminated as it was by acts of barbarous oppression, found many partisans among the aristocracy of the country, and even among the clergy. The Patriarch of Lisbon issued a pastoral letter to his flock, begging App. No. 9.
 them, in the name of *patriotism* and *religion*, to unite in establishing the authority of the intrusive government, and in bringing those to punishment who should dare to disturb the tranquillity of the country by vain and contumacious resist-

Dated
 Milan,
 Dec. 23.

Dec. 8.

CHAP. II. 1808. But it is unquestionable that the burden of foreign thralldom carried with it, an outrage on all the better and prouder feelings of the people. Unaccustomed to any yoke, save that of a native and domestic despot, they burned with desire to burst the galling shackles by which they had been suddenly enthralled, and to wreak their vengeance on the authors of the national misfortunes and degradation.

Yet the demonstrations of these feelings were not in proportion to their depth and ardour. Occasionally a tumult in the streets of Lisbon, and curses, not loud but deep, muttered on the French soldiery, as they passed on in the pomp and panoply of war, gave evidence how little amalgamation of feeling the government had been successful in inducing between the conquerors and the conquered—the oppressors and the oppressed. When insurrection stalked forth into open day, it was instantly punished and suppressed by a vigilant police, and the strong arm of military power: but for that alienation of heart, that deep-rooted though silent hatred of their invaders, which rankled in the bosoms of the people, a cure was not to be found by those who violated their prejudices, and outraged their religion.

CHAP. II. 1808. It was in vain, therefore, that Junot endeavoured to captivate the nation, by dazzling pictures of the prosperity which was about to dawn on the oppressed and suffering country. It was in vain that he promised roads, canals, commerce, an improved government, and the wide diffusion of intelligence. To the value of such blessings the people were insensible. The shadowy glories of this visionary perspective were gazed on with indifference or incredulity. All their wants and aspirations were concentrated in one single word—*Freedom*. Not indeed freedom in its wider and more valuable acceptation; but freedom from the tyrannical yoke of foreign dominion; freedom again to become the slaves of a government, adapted, by its own limited intelligence, to the prejudices of the nation over which it ruled.

One of the first steps which the policy of Junot led him to adopt, in order to secure the peaceable occupation of the country, was that of disbanding a large portion of the native army, and employing the remainder in foreign service. Accordingly, the thirty-seven regiments which constituted the standing force of the kingdom, were reduced to seven regiments of infantry and three of cavalry, and of these a large proportion

CHAP. II. was immediately organized, and sent off to France,
1808. under the command of the Marquis de Alorna. The superior officers of this corps were selected from the number of those who possessed the highest character and influence among their countrymen. They were proud, we are assured, of serving under the banners of Napoleon, of enjoying an opportunity of sharing those laurels which had hitherto been so plentifully gathered by his victorious soldiers. But such feelings did not extend to the great body of the army. To them, the path of military distinction appeared less strewn with flowers than thorns. Animated, perhaps, with feelings of deeper patriotism than those who led them to the field, they felt also more deeply the pang of separation from their country, and saw, with a clearer view, the difficulties, the dangers, and the privations, to which, in their destined service, they could not fail to be exposed.*

* Of the aversion of the Portuguese to embark in the service of France, the following striking facts, narrated by General Foy, afford sufficient proof. When the army of Alorna began its march, it was between eight and nine thousand strong. In passing through Spain, more than four thousand deserted and returned home. Five or six hundred remained in the hospitals. Some

In the invasion of Portugal the Spanish troops
CHAP. II. appear to have played altogether an insignificant
1808. part. Their leaders were allowed to assume no command over the provinces which had been allotted them by treaty, and the authority of Junot was that by which alone all public acts were promulgated or enforced. Even this circumstance brought with it some alleviation to the fears of the nation. The terms of the treaty of Fontainebleau had filled the people with despair. The dismemberment of their country, was the misfortune of all others which they regarded with the deepest dismay. The assumption, therefore, of the supreme authority by Junot, abhorrent as in other respects it might be to their feelings, carried with it the belief that the stipulations which decreed the separation and dismemberment of Portugal were no longer intended to be enforced. If the future presented but a choice of evils, it seemed at least the smaller and less formidable, to become the dependent of France, than to be cut up and

were killed at the first siege of Saragossa; and, out of the whole number, only three thousand two hundred and forty arrived at Bayonne.

CHAP. II. parcellled out into sovereignties, too limited in
 1808. extent, resources, and population, to afford the means of effective repulsion to foreign insult or aggression.

Another circumstance contributed to confirm and to augment the hopes of the people, that the integrity of the country at least, would be saved from violation. The deputation from Lisbon which had been sent to congratulate the Emperor, were received by that monarch with a degree of flattering condescension, which led them to augur too favourably of his intentions towards Portugal. In consequence of this interview the deputies addressed a letter to their countrymen, which was made public in Lisbon. It was signed by the Bishop of Coimbra, by the Marquis of Abrantes, president of the council of regency, nominated by the Prince on his departure, and by Don Nuno Caetano de Mello, connected by blood with the reigning family, and by many others of powerful influence in the state.

April 27.

App. No. 10. In this document the nation were assured, that the mighty genius of Napoleon could be equalled only by the elevation of his soul, and the disinterested generosity of his principles; that the army of France had entered Por-

tugal not as conquerors but friends; that in CHAP. II.
 occupying the kingdom, Napoleon had not been 1808. influenced by enmity to their former Sovereign, but by the wish to enable the nation to cast off the trammels of England, and unite itself with the great continental system established over Europe. The deputies further stated, that the Emperor knew and lamented the privations which Portugal, in common with other nations, had endured from the temporary suspension of her commerce, and conveyed the Imperial assurance, that these would speedily be succeeded by great and lasting prosperity. The nation, they affirmed, stood absolved from all allegiance to the house of Braganza, which had forsaken them in the time of danger and difficulty; and they assured the people, that the only course by which the honour and integrity of the country could be secured, was that of unlimited submission to their great and magnanimous deliverer.

This address of the deputies was not without its influence on the people. The hope of the restoration of their ancient dynasty, for a time had died in their hearts. Their sovereign was already in another hemisphere; and the course of events seemed to hold out no prospect

CHAP. II. of his future restoration. In such circumstances,
 1808. it is scarcely possible to doubt, that, had the government of France been moderated in its action on the nation by the dictates of humanity and prudence, the prejudices of the people would have gradually yielded, and their attachment to the fugitive sovereign have progressively diminished. To such a consummation, however, the abuses and oppression of the new government certainly did not tend. Contributions of unexampled magnitude were levied on the people; and the severity of the measures by which these inordinate exactions were enforced, brought home at once to the bosoms of the people, a deep consciousness of the rapacity of their rulers. They beheld the plate torn by sacrilegious hands from their churches; the palaces of their nobles plundered; while even the humble dwellings of the poor were robbed of the little hoard that industry had enabled them to amass.

Was it possible that a government which sanctioned such detestable proceedings could ever acquire a footing in the affections of the nation? Or, was it possible by any measures of insult and outrage, to rouse into more

vehement resistance, the whole passions of a
 people? Human action is the offspring more
 frequently of impulse than of reason. A na-
 tion may be subdued, but it can seldom be
 trampled on with impunity. Notwithstanding
 the hopelessness of resistance, the spirit of national animosity was continually breaking forth in acts of isolated rebellion against the power of their oppressors.

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CHAPTER III.

INVASION OF SPAIN.

CHAP. III. WHILE Portugal had thus become the prey of
1807. the spoiler, a deeper and more hazardous game was playing by Napoleon in Spain. The sluices of war had now been opened; and the French armies swept onward into the Peninsula, like a mighty torrent, covering and overwhelming the land.

It was stipulated, by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, that, exclusive of the force destined more immediately for the reduction of Portugal, a *corps de reserve*, of forty thousand men, should be assembled at Bayonne, ready to repel any hostile demonstration of England for the relief of her ally. The army of the Gironde, therefore,

had no sooner crossed the Pyrenees, than another CHAP. III.
corps, of twenty-four thousand of the anticipated 1807.
conscriptions of 1808, was assembled on the November.
frontier. The commander of this force was General Dupont, an officer who was destined, in Spain, to blight the laurels which, under a happier star, he had acquired in other fields. Arrangements were speedily made for the advance of this second army of the Gironde; and, having crossed the frontier, its march was directed on Valladolid, in which city the head-quarters of General Dupont were established. The situation December.
was in all respects happily chosen. Valladolid is a position which commands the roads both to Lisbon and Madrid, and thus, without any unequivocal demonstration of his views, Dupont was prepared to advance on either capital as circumstances might require.

But the warlike preparations of France had 1808.
not yet attained their full development. A third army, consisting of twenty-five thousand Infantry, three thousand cavalry, and forty-one pieces of artillery, was assembled on the Garonne. On the 9th of January, the vanguard of this force, commanded by Marshal Moncey, crossed the January.
Bidassoa, and pushed onward into Spain, over-

CHAP. III. running Biscay and Navarre in its advance.

1808.

January.

Even this was not all. Another force was collected at the eastern extremity of the Pyrenean chain, consisting of twelve thousand men of different arms, intended for the occupation of Catalonia. Independently of all other circumstances, the congregation of this force should at once have opened the eyes of Charles and his minister to the hostile schemes of Napoleon. All resistance in Portugal to the usurpation of France was already at an end, yet the reinforcement of the armament in that kingdom, formed the only pretence on which the introduction of large and successive armies into the western provinces of Spain, was attempted to be justified. The views of the French ruler in thus assembling an army on the north-eastern frontier of the kingdom, admitted, however, of no such colouring or excuse. It carried with it an indication of hostile intention, too palpable to admit of fallacious interpretation. But all measures of spirit and vigour seem to have been alien to the character of Charles and his minister. No energetic steps were taken to repress the invaders; no call was made to rouse the loyalty and patriotism of the people; and the des-

picable rulers of this unhappy country were CHAP. III.

contented to behold the progress of insult and 1808.

February.

aggression, in silence and submission. So blunted and obtuse were the perceptions of the government of Spain, that it could neither appreciate nor understand the moral energy of the people whom it governed, when roused into powerful and consentaneous resistance.

Though the character of Napoleon's views on the Peninsula had, in a great measure, been denuded of disguise, it is probable that, even at this period, they were apprehended by none, in their full bearing and extent. The independence of Spain indeed, thanks to the fatuity of her rulers, was gone. The yoke was on her shoulders, and the iron bit of the oppressor in her mouth. But none could calculate the erratic course of an ambition, which was continually subject to the operation of a thousand unknown influences. The measures, however, by which the projects of the French Emperor were to be carried into effect, had become no longer secret. On the great roads from France nothing was to be seen but convoys of ammunition and provisions, trains of artillery, the marching of battalions, and officers riding post in the execution of military duty.

CHAP. III. From the Bidassoa to the Douro the country was covered with soldiers. The convents were converted into hospitals and barracks, forts and batteries were erected on the more commanding stations, and in all the principal towns even the functions of the civil magistrate were assumed by the intruders.

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February.

The character of the troops thus profusely poured into the Peninsula, is represented, by competent authority, to have been of the worst description. The officers were either veterans, disqualified by age and infirmities for the arduous duties thus involuntarily imposed on them, or ignorant boys, prematurely taken from school, to be intrusted with the discharge of functions to which from youth and inexperience they were inadequate. The soldiery was composed of men of all countries, returned deserters, and recruits from the hospitals. It was impossible that masses composed of elements so dissimilar, should be inspired with any corporate spirit, or sentiment of collective honour. Disunited by diversity of language, prejudice, and education, the soldiers of an army, thus thrown fortuitously together, could be animated by no common remembrances of former achievements, nor participate

in the feeling of confidence and brotherhood which emanates from the anticipated fellowship of future glory. Strangers to each other; unconnected by community of interest; united by no bond but that of military command; unknown to their officers, by whom their comfort was neglected; irregularly provisioned, and still more irregularly paid; these were apparently not the men from whom any great or brilliant achievement could be rationally expected.

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February.

On the return of Napoleon from Italy, orders were instantly issued for summoning into service a new conscription of eighty thousand men. These were speedily assembled, and Murat having been appointed to the command, they pushed forward into Spain, and remained concentrated in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, ready, on the earliest signal, to advance on Madrid.

March

It would, perhaps, be little interesting—it would, at all events, be incompatible with the narrow limits of the present work—to enter on a detailed and minute account of the measures of disguised hostility and open fraud, by which, at this period, the projects of the French ruler made rapid advances to completion. It is sufficient

CHAP. III. cient to state, that the important fortresses of
 1808. St. Sebastian, Pampluna, Figueras, and Barce-
 March. lona, fell, without resistance, into the posses-
 sion of the invaders, whose force in the north-
 ern provinces continued almost hourly to in-
 crease.

The time, however, had not yet come when Napoleon considered it prudent to throw off the mask under which his designs were veiled from the Spanish monarch. He flattered the vanity of Charles, by sending him magnificent tokens of regard, and in his letters continued to express his ardent desire for the completion of the contemplated alliance of their families. Napoleon further stated his intention of visiting the Spanish capital, where, without the intervention of diplomatic forms, all matters of difference between them might be personally arranged.

The promised visit, however, did not take place; but Izquierdo, the confidential agent of Godoy at the court of Paris, was despatched on a mission to Madrid, bearing the proposals of the Emperor to the King of Spain. These were of a character undoubtedly somewhat startling and exorbitant. Assuming his own pretensions to the

sovereignty of Portugal, to be at once exclusive CHAP. III.
 and undisputed, Napoleon demanded in exchange 1808.
 for that country the kingdoms of Gallicia, Biscay, March.
 and Navarre, in order to prevent the necessity of maintaining a military communication through the territory of Spain. It was proposed, likewise, that France should participate in the commerce of the Spanish colonies on the same terms as the mother country; and it was signified to Charles, that the time had at length arrived when it was necessary that the succession to the Spanish throne should become the subject of a final and immediate settlement. Such were the terms on which it was intimated to the King of Spain, he could alone hope to avoid the dreaded hostility of Napoleon.

Of the events in Portugal, Godoy had been no uninterested spectator. He saw that his star, which had long been declining, was at length fast approaching the aphelion. In weariness of heart, he would gladly have resigned that power, whose possession had been to him one long scene, not of enjoyment but of struggle. To the principality which had been assigned him by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, as affording the only chance of honourable retirement, he still looked

CHAP. III. forward with fondly cherished anticipations. But
 1808. time passed on without bringing with it the ex-
 March. pected gratification; and at length the public de-
 claration that the undivided sovereignty of Por-
 tugal had been assumed by Napoleon, put an end
 for ever to his hopes.

Under the deepest cloud of his misfortunes, it
 is impossible to compassionate Godoy. The
 whole efforts of his public life had been directed
 towards the single object, of promoting his own
 personal enjoyment. Never was a more ignoble
 purpose more perseveringly pursued, and never
 was there a failure more signal and complete.
 Disappointed in all his endeavours to secure the
 permanent enjoyment of his wealth and honours,
 his hopes were at length narrowed to passing the
 remainder of his life in some obscure and tran-
 quil retreat. He already meditated the resigna-
 tion of his public offices, and was restrained only
 by the consciousness, that by the loss of power he
 would be deprived of his only safeguard from
 the violence of an indignant people.

Amid the wreck of his hopes in the Old World,
 the views of Godoy were naturally directed to
 the New; and still anxious to escape the perils by
 which he saw himself environed, he proposed to

Charles to consult the tranquillity of his declin- CHAP. III.
 ing years by transferring the seat of sovereignty 1808.
 to his transatlantic dominions. Charles, exhaust- March.
 ed by infirmity, and hopeless of relief from the
 assistance of Napoleon, acceded to the advice of
 his minister, and, with all possible secrecy, prepa-
 rations were set on foot for the departure of the
 Court. The army of Solano was recalled from
 Portugal, and directed to march for Seville.
 Troops were stationed along the road by which
 the royal travellers were to pass, and the body
 guards were ordered to march from Madrid to
 Aranjuez.

These preparatory movements, however, did
 not pass unnoticed by the people, whose fears
 were strongly excited by the prospect of the
 departure of their sovereign. Their discontent
 became clamorous and obtrusive; and a procla-
 mation of the King, in which he denied being
 influenced by any intention of quitting the king-
 dom, had not the effect of restoring public con-
 fidence and tranquillity.

The indignation of the populace was still fur-
 ther excited, by the circulation of reports, that,
 notwithstanding the assurances contained in the
 royal proclamation, preparations were still in

CHAP. III. progress for the evasion of the Monarch. Among
 1808. those who gave currency to such intelligence was
 March. the Prince of Asturias. Relying on the protection of Napoleon, whom he considered favourable to his views, Ferdinand had openly declared his aversion to the project of emigration, and this coincidence with the national feeling, had the effect of still further increasing his popularity.

Time brought new confirmation to the suspicions of the people, and the demonstrations of public discontent became daily more violent and tumultuous. On the 17th of March, Aranjuez was surrounded by a multitude of peasants from the neighbouring villages, in a state of violent excitation. In the palace they found every symptom of preparation for a journey; and goaded almost to frenzy by this proof of royal duplicity, they seized arms and shouted for vengeance on Godoy. The Life-Guards were drawn out for the defence of the palace, and the people rushed in tumultuous confusion to the house of the favourite. The servants of the Infant Don Antonio and the Count de Montijo were the first to raise the cry of "*Death to Godoy! The King for ever!*" In a moment it was simultaneously reverberated by many thousand voices. A squa-

dron of the Prince's Guard advanced to protect their leader; and in the execution of this duty were furiously assaulted by the mob. The brother of the favourite, Don Diego de Godoy, then came up with his regiment of guards, and directed them to fire on the multitude. The troops refused to obey; and uniting with the populace, struck and insulted their colonel and joined in the onset. The doors of the house were burst open, the furniture broken to pieces, and the splendid contents of the mansion subjected to unsparing havoc. In the meanwhile, Godoy had escaped; the Princess de la Paz, terrified and trembling, ran out into the street; yet so little was that injured lady the object of popular aversion, that she was escorted to the palace with every demonstration of respect.

This alarming exhibition of national feeling produced the desired effect. Godoy was instantly removed from his offices of Generalissimo and High Admiral; and Charles declared his resolution of assuming personally the command of his forces, both naval and military. At Madrid events of a similar character took place. Intelligence of what was passing at Aranjuez, had no sooner reached the capital, than the cry of

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 March.

Mar. 18.

CHAP. III. "Death to Godoy" was echoed through all the streets and squares of the city. Crowds assembled round the houses of the Prince of Peace, his mother, his brother, and his sister. They were attacked and plundered, the furniture was thrown into the streets and burned, and all their inmates subjected to insult and abuse. The greater part of the garrison had been withdrawn to Aranjuez; and the few remaining troops were found altogether insufficient to preserve order. The riot continued for two days, during which no restraint was attempted to be imposed on the violence of the people. Tranquillity was at length only restored by the proclamation of the King declaring the deposition of Godoy.

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March.

Notwithstanding the deposition of the favourite, the appetite of the people for vengeance was yet unsated. The simple privation of that power which he had so flagrantly abused, appeared, in their ideas of retributive justice, to be a punishment altogether inadequate to his deserts. Nothing less than the gibbet or the block would satisfy the excited craving of the populace, who thirsted for his blood. The escape of Godoy was no sooner known, than pursuit was made after him in every direction. On the

morning of the 19th he was found concealed in a garret at Ocana, where he had remained without food for nearly two days. The populace dragged him from his hiding-place; and he would inevitably have fallen a victim to their fury, had not the Prince of Asturias, with a body of Life-Guards appeared to his rescue. The popularity of Ferdinand saved the life of Godoy; and the multitude, on receiving the promise of the Prince, that the object of their hostility should be given up to justice, quietly dispersed.

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The support of Charles was at last broken. Godoy, in spite of the favour of the monarch, was in the power of his enemies; and Charles, in his declining years, at length knew himself to be friendless and alone. Suffering from the united inroads of age and infirmity, he felt

—— That like a column left alone,
The tottering remnant of some splendid fane,
'Scaped from the fury of the barbarous Gaul,
And wasting time, which has the rest o'erthrown,
Amidst his house's ruins, he remained
Single, unpropped, and nodding to his fall.

In the person of Godoy, the real, though vicarious sovereign, had already been dethroned,

CHAP. III. and the crown at once fell from the brows of the shadow which had hitherto worn the semblance of a monarch. On the evening of the day following, Charles notified, in a public decree, his abdication of the throne. "The habitual infirmities," he said, "under which he had long laboured, rendered him incapable of supporting the heavy burden of government; the enjoyment of private life, and a climate more temperate than that of Spain, had become necessary for the restoration of his health; and, in these circumstances, he had resolved on abdicating the crown in favour of his beloved son. He, therefore, by this decree of free and spontaneous abdication, made known his royal will, that the Prince of Asturias should forthwith be acknowledged and obeyed as king and natural lord of all his kingdoms and dominions."

The joy of the nation on the abdication of their monarch was extreme. Charles had long ceased to be popular, and participated largely in the odium attached to his minister. Ferdinand was the idol of the nation; and to him alone did the people look with passionate ardour of expectation for deliverance from all their perils and oppressions. Never, in times of danger and of trou-

ble, did a monarch mount the throne under loftier auspices. He carried with him the affections and devotion, of a proud and generous people. The seeds of resistance to foreign tyranny had been planted in the bosom of the nation, and were ready, at a breath, to have risen into a glorious harvest of armed men, prepared to sanctify the soil that bore them, by the outpouring of patriot blood. Never was the sacred cause of liberty and justice, more deeply injured and contaminated, by the folly and apostacy of its champion.

The Council of Castile is the only body in Spain which bears even the semblance of a constitutional assembly. The princes and nobles of whom, in former ages, it was composed, held their seats by hereditary tenure, and acted in a capacity somewhat similar to that of privy council to the king. In later times, it was constituted a judicial body; and, since the disuse of the Cortes, had succeeded to many of the functions of that national assembly, while the prerogative of nominating or displacing the members at his pleasure, had been assumed by the monarch. Notwithstanding this dependance on royal favour, the Council of Castile, in character of conservator

CHAP. III. of the laws of the monarchy, resolved, with becoming dignity, to withhold their sanction from the abdication of the King, until the highest legal authority should have pronounced it valid, and consonant to constitutional usage. The new sovereign, however, was little disposed to give time for any laborious investigation of his title; and issued an ordinance, enjoining the Council, without delay, to publish the abdication of Charles. The vicinity of the French army to the capital, and the danger and unpopularity of the duty they had assumed, induced them to comply with this peremptory mandate; and the abdication of the late monarch was publicly notified by the Council of Castile, unpreceded by the constitutional formalities.

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March.

Mar. 21.

The first edict of the Crown tended still farther to increase the popularity of Ferdinand. It contained an order both for the confiscation of the property of Godoy, and the privation of his honours; and directed that, along with his brother, and the chief instruments of his malversations, he should be brought to immediate trial. The publication of this decree was the signal of public triumph and rejoicing. *Te Deum* was sung in the churches; and in almost every village in the

kingdom, effigies of the favourite were burned, or trampled under foot by the populace. At Salamanca, the professors and scholars of the university gave scholastic demonstration of their joy on the downfall of the favourite, by dancing round bonfires in the market-place; and even the magnificent Botanic Garden, of which Godoy had been the founder and the patron, containing perhaps the finest collection of Exotics in Europe, was destroyed by the blind impulse of popular fury.

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After his accession, Ferdinand lost no time in promoting to office and honour, all those who had suffered in his cause in the affair of the Escorial. The Duke del Infantado was appointed commander of the Spanish Guards, and Governor of Castile. Don Miguel de Azanza was made Minister of Finance, and Don Gonzalo de O'Farrel, Minister of War. Of all the counsellors of the late king, Cevallos and the Marquis Caballero alone retained their situations, and continued to enjoy the favour of the Court. The former, from motives of delicacy, arising from family connexions with the late minister, tendered his resignation to the king. This was not accepted; and Ferdinand, in a public decree,

CHAP. III. vindicated Cevallos from the suspicion of participation in the evil projects of Godoy.

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Such were the domestic arrangements of the new monarch; with regard to the character of his foreign policy, the world were not long left in doubt. Immediately on the abdication of his father, Ferdinand had addressed a letter to the French Emperor, in which the notification of his accession to the crown was accompanied by a declaration, that the recent changes at Madrid would, in no degree, affect the political relations of his government with France; and this assurance was accompanied by an expression of his desire, to draw still closer the bonds of amity by which the two nations had been so long united. In the same communication, Ferdinand repeated his request, that the personal alliance with the family of the Emperor, of which he had long been ambitious, should be happily accomplished.

Mar. 20.

The chief command of the French armies in the Peninsula had been assumed by Murat. He was already approaching Madrid, when intelligence reached him of the commotions at Aranjuez. It is probable that both Napoleon and his commander had calculated on the departure of

the Spanish Monarch before the arrival of the army at the capital. The successful resistance

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of the people to this measure had not been foreseen; and it occasioned a considerable derangement of their schemes. It is certain that the subjugation of Spain could not have been more effectually promoted, than by the emigration of the reigning family to America. Disappointed, however, in the result thus confidently anticipated, Murat continued his advance, in order to take advantage of any political disturbances which might be made conducive to the interests of his master. On the 23d he entered the capital, of which military possession was immediately taken by the troops under his command. This startling event was accompanied by assurances on the part of Murat, that the stay of his army would be of very limited duration, and that whenever public tranquillity should be restored at Madrid, it was his intention to continue his march towards Cadiz.

Mar. 23.

On the following morning Ferdinand made his public entry into the capital, where he was greeted with tumultuous welcome, and received the homage of the nobility and great functionaries of the state. Of all the foreign Ambassa-

Mar. 24.

CHAP. III. dors, the French alone declined joining in any
 1808. public demonstration of respect towards the new
 March. monarch, or in acknowledging his title to the
 Crown. The same line of conduct was adopted
 by Murat, and justified to the Spanish ministers
 by an equivocal explanation of its motives. He
 declared himself solely influenced by a desire to
 heal the divisions of the council; but likewise
 stated the propriety of awaiting the decision of
 the Emperor, before committing his government
 by any step which might imply an acknowledg-
 ment of the right of Ferdinand to the Crown.

The letter of the new monarch to Napoleon
 was not the only communication from the parties,
 regarding the recent changes at Madrid. Charles
 Mar. 20. likewise transmitted immediate intelligence to
 the Emperor of his abdication. In his letter he
 solicited a continuance of that protection which
 he had hitherto enjoyed, and expressed, like
 Ferdinand, his fervent hope, that the intimate
 alliance between the countries would continue
 firm and unbroken. Of the claim for protection
 thus doubly urged, Napoleon did not fail to
 take advantage. By the application of both par-
 ties, a right was apparently given to an inter-
 ference in the internal government of Spain,

too favourable to his views not to be exerted to CHAP. III.
 the utmost. The functionaries of France, in 1808
 executing the designs of their master, assumed March.
 the tone, not of counsellors, but rulers, and
 exercised a paramount influence in everything
 connected with the internal policy of Spain.
 The yoke of Napoleon was not easy, nor his bur-
 den light. Yet the government of Ferdinand
 was too unstable, and even the tenure by which
 he held the sceptre too precarious, to admit of
 his adopting any vigorous measures of resistance
 to the imperious dictation of a monarch, whose
 armies already girded his palace, and held pos-
 session of his capital.

A bolder monarch might have pursued a
 bolder policy. One more generous would have
 placed greater reliance, on the courage and de-
 voted loyalty of his people. In the dictates
 of his own proud and daring spirit, in his own
 indignant impatience of foreign tyranny and
 dominion, he would have learned that the chi-
 valrous energy of the Spanish character, though
 it had long slumbered, was not dead; that the
 voice of their monarch might yet rouse it into
 grand and irresistible action. A gallant peo-
 ple waited but for the signal to burst, by a

CHAP. III. mighty and unanimous effort, the chains of the oppressor. That signal was not given. It was not in the nature of their sovereign, either to appreciate the dictates of true wisdom, or to be influenced in his actions by generous and lofty impulses. The nation had not profited by their change of ruler. In power or elevation of intellect, Ferdinand was not superior to his father; and he possessed none of that benevolence which tended, in some measure, to redeem the weakness and the vices of Charles. Like Charles he was devoid of moral courage; but he was even more obtuse in his moral sympathies, more selfish, sensual, and not less ignorant. He bore the heart of a slave in the bosom of a monarch.

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While the French were in the capital, the Spanish government made no endeavours to resist the progressive encroachments which were gradually circumscribing both its power and independence. No effort was made by a concentration of military force to counteract their increasing ascendancy in the capital. The division of Solano, which by its presence might have given confidence to the people, and have operated as a check on the measures of Murat, was ordered to

Badajos, and placed at the disposal of Junot. CHAP. III. The Spanish garrison in Madrid was trifling, when compared with the numerous army of the intruders, stationed in and around the city. The military force of Spain was dispersed in isolated divisions through the distant provinces, or cut up into petty garrisons, which could scarcely be made available to any immediate necessity of the government.

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It was not therefore from the rulers of Spain, it was not from an undisciplined and scattered army, devoid of munition, and officered by men ignorant of war in all its practical details, that any formidable opposition to his projects was anticipated by Murat. His fears were alone excited by *the people*. The occurrences at Aranjuez and Madrid, the enthusiastic devotion manifested by the whole nation to their new sovereign, could not but engender the conviction, that from a people thus powerfully actuated by one common sentiment of loyalty, he had yet to calculate on a fierce, strenuous, and protracted resistance to any scheme of foreign usurpation. He read in the proud independence of the national spirit, that the day of struggle was fast approaching. The horizon of Spain had been overcast, but the

CHAP. III. stillness which pervaded her atmosphere, was yet

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unbroken. Murat was not deceived by this. In the unnatural hush of the elements, he beheld only an indication of the coming storm.

To intimidate the people, therefore, had now become the chief object of his policy. With this view measures were immediately taken for strengthening the position of the French army at Madrid. A large corps of infantry, with a numerous artillery, was posted on the height of Casa del Campo, in the immediate vicinity of the Royal Palace, which it commanded. Cannon were planted on all the eminences in the neighbourhood. New divisions were ordered instantly to direct their march on Madrid; and the troops were publicly reviewed, in order, by a formidable demonstration of military power, to impress the people with a conviction of the hopelessness of resistance. The command of the capital was then assumed by the intruders. By order of Murat, General Grouchy was appointed Governor, and the municipal regulations by which Madrid had hitherto been governed, were superseded by military law.

Intelligence of the occurrences at the Spanish capital no sooner reached Napoleon, than he set

out for Bayonne, in order to be nearer the scene CHAP. III.

of action, and to maintain a more rapid communication with his armies. His final purpose of deposing the dynasty of the Bourbons had at length been adopted. Till now, it had probably been his intention that Ferdinand, united to his family by marriage, should have filled the throne of Spain. The Emperor well knew his intellectual weakness, his utter destitution of high and honourable principle, his timidity, and that ductile subserviency of character which adapted him for the servile instrument of a more powerful intelligence. Where could he have found a fitter or more submissive agent of vicarious tyranny than this? Why then, to dethrone a man so happily suited to his purposes, did Napoleon commit an act of perfidy incomparably greater than any by which his character had been stained, and which he could not be unconscious would be regarded throughout Europe with indignation?

To this question the answer is not difficult. It appeared necessary to Napoleon, in order to secure the subserviency of Ferdinand, that he should be dependent on his power. Had the new monarch, like his father, been an object of indifference to the nation, nay, had his assump-

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CHAP. III. tion of the crown been generally unpopular, he
 1808. might have found support in the armies of
 March. France. In such circumstances, it is probable, Napoleon would have seated him on the throne, and have stood forward as the champion of his right. It formed part of his policy that the Spanish nation should continue, as in the time of Charles, to be divided by parties, so nearly balanced, that the influence of France, when thrown into the scale, could give to either a decided preponderance. When he saw, therefore, that Ferdinand, weak and unworthy as he was, had become the object of a loyalty and devotion so deep and ardent, and already occupied a throne to which he had been raised by an influence altogether independent of his power, the views and policy of Napoleon were at once changed. The king who, by a single word, could rouse a nation into arms, who carried with him the full and undivided sympathies of a generous and brave people, was not the man by whom it suited his purposes that Spain should be governed. Contemptible as he might be, in all personal attributes, there was danger in the vicinity of such a neighbour. In the affections of the people, he possessed a mighty lever, by which Na-

CHAP. III. poleon was aware that the schemes of his am-
 1808. bition might at any time be overthrown. He
 March. knew it to be impossible that a sovereign, backed by an influence so powerful, could become the tame dependent on his will. Even the obedience of such a monarch would bear the character rather of voluntary compliance than of humble and enforced submission. This was not a state of things which the policy of Napoleon was directed to establish. It was indispensable to his purposes that the crown should be torn from the brows of a prince who reigned in the affections of his people; and the imperial fiat, which decreed the deposition of the Bourbons, was at length sent irrevocably forth.

It is difficult to believe that the sudden demission of the crown by Charles was altogether an independent and voluntary act. Connected with the preceding events, it certainly bore evidence of haste and compulsion. The act of abdication was unaccompanied by any future provision for the King and Queen, the place of the royal residence was not determined, and none of the stipulations, by which it is probable that such a document would be preceded, appear to have been proposed by the retiring monarch.

CHAP. III. Napoleon was not slow in taking full advantage of these suspicious circumstances. Murat was no sooner apprized of the intentions of his master than he despatched a messenger to Aranjuez, with assurances to Charles, that his cause would be supported by the arms of France. Naturally actuated by a deep sense of filial injustice, the deposed monarch instantly expressed his readiness to avail himself of the offers thus conveyed. He assured General Monthion that the revolution had been the consequence of a conspiracy; and vehemently complained that his son, in spite of his entreaty, was about to banish him to Badajoz, the most unhealthy situation in the kingdom. The Queen, it was further stated, had entreated permission that their departure might, for a short time at least, be deferred, but this likewise had been refused. There is something pitiable in the bitter and helpless complaints of the aged Sovereign; and it is well they should be recorded, from the light they throw on the causes of that relentless hatred, by which Charles and the Queen appear to have been actuated towards Ferdinand, in the subsequent transactions at Bayonne.

The exile of the dethroned monarch was averted

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by the intervention of Murat. Emboldened by this act of favour, Charles placed in the hands of the French General, a formal protest, declaring, that the Deed of Abdication was invalid and compulsory. He likewise transmitted a letter to the Emperor, containing a statement of the facts connected with his resignation of the crown, and professing that he relied on the justice and magnanimity of Napoleon, to re-establish him in his rights.

There was another object, however, on which the desires, both of Charles and the Queen, were even more deeply fixed than on the restoration of the Crown. From the time of the tumult at Aranjuez, the danger of Godoy seems to have haunted their imaginations like a frightful dream. They now besought Murat, with importunate solicitations, to exert his influence in behalf of this unworthy object. His only crime, they said, had been his attachment to his sovereign; and Charles, in the fulness of his heart, declared, that the death of Godoy would be but the harbinger of his own,—he could not survive him.

The intercourse thus carried on between Charles and Murat, was kept profoundly secret

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CHAP. III. from the government of Ferdinand. The agents
 1808. of Napoleon had hitherto refrained from any
 April. acknowledgment of the new monarch. It was
 their policy to impress Ferdinand with a feeling
 of insecurity, and to induce him, by humiliating
 submissions, to court the favour and protection
 of France. A report was accordingly spread,
 that Napoleon had quitted Paris, and was already
 on his route to Madrid. It was notified to the
 Apr. 2. French army, that the Emperor in person was a-
 bout to become their leader. Ferdinand was like-
 wise informed, that it would probably be consider-
 ed by Napoleon, as an acceptable mark of respect,
 should the Infante, Don Carlos, be deputed to
 receive him on the frontier. The suggestion
 was immediately adopted, and the Infante, ac-
 companied by the Duke del Infantado, set for-
 ward on the complimentary mission.

The policy of Murat was not limited to the
 attainment of this partial success. A still more
 delicate proposal was made to the Monarch. It was
 hinted, that if Ferdinand in person would advance
 from his capital for the purpose of welcoming the
 Emperor, a mark of consideration so distinguish-
 ed could scarcely fail to influence the sentiments
 of Napoleon powerfully in his favour. The

suggestion of Murat was seconded by all the CHAP. III.
 influence of Beauharnois, the Ambassador of 1808.
 France ; and the King was yet wavering in his April.
 resolution, when General Savary arrived in
 Madrid, and declared himself the bearer of a
 Apr. 7. message from the Emperor.

In his first audience of the King, the nature and
 extent of his mission were explained to Ferdinand.
 He had been deputed, he said, to convey the com-
 pliments of his master, and to express his desire
 to be informed whether the sentiments of Fer-
 dinand towards France were similar to those of
 his father. Should his answer on this point be
 considered satisfactory, the Emperor was will-
 ing to cast a veil over the questionable proceed-
 ings connected with his accession to the throne,
 and at once to acknowledge him as King of Spain
 and the Indies.

Though Savary brought with him no cre-
 dentials, nor was the bearer of any answer to
 the letter of Ferdinand notifying his accession,
 the terms of the communication were too gra-
 tifying not to be warmly welcomed by the
 Monarch. It had never been the intention of
 Ferdinand to separate his policy from that of

CHAP. III. France, and assurances of unshaken fidelity were accordingly given to the Envoy.

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By Savary, Ferdinand was informed that Napoleon was already on his route to Madrid. He had in fact quitted Paris on the second of April. Instant preparations were accordingly made for his reception in the capital. Guards of honour were appointed to escort him in his progress; nor did it occur to the Spanish Monarch or his ministers to doubt the truth of intelligence thus apparently corroborated. The entreaties of Beauharnois and Murat, that the King should quit his capital to welcome his formidable ally, were again renewed, and at length successful. Ferdinand fell into the snare. He was assured it would be unnecessary to extend his journey beyond Burgos, where he would certainly be met by Napoleon. He accordingly set forth; and the Emperor not having yet entered the Spanish territory, Ferdinand was persuaded to extend his journey to Vittoria. On his arrival, he received a letter from Napoleon, and learned that he was still at Bayonne. The communication was in a very different spirit from what his hopes had led

Apr. 10.

him to anticipate. It cautioned him to beware of using popular violence as an instrument of power, and censured the part he had taken in encouraging the tumults of Aranjuez and Madrid.

The advice of one in a situation to command, is generally unpalatable; and Ferdinand did not want counsel but encouragement. The letter gave him little. Napoleon did not address him as a sovereign, nor commit himself by any acknowledgment of his title. He hinted that the circumstances of Ferdinand's accession were full of suspicion, and that the abdication of Charles bore strong evidence of compulsion. Little disposed as he might be, to participate in such suspicions, it had become necessary, for the satisfaction of Europe, that the recognition of his rights should be preceded by an elaborate investigation of all the circumstances by which his assumption of royal authority had been accompanied. The letter, moreover, conveyed a strong expression of opinion, that the prosecution of Godoy should immediately cease. It was impossible he could be brought to trial without eliciting disclosures injurious at once to the interests of the Prince, and disgraceful to his parents. "Beware," said Napo-

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CHAP. III. leon, "of adopting a policy of which you may
 1808. yourself become the victim. Your Royal High-
 April. ness has no title to the throne but that derived
 from your mother. Should the process dishon-
 our her, your own rights must be the sacrifice.
 Shut your ears to perfidious counsels. You can-
 not prosecute the Prince of Peace without dan-
 ger to your crown. You have no right to
 try him; the crimes with which he is reproached
 are lost in those of the throne. I have often ex-
 pressed a wish that he should be removed from
 the direction of affairs, though my friendship for
 King Charles made me anxious to shut my eyes
 on his weak attachment. Miserable men that
 we are! Weakness and error are the badge of
 all our tribe!* Your Royal Highness," reiterated
 the document, "should beware of popular com-
 motions. Through their means, some murders
 may be committed on the soldiers of my army;
 but the ruin of Spain will be the consequence. I
 have already seen with pain that every thing has

* It is not often we find Napoleon in the moralizing vein, and this singular specimen of Imperial hypocrisy, is therefore curious enough. One can scarcely read it without participating in the fervid disgust of Sir Peter Teazle, to any thing smacking of fine *sentiment*. It betrays at least, the low estimation in which Napoleon held the understanding of his correspondent.

been done at Madrid to inflame the public feel-
 ing; and that certain letters of the Captain-Gen-
 eral of Catalonia, tending to interrupt the exist-
 ing harmony between France and Spain, have
 been industriously circulated through the king-
 dom."

This remarkable letter concludes with the fol-
 lowing menace and benediction, which are prob-
 ably not equally entitled to the praise of sincerity:
 "I have now opened to your Royal Highness my
 whole mind; and you may perceive I have hith-
 erto hesitated between conflicting motives; but
 decision is at length necessary.

"I pray God, my brother, that he may have
 you in his high and holy keeping."

The receipt of such a letter did not tend in any
 degree to allay the apprehensions of Ferdinand.
 From Vittoria he would willingly have returned
 to Madrid; but surrounded on all hands by the
 French armies, there was danger even in re-
 treat. To the adoption of this course, however,
 he was strongly urged by the faithful servants
 who accompanied him in his journey. Various
 projects were devised for his escape, but Ferdi-
 nand rejected them all. In vain did his coun-
 sellors appeal to his pride, and ask whether

CHAP. III. the monarch of Spain and the Indies would submit to the public degradation of entering, without invitation, without suitable preparation, or any of the formalities which became his dignity, the dominions of a foreign sovereign, by whom he had not yet been recognised as King. The pride of Ferdinand was overbalanced by his fears. Influenced by the promise of Savary, that his arrival at Bayonne would be immediately followed by the Imperial recognition, and by dread lest his return to the capital might tend still further to alienate Napoleon from his cause, he at length decided on the perilous measure of continuing his journey.

Apr. 20. Ferdinand on his arrival at Bayonne, was received by the Emperor with every demonstration of respect. He dined at the same table with his host, and was treated with all the observances due to royalty. Scarcely, however, had he retired to his residence, when Savary, by the falsehood of whose promises he had already been so fatally deluded, apprized him of the irrevocable decision of Napoleon for the expulsion of the Bourbon dynasty, and required that he should instantly sign an abdication of the crown. Astounded by this sudden and unexpected demand, Ferdinand

refused compliance; and supported by the advice of those intrepid counsellors by whom he was accompanied, he declared his unalterable resolution that no exercise of power should draw from him the surrender of his rights.

But Napoleon too thoroughly understood the character of his victim, to be deterred from the prosecution of his views by this temporary demonstration of firmness. Every engine was employed, to render the advisers of Ferdinand subservient to his purposes—and to their honour be it recorded—in vain. The petty kingdom of Etruria, of which the rightful sovereign had been deprived by the treaty of Fontainebleau, was tendered as an equivalent for Spain and the Indies, and at once rejected by the Council. In vain did Napoleon exert his powers of argument and corruption; in vain did he attempt to intimidate and overawe the men, who though open to his vengeance, yet dared to oppose a barrier to the schemes of his ambition: the counsellors of Ferdinand remained alike impregnable to his persuasion, promises, and threats. They refused to compromise the honour of their country, or the rights of its monarch; and it soon became evident

CHAP. III. that another course was necessary for the attainment of his views.

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Such occurrences, it will be readily believed, did not contribute to enliven the residence of Ferdinand at Bayonne; and Cevallos was accordingly directed to notify to the French Minister of State, the intention of the Spanish Monarch to re-enter his dominions. To this communication no answer was returned, though the measure immediately adopted of doubling the guards by which his residence was surrounded, was in itself a practical response, which could scarcely be considered as equivocal.

In the meanwhile, the chief authority at Madrid had been assumed by Murat. Shortly after the departure of the King, a military requisition for the instant release of Godoy was transmitted to the government. It was stated, by Murat, in explanation of this extraordinary demand, that as Charles IV. alone could be recognised by Napoleon as monarch of Spain, it was considered necessary for the public tranquillity, that the Prince of Peace should be removed from the kingdom, in order that the counsels of the King should no longer be perverted by his pernicious interference.

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With this authoritative requisition, the fears of the Council of Government induced them to comply. Godoy was accordingly removed by night from the prison of Villa Viciosa, and sent off under a strong escort to Bayonne.

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The departure of Godoy was speedily followed by that of Charles and the Queen, whose presence Napoleon considered necessary to the further prosecution of his schemes. The appearance of these new personages on the scene, produced a considerable change in the character of the drama then acting at Bayonne. All his former ascendancy over the minds of the Royal pair was reassumed by Godoy; and, with hatred exasperated doubtless by the memory of his recent sufferings, he became a willing instrument of Napoleon in depriving Ferdinand of the crown. Nor were Charles and his consort without a deep and resentful remembrance of the unnatural conduct of their son. In bursting the bonds of filial duty he had likewise broken those of parental attachment; and, influenced by the counsels of Godoy, Charles and the Queen were now prepared to join in unnatural coalition with the destroyer of their house, and

Apr. 24.

CHAP. III. lend support to any measures by which the
downfal of Ferdinand could be effected.

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Apr. 30.

From the period of the arrival of Charles, Ferdinand was no longer treated with the honours of sovereignty. By the agents of Napoleon, by whom he was surrounded, he was even denied the most common and perfunctory observances of decent respect. Denounced as a rebel to his father, and the usurper of his power, his ear was only visited by threats of punishment, which instant obedience could alone avert.

Thus surrounded by dangers, from which it seemed impossible to escape, Ferdinand was induced by his counsellors to address a letter to Charles, in which, while he continued to assert his right to the throne, he offered, on his return to Madrid, to resign his claims in presence of the Cortes, or other high authorities of the kingdom. This mode of proceeding, however, which was, in truth, little else than an appeal to the sentiments of the nation, was not at all in harmony with the projects of Napoleon. The offer was accordingly declined; and the ingratitude and contumacy of Ferdinand were somewhat proluxly set forth in a letter bearing

the signature of Charles, which, exhibiting in some portions strong marks of the peculiar and emphatic style of Napoleon, is abundantly distinguished in others by the feebleness of his own. To this communication Ferdinand transmitted an immediate reply, vindicating his conduct and motives from the charges of his accusers. He once more testified his readiness to resign the crown in presence of the Cortes; or, should his father, from personal infirmity, not chuse again to assume the duties of sovereignty, he was willing to govern the kingdom as his deputy, and in his name.

This answer of the Prince produced no mitigation either of the menaces or persecutions of his enemies. On the day following, Napoleon had a long interview with Charles and the Queen, to which Ferdinand was summoned. Some particulars of this conference have been recorded by Cevallos. By those whom power had constituted his judges, and evil passions his accusers, Ferdinand was treated as a culprit, and made the object of the most vehement and disgusting abuse. Charles asserted his usurpation; the Queen denied his legitimacy; and Napoleon, by

CHAP. III.
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May 6.

CHAP. III. an alternation of threats and promises, endeavoured to extract from his victim an unconditional abdication of the crown.

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Considering the circumstances of his situation, it is not surprising that the resolution of Ferdinand should at length have yielded. On the same day he gave his signature to a document containing an absolute renunciation of his rights to the throne. A similar resignation of their claims was extracted from the other branches of the Royal Family; and thus, by a series of the most flagrant violations of the vital principles of law, the legal restoration of Charles to the sovereignty of Spain was considered as complete. These disgraceful transactions were accompanied by a joint address of Ferdinand and the Infantes, Don Antonio and Don Carlos, to the Spanish nation, in which they formally absolved them from their allegiance, and exhorted them to conform implicitly to the new order of events.

Even before the completion of this formal mockery, Charles had become disqualified for the App. No. 11. reassumption of the crown. By a treaty which bears date the fifth of May, he had already

conveyed his rights to Napoleon. By an edict on the day preceding, addressed to the supreme Junta at Madrid, he had likewise delegated Murat to act as Lieutenant of the Kingdom, and President of the Council of Government. A proclamation to the people accompanied this document. They were assured that the King was engaged in concerting with his ally the measures best calculated to promote the prosperity of Spain; and they were warned, on pain of signal punishment, to reject the perfidious counsels of those turbulent disturbers who endeavoured to excite enmity against France. "Trust to my experience," said this miserable instrument of foreign tyranny, "and obey that authority which I hold from God and my fathers. Follow my example, and believe, that in your present situation there is no prosperity or safety for the Spanish nation, but in the friendship of the great Emperor, our ally."

In a rescript addressed to the Councils of Castile, and the Inquisition, Charles publicly notified to the nation his final abdication of the throne, in favour of his friend and ally the Emperor of the French. With this act the political life of

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App. No. 12.

App. No. 13.

CHAP. III. Charles terminated. He soon after went into retirement at Compiègne, where, supported by a pension from Napoleon, he passed the remainder of his life. Ferdinand and his brother Don Carlos were dismissed to the Chateau of Valencey, in which they remained securely guarded till the return of better times. Godoy, the weak, sensual, and depraved instrument of his country's ruin, deprived of his wealth and honours, was saved only from the sufferings of abject poverty by the bounty of that monarch whose confidence he had abused.

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Thus have the chief victims of Napoleon's tyrannical ambition at length vanished from the scene. Many of the details of those events with which their history is intimately connected, must have been felt by the reader to be at once painful and degrading. But a new era is now about to commence. The pictures of human weakness, guilt, and suffering, which he is still destined to behold, will at least be partially redeemed by noble and animating examples of heroic courage and devoted zeal. He will gaze on a horizon, clouded indeed, but never wholly overcast; and he will watch the dim twilight of the coming glory, as it grad-

ually brightens into that flood of radiance, by which the name and arms of his country shall continue to be illustrated, till all written and traditional records of this memorable contest be swept into oblivion.

CHAP. III.
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CHAPTER IV.

COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES IN
SPAIN.

CHAP. IV. THE departure of Ferdinand spread alarm through the nation. The French had hitherto been regarded as allies, and the presence of foreign armies had excited in the people neither jealousy nor alarm. There was no press in Spain. Public proclamations were the only recognised channels by which intelligence could be circulated through the provinces; and the information of the people was seldom suffered to extend to the political relations of the kingdom. A despotic government delights in the ignorance of its subjects. It is on ignorance alone that it can rely for unhesitating submission to its will; and it had long been the policy of the Spanish

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government to obstruct every channel of know-ledge by which the people might be raised to a higher rank in the scale of intelligence.

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It was long, therefore, before the body of the nation became aware of the extent to which the encroachments of their invaders had been carried, or of the purposes they were directed to effect. The progress of the French armies had been silent though sure, swift, yet calm and unruffled. The people in one province were ignorant of the events simultaneously passing in another. In beholding the occupation of one fortress, they did not know that this assumption of power was neither isolated nor incidental, but formed part of a skilful and connected scheme of usurpation, by which the independence of the country was to be overthrown. They saw but one link of the chain by which they were intralled; and, habituated to tranquil and unthinking submission, their dreams of security had even in the midst of danger remained unbroken.

But this was not always to be. The burden of the maintenance of the French armies pressed heavily on the people of the provinces. Their invaders, emboldened by success, became haughty and overbearing; and occasional acts of violence

CHAP. IV. and rapacity, which the enforcement of the strictest discipline could not always prevent, contributed to break the harmony which had hitherto subsisted between the military and the populace. These evils had been progressively increasing. Not a day passed in which Castilian pride was not wounded by the military arrogance of the intruders. The fire which thus smouldered in the bosoms of the people, occasionally burst forth into a flame. Hostile rencontres ensued, not always unattended with bloodshed; and a spirit of national animosity took place of the ancient favour with which France had been regarded.

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To these feelings the abduction of their Monarch, and the liberation of the Prince of the Peace, gave additional strength and bitterness. The Governors of the provinces yet unoccupied, began spontaneously to collect arms, and prepare measures of defence. In the name of their imprisoned Sovereign there was a talisman of sufficient power to rouse the sleeping energies of the nation. There was indignation in every heart, and defiance on every lip. The signs of the times were no longer to be mistaken; and it was evident that the crisis of struggle was at length come.

CHAP. IV. The French on their part neglected no precaution by which their security could be promoted. The division of General Vedel was directed to march from Segovia to the Escorial; and the lines of communication with the capital were strengthened. Dupont was ordered to transfer the head quarters of his army from Aranjuez to Toledo; and the troops in the neighbourhood of Madrid were kept in constant readiness to bear with all their power on the people, in case of tumult or insurrection.

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It had already been publicly announced that the Emperor refused to acknowledge Ferdinand, and that Charles was about to reassume the reins of sovereignty. At Toledo this intelligence was followed by a riot. Crowds collected in the great square of the city, and cries of "*Ferdinand the Seventh, for ever,*" rent the air. A flag bearing the picture of the King was the banner of this tumultuous assemblage, which, armed with musquets, pikes, and bludgeons, paraded the city, inflicting vengeance on those whose sentiments were conceived hostile to the restoration of Ferdinand. The house of the Corregidor was attacked and plundered, and that functionary with difficulty effected his escape.

CHAP. IV. In a few days the division of Dupont arrived in the city. Doubtful of the temper of the inhabitants, he advanced in order of attack, ready on any apparent symptom of popular resistance to act on the offensive. But quiet had already been restored. The Princess of the Peace, accompanied by the Cardinal de Bourbon, came forth to meet the General in the neighbourhood of the city, and informed him that the efforts of the municipal authorities, aided by those of the clergy, had already been successful in quelling the tumults. From this demonstration of popular feeling no immediate consequences followed; but it indicated to the French leaders the necessity of increasing their forces in that neighbourhood; and another division of Dupont's army was accordingly advanced to Aranjuez.

But the chief precautions of the invaders were directed to the maintenance of the capital. From the time of Ferdinand's departure, all harmony between the military and the inhabitants was at an end. The intelligence subsequently received, of the proceedings at Bayonne, had the effect of rousing to its highest pitch the indignation of the people. Their imprisoned monarch was the engrossing subject of their thoughts. When a

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courier was expected to arrive from France, immense crowds surrounded the post-house, and waited with intense anxiety to receive intelligence of his safety. The French generals, alarmed at these tumultuous masses, endeavoured to divert their attention, and to conceal the real character of the transactions at Bayonne. In both these objects they were unsuccessful. The falsehoods of the public journals were discredited and detected; and private letters, containing a true description of the passing events, were circulated through the city. The situation of the French was that of men on the brink of a volcano, when the portents of an approaching eruption are already manifest.

In such a state of things it appeared to Murat that strong measures were necessary to tame the spirit of the people. The natives of Madrid had engaged in frequent rencontres with the French soldiers; and blood had been shed. The spirit of loyalty had penetrated even into the mad houses; and lunatics rushed forth into the street to assassinate the enemies of their country.

It was natural that the antipathy of the people should generate similar sentiments in the French armies. The soldiers already regarded the par-

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CHAP. IV. tisans of Ferdinand as enemies, and were even
 1808. anxious for a conflict, the successful termination
 April. of which they regarded as undoubted. Their
 wishes were soon gratified. On the 30th of April,
 Murat presented to the Infante Don Antonio,
 president of the Junta of Government, a letter
 from Charles, requiring him to send off the Queen
 of Etruria, and the Infante Don Francisco de
 Paula, brother of Ferdinand, to Bayonne. With
 this mandate the Junta at first declined com-
 pliance, till the pleasure of the King should be
 known. But their scruples were overruled by
 Murat, who declared himself ready to assume the
 whole responsibility of the proceeding, and inti-
 mated that any opposition to his commands would
 be repressed by the full exercise of his power.

The time appointed for the departure of these
 Royal personages came. On the preceding day no
 intelligence had been received from Bayonne;
 and this circumstance had contributed to deepen
 the anxiety of the people. Early in the morning
 great multitudes assembled at the Puerta del Sol,
 waiting in a state of great excitement for the
 arrival of the expected courier; and the square
 in front of the palace was crowded with women,
 who watched with melancholy earnestness the

CHAP. IV. preparations for the journey of the Royal tra-
 vellers. At nine o'clock the *cortege* set forth.
 It was reported that Don Antonio was like-
 1808. wise about to quit the capital for Bayonne;
 May. and two carriages, which still remained at the
 palace, evidently prepared for travel, gave sup-
 port to the rumour. The fermentation of the
 populace was now excited to the highest pitch.
 The cry, "*They are all forsaking us; the last
 of the family of our kings is about to be torn
 from the country!*" flew from lip to lip; and a
 violent commotion was the consequence. The
 servants of the palace declared that Don Fran-
 cisco had betrayed reluctance to depart, and even
 wept bitterly. On hearing this the women burst
 into tears; and the men, almost frantic, fell upon
 the carriages, and broke them to pieces.

At this moment a French officer, who had
 been sent to ascertain the cause of the tumult,
 appeared in the crowd. He was indicated by
 his dress to belong to the staff of Murat. The
 sorrowful exclamations of the mob were at once
 changed into expressions of indignant hatred.
 The officer was immediately attacked, and would
 probably have become the sacrifice of popular
 fury, had he not been rescued by a patrol of

CHAP. IV. the Imperial Guard, which succeeded, by a
 1808. charge of bayonets, in driving back his assail-
 May. ants.

The affair now began to wear a serious aspect; and the piquet battalion on duty for the day was immediately ordered out by Murat. They fired on the people; but this had only the effect of increasing their numbers. The whole population of the city rushed into the streets. The air became vocal with cries of "*Vengeance!*" "*Death to the French!*" "*Ferdinand the Seventh for ever!*" and accumulating masses came pouring on, armed with such weapons as they had been able to procure, and prepared to join in the onslaught. Stones were thrown, and musquets fired from the windows. A party of Mamelukes of the Guard was massacred by the mob, and every French soldier found straggling in the streets met a similar fate.

The whole troops in the city were now under arms; artillery was planted in the squares, and a destructive fire of musquetry and grape-shot opened on the multitude. The Plaza Mayor, the Puerta del Sol, and the great street of Alcalá, were the chief theatres of slaughter. Terrified by the havoc, the people would have sought

safety in flight, but even this was denied them. CHAP. IV.
 They were charged and sabred by the cavalry, and fired upon by bodies of infantry stationed at the intersecting points of the streets, in order to intercept their retreat. Thus driven to extremity, they rushed into the houses, where they were followed by their pursuers, and put mercilessly to the sword. Parties of cavalry were stationed at the outlets of the city, to charge and cut down those who had succeeded in escaping from the scene of slaughter within.

While the work of extermination was thus vigorously carried on, Murat had taken post on the height of St. Vincent, which commands the western part of the city. Thither he was followed by several members of the Junta, who implored him to put a stop to the effusion of blood. O'Farrel and Azanza, accompanied by many of the nobles and French officers of rank, rode through the streets, endeavouring to restore tranquillity, and waving white handkerchiefs as a token of peace. By their personal exertions, many lives were saved; but the firing in the streets still continued till not a Spaniard was to be seen. By two o'clock, however, hostilities had ceased, and all was silent in

CHAP. IV. Madrid. Towards evening a body of peasantry from the neighbouring villages, on approaching the capital, were charged and fired on by the military. Many were killed; a still greater number wounded by the sabres, and trampled down by the horses of the cavalry.

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In the events just narrated, the Spanish troops took no part. They were detained in barracks by their officers; and a small body of artillery, stationed at the gate of the Arsenal, was the only part of the garrison which attempted to co-operate with the people. Their conduct, and that of the gallant men by whom they were commanded, is worthy of record.

At an early period of the conflict, a detachment was directed by Murat to seize possession of the Arsenal. The execution of this order was opposed by two officers of artillery named Daoiz and Velarde, who, assisted by their fellow soldiers, harnessed themselves to the cannon, and succeeded in bringing three pieces to bear on a French column then advancing to enforce the execution of their orders. A discharge of grape-shot followed, which made such havoc in the ranks that the French instantly retreated. In consequence of this disaster, fresh columns were

instantly advanced; but before they succeeded in obtaining possession of the neighbouring houses, many discharges had taken place with terrible effect. The guns were at length taken. Velarde was killed on the spot; and Daoiz, though severely wounded and unable to stand, continued to give orders, till he had received three other wounds, the last of which was instantly fatal.

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On the termination of active hostilities, Murat was not satisfied with the punishment already inflicted on the inhabitants, and determined yet further to signalize his vengeance. On the evening of the same day, and on the following morning, the prisoners were brought before a military tribunal of which General Grouchy was president, and sentenced to be shot. The scene selected for the display of this terrible example, was in the neighbourhood of the Prado; and upwards of an hundred individuals were led forth to execution, without being suffered in their dying moments to receive the last offices of religion.*

* It has been stated by Colonel Napier, on the authority of several French writers, that these executions are attributable not to Murat but to Grouchy, who continued the work of

CHAP. IV. It is admitted on all hands that many of the
 1808. sufferers were entirely innocent of participation
 May. in the tumults, and were convicted on no other
 evidence than that of large knives being found
 on their persons. Forty-five Catalan traders,
 taken in the street of Alcala, were with difficul-
 ty rescued from death by the interference of the
 authorities, who assured the French officers, that
 the privilege of carrying arms is one enjoyed by
 the Catalan merchants, and sanctioned by the
 laws of the kingdom. The trials indeed—if the
 few hasty formalities which preceded the infliction
 of sentence deserve such a name—seem to
 have been intended to serve rather as a warrant
 for indiscriminate execution, than to afford protection
 to the innocent.

With regard to the number of the sufferers in
 this unfortunate affray, there is much variance
 of statement. It is generally asserted by the
 Spaniards that upwards of ten thousand of their

slaughter on his own responsibility, and in direct disobedience to
 the orders of his commander. The statement would have certainly
 been entitled to greater credit, had we learned from the same
 authority that the delinquency of Grouchy had been followed
 by censure or disgrace.

countrymen bled on the occasion. In the account of the transaction given in the *Moniteur*, the loss of the French was estimated at twenty-five killed, and about twice that number wounded: that of the Spaniards at "*plusieurs milliers des plus mauvais sujets du pays*." Subsequently, however, when it was deemed politic to diminish rather than to exaggerate the extent of the casualties, a report was drawn up by the Council of Castile, and published by order of Murat, which reduced the number of Spanish sufferers to one hundred and ninety-three. From statements so widely at variance, it is impossible to draw any satisfactory conclusion. Nor is it necessary. Taken at the lowest estimate, enough will remain to rouse our warmest sympathy with the people in their first ineffectual effort to cast off the yoke of bondage which pressed them to the earth. We have no wish to magnify the atrocities of the French. We are far from supposing Murat to have been actuated on this occasion by an abstract and constitutional appetite for blood, at variance with the whole tenour of his life. Murat was a soldier, and a brave one, and adorned with all the splendid qualities which belong to that character. But,

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CHAP. IV. little influenced by principle, and accustomed,
 1808. on all occasions of honourable danger, to hold
 May. his life at a pin's fee, he was led, perhaps, to
 place less value on the lives of others, when
 their sacrifice could contribute to the advantage
 of his cause, than any system of ethics, however
 lax, would pretend to justify. Murat was no
 statesman. He probably believed, that a striking
 and terrible example was necessary to intimidate
 the people, and secure the future safety of his
 army. The cause of injustice must often be
 supported by unjustifiable means. *Per fas aut
 nefas*, is ever the motto of usurpation; and the
 crimes it engenders may generally be considered
 less as emanations of the evil passions of
 individuals, than as necessary consequences of
 the system they support.

The immediate effects of the events of the
 second of May, were such as Murat had anticipated.
 Astounded by the scenes of bloodshed of which
 their city had been made the theatre, the
 inhabitants of Madrid remained in a state of
 gloomy submission to a power which experience
 had taught them it was impossible to resist. In
 the meanwhile, the French relaxed nothing of
 the rigour of their sway. The people were no

longer allowed to congregate in the streets or
 squares of the city; and any unusual assemblage
 was immediately dispersed by strong military
 patrols. The public proclamations which promised
 amnesty for the past, contained likewise
 denunciations of the heaviest punishment on any
 repetition of the offence.

If the people, however, were silent, it was not
 so with their rulers. Humble addresses were
 presented by all the public authorities. The
 Council of the Inquisition denounced the censures
 of religion on all the instigators of "such
 excesses as the scandalous sedition of the second
 of May." Don Antonio, the President of the
 Junta, followed his family to Bayonne; and the
 authority of the usurpers in Madrid remained
 paramount and unquestioned.

It was in this state of things, that the order
 constituting Murat Lieutenant of the Kingdom,
 arrived in Madrid, accompanied by a proclamation,
 exhorting the people to yield implicit obedience
 to his authority. These documents were speedily
 followed by another, conveying intelligence of
 Ferdinand's resignation. To the mandate for
 the appointment of Murat, the Council offered
 no opposition; and that leader was formally in-

CHAP. IV. stalled in an office the powers of which he had already virtually exercised.

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Ferdinand, before signing the deed of abdication at Bayonne, had taken the precaution of despatching a private messenger to the Junta, informing them of the real nature of his situation, and the compulsory measures which had been adopted to enforce the resignation of his rights. He directed that hostilities should instantly commence, on intelligence being received of his removal into the interior of France; a measure to which, unless compelled by violence, he declared he never would consent. The Cortes were likewise ordered to be convoked, in order that such steps might be adopted as would communicate the greatest vigour to the measures of national resistance.

This communication from their Sovereign was not received by the Junta till two days after the investiture of Murat as chief of the government; and it was unanimously decided by that body, that the orders of Ferdinand could no longer be obeyed. By this decision, the Junta was at once deprived of all influence with the nation; and instead of holding its authority by appointment from an independent sovereign, be-

came degraded into the passive instrument of foreign tyranny.

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The terrors of the military executions at Madrid did not extend beyond the capital. In the provinces they excited only more vehement hatred of the invaders. Murat, however, was not idle. Two Swiss regiments, which formed part of the garrison of Madrid, were incorporated with the army of Dupont. Three companies of the Body Guard, and four battalions of the Spanish and Walloon Guards, were placed at the disposal of Marshal Moncey. Three thousand of the Spanish army were ordered to embark at Ferrol for South America; and in the more important fortresses of Catalonia the garrisons were reduced and weakened. Orders were issued for the army of Solano, which had not yet entered Portugal, to march on Cadiz, and its commander was directed to resume his functions as Captain-General of Andalusia. The heights of the Retiro at Madrid were strongly fortified, and supplied with large stores of ammunition and provisions. All magazines of arms and warlike equipment were seized by the French authorities; and officers were des-

CHAP. IV. patched to Ceuta, to cause the recognition of the new government in that important fortress.

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In the meanwhile, Napoleon had formed the resolution of elevating his brother Joseph to the throne of Spain. Joseph was then King of Naples; and by the mildness of his manners and the leniency of his government, had succeeded in acquiring, in a considerable degree, the affections of his subjects. Of retired habits, and fitted by his tastes rather for the pursuits of philosophy than for those of ambition, he would willingly have declined the dangerous elevation; but his refusal was overruled by Napoleon, and Joseph yielded to the influence of that ascendancy which stronger minds had found it impossible to resist.

Intelligence of the Emperor's intentions no sooner crossed the Pyrenees, than addresses of the most humble and adulatory character poured in from the public authorities of the kingdom. The Junta of Government, the Council of Castile, the Municipality of Madrid, all entreated for the honour of a King of the Imperial blood; and in this they were joined by the Cardinal Archbishop de Bourbon, the only male branch of the

Royal family in the kingdom. Thus secure in the servility of the higher classes, and their entire devotion to his will, Napoleon thought it prudent that the work of usurpation should be sanctioned by at least a semblance of national consent. He accordingly convoked an assembly of one hundred and fifty of the chief persons of the kingdom to meet at Bayonne, and addressed the Spanish people in the following proclamation.

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"Spaniards, after a long agony your nation was perishing. I have seen your sufferings,—I will relieve them.—Your greatness and power are inseparably connected with mine.—Your princes have ceded to me all their rights to the Crown. I will not reign over your provinces, but I will acquire an eternal title to the love and gratitude of your posterity. Your monarchy is old. It must be restored to youth, that you may enjoy the blessings of a renovation which shall not be purchased by civil war or calamity. Spaniards, I have convoked a general assembly of the deputies of your provinces and towns, that I may know your wishes and your wants. I shall then lay down my rights, and place your illustrious crown on the brows

CHAP. IV. of one who bears resemblance to myself: thus
 1808. securing to you a constitution which will unite
 May. the salutary power of the Sovereign, with the
 protection of the liberties and rights of the
 Spanish nation. It is my wish that my memory
 should be blessed by your latest posterity, and
 that they shall say, 'Napoleon was the regen-
 erator of our country.'"

By these proceedings the Spanish nation was at length effectually roused into resistance. The hatred of the people towards their invaders, broke forth, as it were, in one loud and simultaneous burst, from all quarters of the kingdom. They would not tamely submit to become the subject of perfidious barter between the servile government of Madrid and that of France. They would not transfer their allegiance at the command of a foreign tyrant, from the heir of the Bourbons, to an upstart and an adventurer. The *fusillade* of the second of May, and the disgraceful transactions at Bayonne, put an end to that state of torpid quiescence in which the spirit of the nation had so long slumbered. A loud and intelligible voice was at once sent forth from every province in the kingdom. The universal cry was for re-

sistance; and the pervading sentiment of every heart, was loyalty to Ferdinand, their betrayed and imprisoned monarch.

The provinces of Asturias and Galicia were the first to take arms. A representative Junta was assembled at Oviedo, and assumed the sovereignty of the district. To quiet these disturbances, Count Delpinar, councillor of Castile, and Don Juan Melendez, were commissioned by Murat to collect the forces of the district, and quell by military power the spirit of insurrection. But it was too late. The functionaries were attacked by the people, and compelled to seek safety in flight. The first act of the Junta was to despatch two deputies to England, in order to engage assistance from that power; and measures were immediately adopted to arrange plans of concert and co-operation with the neighbouring provinces.

Leon started next into the field, and sent deputies to Corunna requesting arms. The demand was not complied with. Don Antonio Filangieri, a Neapolitan by birth, and Captain General of Galicia, was unwilling to commit himself by any act of hostility to France; and his temporizing policy having rendered him au-

CHAP. IV. object of aversion, the mob broke into his house, seized his papers, and, had he not prudently withdrawn, it is probable his life would have been sacrificed to the popular fury. A portrait of Ferdinand was carried in procession through the streets of Corunna, and the cry of "*Down with the French and the traitors,*" was heard on all hands.

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In Estremadura the rising of the people was no less decided and tumultuous. The Count de la Torre del Fresno, Governor of Badajoz, endeavoured to controul the spirit of insubordination, and lost his life in the attempt. The populace dragged him from his house, and murdered him in the street. At Valladolid, Jaen, Saragossa, Carthagen, San Lucar, Salamanca, Carolina, Ciudad Rodrigo, and many other places, excesses equally horrible occurred. Like a river which has burst its channel, the evil passions of the people rushed onward, without limit or restraint.

By such revolting acts of atrocity was the cause of freedom at this period injured and dishonoured. They cannot be defended; they ought not to be concealed. Yet even the ferocities of a people, thus goaded into madness by

a long course of injury and insult, will weigh lightly in the balance when compared with the cold-blooded and barbarous policy of their invaders. In recording the events of this extraordinary struggle, it is indeed the duty of the historian to render justice to the oppressor; but his sympathies are due only to the cause of the oppressed. And if, by the very constitution of our being, it is necessary we should be influenced by prejudice, that prejudice is at least more generous which leans to the side of freedom in the contest, than that which would veil the crimes, while it blazons the triumphs of the usurper.

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Fortunately, however, this state of anarchy was of short duration. In the principal cities of the provinces, Juntas were speedily formed for the provincial administration of affairs, and to direct and organize the resistance of the people. These assemblies published proclamations and addresses to their countrymen, inciting them to the vigorous assertion of their rights, and the vindication of the national honour. They recalled to their recollection the heroic deeds of their ancestors, and the noble struggles which they had maintained against the Moorish invaders in the cause of freedom

CHAP. IV. and religion. They painted in its true light
 1808. the insidious and grasping policy of Napoleon.
 May. "It is better," said the Junta of Galicia, "to
 die in defence of our hearths and altars, on our
 own soil, and with arms in our hands, than
 to be led bound to slaughter, the unresisting
 victims of bloody and inordinate ambition.
 The conscription of France awaits us. If we
 do not defend our own kingdom, we must go
 to perish in the north. By resistance we lose
 nothing; for should our efforts in behalf of our
 country prove fruitless, by a glorious death we
 shall at least be freed from the galling chains of
 the oppressor. Fly to arms then, and assist
 your countrymen to rescue your King from
 captivity, to restore to your government its just
 rights, to preserve your families, to assert the
 independence of your native soil, and above all
 to defend your sacred Religion. Employ the
 arms which she tenders; nerve your minds with
 the fear of God; implore the aid of the blessed
 Virgin, and of our patron the glorious St. James.
 Under such auspices go forth confident of suc-
 cess, and grasp the victory which is prepared for
 you by their intercession, and the eternal jus-
 tice of your cause."

The addresses of the other assemblies were CHAP. IV.
 not less energetic; nor less happy in contrasting
 the war in which they had been compelled to
 take arms by all the holiest motives that can
 sanctify a cause, with those in which Napoleon
 had plunged his country, to gratify the frantic
 dictates of an insatiable ambition.

Among the provincial Juntas formed by the
 necessity of the times, that of Seville assumed the
 lead, and styled themselves, in public proclama-
 tions, "The Supreme Government of Spain and
 the Indies." Seville possessed at that time
 many claims to become the chief *nucleus* of the
 government. In point of influence and popu-
 lation it was the second city of Spain. It pos-
 sessed the only foundery for cannon in the king-
 dom. It abounded in arms and military stores;
 and it possessed likewise the advantage of being
 removed from the immediate sphere of the in-
 fluence of the French armies.

With such favouring circumstances to lend
 influence to its measures, the Supreme Junta
 lost no time in organizing a system of resist-
 ance suited to the exigencies of the country.
 They directed that in every town containing
 two thousand inhabitants, a subordinate Junta

CHAP. IV. should be established, to enlist under the national standard all those capable of bearing arms. 1808. Defensive measures were concerted by the chief May. military authorities of the province. War was declared against France. Vessels were despatched to the Canaries and South America to announce the rising of the people; and commissioners were sent into the southern provinces of Portugal, in order to solicit assistance and co-operation. The Junta also published a series of precautionary rules for the conduct of the war, distinguished throughout by practical knowledge of the art military, and a prudent adaptation of its principles to the situation of the kingdom.

But not the least important step taken by the Supreme Junta was that of opening communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple, Governor of Gibraltar, and the British Admiral on the Cadiz station. Every assistance, in the power of these officers to grant, was immediately afforded to the patriots. Admiral Purvis offered the assistance of the British fleet to Solano, Governor of Cadiz, in an attack on the French squadron, commanded by Admiral Rossilly, then in the harbour. This proposal of the Admiral, Solano did not

venture openly to decline, yet he felt unwilling to CHAP. IV. commit himself by any act of what he doubtless 1808. considered premature hostility to France. When May. Admiral Purvis therefore arrived at Cadiz, Solano, instead of concerting measures of attack with that officer, was only anxious to repress the spirit of the people, and restore harmony with their invaders. All his measures for this purpose failed signally of effect. The time for such temporizing policy had passed. Solano, in the eyes of the people, was a traitor, and they treated him as such. The mob tore him from his dwelling, and murdered him in the street. His house was rased to the ground, yet, by an impulse of singular magnanimity, his property was held inviolate by a multitude of the very meanest and poorest of his countrymen. "We will take," they exclaimed, "nothing that belonged to a traitor." Even the jewels and money they found in his possession were deposited in the public treasury, to be employed in that cause which they held Solano to have betrayed.

On the death of Solano, the command devolved on Don Tomas de Morla; and on his accession to the government, vigorous measures were immediately adopted to compel the squadron of

Southey.

CHAP. IV. Rossilly to surrender. The French Admiral, aware of his danger, made proposals to Morla, which were rejected. He wished to quit the harbour of Cadiz; and demanded protection against the English fleet then in the offing. But Morla refused all terms, declining the assistance of Lord Collingwood, who had assumed the command of the British fleet, and proceeded to erect batteries on various parts of the Isla de Leon, from which they assailed the hostile squadron with a heavy fire. These measures, after an interval of several days, during which a strong fire was kept up on the enemy, were at length productive of the desired effect. Rossilly, on the morning of the 14th of June, sent a flag of truce to the shore, and intimated his readiness to surrender at discretion.

This success was followed by the arrival of General Spencer with a corps of five thousand men, which had been despatched from Gibraltar to co-operate with the Spaniards. By the appearance of this force on the coast, the progress of a French corps under General Avril, which had been despatched by Junot to hold possession of Cadiz, was arrested; and General Spencer having subsequently taken up a position at A-

yamonté, the garrison of Faro surrendered to the patriots. On this event, the Authorities of Algarve sent deputies to Seville, and united that province by alliance with the Supreme Junta. The patriotic force in this quarter was still further augmented by the junction of sixteen Spanish battalions, which withdrew from the occupation of Portugal and joined the standard of their countrymen.

Previous to the appearance of General Spencer on the Spanish coast, the deputies from Seville and Galicia had arrived in England. Never was there enthusiasm more deep and general, than that which then animated the British nation in the cause of Spanish independence. The deputies were welcomed in London by loud and general acclamation. There was no hesitation manifested as to the line of policy which it became Great Britain to adopt. The people called on their rulers to assist, with heart and hand, a nation struggling for liberty, to cast off the chain of the oppressor. Never was the unanimous voice of a people poured forth with greater majesty and effect. The government did not withstand—no government could have withstood a call thus energetically made. In

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CHAP. IV. such an excited state of the public mind, if their rulers had dared to oppose themselves to the wishes of the nation, they must have been driven from their situations with scorn and ignominy. It mattered nothing in such a case what party was in power, or by what peculiar principles their general policy was regulated. The ordinary barriers and distinctions of party were in a moment broken down, and Whig or Tory must have acted alike in yielding instant obedience to a voice thus sublinely and irresistibly poured forth.

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Since the accession of Napoleon, England had fought not for conquest but for safety. In spite of all her efforts, she had beheld the power of France continually gaining new accessions to its gigantic bulk. Europe, after a fruitless resistance, was at the foot of the conqueror, and the subsidies of England, by provoking premature hostilities, had only contributed to accelerate the catastrophe. Since the days of Egypt, the military force of England had been employed only in the conquest of Sugar Islands, or of some distant and isolated colonies which France still retained in the East. A nobler field was now open for her exertions. She was at length

to meet the Great Conqueror of the Age on CHAP. IV. the very continent he had subdued, to plant her sons breast to breast with those victorious soldiers who had never yet experienced defeat. The moment of decisive struggle was at length come, when the standard of England was to be raised in a higher and a better cause than any of which she had hitherto stood forward as the champion. Justice was on her side: the character of the contest was become too palpable to be mistaken by any party in the state. The cause of freedom and of resistance to oppression, is one that comes home with peculiar force to the heart and the understanding of an Englishman; and followed in all its measures by the unanimous wishes of the nation, the government at once knew itself to be armed with a strength, of which, during a long course of inglorious policy, it had hitherto been deprived.

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May.

Every practicable assistance was immediately afforded to the patriotic cause. Vessels, freighted with arms, clothing, and military stores, were speedily despatched for Gijon. Supplies of money were sent to Ferrol to assist the insurrection in Gallicia. All the Spanish prisoners of war were liberated and restored to their

CHAP. IV. country. The British army in Sicily was ordered to afford protection and assistance to the insurgent Catalans; and General Spencer was directed to engage in active co-operation with the patriots of Andalusia.

1808.
May.

While such measures were adopting in England, the Spanish people had lost nothing of their ardour in the cause of independence. Valencia became the theatre of a tragedy deeper than any which we have hitherto been called on to record. The inhabitants, like those of the other provinces, had risen in arms against the French. In the vehemence of the first commotion, Don Miguel de Saavedra became the object and the victim of popular fury. He was followed to Requena, whither he had fled for safety, and brutally murdered by the people. His head, raised on a pike, was carried with acclamations round the city of which he had recently been governor. A Junta was then elected for the administration of the province; and it is probable that Valencia might have remained undisgraced by further violence, but for the appearance of a wretch, named Calvo, by whom the functions of leader of the government had been assumed. Calvo came from Madrid, and was a canon of

the Cathedral of St. Isidore. By the display of a sort of demoniac energy, he acquired influence with the people. He retained, under his command, a band of assassins; and, confident in this support, he insulted the Junta, who refused to admit him as a member, and succeeded in acquiring such power as awed the authorities into submission.

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In Valencia there were many French residents; and it was natural, in the circumstances of the country, that these should become the peculiar objects of jealousy and suspicion. Alarmed at the dangers which surrounded them, they sought refuge in the citadel, and Calvo publicly denounced them, as having engaged in a plot for the surrender of the city to Murat. Accounts differ as to the particular proceedings which ensued; but all agree in the result, that these unfortunate persons, in number about two hundred, were massacred by Calvo and his assassins.

The mad ambition of Calvo grew with his success. He caused himself to be proclaimed Sovereign of Valencia, summoned the Captain-General to his presence, compelled the Intendant to disburse the public money, and treated the

CHAP. IV. Archbishop with insolence and contempt. By
 1808. his orders, likewise, a new Junta was directed
 May. to assemble and assume the functions of that
 which he had determined to abolish.

Fortunately for the interests of humanity, the career of Calvo was a short one. The Junta, which at first had been panic-stricken, began at length to gather courage, and to concert measures for the overthrow of this frantic demagogue. His popularity with the mob, already satiated with slaughter, was in the wane. The schemes of the Junta soon ripened into action. At one of their meetings, Calvo was invited to join in the deliberations. He came, followed by a train of ruffians who occupied all the avenues to the place of meeting. Towards the Junta he demeaned himself with his usual insolence, and attempted to awe them into submission by threats of punishment. At length a Franciscan friar, named Rico, the most intrepid of their number, rose and denounced him as a traitor, and demanded his immediate arrest. This was done. Calvo was sent in irons to the Island of Majorca, and subsequently executed as a traitor. The retribution of the Junta did not rest here. About two hundred of his blood-thirsty followers were

likewise subjected to trial, and executed in pursuance of the sentence awarded by the tribunal.
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It rarely happens, observes an able writer, that popular convulsions, however horrible may be the circumstances by which they are attended, have any prejudicial effect on the vigour of national defence; for the passions of the people, thus excited by domestic atrocities, when directed against foreign enemies, acquire new intensity. It was so in Valencia. The people were no sooner freed from the tyranny of Calvo, than they commenced vigorous preparations for defence. There appeared no limits to the popular enthusiasm. Provision was made not only for the security of the city, but of the province. The defiles leading into Catalonia were fortified. Troops were detached to co-operate with the military in Murcia; and active dispositions were made to secure the passes of the road from Castile.

Before intelligence was received at Madrid of the insane atrocities of Calvo and his followers, an expedition against Valencia had been in preparation. The command of the force destined for this service was intrusted to Marshal Mon-

CHAP. IV. cey, an officer of high military reputation and
 1808. unblemished personal character. On the thirtieth
 May. of May, Moncey received orders to advance with
 a column of ten thousand men upon Cuenca,
 where, in case the disturbances at Valencia
 should have ceased, he was directed to halt, and
 content himself with watching the country be-
 tween the lower Ebro and Carthagená. Should
 the disorders in Valencia, however, remain un-
 quelled, he was instructed to direct General
 Chabran, at Tortosa, to advance with his divi-
 sion, and effect a junction in the neighbourhood
 of Valencia.

In pursuance of these orders, Marshal Mon-
 ceay, with an army of about ten thousand men of
 the different arms, set forward from Madrid on
 the fourth of June, and reached Cuenca on the
 Jun. 11. eleventh. In that town he remained for a week,
 and received intelligence of the state of mat-
 ters in Valencia. During his march, Marshal
 Moncey found the whole population animated
 by feelings of strong aversion to the intrusive
 government. Even around Cuenca, while it
 remained the head-quarters of his army, symp-
 toms of disaffection were daily manifested. In
 these circumstances, the Spanish and Walloon

guards were sent forward to Valencia, and Mon-
 ceay ordered Chabran to advance to Castellon de
 CHAP. IV. Plana, that a more active concert might be es-
 1808. tablished between the armies. To a General of
 June. Moncey's experience it could not but be appar-
 ent that the campaign was not long destined to
 be bloodless. Not satisfied, therefore, with the
 precautions already mentioned, he wrote to Mu-
 rat, requesting that a column might be sent for-
 ward from Madrid to Albacete, to protect his
 right from attack, during his anticipated opera-
 tions.

Murat, on his part, little aware of the difficul-
 ties with which Moncey was surrounded, felt dis-
 satisfied at the slowness of his progress. With
 a view to stimulate the sluggish movements of
 the veteran, he despatched Brigadier-General
 Exclmans, with directions to excite him by
 every means to operations of greater vigour and
 more decisive character than he had yet thought
 it prudent to undertake. Exclmans departed
 on his mission; but on his route was seized by
 the populace, and, with his suite, carried prison-
 ers into Valencia.

The difficulties of Moncey were evidently
 increasing; and on the sixteenth he quitted
 Jun. 16.

CHAP. IV. Cuenca. The country around his line of march was deserted; and notwithstanding the strict discipline enforced in his army, the inhabitants everywhere continued to fly on his approach. No opposition, however, was offered to the advance of Moncey till he reached the bridge of Pajaso. There he found two or three thousand armed peasants, supported by a corps of about eight hundred Swiss Guards, prepared to dispute his passage. A clumsy work had been thrown up for the defence of the bridge, surmounted by four pieces of cannon; and fortified by the difficulties of the surrounding country, which was rocky and mountainous, they stood resolutely prepared for the advance of the French. Moncey waited for the coming up of his artillery; and then, by a vigorous attack, at once gained possession of the bridge. The Spaniards fled in confusion, leaving their cannon and about twenty prisoners in the hands of the assailants. The latter were likewise strengthened by a considerable body of the Swiss Guards, who deserted to the victors.

The next affair in which the French army was engaged, was with the force commanded by Don Joseph Caro, brother to the Marquis de la

Romana, who occupied a strong position at CHAP. IV. Cabrerias. The chain of mountains by which Valencia is separated from New-Castile form 1808. a rampart of great strength to that province. There is but one road by which they can be traversed by artillery, and even that presents difficulties of the most formidable character. The position which Caro had selected for his army was one of extraordinary strength. Its front was secured by entrenchments; and its flanks were rendered almost inaccessible by ranges of precipitous rocks, which appeared on either side to present an impenetrable rampart. The army, thus advantageously posted, amounted, in point of number, to about ten thousand; but, with the exception of two regular regiments of infantry and a few dragoons, it was composed exclusively of raw and undisciplined levies, badly armed, and without military garb.

To attack this position in front was impossible. A long detour therefore was necessary; and a detachment, under General Harispe, was directed to scale the mountains and turn the right flank of the Spanish army. This service was executed with success, though not without extreme difficulty; and Moncey immediately ad-

CHAP. IV. vancing on the front of the position, carried it
 1808. with little loss, and became master of all the
 June. cannon, baggage, and ammunition of the enemy.

These difficulties past, no further obstacle seemed at first to present itself to the peaceful occupation of Valencia. The hostile army had entirely disappeared; and Moncey considered it his policy to conciliate if possible the inhabitants of the beautiful and fertile country through which he was advancing. All the prisoners not in uniform, were liberated; and he gave strong assurances to the authorities of the province, that he came only as a friend to restore tranquillity and order.

June 27. It was not till the twenty-seventh that he appeared before the walls of Valencia. That city, which is one of the largest in the kingdom, is completely enclosed by an old wall of no great height, but massive, and in good preservation. It stands upon low ground, and is surrounded by deep canals and reservoirs of water, which render approach almost impossible unless by the roads leading to the gates. About five miles from Valencia, Moncey found a body of troops under Caro entrenched on the bank of a canal, and prepared to dispute his advance. The po-

sition thus taken was strong. Several pieces of CHAP. IV.
 cannon commanded the road; and the peasants, 1808
 who lay hid in the mulberry groves and hemp- June. fields on either side, harassed the march of the French army. By these obstacles, however, Moncey was not retarded. The position was immediately attacked and carried; and Moncey remained master of the suburban village of Quarte, in which he took post, and summoned the city to capitulate. But surrender was the last thing in the thoughts of the Valencians. A peremptory refusal was returned; and Moncey gave instant orders for attack. His hopes of gaining possession of Valencia did not rest exclusively on the success of his military operations. There were traitors in the city, who had promised to deliver up the gates on his approach. But these had been discovered on the night preceding the attack, and immediately put to death; and Moncey, ignorant of this circumstance, continued to expect that his efforts from without, were to be aided by treachery within.

The fire of the French batteries was directed chiefly against the gates of Quarte and San Joseph; but the troops advanced in several

CHAP. IV. columns in order to distract the attention of the

1808.

June.

garrison. In these circumstances, the Spanish commander had recourse to the bold stratagem of throwing open the gate of Quarte, as if to welcome the assailants. Moncey, imagining this was done by his partisans in the city, fell at once into the snare, and pushed rapidly for the gate. The advancing columns were assailed by a heavy fire of grape; and, after strenuous but ineffectual efforts to surmount the obstacles opposed to their entrance, were driven back with great loss. In the attack of San Joseph they were not more fortunate. The troops found themselves surrounded by canals which could not be crossed unless by swimming; and here too they experienced discomfiture. The heavy fire from the walls soon succeeded in silencing the French batteries; and Moncey, repulsed at all points, found it necessary to retreat.

In this affair, the loss of the French amounted to two thousand, while that of the garrison was trifling. Moncey found himself in a situation full of difficulty and peril. In the provinces of Valencia and Murcia alone the patriotic forces were in number about thirty thousand; while there remained of his army scarcely more than

five. Of Chabran and his division he could hear nothing. On all sides he was surrounded by enemies, to whom his defeat at Valencia had lent hope and vigour. His communication with Madrid was intercepted; and, to heighten his difficulties, intelligence was received on the thirtieth that the Count de Serbelloni, Captain-General of the province, was advancing, with a view to oppose his passage of the Xucar, and cut off his retreat.

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In such circumstances, instant and vigorous measures were necessary to secure the safety of the army. The first project which suggested itself to Moncey, was that of crossing the Guadalaviar, and, by entering Catalonia, to secure the co-operation of Chabran and Duhesme. But this was relinquished; and Moncey, sacrificing part of his artillery, put his army in immediate motion, with the view of attacking Serbelloni; and despatched a courier to General Chabran, with intelligence of his retreat. Two marches brought him to Alcira, about a league distant from the position on the Xucar occupied by Serbelloni. The force, under that leader, amounted to about six thousand, and consisted

CHAP. IV. chiefly of armed peasants, who, animated by the prevailing enthusiasm, had flocked to the banners of their country. Both sides of the river were occupied by this body; and two pieces of artillery were planted for the defence of the bridge.

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Moncey lost no time in commencing the attack. The Spaniards, on the French side of the river, were defeated with little difficulty; but the bridge was found to have been rendered impassable for the army. At length the sluices of a canal were opened by the French, in order to draw off the waters of the Xucar, and render it fordable for the troops. This measure was successful. The cavalry crossed the river, and making a vigorous charge on the Spanish line, Serbelloni, after some resistance, found it necessary to retreat.

By this success, the only obstacle to the retreat of Moncey was removed; and he continued his march to Albacete, where he arrived on the sixth. From thence he retired on Madrid, halting at San Clemente. At Madrid the situation of Moncey had excited considerable alarm. It was known that immediately after Moncey's ad-

Jul. 6.

vance from Cuenca, the population of that city had risen in arms, and overpowered the garrison. The brigade of Caulincourt was ordered, in consequence, to march from Tarancon to reduce the people to obedience. On his arrival at Cuenca, Caulincourt immediately attacked the insurgent army, routed them with great slaughter, and gave up the town to pillage.

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The division of General Frere was likewise despatched to the rescue of the lost Marshal and his army. Instead of remaining at Albacete, he too marched on Valencia; and, on his arrival at Requena, learned the disastrous issue of the attack on that city, and that Serbelloni was prepared to intercept the retreat of the discomfited army. This intelligence induced Frere to retreat to San Clemente, where he at length effected a junction with Moncey. Preparations were again in progress for an advance to Valencia, but these were interrupted by an order from Madrid for the return of the divisions under Caulincourt and Frere. Marshal Moncey, conceiving himself to be treated with indignity by Savary, in thus diminishing his force, quitted San Clemente, and likewise returned to the capital. Thus ended a series of operations, on the

CHAP. IV. part of the French army, glaringly marked
 1808. throughout by blunder and imbecility.* Certain
 July. it is, that the moral influence of these events in
 Valencia, was felt throughout Spain, and gave
 additional nerve and vigour to the popular re-
 sistance.

* While we venture to impugn the military talents of Marshal Money, it is only justice to place on record the following unexceptionable testimony to his moral worth. "We know," says the President of the Junta of Oviedo, "that this illustrious General detests the conduct of his companions. We offer him the tribute of truth and honour; and we invite this generous soldier to aid us, by the addition of his talents and bravery. If the respect which he pays to the mandates of nature, do not permit him to take up arms against his unworthy companions, yet he shall be considered by us as a just and honourable man, and our love and our esteem shall follow him wherever, in the vicissitudes of life, his lot shall be cast."

His must be a low ambition, who does not consider such a tribute, given in such circumstances, as above the value of military fame.

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

IN Andalusia the French arms were destined
 to sustain yet deeper disaster and disgrace. In
 no part of Spain was resistance to the authority
 of the intrusive government more general and
 formidable. Castanos, who commanded the
 Spanish army stationed at St. Roque, had early
 opened a communication with the Governor of
 Gibraltar; and from that fortress had been fur-
 nished with supplies of money, arms, ammuni-
 tion, and equipment. The surrender of the
 squadron of Rossilly, and the arrival of the aux-
 iliary force of General Spencer, added new
 vigour to the measures of popular resistance.
 The efforts of the Supreme Junta, though

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CHAP. V. marked occasionally by indiscretion, were, on
1808. the whole, vigorous and judicious; and it was
June. already apparent that the reduction of Andalusia
would at least be preceded by an obstinate and
severe struggle.

The necessity of immediate measures for the invasion of this important province, appears somewhat tardily to have occurred to Murat. The danger of the fleet, then in harbour at Cadiz, was a circumstance not at all contemplated at Madrid; and the Supreme Junta had, in a great measure, succeeded in exciting the ardour, and organizing the efforts of the people, before the internal tranquillity of the province was disturbed by the appearance of an enemy.

At length decided steps were taken for the invasion of Andalusia. The command of the force destined for this service, was intrusted to General Dupont, who had hitherto remained inactive in the neighbourhood of Toledo. On the twenty-fourth of May, that officer commenced his march, with a column consisting of General Barbou's division of infantry, six thousand strong; two brigades of cavalry, commanded by General Fresia; five hundred marines of the Imperial Guard; two Swiss regiments in the

service of Spain; and twenty-four pieces of artillery. In addition to this force, General Dupont was to be joined by a detachment from Junot's army; and he received orders to collect and take with him whatever Spanish troops he might find in the neighbourhood of his route.

The French army crossed the plains of La Mancha and the chain of the Sierra Morena, without encountering any obstacle in the hostility of the inhabitants. On his arrival at Andujar, General Dupont received information that the whole province was in arms, and that General Avril, whom Junot had detached to his assistance, had been compelled, by the appearance of a British force, to make a retrogressive movement on Lisbon.

Alarmed by this unpleasant intelligence, Dupont wrote instantly to Madrid, demanding reinforcements, and took such precautions as circumstances seemed to require for the safety of his army. On the sixth he passed the Guadalquivir, by the bridge of Andujar, and on the left bank of the stream continued his march to Alcolea, where the river is again crossed by the road.

In front of the bridge at Alcolea, Dupont, for

CHAP. V. the first time, encountered a Spanish force. It was commanded by Don Agostino Echevarria, and amounted to about three thousand regulars, with the addition of four or five thousand of the armed peasantry of the neighbouring villages. The bridge was fortified by works hastily constructed, and a battery of twelve cannon on the right bank of the river.

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Dupont advanced instantly to the assault ; and driving back the Spanish cavalry and infantry on the left bank, stormed the works of the bridge, and, crossing at full speed, gained possession of the village of Alcolea, and of several waggons of ammunition. Echevarria again rallied his troops on the Cordova road, but on the approach of the French cavalry recommenced his retreat.

On the evening of the same day, the French army reached Cordova. General Foy shall describe the scene which followed.

“ The French arrived at three in the afternoon, eager to enter those ancient walls which were partly constructed by the Romans, and partly by the Moors. Some musquet shots fired from the tops of the towers increased the irritation of the victors. General Dupont invested the city, and expected to become master of it with-

out a blow. The Prior of a Convent in the suburbs was despatched with pacific proposals to the inhabitants. He presented himself at the gate, but was denied admission. In this city of thirty-five thousand souls, deserted by its magistrates, without recognized leader, stunned by the cries of imprudent men, who rushed on danger while endeavouring to avoid it, several hours would have been necessary to restore tranquillity. The citizens were incapable of hearing. The French General imagined they would not hear. He ordered cannon to be brought up. In a few minutes the new gate was broken open, and the troops were let loose on the city. To some shots which were fired accidentally from the windows, they replied by continued volleys of musquetry. Men in arms, and others who were defenceless, were killed in the streets ; churches, houses, even the celebrated Mosque, which the Christians had converted into a cathedral—all were pillaged. The ancient capital of the Omniade Caliphs, the favourite abode of the Abderamans—the greatest monarchs that ever filled the throne of Spain—now witnessed the renewal of scenes of horror, such as it had never seen since the year 1236,

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CHAP. V. when the Moors were driven from it by Ferdinand III. King of Castile and Leon: *dreadful scenes for which no excuse was to be found in the loss sustained by the victors*, since the attack of the city had not cost them ten men, and the success of the day only thirty killed and eighty wounded!"

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Such—detailed in language honourable to the writer—were the gratuitous atrocities perpetrated at Cordova by Dupont, whose cruelty and incapacity contributed in no ordinary degree to disgrace the arms of his country. Amid the unpleasant views of human nature, to which the contemplation of such scenes can scarcely fail to give rise, it is consoling to discover how generally cruelty of disposition is united to weakness of understanding, and that the higher qualities of intellect have a natural affinity with purity of principle and generosity of feeling.*

* In contrast with the account given of this inhuman butchery by General Foy—who will scarcely be suspected of exaggerating the atrocities of his countrymen,—we beg to subjoin that of Colonel Napier. "As the inhabitants took no part in the contest," says that officer, "and received the French without any signs of aversion, the town was protected from pillage! and Dupont, fixing his quarters there, sent his patrols as far as Ecija, without meeting with an enemy."

It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by Colonel Napier, *without any quotation of authority!*

The difficulties of Dupont were in no degree diminished by the conquest and massacre of Cordova. The intelligence he received from Cadiz informed him of the surrender of Rossilly. He learned, also, that Castanos, and the army under his command, had declared in favour of the Constitution, and were advancing to invest his position; and that the passes of the Sierra were occupied by bodies of armed smugglers, which cut off his communication with Madrid.* Under these circumstances, Dupont judged it prudent again to retire on Andujar, where he took up his position on the nineteenth. On his arrival, a detachment was immediately ordered to attack a band of insurgent peasantry at Jaen, which, by pressing on his out-posts, and cutting off his detachments, had occasioned considerable

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* The following extract, from an intercepted letter of Dupont to General Belliard, gives a striking picture of the difficulties with which he felt himself to be surrounded at this period. "We have not a moment to lose in quitting a position where we cannot exist. The soldier, all day under arms, cannot, as hitherto, reap the corn and make bread; and all the peasantry have forsaken their homes. For Heaven's sake send us prompt assistance,—send us a strong body of troops,—send us, without delay, medicines and linen for the wounded; for the enemy, for a month past, have intercepted all our ammunition, our waggons, and our provisions, from Toledo."

CHAP. V. annoyance. This service was performed with success; the town of Jaen was pillaged, and many of its inhabitants massacred, but the detachment returned without having been able to procure a supply of provisions to relieve the necessities of the army. The war on both sides had become one of barbarous and wanton cruelty. The people sought vengeance for the massacre of Cordova; and they found it. All prisoners that fell into their hands were murdered. At Manzanares, they assaulted the hospital and massacred the sick. General René was siezed at Carolina, and thrown alive into a caldron of boiling water. Other officers were sawn in twain. The war of the most savage tribes could not exceed in guilt and cruelty, the contest of these two *civilized* and *Christian* nations.

Foy.

While at Andujar, Dupont was at length joined by the expected reinforcements from Madrid; and was enabled to muster in the field nearly twenty thousand men. But even with this force he still continued inactive. Had he advanced to Seville, or at once determined on evacuating the province, there can be little doubt that, in either case, his operations

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would have been attended by comparative success. Had Seville not been his object he ought never to have advanced to Cordova. Nothing had occurred after his march from Andujar, which should have had any influence in changing his resolution. To remain at Cordova was to court defeat, to suffer himself to be hemmed in by the insurgent armies, to submit voluntarily to the evils of a blockade. Seville was the chief focus of the insurrection; it contained abundant supplies, possessed a wealthy population, and, by attacking it, Dupont would have aimed a blow at the very heart which had occasioned a strong insurrectionary pulsation through every member of the kingdom.

On the other hand, there were no obstacles of any serious magnitude to interrupt his retreat. The passes of the Sierra were occupied only by bands of peasants and smugglers, unequal to sustain the assault of regular troops; and, in the plains of La Mancha, he might have awaited the arrival of such reinforcements as would have enabled him successfully to encounter the insurgent forces.

But such views, though they might have had some influence with any ordinary general, had

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CHAP. V. none with Dupont. With the main-body of the
 1808. army he remained at Andujar; and the division
 June. of General Vedel was advanced to Baylen, with
 the view of maintaining, uninterrupted, the communication with La Mancha. In the choice of his position, Dupont displayed little military judgment. It commanded indeed the main road from Seville to Madrid, but was liable to be turned at many points, in the season when the Guadalquiver became fordable; and at all seasons by the bridge of Marmolexo, about two leagues lower down the river, and by the ferry of Mengibar, about twice that distance higher up. Works, however, were erected for the defence of the bridge at Andujar; and Dupont, blind to the real perils of his position, evidently anticipated that this would become the chief object of the enemy's attack.

The enemy were not idle. Their commander was Don Francisco Xavier de Castanos, a general devoid neither of talent nor experience, and destined to play a conspicuous part in the progress of that war of which we have already traced the commencement. Vigorous preparations were making in Andalusia and the neighbouring provinces to attack Dupont; and the circle from

which the supplies of the French army could be drawn was becoming gradually more confined. A body of the insurgents from Grenada had advanced to Jaen, and were preparing to move on Carolina. It was necessary these should be dispersed; and General Cassagne, with a brigade of Vedel's division, was ordered to advance for this purpose. General Cassagne was successful in his attack on the insurgents, whom he routed after a severe engagement; yet he did not return to Baylen without considerable loss, and a fame blackened by the perpetration of the most horrible enormities.

In the meanwhile, the organization of fresh troops was proceeding without intermission at Seville. Every hour of delay was bringing fresh accessions of strength to the Spanish army. The inaction of the French army—naturally attributed to timidity—gave new confidence both to the leaders and the people. The army of Castanos, formed into four divisions, was gradually approaching the French army, and narrowing the sphere of its influence on the surrounding country. The first division, commanded by General Reding, was, in number, about ten thousand, and formed the right of the army. The

CHAP. V. second, about six thousand strong, was led by
 1808. the Marquis de Coupigny, a Frenchman by birth,
 July. who had served in the Walloon Guards. The

third division, and the reserve, under Don Felix
 Jones, an Irish refugee, and Don Manuel de la
 Pena, amounted, together, to about ten thousand
 Jul. 9. and men. On the ninth of July, it occupied
 a position extending from Carpio to Porcunas.
 On the eleventh, the scheme of operations
 against Dupont was concerted in a council
 of war. At this meeting, it was arranged that
 Reding's division should cross the Guadalquivir
 at Mengibar, and advance on Baylen; that Coupigny
 should proceed, by Villa Nueva and La Hiquereta,
 to support the operations of Reding; and that the
 remainder of the army, under Castanos, should
 attack the enemy's position in front simultaneously
 with the meditated advance on his rear by Reding
 and Coupigny. The light troops were directed to
 cross by Marmolexo, and gain possession of the
 passes of the Morena leading to Estremadura.

Jul. 13. On the thirteenth, Reding advanced to Mengibar,
 and, by a gallant attack, drove the enemy from the
tete-du-pont, and established himself in the village,
 which, on the appearance of Vedel's

division, he judged it prudent to evacuate. On
 the fourteenth, the force of Coupigny appeared in
 the neighbourhood of Villa Nueva, and a continued
 skirmish took place during the day. On the
 fifteenth, Castanos occupied in force the heights
 of Arjonilla, and opened an immediate fire with
 his artillery on the bridge of Andujar. Dupont
 was deceived by this. He imagined the attack
 would be made in that quarter, and disposed
 his army accordingly. The Spanish light infantry,
 under Colonel Cruz, crossed near Marmolexo,
 and made an attack on the rear of the French
 army. This was speedily repelled. Cruz retired
 with his skirmishers; and Castanos, who had
 made a simultaneous demonstration in front of
 the enemy, returned to his position.

The circumstances of his situation appeared,
 however, to Dupont to become hourly more
 alarming; and, ignorant of the occurrences at
 Mengibar, he directed Vedel to despatch a
 brigade to his assistance. Vedel, who had been
 strengthened by the arrival of Gobert's brigade
 at Baylen, either did not understand the order
 of his leader, or did not choose to obey it.
 On the evening of the fifteenth,

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CHAP. V. he set out for Andujar with his whole division,
 1808. leaving only a small body, under General Leger
 July. Bellair, to defend the village and ferry of Mengibar.

Reding took advantage of this. On the morning of the sixteenth he sent forward his skirmishers as if intending to gain possession of the boats, while the main-body of his army crossed the river, about half a league above, at the ford of Rincon. The French immediately retreated. Reding followed up his success, and drove them in confusion from point to point till the arrival of Gobert, who, on hearing of the attack, advanced immediately from Baylen. The arrival of this reinforcement retarded, though it did not stop, the progress of the assailants. General Gobert was killed. The French were driven back into Baylen; and Reding, carrying with him a piece of artillery, and all the baggage of the detachment, retired to Mengibar. On the following day he crossed the Guadalquiver, and effected a junction with Coupigny.

No sooner had Dupont received intelligence of these events, than, instead of concentrating his force at Andujar, he ordered Vedel to return on the night following to Baylen, and, uniting

his force with that of General Darfour, who CHAP. V.
 had succeeded Gobert in the command, again to 1808.
 drive the Spaniards across the Guadalquiver. Before his arrival, Darfour had retired to Carolina, in consequence of a report that a body of the Spanish army were advancing on that town by the Linhares road. Vedel was naturally astonished at the sudden and unexpected evacuation of this important post, but relying on the accuracy of Darfour's intelligence, he followed the movement of that general, and likewise fell back to Carolina.

Reding, thus left without an enemy in his front, advanced successively to Baylen and the neighbourhood of Andujar, where he took up a position in rear of the French army, ready to take part in the anticipated attack of Castanos.

Dupont's illusion respecting the strength of his position was at length dispelled. Taking every precaution to conceal his intention from the enemy, he abandoned Andujar on the night of the eighteenth, carrying with him the pillage of the city. By day-dawn he had advanced about five leagues on the road to Baylen, when his advanced-guard came in contact with the Spanish out-posts. Reding, ignorant of the motions of

Jul. 18.

Jul. 19.

CHAP. V. his adversary, was at that moment forming his columns of attack on Andujar. The appearance of the French army took him wholly by surprise, yet all his arrangements were made with promptitude and skill. Reding had formed his army on the acclivity of a hill, rugged, intersected by deep ravines, and covered with plantations of olive. Dupont resolved at once on attack. It was absolutely necessary that he should recover Baylen, and re-open the communication with the scattered divisions of his army. He saw at last that the chances of a battle were less formidable than the evils of continued inaction, and determined on the adoption of that policy which, at an earlier period, would probably have been productive of a happier issue.

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Dupont halted his advanced-guard, and waited for the coming up of his army, a large proportion of which, encumbered by plunder, were yet a great way in the rear. Reding lost no time in attacking that portion of the French army already opposed to his division, and opened on them a destructive fire from all his artillery. The French cavalry at length came up, and were ordered instantly to charge. They did so with distinguished gallantry, but without success.

General Dupré was killed in an attack on the Walloon Guards; and though the Spaniards at first lost ground, the cavalry were eventually repulsed with considerable loss.

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On the right of the line the Swiss battalions of either army were brought into conflict. Here the battle was waged on both sides with great vigour and pertinacity. Victory at length declared for the Spaniards. The French were driven back through the whole extent of their line, and were compelled to abandon their artillery.

Fresh reinforcements, however, were continually arriving to the French army from the rear. These, with singular want of judgment, Dupont pushed forward into action as they arrived, thus affording to the enemy an opportunity they did not neglect, of beating his whole army in detail. A marine battalion of the Imperial Guard, which belonged to the reserve of the army, at length came up and overthrew the enemy opposed to it with singular gallantry. A general charge was made by the cavalry, which broke for a moment the Spanish line. But it was found impossible to

CHAP. V. drive the Spaniards from their ground ; and the efforts of the French army gradually slackened.

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Under these circumstances, two Swiss battalions in the French service, which had already distinguished themselves in the action, went over to the enemy. The troops, fatigued by a long night march, and exhausted by the burning rays of the sun, were unequal to further exertion ; and Dupont, having failed in battle, determined to try the chance of negotiation. This might have been more successful, had not the advance of the army of Castanos, under General La Pena, at that moment attacked the bridge on the Andujar road, which Barbou's brigade had been left to defend. On hearing the report of artillery in the rear, Reding, who had readily accepted Dupont's proposal of an armistice, with the view to the arrangement of a convention, became at once aware of the advantages of his situation, and of the extent of the difficulties by which the French army was surrounded. In the new view thus afforded him of the situation of the armies, he declined the responsibility of granting any terms, and referred the bearer of Dupont's proposals to General Castanos, at Andujar.

The latter was disposed to insist that Dupont should surrender at discretion ; yet ultimately consented to a stipulation, that his army should be embarked in Spanish vessels, and conveyed to France.

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During the progress of these disastrous events, the question naturally arises, where was Vedel ? It is difficult, on any hypothesis, to account for his conduct. That officer had quitted Carolina at an early hour, and marched on Baylen. As he advanced, the report of artillery became more frequent and distinct, and afforded satisfactory evidence of an engagement having taken place between the armies. About nine o'clock he reached Guarroman, about two leagues distant from Baylen ; and in that neighbourhood halted to refresh his soldiers. There he remained for several hours, though aware that the armies were engaged ; and when he at length continued his advance, so little did he seem to dread the result of the action, that the brigades of Darfour and La Grange were left on the halting ground.

On approaching Baylen, a body of troops were perceived, which Vedel imagined to be part of the army of Dupont. He was deceived.

CHAP. V. The troops in question were Spaniards; and
 1808. Vedel, on perceiving his mistake, despatched or-
 July. ders for the immediate advance of the troops at
 Guarroman, and prepared to attack the enemy
 in his position.

Reding made every disposition to repel the advance of Vedel, and announced, under a flag of truce, the suspension of arms, which had already taken effect between the Spanish army and that of Dupont. In spite of this communication, some fighting took place, but without any favourable result on the fortunes of the French army. At length an order arrived from Dupont, directing a cessation of hostilities. Vedel obeyed; and in the course of the night retreated to Carolina, bearing with him the prisoners, cannon, and standards, which he had captured from the enemy.

We now come to the extraordinary catastrophe of these most singular preliminaries. On
 Jul. 22. the twenty-second, the armies of Dupont and Vedel, amounting to about eighteen thousand, laid down their arms before an army, inferior in all military requisites, and not greatly superior in numbers.

Never did the chivalry of France receive a

deeper tarnish than in the surrender of Baylen. Occurring in such circumstances, and at such a period, it could not fail to exert a powerful influence on the character and events of the war. All hope of speedy conquest was at once overthrown. Baylen was one of those disasters which the sophistry of Napoleon could neither varnish nor disguise. Eighteen thousand of the French army had laid down their arms, before men whom they had uniformly derided as an undisciplined and cowardly rabble. A blot had fallen on the proud escutcheon of France, which eloquence could not deepen, and certainly could not erase.

Intelligence of this proud achievement flew with the speed of lightning through every quarter of the kingdom, stirring the hearts of the people like the blast of a trumpet. They had now practically learned the animating truth, that the French were *not* invincible; that even by men undisciplined and inexperienced in war, the soldiers, before whose prowess the world had bent in awe, might be encountered and overthrown. The projects of the enemy had not only been foiled, but that enemy had been humbled into submission. The Anda-

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CHAP. V. lusians felt that they had not only conquered the soldiers of France, but stamped disgrace upon her arms; and it would be too much to expect, from such a people, that they should reduce their vanity within due limits, and apportion, to the ignorance and vacillation of the leader whom they had subdued, their real share of the exploit. Could those who beheld an army of eighteen thousand French soldiers, submit to the ignominious ceremony of depositing their arms, and afterwards march tamely into captivity, amid the jeers and insults of a triumphant and indignant people, retain from that hour any vehement and pervading terror of the arms of France? The plumage of those eagles which, in other lands, had soared victoriously over fields of blood and battle, they beheld soiled in the dust. Against the spoilers of their beautiful country, against the men who had not hesitated to support the cause of usurpation by massacre and outrage, who had trampled, in the insolence of power, on all they held dearest and most sacred, the heart of every Spaniard was naturally animated by sentiments of indignant hatred; but fear, at such a moment, did not, and could not mingle in their feelings. The terrors

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of the French arms, for a time at least, were gone. France would require many victories, to efface the memory of that solitary and disgraceful defeat.

It must be confessed, however, that, to the Spanish cause, the consequences of the victory of Baylen were not wholly beneficial. It contributed to inspire the people with a degree of self-confidence altogether unwarranted by the circumstances of the nation, or the power and character of its invaders. It is well, in such a struggle, that the people should feel confident of victory; but they should likewise be impressed by the necessity of powerful, consentaneous, and persevering exertion. The self-esteem of the Spanish nation, their vague and dreamlike reliance on their own prowess and resources, required no Baylen to rouse them into due influence and activity. Constitutionally addicted to form an exaggerated estimate of their own powers, it became doubly dangerous to undervalue those of their enemy. Of this fault they cannot be acquitted; and of its injurious influence on the subsequent fortunes of the war, the progress of this narrative will afford abundant illustration.

The feelings of Napoleon, on receiving intelli-

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CHAP. V. gence of the defeat and surrender of Baylen, may
 1808. readily be conceived. On their return to France,
 July. Dupont, and all the generals of his army, were
 seized and imprisoned. The former, it has been
 asserted, died by poison in a dungeon. But why
 should Napoleon have been guilty of a crime to
 rid the world of a man like Dupont? To all
 the nobler purposes of existence he was already
 dead. He had become a thing for the finger of
 scorn to point at. The forfeit of his life was
 not necessary either for the purpose of example
 or retribution. To such a man death was a re-
 fuge, not a punishment. In dying, Dupont would
 have encountered but the common lot of hu-
 manity, the fate alike of the proudest as of the
 humblest of mankind; but in continuing an in-
 glorious existence, amid the scorn and contempt
 of his fellow-creatures, he stood forth the mark-
 ed and solitary object of a terrific retribution.

Every effort of the French Government was
 exerted to veil, from public notice, the disastrous
 circumstances of Baylen. All discussion on the
 subject was prohibited in the public journals;
 and it was only after a lapse of four years, that
 a military court was assembled for the purpose
 of inquiring into the circumstances of the capi-

tulation. What the result was, is unknown; but CHAP. V.
 shortly afterwards an Imperial decree appeared,
 1808. by which the punishment of death was denoun-
 July. ced on any general, who should hereafter become
 party to a capitulation by which the troops of
 France should, in the open field, be made to
 lay down their arms.

By the Spanish authorities, the terms of the
 surrender of Baylen were shamefully infringed.
 The troops, instead of being conveyed
 to France, were imprisoned in the hulks at
 Cadiz; and, on their march, little protection
 was afforded from the fury of the people.
 Few indeed of these unfortunate soldiers sur-
 vived the horrors of their confinement. Some
 years afterwards, a few hundreds, rendered des-
 perate by suffering, cut the cables of their pri-
 son-ship; and, allowing her to drift to sea, under
 a heavy fire, were fortunately rescued by their
 countrymen, then blockading Cadiz.

Such was the result of the first invasion of
 Andalusia.

CHAPTER VI.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN
PROVINCES.

CHAP. VI. WHILE the arms of France were thus encountering reverses in the East and South, the most important scene of struggle was in the North. By defeat in the other quarters of Spain, the war was merely prolonged, and the ultimate issue of the contest rendered more doubtful and remote. By defeat in the Northern Provinces, especially in those of Leon and Old Castile, the safety of the French armies, in every quarter of the kingdom, was immediately endangered. The primary basis of operations of the whole armies was Bayonne, and the communication between that city and Madrid could not be interrupted without occasioning, in the words of Napoleon, "an universal paralysis."

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On the first appearance of insurrection in the North, vigorous measures were adopted by Marshal Bessieres, to restore submission and tranquillity.

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General Lefebvre Desnouettes was directed to advance from Pampluna to Zaragoza. From Burgos, detachments were sent against Valladolid, St. Andero, Segovia, and Legrono. Of the progress and results of these operations, it is necessary that we should now speak somewhat in detail.

The force destined for the reduction of St. Andero, was placed under the command of General Merle. Before the insurgent army were aware of his having entered the Asturias he had reached Reynosa. While there he received orders to halt, in consequence of an insurrection having broken out in Valladolid, a city whose military importance was incalculably greater than that of St. Andero. To reduce this place to obedience, General Lasalle was despatched by Bessieres with a force of about five thousand men, and six pieces of artillery. He arrived at Torquemada on the seventh of June. Five hundred peasants had obstructed the passage of the bridge with chains and waggons, and taken post in the surrounding houses and in the

Jun. 7.

CHAP. VI. church of Torquemada. The bridge was at
 1808. once carried by the infantry of Lasalle, the town
 June. was sacked and burned, and the flying peasants
 were pursued and mercilessly sabred by the
 enemy.

Jun. 8. On the eighth, Lasalle entered Palencia. The
 prayer of the Bishop, that the town should be
 spared, was granted; and, having disarmed the
 inhabitants, he proceeded to Duenas on the
 twelfth. There he was joined by General
 Merle; and the army, thus strengthened, ad-
 vanced on the following day to attack Cuesta,
 Captain-General of the province, at Cabeçon.

Jun. 9. The force of that General was drawn up on the
 right bank of the Pisuerga, with the intention
 of defending the bridge and the town. The
 French made a vigorous attack in two columns,
 and were completely successful. The Spaniards
 were driven with great slaughter at all points,
 and many plunging into the river were drowned.
 The loss occasioned to the French, by this en-
 gagement, amounted only to twelve killed and
 thirty wounded; that of Cuesta's army is report-
 ed to have been very great, and no quarter was
 granted by the victors.

Having achieved this victory, the French

Generals continued their advance to Valladolid. CHAP. VI.
 The defeat of Cuesta had left that city at the
 1808. mercy of the enemy. A deputation of the chief
 June. authorities, headed by the Bishop, came forth to
 solicit clemency, and offer submission. All the
 arms and warlike stores found in the arsenal,
 were sent to Burgos; and fifty hostages, for the
 future obedience of the city, chosen from the
 families of greatest rank and influence, were ex-
 acted by the French Generals.

While affairs had put on so pacific an aspect at
 Valladolid, the presence of the French armies
 was required in other quarters. On the six-
 Jun. 16. teenth, General Lasalle broke up from Valla-
 dolid, and returned to Palencia. The division
 of General Merle was ordered to resume its op-
 erations against St. Andero; and a brigade, un-
 der General Ducos, was directed to advance by
 Frias and Soncillo, to effect a junction with the
 force under that officer.

During his march to Reynosa, where he ar-
 rived on the twentieth, Merle's army encoun-
 Jun. 20. tered no opposition. But in the mountainous
 country around the Venta del Escudo, he found
 an insurgent force prepared to oppose his pro-
 gress. They occupied a range of defiles, through

CHAP. VI. which it was necessary the French should pass on their route to St. Andero; and had the skill and vigour of the defence been equal to the strength of the position, the French must have been unsuccessful in the attempt to dislodge a military body so formidably posted.

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Merle formed his army into three columns, two of which were directed to scale the mountains, and take the enemy in flank, while the third advanced by the road, and made a charge on the front of the position. The Spaniards were driven at all points; several guns were captured; and the pursuit of the flying enemy was continued for some distance along the St. Andero road.

Before reaching the point of his destination, General Merle had another obstacle to encounter. The road between Las Fraquas and Somahoz, is scooped out of the rock for a considerable distance, and is flanked on one side by an almost perpendicular mountain, and on the other by a steep and precipitous ravine. Here the Spaniards had barred the road by an *abattis*, surmounted by four pieces of cannon, and defended by a numerous detachment of their army.

In order to overcome this formidable impedi-

ment, Merle sent out columns on either flank, directing them, by a circuitous route, to take the enemy in rear. These lateral movements were successful. The Spaniards no sooner descried the approach of the columns than they hastily retreated; and the French, without further opposition, entered St. Andero on the following day. In that city a junction was effected with the corps of Ducos, who, on his march, had defeated a considerable body of the insurgents, by whom his progress had been obstructed at the pass of Soncillo.

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These vigorous measures were for a time successful in subduing resistance in the surrounding country; and the chief towns of Leon, Biscay, Asturias, and Navarre, awed into temporary submission, sent deputies to Bayonne, to make formal declaration of obedience to the intrusive sovereign.

The operations against Aragon, were conducted by Lefebvre Desnouettes. The leader of the insurrection in that kingdom was Don Joseph Revollo de Palafox, whose name, if devoted patriotism afford claim of exemption from oblivion, will be pronounced with honour by posterity. Palafox was the youngest of three

Cavallero.

CHAP. VI. brothers, and belonged to one of the most an-

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cient and distinguished families in the kingdom. He had accompanied his sovereign to Bayonne; and his loyalty, amid the trying circumstances of the times, had been ardent and unswerving. As Captain-General, he had exerted his authority in suppressing popular commotions, and in organizing an effective system of resistance to the common enemy. In this honourable path his progress was beset with difficulties. Aragon was alike destitute of regular troops, and of arms and ammunition. No province in the kingdom was poorer in defensive resources. She was rich only in the spirit of her people, and in the talent and heroic devotion of her leader. By Palafox every thing was done to give effect to the popular resistance. With the deserters from the regular army in other provinces, he organized new regiments. A body of artillery was equipped for the field; and all who could procure arms, enrolled themselves as his followers.

When Lefebvre was directed to advance against Aragon, the Baron de Versage, an officer of the Walloon Guards, was at Calatayud, which he occupied with a battalion of students, and was daily adding to his force by the volun-

tary enlistment of the neighbouring population. CHAP. VI.

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Palafox was at Zaragoza, from which place he detached a body of his army to assist the people of Tudela in defending the passage of the Ebro. The roads from the neighbouring provinces were guarded by detachments of troops, armed and organized with as much efficiency as the urgency of the juncture would permit.

On the seventh of June, Lefebvre commenced his march from Pampluna, with a force of five thousand infantry, eight hundred cavalry, and several pieces of artillery. On the ninth, he came in contact with the insurgent force at Tudela, and routed them without difficulty. With unwarrantable cruelty, the leaders of the insurrection were put to death, and the French army continued its advance on Zaragoza.

On learning this disaster, Palafox, with nine thousand of his raw levies, and a few pieces of badly organized artillery, advanced to Mallen, and took post on the rivulet of Huerba. Here he was attacked by Lefebvre, and driven with slaughter and loss of cannon from his ground. Another attempt was made to dispute the passage of the Xalon, but without success. The French army took possession of Alagon on the

CHAP. VI. fifteenth, and on the day following appeared before Zaragoza.

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Palafox and his army had already retreated to the city, where every preparation for defence was immediately set on foot. He took up a position in the surrounding gardens and olive grounds, and along the banks of the canal; and having planted his cannon to defend the gates of the city, awaited the approach of the enemy. The conflict which ensued was bloody. The insurgents fought without order, yet with a resolution worthy of their cause. A body of the French army forced its way into the city, but was driven back with heavy loss by the inhabitants, who assailed them from the roofs and windows of the houses. The carnage was great on both sides; and Lefebvre, probably little prepared for a resistance so vehement and determined, having dislodged Palafox from his position, withdrew his army, and awaited the arrival of reinforcements.

Zaragoza was a walled, but not a fortified city. It stands in an extensive plain covered with vineyards and olive groves; and, within reach of cannon, is commanded on the south-west by a hill called the Monte Torrero, which forms the

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site of a convent. On one side the walls are washed by the Ebro, across which the communication with the suburbs is by a bridge of stone; and at the base of the Monte Torrero, the canal of Aragon runs in a direction nearly parallel to the course of the river. On the east and west, the country is intersected by two tributaries of the Ebro, one of which, the Huerba, approaches very closely to the walls of the city. In summer the Huerba is generally dry; but the winter torrents have worn deeply into the soil, and thus formed a ravine, which is crossed in the neighbourhood of the city by two bridges. The Gallego, a river of considerable magnitude, discharges its waters into the Ebro, nearly opposite to the point of confluence of the Huerba.

The walls, though old, were massive, generally about ten feet high, and built of brick and rough stones. They were, apparently, not meant for the purposes of defence, but merely to enable the civic authorities to levy taxes on every article brought into the town for sale. The gates, which are nine in number, are of the most simple construction, and the alignment between them is, in some places, preserved by the mud-wall of a garden—in others, by convents and

Vaughan.

CHAP. VI. dwelling-houses, or by the remains of an old
 1808. Moorish wall, which has a slight parapet, but
 June. without any platform, even for musquetry. The
 city is built of brick; the houses are three stories in height, and the streets narrow and crooked, with the exception of one or two market-places, and the street called the Cozo, situated nearly in the centre of the town.

Such was the situation, and such the defensive appliances, of Zaragoza. To an eye merely military, it would probably have appeared incapable of resisting a siege. To one of keener penetration, which saw that all the energies of its numerous population were powerfully roused to the determination of resolute resistance, the cause, though perilous and doubtful, might not have seemed hopeless. But of a defence so gallant and heroic, as that by which the siege of Zaragoza has been rendered for ever historically memorable—of an endurance so unshrinking—of sufferings, which it is even painful to contemplate, no anticipation could have been formed by the most prescient observer.

Palafox, driven into the city, did not relax in his efforts for its defence. He exhorted the inhabitants to continue steadfast to the cause in

which they had gloriously embarked. He be- CHAP. VI.
 sought them to prove, by their actions, that
 they were worthy of the precious blood which
 had been already shed in their behalf. He
 animated them by assurance of victory, but
 did not conceal the price at which it was necessary it should be bought. Their soil was already moist with the martyr blood of their brethren. The Moloch of tyranny required new victims—"Let us," he said, "be prepared for the sacrifice."

But the views of Palafox were not confined to the internal defence of Zaragoza. As Captain-General of Aragon, his duties had a wider scope. He had to organize and embody the resistance of the whole province; and, unwilling to hazard every thing on a single contingency, he determined to distract the attention of the enemy from the siege, by another effort from without. He accordingly quitted Zaragoza; and, crossing the Ebro at Pina, with such force as he had been enabled to collect, proceeded to Belchite, where he effected a junction with the corps of Versage. With the army thus collected, amounting to about six thousand men, Palafox immediately advanced to Epila, in order to

CHAP. VI. cut off the supplies of the French army. Some
 1808. of his troops betrayed reluctance again to en-
 June. counter in the field an enemy with whom it was
 already apparent they were unequal to cope ;
 and several of the higher officers proposed re-
 treating to Valencia. Such timid counsels were
 rejected. Palafox offered passports to all who
 chose, at such a moment, to forsake his standard.
 " Let those who love me follow me," was his
 brief but emphatic address to the soldiers :—the
 whole army followed him.

Lefebvre no sooner learned that Palafox was
 in the field, than he advanced to attack him. On
 Jun. 23. the night of the twenty-third the engagement
 took place. The Spanish army were unequal to
 cope with the superior skill and discipline of
 their opponents. Two thousand of their num-
 ber were killed or wounded ; the whole artillery
 was captured ; and Palafox, defeated but unsub-
 dued, retreated to Calatayud. There he re-
 mained for a few days, endeavouring, with un-
 daunted spirit, to re-organize the wreck of his
 gallant band. On the first of July he again en-
 tered Zaragoza.

In the meanwhile, the army of Lefebvre had
 been joined by that of General Verdier, who

had been successfully employed in the reduction CHAP. VI.
 of Lograno, and by some battalions of Portu-
 guese. A heavy battering train was likewise
 brought up from Pampluna ; and the combined
 force, thus collected for the siege of the city,
 amounted to about twelve thousand men. On
 the twenty-seventh, an attempt was made to
 carry the Torrero by assault, in which the ene-
 my were repulsed with severe loss, leaving six
 guns, and five waggons of ammunition in the
 hands of the besieged. On the following day,
 their efforts were more successful ; and, owing
 to the cowardice of an artillery-officer, who af-
 terwards suffered death for his misconduct, the
 Torrero, and a neighbouring battery, fell into
 their hands. This misfortune prevented all com-
 munication with the city from the south.

The French battering train was now brought
 into full action on the city. But the increasing
 danger which surrounded them, only roused the
 enthusiasm of the inhabitants to a higher pitch.
 They planted cannon at every commanding
 point ; broke loopholes for musquetry in the
 walls and houses, and converted the awnings of
 their windows into sacks, which they filled with

CHAP. VI. sand, and placed in the form of batteries at the gates. Every house in the environs of the city, which could afford shelter to the enemy, was destroyed. The gardens and olive grounds were even rooted up by the proprietors, wherever they were supposed to impede the general defence. Thus was it, that in this noble struggle for freedom, all private interests were disregarded.

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The share taken by the women in the memorable defence of Zaragoza, it belongs to history to record. By their voices and their smiles, the men were rewarded for past exertions, and animated to new. Regardless of fatigue and danger, they formed parties for relieving the wounded, and for carrying refreshment to those who served in the batteries. Of these undaunted females, the young, delicate, and beautiful Countess Burita was the leader. Engaged in her blessed work of merciful ministration, with death surrounding her on all sides, she went, with unshrinking spirit, wherever anguish was to be relieved, or sinking courage to be animated. Never, during the whole course of a protracted siege, did she once swerve from her generous and holy purpose. With all a woman's softness

of heart, yet without a woman's fears, she participated in every danger and every privation—a creature at once blessed, and bringing blessings.

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It was impossible, in such circumstances, that the defence of Zaragoza could be otherwise than heroic. Where women suffer, men will die. All ranks and classes of society laboured alike in the defence. Mothers, tearless and untrembling, sent forth their children to partake in the common peril, and to perform such labours as their strength would permit. The priests took arms and mingled in the ranks. The ammunition was made into cartridges by the nuns. In Zaragoza all hearts were animated by a sacred zeal in the cause of liberty and their country.

On the night of the twenty-eighth, a powder magazine blew up in the centre of the city, by which fourteen houses were destroyed, and two hundred men killed. This has been attributed to treachery, but without evidence. The enemy, however, took advantage of the confusion which such an occurrence could not fail to create, and opened a heavy fire on the city, which continued with little interruption during the whole of the succeeding day.

Jun. 28.

CHAP. VI. In the morning the Portillo gate, and the castle in its vicinity, became the chief object of attack; and the fire of the French artillery, concentrated on that point, destroyed the sand-bag battery erected for its defence. This, however, was continually re-constructed by the indefatigable labours of the people. Here the carnage was excessive. The battery was repeatedly cleared of its defenders; and so vehement and overwhelming was the fire of the enemy, that the citizens at length stood aghast at the slaughter, and recoiled from entering a scene already glutted with victims.

At this moment it was, that a young female, named Augustina, of the lower class of the people, arrived at the battery with refreshments. She read the prevailing consternation in the countenances of those around her; and snatching a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, she sprung forward among the bodies of the dead and dying, and fired off a twenty-six pounder; then mounting the gun, made a solemn vow, never, during the siege, to quit the battery alive. This animating spectacle revived the drooping courage of the people. The guns were instantly re-manned, and point-

ed with such effect, that the French were repulsed with great slaughter; and having suffered severely at other points, Verdier at length gave orders for retreat.

On the second of July another attempt was made to effect an entrance by the Portillo. A strong column advanced toward the gate with fixed bayonets, and without firing a shot. They were received with so destructive a fire, both of grape shot and small arms, that their ranks fell into disorder; and, dispersing on all hands, no further attempt was made on that quarter of the city. Another column advanced against the gate Del Carmen; and there also the enemy experienced a spirited repulse.

Hitherto the French had remained on the right bank of the Ebro. On the eleventh they effected the passage of the river at a ford above the city; and Verdier crossed a body of his army, in order to protect a floating bridge which he was engaged in constructing. This was finished on the fourteenth, notwithstanding every effort of the garrison to impede the work. The cavalry immediately passed the river; and scouring the country in all directions, destroyed the corn-mills, levied contributions on the villages,

CHAP. VI. and deprived the city of its supplies. The powder-mills of Villa Feliche, from which the city received its supplies, after a severe contest with the corps of Versage, were likewise gained possession of by the enemy.

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July.

Vaughan. But the energy of Palafox, and the fertility of resource by which he was distinguished, did not desert him in these trying circumstances. In the city he erected corn-mills, which were worked by horses, and the monks were employed in the somewhat unclerical and anomalous operation of manufacturing gunpowder. For this purpose all the sulphur in the city was collected; nitre was extracted from the soil of the streets; and charbon was supplied by the hemp stalks, which in that part of Spain are of unwonted magnitude.

By the end of July the city was entirely invested, and its defenders had already suffered severely from want of provisions. But the spirit of the people did not flag. Frequent sorties were made with the view of re-opening the communication with the country; and, emboldened by the arrival of the regiment of Estremadura, which had found its way into the city, an attempt was made to regain the Torrero by as-

sault. This failed; and the inhabitants, despairing of success in any external effort of hostility, determined to remain within the walls of their city, and perish, if necessary, in its ruins.

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1808.
August.

On the night of the second of August and on the following day, the French bombarded the city. An hospital, containing the sick and wounded, caught fire, and was speedily reduced to ashes. Every effort was made to rescue the sufferers. Men and women distinguished themselves alike in this work of noble humanity, and, rushing amid the flames, braved all danger in the high excitement of the moment. It is pleasant that the annals of war and bloodshed, may be occasionally redeemed by the record of events like these.

Aug. 3.

The efforts of the besiegers did not slack, though their progress was retarded by the daily sorties of the garrison. On the fourth of August, at daybreak, they began battering in breach, and by nine o'clock the troops in two columns advanced to the assault. One of these made good its entrance near the Convent St. Engracia, the other by the Puerta del Carmen, which was carried by assault. The

Aug. 4.

CHAP. VI. first obstacle overcome, the French took the
 1808. batteries in reverse, and turned the guns on the
 August. city. A scene of wild havoc and confusion ensued. The assailants rushed through the streets, and endeavoured to gain possession of the houses. The Convent of St. Francisco and the general hospital took fire, and the flames spread on all hands. Many cast themselves from the windows on the bayonets of the soldiers; and the madmen escaping from the hospital, added to the horrors of the scene, by mingling with the combatants—shouting, shrieking, or laughing, amid the carnage.

Cavallero.

Wherever the French penetrated they were assailed by a dreadful fire from the houses, all of which had been barricaded. Dismayed by a resistance so obstinate and destructive, towards evening they lost courage, and retreated in confusion to that quarter of the city which remained in their possession. The terrible events of the day had thinned the ranks of the assailants. Of their number above fifteen hundred had fallen, including several generals.

In such circumstances it was, that the French

General summoned Palafox to surrender, in the CHAP. VI.
 following laconic note :—

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August.

Quartel General—Santa Engracia.

LA CAPITULACION.

The answer immediately returned was—

Quartel General—Zaragoza.

GUERRA AL CUCHILLO.

Aug. 5.
 The morning dawned and brought with it a renewal of the dreadful conflict. The French had penetrated to the Cozo, and occupied one side of the street while the Spaniards were in possession of the other. In the centre, General Verdier was seen giving orders from the Franciscan convent. Here a contest almost unexampled took place. War was waged from every house; the street was piled with dead, and an incessant fire was kept up by both parties. The batteries of the Zaragozans, and those of the French were frequently within a few yards of each other. At length the ammunition of the city was nearly expended, yet even this circumstance induced no thought of surrender. As Palafox rode through the streets, the people crowded round him, and declared that if am-

CHAP. VI. munition failed they were ready to resist the enemy with their knives. Towards sunset, however, their hopes were cheered by the unexpected arrival of Don Francisco Palafox, the brother of their heroic leader, with a reinforcement of three thousand men.

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August.

Eleven days passed, during which this murderous contest was continued, and new horrors were gradually added to the scene. The bodies of the slain which were left unburied in the streets, had become putrid, and tainted the atmosphere with pestilential odours. This was partially remedied by securing the French prisoners by ropes, and pushing them forward into the streets, in order to remove the bodies for interment.

Aug. 8.

On the eighth a council of war was held in the garrison, and in that assembly no voice was heard for surrender. It was determined to maintain those quarters of the city still in their possession with unshaken resolution; and should the fortune of war be eventually unfavourable to their cause, to retire across the Ebro, and, destroying the bridge, to perish in defence of the suburbs. There is a moral sublimity in the courage of the unfortunate, in that patient and

unshrinking fortitude of the spirit, which enables the sufferer to stand fearless and unsubdued amid the fiercest storms of fortune. The devotion and patriotism of the Zaragozans had been tried by fire, and they came forth pure and unsullied from the ordeal.

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August.

The resolution of their leaders was communicated to the people, and received with loud acclamations. The conflict was continued from street to street, from house to house, from room to room, and with renewed spirit on the part of the defenders. They gradually beat back their opponents, and regained the greater portion of the city. In the meanwhile, Verdier being wounded had retired from the command, and Lefebvre received orders from Madrid to raise the siege, and take up a position at Milagro. On the night of the thirteenth, a destructive fire was opened by the enemy from all their batteries, and many parts of the city were set on fire. The Church of St. Engracia was blown up, and that venerable fane of ancient religion was levelled with the dust. But the night of terror was followed by a dawn of joy. In the morning the inhabitants beheld the distant columns of their enemy retreating discomfited, from one of

Vaughan.

Aug. 13.

Aug. 14.

CHAP. VI. the most murderous and pertinacious struggles
of which history bears record.

1808.
August.

Thus concluded the ever memorable siege of Zaragoza, and thus was achieved the brightest and most honourable triumph of a people struggling for freedom. "There is not," says Mr. Southey, in a strain of eloquence worthy of the occasion, "in the annals of ancient or of modern times, a single event recorded, more worthy to be held in admiration, now and for evermore, than the siege of Zaragoza. Will it be said that this devoted people obtained for themselves, by all this heroism and all these sacrifices, nothing more than a short respite from their fate? Wo be to the slavish heart that conceives the thought, and shame to the base tongue that gives it utterance! They purchased for themselves an everlasting remembrance upon earth—a place in the memory and love of all good men, in all ages that are yet to come. They performed their duty; they redeemed their souls from the yoke; they left an example to their country never to be forgotten, never to be out of mind, and sure to contribute to, and hasten its deliverance."

"Let it not be said," observes General Foy, speaking of the defenders of Zaragoza,

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"that it would have been better to preserve themselves, because at a subsequent period they were forced to yield. Leonidas also died at Thermopylæ, and his death was certain before he went into battle. The glory of Zaragoza is of a similar kind. There too burst forth that religious fervour which embraces the present and the future, the cradle and the tomb, and which becomes still more holy when it is exerted against foreigners and the oppressors of our country. There also was exhibited that sublime indifference to life and death, which thinks of nothing but obedience to a noble impulse; and there the triumph of moral over physical nature was signally achieved."*

The retreat of the besieging army left the

* After these writers it is almost painful to quote Colonel Napier. "It is manifest," he asserts, "that Zaragoza owed her safety to *accident*, and that the desperate resistance of the inhabitants, *was more the result of chance than of any peculiar virtue*." CHANCE! Such is the melancholy extremity to which a writer so talented as Colonel Napier is driven, in denying the heroic devotion of the Zaragozans; and the hypothesis has at least the advantage of being one not likely to encounter refutation.

CHAP. VI. Zaragozans in a state of extreme suffering and exhaustion. Yet the privations of their situation were borne without a murmur. Many there were who had been reduced from opulence to abject poverty. Parents had to lament their children, wives their husbands, orphans were cast shelterless upon the world. Yet the voice of wailing was not heard in Zaragoza. Private sorrows were not suffered to disturb the glory of the public triumph. The time of trial and excitement had passed away, yet the fortitude of the brave and devoted Zaragozans remained unshaken.

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August.

Vaughan.

Measures were immediately adopted to preserve the city from infection. The streets and ruins were cleared from their dead. Ferdinand was publicly proclaimed, and rewards were bestowed on those who had distinguished themselves in the struggle. The undaunted Augustina was distinguished by peculiar honours; and Palafox, in the name of his sovereign, granted to the inhabitants of Zaragoza, the exclusive privilege of being perpetually exempted from disgraceful punishment for any cause, save treason or blasphemy.

CHAPTER VII.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

OF the movements in Catalonia we have not yet spoken. It is now necessary we should do so. CHAP. VII. 1808.

While the reliance of Spain on the faith of her invaders was yet unbroken, Duhesme, who commanded the army of the eastern Pyrenees, had succeeded by fraud and intimidation in gaining possession of the city of Barcelona, and the fortresses of Figueras and Mont Jouy. On its occupation by the French, the garrison of Barcelona amounted to about four thousand men, but so precarious was the tenure by which that city was held by the intrusive army, that Duhesme connived at their escape, and they

CHAP. VII. were suffered silently to depart and unite their
 1808. strength with that of the neighbouring insur-
 May. gents.

It was in Manresa that the earliest and most formidable ebullition of popular feeling took place. The inhabitants of that town, regardless of danger, were unanimous in declaring their adherence to Ferdinand; and the decrees from Bayonne, and the edicts of the servile Junta of Madrid, were burned publicly in the market-place. In Tortosa the Governor was murdered by the inhabitants, in the first exacerbation of their loyalty, and Duhesme thought it prudent still further to strengthen his position by the occupation of Lerida. The Spanish regiment of Estremadura, which had joined the French standard, was detached on this service; but the Leridans, with natural distrust, refused admission to their countrymen; and this body, unwilling again to unite themselves with the invaders, were subsequently received into Zaragoza, and bore part in the defence of that city.

There were at this period many difficulties by which the French army in Catalonia were surrounded. The Junta of Gerona was indefati-

gable in stimulating the spirit of the people into CHAP. VII.
 overt acts of insurrection. The whole extent of
 1808. its coast was open to the Mediterranean, and the
 May. province was liable at any moment to become the theatre of action for a British army. By the Navy of Britain the insurgents could easily be supplied with arms and warlike stores; and the patriotic cause in Catalonia numbered among its assertors a very considerable body of disciplined and efficient troops.

The general population, too, by the constitution of the province were inured to arms. At the signal of the alarm-bell or *Somaten*, every person capable of bearing arms was compelled to appear at certain indicated points of each district, ready to perform such service as the authorities of the province might require at their hands. From this circumstance it was, that the insurgent Catalans were distinguished by the name of *Somatenes*, a body, in point of military requisites, more than ordinarily formidable to the invaders.

Towards the end of May, Duhesme received orders to despatch two bodies of his army to co-operate with those in Valencia and Aragon. General Chabran, with a force somewhat ex-

CHAP. VII. ceeding four thousand men, was accordingly ordered to gain possession of Tarragona, and, securing its occupation by a sufficient garrison, to proceed by way of Tortosa, and, having incorporated the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen with his division, to unite with Moncey in his operations against Valencia. General Schwartz, with a force nearly equal in amount to that of Chabran, was despatched against Manresa, with orders to inflict punishment on the promoters of sedition in that city, and to levy on it a heavy contribution. He was then to proceed to Lerida, and, having gained possession of the city, to garrison the castle with five hundred men; and subsequently to join Lefebvre's army in the siege of Zaragoza.

Jun. 3. On the third and fourth of June, these two divisions set forward from Barcelona. The object of Schwartz's movement did not remain secret. It was communicated to the people of Manresa, by intelligence from Barcelona, and they were prepared for his approach. The Somatenes rung forth the alarm, and the peasantry of the country assembled in arms at the sound. The strong position of Bruch was selected as the scene of resistance, and

CHAP. VII. the force congregated on that point, were supplied with ammunition from the powder-mills at San Feliche. It was a circumstance favourable to the Somatenes, that the French General was induced by the inclemency of the weather to halt for a day at Martorel, where he arrived on the fifth. When Schwartz, on the day following, advanced to attack the position, he found, to his cost, that the interval thus afforded had not been misapplied. On his approach to Bruch, a heavy fire was opened on his column from the rocks and brushwood which surrounded the road, and his men fell back in confusion. But order was soon restored; and the Catalans, driven from their station, made a hasty retreat to Manresa and Igualada.

In such circumstances it was that Schwartz, unfortunately for his military fame, alarmed at the unexpected resistance he had encountered, instead of pushing forward to Manresa, halted his division. Encouraged by this circumstance the discomfited Somatenes rallied in their turn, and became the assailants. Schwartz, still more alarmed at this fresh instance of courage, gave orders for retreat. During this operation, the gallant Somatenes hung upon the flanks and

CHAP. VII. rear of the French army, and the difficulties of the latter becoming hourly more pressing, the ranks fell into disorder; and when they reached Martorel, it was in such confusion, and after sustaining such loss, that the continuance of offensive operations was impossible. On the following day the troops re-entered Barcelona.

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June.

Throughout the whole province the tidings of this victory produced the most powerful effect. Insurrection broke out on all hands. It was no longer with fearful hearts that the inhabitants took arms: they flew to the standard of their country in the full hope and confidence of victory. Duhesme was soon aware of the peril which surrounded him, and despatched orders to Chabran instantly to return with his division. On the eighth that general reached Tarragona, without having encountered opposition; but his retreat was impeded by the Somatenes, who already occupied the towns of Vendrell, Arbos, and Villa Franca. On arriving at Vendrell, a small body of the insurgents, which still occupied the place, were immediately attacked and driven back without difficulty. At Arbos the chief stand was made; and Chabran, on his approach to that town, found

Jun. 8.

the Somatenes drawn up in position. The country was open and adapted for the operations of cavalry; and the superiority of the French in that arm, gave them an overwhelming advantage. In these circumstances the Catalan army was defeated, and the town of Arbos was pillaged and set on fire.

Duhesme, in the meanwhile, had judged it prudent to despatch a reinforcement to Chabran, which succeeded, on the eleventh, in effecting a junction with the corps of that officer at San Feliche. With this addition to his force, Chabran marched against Manresa, in order to revenge the disgrace which the gallant Somatenes, in that neighbourhood, had already inflicted on the French arms. Unluckily for the success of this project, the pass of Bruch again intervened. Since the former engagement every effort had been made by the Catalan authorities to add, by artificial means, to the natural strength of the position. Chabran attacked it, and was driven back with some loss; and, dispirited by this circumstance, he retreated to Barcelona, amid the scoffs of the triumphant peasants, who continued to harass his march to the very gates of the city.

In every part of the province there was now

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June.

Jun. 11.

CHAP. VII. open and avowed hostility to the French authority. Almost every town possessed its Junta of government; and the flame of resistance, which had hitherto smouldered in the bosoms of the people, now burst forth in full volume and intensity. The danger of Duhesme became hourly more imminent. The frontier fortress of Figueras had already been attacked by the insurgents, and the garrison were driven from the town into the citadel, and subjected to a rigorous blockade. Thus was Duhesme's communication with France interrupted; and he determined, without delay, to proceed to the relief of that important fortress. With this view it was necessary that he should gain possession of Gerona; and he accordingly set out from Barcelona with the brigades of Generals Lecchi and Schwartz, in order to reduce that city. With the view of avoiding Hostalrich, a small fort held by the insurgents, Duhesme advanced by the road leading along the coast, and employed a French privateer, then at anchor in Barcelona, to attend his march.

For this movement the Somatenes were not unprepared. A considerable body had taken post on the heights near Mongat, a small fort, which had been erected on the coast to afford

protection from the inroads of the Barbary Corsairs. In attempting to defend the position thus taken, the Catalans were unsuccessful. The French drove them from the castle, and captured their guns; and another body, which occupied the neighbouring heights of Moncada, were likewise put to flight.

The town of Mataro fell next. The resistance of the people was neither strong nor pertinacious, yet the place was given up to plunder, and the foulest atrocities were committed by the French troops.

On the morning of the twentieth, Duhesme appeared before Gerona. The suburban villages of Salt and St. Eugenia were occupied and given up to plunder, and preparations were immediately made for the assault of the city. Gerona stands at the confluence of the Ter and the Ona; by the latter of which rivers the city is divided. On the east is a ridge of rocky hills; on the lower acclivity of which, the town is chiefly built, while a smaller portion, called the Mercadal, extends into the plain. On a mountain to the north-east stands the castle of Mont Jouy,* a place regu-

* There are in Catalonia two fortresses of that name.

CHAP. VII. larly fortified, and though small, of considerable strength. By three other forts connected by a ditch and rampart, the ridge to the eastward is completely commanded. All of these forts are within cannon shot of the city, and are separated from Mont Jouy by a rivulet and narrow valley. The more immediate defences of Gerona consist of an old wall with towers, but without ditch or platform, and two bastions, situated at the points where the Ona enters, and where it departs from the city. The Mercadal is fortified by a turreted wall with five regular bastions, but without half moons or covered way.

In the city every preparation was made for a vigorous defence. The garrison consisted of three hundred men of the regiment of Ultonia, and a small party of artillery, which had escaped from Barcelona on its occupation by Duhesme. But the whole population of the city were in arms, and ready to bear part in the approaching contest.

Laffaille. During the day, two batteries, which had been established by the French, opened fire on the city, but with little effect; and, as night closed, the assaulting column advanced, in a state of great disorder, against the bastion of Santa Clara.

The attack was feebly supported. Some of the CHAP. VII. assailants succeeded in surmounting the wall, but these were charged instantly by the regiment of Ultonia, and hurled back into the ditch.

Another attempt was made on the gate del Carmen. This too was repulsed with great slaughter; and Duhesme, discouraged by these reverses, made no further attempt to gain possession of the city. The day following was spent in fruitless negotiation; and, foiled alike in artifice and arms, Duhesme judged it prudent to return to Barcelona.

The leading Junta of Catalonia was that of Lerida. The authority of that body was generally acknowledged throughout the province; and its endeavours were directed to give effect and organization to the desultory resistance of the people. In pursuance of this object, a communication was kept up with Seville, Gibraltar, and the Balearic Islands, with Aragon and Valencia; and measures were adopted to collect and discipline a body of regular troops, or, in the language of the country, *Miquelets*, which might meet the enemy in the field with some prospect of success. Eighty *tercios*, or regiments of one thousand men each, were directed to be raised,

CHAP. VII. forty of which were to act as regulars, the remainder as a reserve.

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June.

In measures of such vigour and decision, there was of course much to excite the alarm of the French Government for the stability of their footing in Catalonia. General Reille was accordingly sent forward from Perpignan to the relief of Figueras. His force amounted to about nine thousand men; and having accomplished the primary object of the expedition, he was directed to continue his operations against Rosas and

Jul. 5. — Gerona. On the fifth of July, Reille appeared in the neighbourhood of Figueras, and with difficulty effected the relief of the fortress. On the eleventh, he proceeded against Rosas, a small but fortified town on the coast, and on his route encountered no enemy. The gates of Rosas, however, were closed against his entrance; and on summoning the place to surrender, the messenger was made prisoner, and a shower of bullets from the walls conveyed the answer of the garrison. Reille had no time for a siege. Don Juan Claros had raised the country in his rear, and an immediate retreat became necessary to the safety of his army. This was not effected without loss. The insurgents harassed his march;

and his loss, before reaching Figueras, exceeded two hundred men. CHAP. VII.

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July.

In the meanwhile, the insurgents had again occupied the strong country on the right of the Llobregat, from San Boy to Martorel. In order to dislodge them, a force, under General Lecchi, was despatched from Barcelona, which, on the thirtieth, appeared before Molinos del Rey. While the attention of the Somatenes was thus directed to the movements of Lecchi, the brigades of Bessieres and Goulas crossed the river at San Boy; and, taking them by surprise, turned the line of their position. The French thus successful, continued the pursuit to Martorel, plundering and burning the villages through which they passed.

Jun. 30.

Nearly at the same time, Chabran, having recruited his division by a halt at Mataro, set out from that town to collect provisions in the neighbouring country. Near Granollers he encountered a body of Somatenes, commanded by Don Francisco de Milans, and after an engagement, at most of doubtful success, Chabran fell back to Mataro, harassed on his retreat by the insurgent force.

Jul. 5.

Duhesme, still bent on the reduction of Gero-

CHAP. VII. na, proceeded to that city by the road along the coast, and encountered new difficulties every mile of his progress. The Catalans had obstructed the road by every possible impediment; and while his left flank was exposed to annoyance from the insurgents in that quarter, his right was cannonaded by Lord Cochrane in the *Imperieuse* frigate, and by several Spanish feluccas. After passing Mataro, General Goulas, with three battalions, was detached to attack the fort of Hostalrich, with the view of protecting the flank of the army from the continued hostilities of the Somatenes. The attack on Hostalrich failed. Goulas twice attempted an escalade, and was repulsed with loss; and desisting from further efforts, again joined the army of Duhesme before the walls of Gerona.

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Jul. 21.

Jul. 22. The city was invested on the twenty-second; and, on the day following, the army was reinforced by the division of General Reille. By Duhesme, the capture of Gerona was regarded as certain. A battering train had been brought from Barcelona; and he is said to have declared, that, on the third day of the siege, the city should be taken—on the fourth, it should be destroyed. There is a homely proverb, by the

recollection of which, Duhesme would have done well to temper his vaticinations. CHAP. VII.

All measures, compatible with the strength of the besieging army, were immediately adopted to cut off external communication with the city. The corps of General Reille was posted at Puerta Mayor; and the line of investment extended along the heights of San Miguel to the fords of the Ter, and from thence onward to the Monte Livio.

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July.

The labours of the siege were prosecuted with little vigour. Several batteries were opened, and shells were thrown into the town, but the resolution of the inhabitants remained unshaken. The garrison was reinforced by the arrival of a light-infantry battalion, thirteen hundred strong, which, with two pieces of field-ordnance, entered the city on the twenty-fifth. This raised the spirit of the people to a pitch of exultation seldom to be found in a besieged city.

Jul. 25.

Nor were their countrymen without less active and energetic in the cause than the garrison within. The Miquelets of Milans, and the Somatenes, commanded by Don Juan Claros, hovered round the camp of the enemy, attacking all stragglers, and driving back the foraging-par-

CHAP. VII. ties sent out to collect provisions in the neighbouring country. The resources of the besieging army were becoming daily more precarious. Sickness broke out in the camp; and while the city, whose communication with the neighbouring country still continued unbroken, received abundant supplies, the French were, in truth, suffering all the evils of a blockade.

1808.
July.

While matters were in this situation before Gerona, the Marques del Palacio, governor of the Balearic Islands, having concluded a treaty with Lord Collingwood, who commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean, landed at Tarragona, with about five thousand men, and thirty-seven pieces of artillery. This produced a great change in the aspect of affairs throughout the province. The Spanish fleet became disposable for the general purposes of defence; and the Catalans, filled with joy at this accession of strength, became inspired with new confidence in the extent of their resources. Many officers, who had hitherto remained passive, and several of the civil authorities, quitted Barcelona, and joined the standard of Palacio. The Supreme Junta immediately repaired to Tarragona; and constituting that city the seat of govern-

ment, appointed Palacio to the chief command of the provincial forces.

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July.

The primary object of the new leader was to strengthen the line of the Llobregat, which had again been occupied by the Somatenes. With this view, the Count de Caldagues, with a force about two thousand strong, was detached to Martorel, where he was joined by the Miquelets, commanded by Colonel Bajet, a patriotic scrivener of Lerida. A part of this force had scarcely taken post at San Boy, when the position was attacked by a body of the enemy, which encountered a vigorous repulse.

An assault on the castle of Mongat was concerted with Lord Cochrane, and executed with complete success. The crew of the *Imperieuse* bore part in the action; and, relying on the faith of a British officer, the commander of the castle surrendered on capitulation. By this event, about an hundred prisoners, seven guns, and a considerable quantity of ammunition and stores, fell into possession of the victors.

Jul. 31.

Secure in their position on the Llobregat, the Spanish army became disposable for the relief of Gerona. But Palacio, deficient in the arm of

CHAP. VII. cavalry, was probably averse to risk the conse-

1808.

August.

Aug. 14.

quences of a general engagement, with troops so palpably inferior in discipline and equipment, to those with whom the palm of victory must, in such circumstances, have been contested. But willing to impede the progress of the siege, he despatched the Count de Caldagues, with four companies of regular troops, three field-pieces, and two thousand Miquelets and Somatenes, to harass the French army in their position, and intercept their supplies. From the fort of Hostalrich, where he halted for some days, the force of Caldagues was increased by the addition of about two thousand of the new levies, and two pieces of artillery. On the fourteenth, he took post at Castella, about two leagues in rear of the French encampment. Here Caldagues was joined by Claros and Milans, and a scheme of joint operations was concerted with the garrison.

The army, thus united, was about six thousand strong; and it was determined, on the following morning, to attack the works of the enemy, who had removed the greater part of his force to the plain on the left bank of the Ona. The batteries in front of Mont Jouy were but slenderly tenant-

ed with troops; and against these, the efforts of the Catalan army were to be principally directed.

1808.

August.

Aug. 16.

At nine o'clock on the morning of the sixteenth, the garrisons of Mont Jouy and Gerona, made a simultaneous sally on the besiegers; and overpowering the French troops opposed to their progress, carried and set fire to the batteries. One of these was for a moment recovered by a fresh column of the enemy; but reinforcements coming up, the battery was again stormed, and remained in possession of the Spaniards.

In the meanwhile, the force of Caldagues advanced in several columns, and driving the French from the heights of San Miguel, attacked their encampment at Camp Duras, and finally pursued them across the Ter.

The advantages of this most brilliant achievement were, fortunately, not lost to the gallant Catalans, by any imprudent prosecution of their victory. Instead of following an enemy, superior in all military requisites, to the open plain, Caldagues, with the prudence of a wise general, remained on the heights, and made preparations

CHAP. VII. to repel the attack which he anticipated on the following morning.

1808.
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But Duhesme, dispirited by the defeat he had sustained, thought only of retreat. Under cover of night he put his army in motion; and separating his force from that of Reille, fled to Barcelona, while the latter fell back to Figueras. All his heavy artillery, large stores of ammunition, and even many of the wounded were abandoned. Duhesme did not venture to take the road by the coast; but on learning that an English frigate was prepared to rake his columns on the march, he betook himself to the mountains, destroying his stores, and throwing his artillery over the rocks. Reille was more fortunate, and succeeded in reaching Figueras without hostile impediment.

Of the brilliant victory thus achieved over an army superior in numbers, discipline, and equipment, and commanded by an officer of high military pretensions, the Catalans were justly proud. Duhesme endeavoured to conceal his disgrace by encouraging the belief, that he had retreated, in consequence of positive orders to relinquish the prosecution of the siege. But

St. Cyr.

this report was too improbable to gain credit; CHAP. VII.
and St. Cyr informs us, that even in the French
army under his command, "*ce bruit ne trouva*
que des incredules."

1808.
August.

As a general, Duhesme must stand convicted of gross ineptitude. In his management of the campaign, we can discover no skilful adaptation of means to ends; and his conduct, before Girona in particular, exhibits a strange mixture of bullying and timidity.* His attacks on the city were foolish, and conducted in a manner utterly disgraceful to a disciplined army. He evidently expected to conquer without resistance; and, deceived in this, he sought immediate refuge in flight. To subdue a brave people he seems to have relied solely on measures of fero-

* Colonel Laffaille, in his work, "*Memoires sur les Campagnes de Catalogne*," gives some amusing details, illustrative of the vacillation of his leader, during the first attempt on Girona. The same author informs us, that after the second siege, it even became a question, between Reille and Duhesme, whether the latter should not abandon Barcelona, and fall back on Figueras. But Duhesme knew that the loss of Barcelona could not fail to draw down on him the indignation of Napoleon; and this circumstance overbalanced his fears. Laffaille's information, on this matter, is stated to have been derived from the General himself. It certainly affords satisfactory evidence of the terror the gallant Somatenes had excited in their opponents.

CHAP. VII. cious intimidation. But there is no axiom more true, than that cruelty is not only a moral crime, but a military error ; and we have authority for the fact, that the savage inflictions of Duhesme were beheld, not with terror, but hatred ; and that many of those who, in other circumstances, would have remained neutral in the contest, took arms from despair. At once to conciliate and subdue, is the achievement of a higher intelligence. Fire and slaughter are ever the instruments of a bungler. Let it be the lasting disgrace of Duhesme, that he employed such weapons, and employed them in vain.

1808.

August.

Cabanes.

Such was the issue of the first noble and successful struggle made by the Catalans for the liberation of their province. At the end of August, 1808, the French, defeated at all points, remained only in possession of the city of Barcelona, and the fortresses of Figueras and Mont Jouy.

CHAPTER VIII.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.

GALLICIA possessed many advantages as a theatre of resistance to the usurping government. Its surface was rugged and mountainous, difficult of access, and easy of defence ; and, removed from the immediate sphere and influence of the arms of France, it was yet sufficiently near to interrupt, by a single successful operation, the most important line of her communication. From its numerous seaports, the intercourse with England was easy and rapid ; and Galicia may be said to have been the heart by which the vital succours of Britain were circulated through the great body of the Spanish people. The population of Galicia is hardy and vigorous beyond that of any other province ; and, driven by the poverty of their

1808.

CHAP. VIII own country to seek employment abroad, these

1808.

June.

gallant and athletic mountaineers had become, as it were, the Parias of their wealthier neighbours, and might be found throughout Spain, engaged in every labour requiring powerful exertion, and continued bodily endurance.

In Galicia, the spirit of resistance to French authority was no less resolute and pervading than in the other provinces. The assembling and training of new levies went vigorously on; and the strong mountainous position of Manzanal, in the neighbourhood of Astorga, was fortified by intrenchments, to serve as a station of defence. The leader of the Gallician army was Don Antonio Filangieri, Captain-General of the province, whose prudence and circumspection, in the first burst of national enthusiasm, had excited popular indignation. By his energy and military knowledge, he had subsequently rendered good service to the patriotic cause; but the suspicions of the people were never wholly eradicated,—and Filangieri died by assassination.

Don Joachim Blake, an officer of Irish extraction, succeeded him in command. During the month of June, the forces of the province were assembled at Lugo; and their num-

bers were materially increased by the return of CHAP. VIII
Taranco's army from Portugal, and by five thousand Spanish prisoners whom England had debarked in Galicia, in a state of complete equipment for service.

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July.

Cuesta, after his defeat at Cabezon, had rallied the army of Castile, and taken post at Benevente. There he was joined by Blake, who, leaving only one division of his army to secure the position of Manzanal, reached Benevente on the sixth. It was the intention of Bessieres, if possible, to prevent this junction by a sudden attack on Cuesta; but, disappointed in this object, he made immediate preparations to encounter the combined armies in the field. On the ninth he quitted Burgos with the reserve. On the tenth he reached Palencia, where he collected the scattered columns of his army, and was joined by the division of General Mouton, which had advanced from Bayonne to replace the portion of the army engaged in the siege of Zaragoza. The force thus assembled, amounted to about fifteen thousand men, with thirty-two pieces of artillery.

Jul. 6.

No sooner had Cuesta been reinforced by the

CHAP. VIII junction of the Gallician army, than he publicly announced his intention of advancing to Valladolid. On the prudence of this project, differences are understood to have occurred between the generals. Blake, aware of the superior discipline of the French troops, and of the great advantages they possessed in point of cavalry, was unwilling to advance into the plains, and try the hazard of a battle. He urged the policy of retiring to a strong position in the mountainous country of Leon or Galicia, which, without a large reinforcement of his army, it would have been impossible for Bessieres to attack. But the more prudent counsels of Blake were overruled by Cuesta, on whom, as senior officer, the chief command had devolved. The Spanish army were put in motion; and leaving a division at Benevente, proceeded in a direction which threatened Burgos and Valladolid.

Jul. 12. On the night of the twelfth, the army of Bessieres set out from Palencia. On the thirteenth it halted in a position extending from the Torre de Marmojas to Ampudia. In the evening, Marshal Bessieres received intelligence that the enemy were at Medina del Rio Seco. Before

day-dawn on the fourteenth, his army, formed in two columns, was on the march to attack them. CHAP. VIII

The strength of the Spanish army has been variously represented. Amid conflicting statements, it may reasonably be assumed to have amounted to about twenty-five thousand infantry, with a few hundred cavalry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artillery. The body, thus formidable in point of numbers, was drawn up in two lines; the first of which, supported by a strong artillery, ranged along the summit of a plateau, with a considerable declivity towards the French army, formed by the overflowing of the rivulet Sequillo during the rains of spring and winter. The country around was flat and cultivated, and divided into enclosures by stone walls. The second line was placed about a mile in rear of the first, and extended greatly beyond it on the left. In this were stationed the best troops; and the remainder of the artillery was ranged in the centre. The position of the cavalry was somewhat in rear of the first line, and within a short distance of the road.

The disposition of the Spanish army gave ad-

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July.

1808.
July.

CHAP. VIII advantages to Bessieres, which he did not neglect.

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July.

The great distance intervening between the lines afforded an opportunity of dividing them; and, with this view, while the brigades of Sabathier and Ducos advanced in column of battalions to attack the front of the position, the divisions of Merle and Mouton took the enemy in flank, and the front line of the Spaniards was instantly broken, and driven from its position with great slaughter. Nearly at the same time, the cavalry was charged by General Lasalle, and instantly put to flight.

Under these unfavourable circumstances, a gallant attempt was made by Cuesta to retrieve the fortunes of the day. Two columns of attack were directed to advance from the second line, in order to regain the plateau. That on the right made a vigorous and successful charge on the enemy, and drove him back in disorder. Part of Mouton's division was likewise assailed by the Spanish cavalry, and compelled to retreat; but a body of the imperial guard advancing to its assistance, the Spaniards in turn were forced to give ground.

The attack of the second line, however, was

vigorous; the French were losing ground, CHAP. VIII
and several of their guns were already taken.

But the right column of the Spaniards had not been supported in its advance by the left, and from this circumstance its flank was unprotected. Of the opportunity thus afforded Bessieres took immediate advantage. The exposed flank of the column was charged by the division of Merle; and the Spaniards were driven back in irretrievable confusion. An attempt was made to rally in the town of Rio Seco, but without success. It was carried by Mouton's division at the point of the bayonet; and the cavalry continued charging the fugitives with great slaughter, along the road to Benevente. The division of Blake was the only portion of the army which retreated in tolerable order.

In this unfortunate action, the loss of the Spanish army was about five thousand. Fifteen pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of ammunition were taken on the field. On the part of the French, the victory was earned with little expense of life. Their loss, in killed and wounded, is said to have amounted only to one hundred and twenty-five of the former, and four

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July.

Foy.

CHAP. VIII hundred of the latter. By another account it is estimated at eight hundred.*

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July.

The battle of Rio Seco, though unfortunate, was far from dishonourable to Spanish prowess. The proximate cause of defeat was, unquestionably, the unskilful disposition of the army, which exposed it to be beaten in detail. Under circumstances the most unfavourable and dispiriting, the second line of the Spaniards fought with a courage and pertinacity worthy of a better general, and a more fortunate result. The advantage of the French, in point of cavalry, was counterbalanced by nothing in the position of the Spanish army. The latter fought in front of a defile, and were simultaneously attacked both in front and flanks. That, after the defeat of the first line, the issue of the battle should even for a time have become doubtful, is a circumstance honourable to the courage of the Spanish troops. No general of sound discretion would have given battle in the circum-

* It is stated by Mr. Southey, on what he calls "*the best authority*"—that of the neighbouring priests—that the number of slain, alone, in the battle, amounted to twenty-seven thousand. Were it worth while, the extravagance of this calculation might be easily demonstrated by a *reductio ad absurdum*.

stances, and in the situation selected by Cuesta. CHAP. VIII His true policy, unquestionably, was, to have remained in the mountains of Leon or Galicia,*

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* We learn from the valuable appendix to the history of Colonel Napier, that the anxiety of Napoleon, with regard to the issue of the operations of Bessieres, was intense. In his communications to Savary, he uniformly expresses his conviction, that Leon and Galicia were the only points from which a vital stab might be inflicted on the power of France in the Peninsula. In one letter he says, "Le but de tous les efforts de l'armée doit être de conserver Madrid. C'est là qu'est tout. Madrid ne peut être menacé que par l'armée de Galice."—"Un échec que recevrait le General Dupont serait peu de chose; un échec que recevrait le Marechal Bessieres serait plus considerable et se ferait sentir à l'extrémité de la ligne."

In another document we find the same opinions even more strongly expressed:—"Q'importe que Valence soit soumise? Q'importe que Saragosse soit soumise? Mais general le moindre succès de l'ennemi du côté de la Galice aurait des inconveniens immenses."

The following extract, from a note dictated by the Emperor, will shew his opinion of the difficulties which must have attended the invasion of Galicia:—"S'il (Bessieres,) obtenait à Benavente et à Leon un grand succès contre l'armée de Galice, peut-être serait-il convenable pour profiter de la victoire, et de la terreur de premiers moments, de se jeter dans la Galice."

So hazardous a measure, as entering Galicia with so limited a force as that of Bessieres, is here considered by Napoleon as only advisable in case Bessieres should previously have achieved a great victory, and the movement could be effected before the "*terreur de premiers moments*" should have subsided. It is therefore evident, that had Blake and Cuesta retired, without fighting, to the Gallician mountains, the French army would not have ventured to attack them.

CHAP.VIII where, in an intrenched position, he might have
 1808. bid defiance to any force with which Bessieres
 July. could have assailed him. If we assume him—as
 we must do—to have been aware of the events
 then passing in the south, his conduct becomes
 still more censurable. Though, possibly, he
 might not have foreseen a success so brilliant
 and decisive as that of Baylen, yet he might,
 and ought to have known, that the situation of
 Dupont was one of almost irretrievable difficulty
 and danger, and to have calculated on the pro-
 bability of the army of Castanos being speedily
 disposable for more distant and extended opera-
 tions. But relying on the numerical superiority
 of his troops, Cuesta forgot that more than half
 of these were nothing better than raw and un-
 disciplined levies, and advanced into the open
 country to encounter an enemy, with whom,
 when unassisted by strong advantages of posi-
 tion, it was abundantly evident he was unequal
 to cope.

After the battle of Rio Seco, the differences
 which had existed between Blake and Cues-
 ta, occasioned the immediate separation of their
 forces. The former fell back on his posi-
 tion at Manzanal, while Cuesta marched for

Leon. Neither were pursued. The energy of CHAP.VIII
 Bessieres seemed to have evaporated in the bat-
 tle; and General Lasalle, who, with the cavalry,
 1808. was engaged in full pursuit, received orders to
 July. return. During the fourteenth and fifteenth, the
 army halted at Rio Seco, and subsequently, by
 easy marches, advanced to Benevente, which it
 did not reach till the twentieth. In that city he
 remained till the twenty-second, when he pro-
 ceeded to Mayorga, where his army was rein-
 forced by the addition of ten thousand men. Jul. 22.

Cuesta had left Leon for Toro and Salamanca;
 and Bessieres received orders to follow Blake
 into Galicia. With this view, he had advanced
 to Puente Orvigo, when intelligence reached
 him of the defeat of Baylen. By this event, an
 entire change of operations was rendered ne-
 cessary.

CHAPTER IX.

ADVANCE OF JOSEPH TO MADRID.

CHAP. IX. THE assembly of Notables lent themselves, as might be expected, to all the purposes of the Emperor. The organization of this body was regulated by the Supreme Junta of Government; and the Church, the army, and the nobility of the higher and lower orders, sent their quota of representatives to bear part in the solemn farce about to be enacted at Bayonne.

Jun. 7. On the seventh of June, the intrusive monarch of Spain arrived on the scene, and received the homage of all the Spanish deputies already in the city. These formed themselves into classes, according to their respective ranks, and waited on the new sovereign with addresses of congratulation.

The fifteenth was the day fixed for the convocation of the Notables. The meeting consisted of eighty-six members. Don Miguel de Azanza, ex-minister of finance, was appointed President, and Don Mariano Louis d'Urquijo, Vice-president and Secretary. Both were men of talent, both were of the party of Ferdinand; but considering the Bourbon dynasty at an end, and hoping to extract benefit to their country even from her misfortunes, they were willing, in the necessity of the times, to transfer their allegiance to the new monarch.

The character of Joseph seemed eminently calculated to allay the popular antipathy to the new government. Mild and generous in disposition, pleasing in manners, with a mind enlarged by study, and a knowledge of the world rarely within the reach of hereditary monarchs to acquire, he apparently possessed every quality by which the happiness of his subjects could be promoted or ensured. Under a new dynasty, the evils of former misgovernment might be corrected. The institutions of antiquated tyranny, which had hitherto retarded the advance of Spain in knowledge and civilization, might be replaced by others better fitted to draw forth her

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Nellerto.

CHAP. IX. resources, and enable her to reassume that rank
 1808. among nations which her natural advantages en-
 June. titled her to hold. Napoleon had promised
 Spain a constitution, which should separate the
 treasure of the state from the property of the
 king ; which should draw a salutary line of de-
 marcation between the legislative and executive
 powers, and establish the independence of the
 judicial order : a form of government, in short,
 which should encourage the diffusion of know-
 ledge among the people ; science, commerce, ag-
 riculture, and the arts ; all that can increase the
 wealth of a nation, or lend grace to its enjoy-
 ment.

It was natural that those who anticipated such
 benefits from the accession of Joseph to the
 throne should support his cause. Yet it is
 now evident they reasoned falsely, and regu-
 lated their conduct on principles inapplicable
 to the circumstances of their country. They
 either knew little of the temper and spirit of
 the Spanish nation, or knowing, underrated its
 energy. They might and should have known
 that the hearts and voices of the people were in
 favour of their ancient dynasty ; that a constitu-
 tion, however excellent, is not to be thrust on an

unwilling nation by the bayonet, or disseminat- CHAP. IX.
 ed from the cannon's mouth. A nation cannot
 be bullied into freedom. They must know and
 feel their rights, before they can enjoy them ;
 and, least of all, can this sense of their privileges
 be successfully imparted to a people by a series
 of proceedings, in themselves a violation of them
 all. In supporting the cause of the intrusive
 monarch, these men betrayed, without benefiting
 their country. They contributed, what in them
 lay, to spread war and havoc through her pro-
 vinces. The course they followed was devious,
 yet not smooth ; it was not the path of loyalty,
 nor of freedom—scarcely that of honour. Never
 were the calculations of the wise more effectually
 put to shame, by the honest, unswerving firm-
 ness of the ignorant. Yet surely not in this igno-
 rant, that they acted on a deep sense of
 inalienable right, and rather than their native
 soil should be defiled by the tread of the op-
 pressor, bedewed it with their blood.

Let us not, however, be unjust. That many of
 those who supported the new dynasty by their in-
 fluence and counsels, did so from pure and consci-
 entious motives, we know from their private cor-
 respondence ; and we know also that many, in

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CHAP. IX. the long and fearful struggle which ensued, nobly redeemed their error by joining the standard of their country, and hazarding life and fortune in her cause. *

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June.

One of the first acts of the council of Notables was to recognise Joseph as king of Spain and the Indies, and present an address of congratulation. The reply of the intrusive sovereign gave expression to sentiments of moderation and benevolence which might confer honour on the most *legitimate* of despots. He wished only to reign, he said, for the good of Spain. To that object should all his efforts be directed. He would not cross the Pyrenees as the partisan of a party. All his subjects had a right to equal justice, and they should all enjoy it. He knew the honour and generosity of the Castilian character. It was his ambition to be regarded as the father, not as the tyrant of his people.

While Bayonne thus presented the extraor-

* Among others, the Duke del Infantado and the Marquis de la Romana. Nellerto gives several letters of the latter, in which he declares the new dynasty to be a *blessing* to his country. That such was, at this period, the real opinion of this distinguished patriot there can be little doubt. That he soon changed it there can be less. Yet the tenor of his letters proves that even Romana could play the sycophant.

CHAP. IX. dinary spectacle of the proudest nobility of Europe, bending in humility before the throne of a plebeian monarch, a circumstance yet more extraordinary gave completion to his triumph.—Ferdinand broke the silence of his retreat at Valencey, in order to congratulate Joseph on his assumption of regal authority. In his own name, and in that of his brother and uncle, he again publicly renounced all pretension to the crown, and felicitated the Spanish nation on the accession of a monarch, adapted, by his talents and his virtues, to promote their prosperity. It is in vain for the advocates of legitimacy, to attempt to palliate the imperishable tarnish of such a document, by attributing it to necessity or violence. Disgrace is never necessary to a brave man; and no one of a spirit prouder than that of a Spanish Bourbon, but would have preferred death to the ignominy of a humiliation so degrading.

The proceedings of such a meeting as that assembled at Bayonne, can possess little interest. At all events, their acts were few, and may be soon enumerated. They acknowledged Joseph as their king; enjoined obedience to his authority; accepted, with trifling modifications,

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July.

Nellerto.

CHAP. IX. the constitution tendered by Napoleon, and regulated the law of future succession to the monarchy. This done, their part in the performance was at an end.

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July.

Before crossing the Pyrenees, Joseph proceeded to appoint his officers of state. To avoid exciting national jealousies, he determined to enter Spain with but a small retinue of Frenchmen. All the important offices connected with the administration were filled by Spaniards. The Prince of Castel Franco, the Dukes Del Infantado, Parque, and Hajar, the Marquesses de Santa Cruz and Hariza, and the Counts de Fernan Nunez, Orgaz, and Castelflorido, and other great names of the monarchy, were invested with the dignities of the new court. The choice of ministers was judicious. Among the number were Azanza, Urquijo, Jovellanos, Mazaredo, and Cevallos. Men more distinguished in talent, or who possessed a higher place in the esteem of their countrymen, Spain did not afford. Blind to the dangers which awaited them, all were ambitious of taking office under the new government, and of giving public demonstration of their zeal in its behalf.

Surrounded by the grantees, and followed by

a numerous suite of noble and distinguished Spaniards, Joseph at length set forth on his journey to Madrid. On entering Spain, he was greeted in every city with congratulations by the civic and provincial authorities; but the people were gloomy and silent. It was the moment when Blake and Cuesta were marching to engage Bessieres, and all hopes were engaged in the event of the approaching contest. Should the Spanish army be victorious, no doubt could be entertained that the usurper would be compelled to re-enter France; and, under such circumstances, all were glad to shun the necessity of compromising their principles or safety, by any shew of allegiance to his authority.

On the day of the victory of Rio Seco, Joseph entered Burgos, and by that event all obstacles to his further advance were at once removed.—

On the twentieth he arrived at Madrid. The municipal authorities came forth in their robes to greet his approach; the houses by which he passed were hung with rich tapestry; laurels over-arched the streets; and it was amid the deafening and joyous clamour of bells, cannon, and military music, that the new monarch entered his capital. All was loud, save the

CHAP. IX.
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Jul. 20.

CHAP. IX. voices of the people. As the cavalcade passed
 1808. onward to the palace, the streets were silent
 July. and tenantless. The citizens hid themselves in
 their houses, as if unwilling to behold the living
 image of their country's degradation. They
 well remembered—could they forget?—that the
 throne of this plebeian successor of the Bour-
 bons was based on fraud, perfidy, and massacre.
 The streets through which he rode in triumph
 had been reddened with the blood of their coun-
 trymen. Was it in the nature of the haughty
 and revengeful Spaniards to forget this? Had
 a few short weeks obliterated from their mem-
 ories all records of the second of May? No!
 The people of Madrid did not disgrace the cause
 of honour, loyalty, and justice, by bending at
 the chariot wheels of their oppressor. They
 were, indeed, told that the new monarch came to
 regenerate the country, to reform the abuses of
 a government with which the nation were con-
 tented, proffering immunities which they wanted
 not, and a freedom from oppression which they
 had seldom practically felt. But were they to
 believe that pure waters could flow from so cor-
 rupt a fountain? Was it possible that the u-
 surper, whose very presence in their capital was

in itself an insult and an outrage; in whom they
 saw only the tool and minion of an ambition
 which trampled on all human rights; to which
 no impediment was sacred, and which recklessly
 pursued its course, desolating and to desolate,
 could be greeted by the Spanish nation as the
 apostle of concord, the chosen minister of bless-
 ings, the saviour of their bleeding and lacerated
 country?

This was scarcely to be expected. The Span-
 ish government, though despotic, was not op-
 pressive to the great body of the nation. The
 nobles, almost uniformly attached to the Court,
 were seldom resident on their estates, which
 were occupied on easy terms by a flourishing
 tenantry. The administration of church prop-
 erty was also highly favourable to the peas-
 antry, who suffered little from the imposi-
 tions of the state, and constituted a body,
 hardy, warlike, and independent, and attached
 to a government under which, for a long suc-
 cession of ages, they had lived tranquil and con-
 tented. By them the evils of despotism were
 but little felt; the trammels on mental freedom
 narrowed none of their enjoyments; and the
 victims of the inquisition were generally taken

CHAP. IX. from a class with which they had little communion either of interest or feeling.

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July.

To a people thus situated, the prospect of political regeneration possessed but little charm. Without knowledge, but that taught by their priests, who inculcated the most slavish doctrines, both political and religious, to them a free constitution was, in truth, nothing but a name. No adage is more true than that a people to be free must be enlightened. The sun of liberty does not rise in the zenith, nor pour down the full flood of his unclouded radiance on regions dark and benighted. The twilight of doubtful struggle must precede his appearance. It is by slow degrees that the clouds which obscure his rays are illuminated and dispelled, till at length, mounting in the horizon, he displays the full measure of his glory and effulgence.

The first acts of Joseph on his arrival at Madrid, were directed to attain that popularity of which he evidently stood in need. Alms were profusely distributed to the indigent. Bull-fights were exhibited, the theatres thrown open, and every art was employed to secure the "sweet voices" of the uncourteous populace.

The Council of Castile, in common with all the authorities of the kingdom, were directed to take the oath of fidelity to the new monarch. This, with some inconsistency,* yet with honourable spirit, the Council declined, and the members of it were, in consequence, excluded from the grand fete, at which the monarch had decided on receiving the congratulations of his more distinguished subjects.

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On the twenty-fourth, Joseph was proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies, with every circumstance of pomp and magnificence. On that occasion, however, the Count d'Altamira, the head of one of the most ancient families of Europe, declined performing the functions of his office, as grand standard-bearer, and that duty was, in consequence, discharged by the Marquis del Campo d'Allange, a grandee of principles more pliant and accommodating.

Jul. 24.

With these petty exceptions, all went smoothly at Madrid. The oath of allegiance was taken by the grandees and dignitaries of the kingdom; and the prelates testified their zeal, by offering

* The Council of Castile, in several of its acts, had already recognised the new dynasty.

CHAP. IX. personal congratulations to the new tenant of the throne on his assumption of the sceptre.

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July.

But a storm was gathering in another quarter, which suddenly overcast the French horizon at Madrid, and changed the whole aspect of affairs in that city. Intelligence arrived of the surrender of Dupont. The moral influence of this event was not less strongly felt in the capital than in other parts of the kingdom. Many, who in the prosperity of the invaders had joined their cause, now deserted it on the first symptom of misfortune. The Dukes del Parque and Infantado escaped from the city in disguise, and joined the insurgents. Cevallos, who, in the course of little more than two months, had sworn allegiance to three monarchs, again deserted his colours and enrolled himself as a patriot. These were evil omens. The capital was now open to the armies of Andalusia and Valencia; and it was reported that the former was within a few marches of the city. The Court were terror-stricken. A council of war was immediately assembled; and Savary, by whom Murat had been succeeded in command, proposed to garrison the Retiro, and attack the Spanish armies in succession, as they advanced to Madrid. But

more timid councils prevailed. It was determined to abandon the capital and retreat behind the Ebro.

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July.

Thus, after a short but fierce struggle, had the Spaniards, by their own unaided valour, succeeded in freeing nearly their whole territory from the presence of the invaders. This success had been achieved against the first army of Europe, commanded by the greatest generals of the age. At the commencement of hostilities, we know that the French forces in Spain amounted in number to one hundred and fifty thousand men. These, by the energetic courage of the people, had been driven back and discomfited. Not a foreign bayonet had been drawn in their cause. Whatever honour may attach to so splendid an achievement, must exclusively be given to the Spanish people. It is theirs and theirs only. Let this be the answer to those who accuse the patriots of lukewarmness, in the cause which they so gallantly and perseveringly maintained. In truth, considering the disadvantages under which they laboured, the wonder is, not that they did so little, but that they achieved so much. It was manifestly impossible, that a body of undisciplined levies, miserably armed and

CHAP. IX. equipped, without experienced leaders, and deficient in the arms of cavalry and artillery, could successfully contend with the French armies in the field. No sophistry, therefore, can be more gross, than that of those reasoners, who argue that the Spanish people were indifferent to the cause of freedom, because their armies were frequently defeated in the field. The memory of Baylen, Valencia, Zaragoza, Bruch, and Gerona, will bear imperishable record of the national ardour and perseverance, and give the lie to those who would basely injure the cause of freedom, by vilifying the character of its defenders.

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July.

Yet, he would judge erroneously of the character of this memorable struggle, who should form an estimate of the amount and vigour of the hostility of the Spanish people, by an exclusive reference to the operations of their armies. These, in truth, formed but a small part of that widely extended system of destructive warfare, by which the French were encountered in the Peninsula. Wherever any detachment of their armies could be overpowered by the peasantry, they were attacked and massacred. All stragglers perished. The motion of large masses was continually required, to keep open the commu-

CHAP. IX. nication of the different corps, and protect their convoys. The expense of life, by which the invaders were enabled, at any period, to hold military possession of the country, was enormous. Throughout the whole contest, there was a spirit of fierce and unmitigated hostility abroad, in every quarter of the kingdom; an enmity which never slumbered nor slept, which was in continual and almost universal action, and which wasted, like a pestilence, the strength of the invaders.

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July.

Though the Spaniards owed much of the success which crowned their efforts, to their own zeal and courage, it must be confessed, that some portion of it is attributable to the blunders of their opponents. The French were evidently unprepared for the degree and character of the resistance which they encountered in the Peninsula. They regarded the people with contempt, and were consequently led to attempt important objects, with inadequate means. Defeat was the penalty of these ignorant miscalculations.—Something of gratuitous tarnish, something even of dark and memorable disgrace, may have been cast on the national arms, by the misconduct and timidity of those intrusted with command;

CHAP. IX. but it is unquestionable, that the disasters, in which their operations so often terminated, are greatly attributable to those who directed the conduct of the war. Objects of vast importance, which, by an effort of competent magnitude and vigour, might have been secured to the invaders, were lost; and all the moral consequences of failure were hazarded with an imprudent rashness, of which the subsequent details of this narrative will abundantly display the results.

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CHAPTER X.

OPERATIONS IN PORTUGAL.

IN Portugal, the measures of the usurping government were not of a character to conciliate the affections of the people. The invaders had at once thrown off the mask. The ancient dynasty was proclaimed to have forfeited the throne. The pictures of the Braganzan monarchs were torn from the walls of the palace, with circumstances of public indignity. Contributions of inordinate magnitude were exacted from the people. The artifices which had been adopted in Spain, to blind the nation to the real views of the usurper, were considered unnecessary in Portugal. That country was too limited in territory, and too feeble in resources, to excite the fears of Napoleon; and there no attempt was

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CHAP. X. made to exhibit usurpation in the semblance of justice.

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In the eyes of the French government, a people so little formidable, had no claim to mercy or forbearance. "Of what use is it," asked the minister of Napoleon, in a letter to Marshal Junot, "to make promises which you cannot perform. Nothing, undoubtedly, can be more laudable, than to conciliate the confidence and affection of the people; but do not forget that the safety of the army is a paramount object. Disarm the Portuguese; maintain a strict watch over the soldiers, lest they become the nucleus of insurrection. Watch too the Spanish troops. Guard the important fortresses of Almeida and Elvas. Lisbon is too large and too populous a city, and the population is necessarily hostile. Withdraw your troops from it. Hut them on the sea coast. Keep them exercised, disciplined, and collected in masses, that they may be always ready to encounter the English army, which, sooner or later, will be landed on the shores of Portugal."

Though the arrogance and the rapacity of their invaders, did not, and could not, fail to excite the indignation and the hatred of the people,

yet several months elapsed, before these feelings gave rise to any general or formidable demonstrations of resistance. Intelligence of the insurrection in Spain, at length set the match to the train, and fired the spirit of the people with a kindred ardour and devotion to the cause of freedom. In vain did Junot endeavour to deceive the people by false information. In vain did he suppress or mutilate the letters by the public post, which gave intelligence of the events passing in the sister country. The news were disseminated through the country by a thousand channels. Secret messengers were employed by the Supreme Junta, to convey to the Spanish army in Portugal, injunctions to join their countrymen in defending the throne and the altar from usurpation and insults. Private letters to the military of all ranks, besought them to return to Spain, and afford protection to their families amid the dangers which surrounded them.

Such appeals were not made in vain. Thenceforward no confidence could be placed in the fidelity of the Spanish army. Junot endeavoured to conciliate them by every means in his power. He treated the higher officers with flattering distinction, and raised the pay and allow-

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June. ances of the troops, to an equality with those of the French army. Every measure was taken to guard against defection. The Spanish army was divided into small bodies, and dispersed over as wide a surface as possible; directions were given to the officers commanding in the neighbourhood, to redouble their vigilance; and preparations were made to repel, by strong measures, the first overt demonstrations of disaffection in the troops.

It was under such circumstances of impending peril, that Junot was compelled, by the order of Napoleon, to weaken his army, by detaching four thousand men under Loison, to co-operate with Bessieres on the Spanish frontier; and an equal number, under General Avril, to assist Dupont in his operations in Andalusia. The army of Junot was thus imprudently weakened, at the very moment when a powerful and general resistance was about to break forth; and the force which remained was barely equal to supply the necessary garrisons, for the more important points of occupation.

But circumstances favoured the French. Avril, having advanced to Tavira, was induced to retrace his steps, by intelligence that an Eng-

lish army was stationed at Ayamonte; and Loison, having failed in his object of occupying Rodrigo, was subsequently recalled to Oporto.

It was in that city that the chief body of the Spanish army was stationed. On the death of General Taranco, the command had been assumed by General Quesnel, a French officer of prudence and moderation, yet by no means acceptable to the troops. The symptoms of disaffection daily increased. Quesnel, fearing a revolt, prepared the fort of San Joao de Foz, which commands the harbour of Oporto, as a place of refuge for himself, and the weak escort on whose fidelity alone he could rely. His fears were soon realized. General Belestá, the officer next in command, received orders from the Junta of Galicia to return to Spain, and to bear with him as captives all the French remaining at Oporto. These orders were obeyed: Quesnel and his staff were arrested; and Belestá having convoked the native authorities of the province, declared them at liberty to act as they thought proper, and departed for Galicia, with the Spanish army and the prisoners they had secured.

On the ninth of June intelligence of these events reached Lisbon. They were naturally

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CHAP. X. pregnant with alarm. Vigorous and decisive measures were immediately adopted by Junot. 1808. Caraffa's division of Spaniards—the only one June. remaining in the country—composed of six battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and several troops of artillery, was stationed in different villages in the vicinity of Lisbon. These troops, by a skilful and daring stratagem, were disarmed, and, with the exception of a few hundreds who succeeded in effecting their escape, were placed as prisoners on board of vessels in the Tagus.

The boldness and facility of execution with which this success was achieved, struck the hearts of the insurgents with alarm. They again declared their allegiance to the existing government. Junot was little inclined to increase the difficulties of his situation, by adding to the irritation of the people. He accepted their submission; and endeavoured, by a conciliatory proclamation, and by increasing the allowances of the Portuguese army, to secure their adhesion to his cause.

Observador Yet strong measures were taken for disarm-
Portuguez. ing the population. Heavy punishment was denounced on the possession of warlike implements,

by any inhabitant, whether foreigner or native; CHAP. X. and heads of families were declared responsible 1808. for the conduct of all belonging to their establish- June. ments. In the numerous quarters where resistance had already appeared, detachments of French troops were stationed, in order at once to punish and overawe the disaffected.

But the flame of hatred and indignation, which had long burned in the bosom of the people, could no longer be suppressed. Insurrection again broke forth in the province of Oporto. On the day of *Corpo de Deos*, the soldiers refused to carry the French eagles in the procession. The appearance of a few Spaniards, who had remained in concealment since the departure of Belestá's division, gave rise to the report that a Spanish army was approaching to liberate the province. An English frigate, cruising off the entrance of the Douro, contributed to spread the belief that a squadron was about to enter the river. The governor, Don Luiz de Oliveira, who had endeavoured to allay the tumult, was deposed from his command and thrown into prison. The gates of the Arsenal were forced, and arms and ammunition distributed among the people. The insurrection continued

CHAP. X. hourly to assume a more formidable character.

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On the morning of the nineteenth, the populace hurried in crowds to the Episcopal Palace. The Bishop came forth into the balcony, and gave them his pastoral benediction. He then descended to the street, and, kissing the banners of the country, said to those who bore them, "Let us go and return thanks to God." The flock followed their pastor to the Cathedral Church, where, having implored a blessing on the cause in which they had embarked, a junta of eight members was appointed for the provisional government of the country, of which the Bishop was declared president.

Jun. 16.

While the standard of liberty was thus raised in the north, another insurrection, nearly simultaneous, took place in Algarve. General Maurin, who commanded in that province, was succeeded, in consequence of illness, by Colonel Maransin, who, with a force of about sixteen hundred men, found himself incapable of restraining the tumultuous hostility of the people. The arrival of a British force at Ayamonte, gave encouragement to the insurgents; while the apprehensions of Maransin were increased, by the report that a Spanish force was about to cross

the Gaudiana and enter Alentejo. It was impossible, under such circumstances, to retrieve the affairs of the province with so limited a force, and Maransin instantly retreated to Mertola, leaving his baggage, papers, military chest, and above one hundred prisoners, in the hands of the insurgents.

The insurrection had now become general throughout the provinces on the right of the Mondego. At Braga, at Leiria, at Coimbra, and at many other places, the national standard had been reared amid the acclamations of the people. Partial engagements were continually taking place between the natives, and detachments of the intrusive army; and though these, as might be expected, generally terminated in the defeat of the insurgents, yet the spirit of resistance was not quelled. While awed by the presence of an overwhelming force, tranquillity was for a time restored; but no sooner had their enemy retired than the people were again in arms. Thus it was, that though nominally masters of the country, the French, in truth, held only such portions of it, as were immediately occupied by their troops.

The measures of the Junta, for the liberation

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CHAP. X. of the kingdom, were vigorous and judicious.
 1808. All the arms in the public depots were distributed
 June. to the people; a train of field artillery was equipped; the pay of the army was increased, and the disbanded officers and soldiers were enrolled in new regiments. Generals Bernardin de Freire and Miguel de Forjas, officers of reputed talent, and of known hostility to the usurping government, were assumed into the councils of the Junta, and appointed military leaders. Proclamations, exhorting the people to burst the shackles of their bondage, and to take arms in the cause of liberty and their country, were circulated through the provinces. The Viscount de Balsemao was sent ambassador to England, to entreat the assistance of that power; and a correspondence was opened with the Junta of Galicia.

While the country was thus torn by violent convulsion, Lisbon, the very seat and centre of the invader's power, was not tranquil. The fete of the Corpus Christi, is one which had uniformly been celebrated in the capital with extraordinary pomp. On that day the whole population of the city, increased by large accessions from the surrounding country, were annually collected

to witness the procession. Nothing could exceed its magnificence. The streets were strewn with flowers, the walls decorated with tapestry, and the balconies displayed all of beauty and splendour which the country could afford. On that solemn occasion, not only the wealth of individuals, but the vast treasures of the church were displayed, to add pomp to the festival.—The most prominent figure in the pageant was an image of St. George, glittering with jewels, mounted on a horse gorgeously caparisoned, and followed by a cavalcade of the royal household. Throngs of penitents and monks, duly marshalled in the procession, formed a train so numerous as to occupy several hours in passing. The corporations of arts and trades, the senate, the tribunals, the councils, the regular troops, the generals, and the militia, followed in succession. Then came the consecrated Host, preceded by knights in their mantles, and covered by a splendid canopy, borne by the chief dignitaries of the church, in all the pomp and circumstance of canonical splendour. Last of all came the Sovereign, the Princes of his family, and the grandees, on foot, without guards, and

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CHAP. X. mixed, as it were, with the great body of the people.

June.

This festival, Marshal Junot deemed it impolitic to abolish. He considered that any prohibition would probably be attributed to fear, and tend to increase the instability of the new government. On the day appointed, therefore, the procession took place, though shorn of its chief honours by the absence of the Sovereign, in whose place Junot did not think it prudent to appear, and of the figure of St. George, whose dress had been carried off to Brazil.— In all other circumstances the splendour of the pageant was undiminished. Cannon were fired from the castle in demonstration of respect, the streets were lined by the French troops, and the procession, in all wonted formality, had begun its progress, when, at the moment when the sacred Host was seen issuing from the Church of St. Domingo, the crowds in the squares of the Comercio and the Rocio, became vehemently agitated, and the commotion spread like wildfire through every street in the city. For this sudden perturbation there was no apparent cause. No symptom of hostility had been

previously manifested, on the part either of the military or the people. But in a moment, from some unknown and even now inexplicable cause, the whole aspect of affairs was changed. Cries of terror arose among the multitude, and were instantly reverberated by many thousand voices. Some exclaimed, "There is an earthquake, the city is about to be destroyed;" others, "The English are landed;" but the greater number were influenced by the apprehension of a general massacre, and invoked their countrymen to resist bravely to the last.

Among the vast multitudes which thronged the city, all was panic and confusion. Priests, nobles, penitents, and monks, in a moment deserted the procession, and mingling amid the crowd, carried with them the remains of broken crucifixes and tapers, strewing the streets with the fragments of their torn vestments. The insignia of the festival were overthrown and trampled under foot. Multitudes, actuated by blind terror, encountered each other like opposing torrents, and obstructed all avenues of escape. The disorder pervaded all ranks. The prelate who bore the Host deserted the sacred incarnation, and, returning into the church, was

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CHAP. X. found concealed behind a screen. All participated
1808. alike in the indefinite and pervading terror, and
June. fled with tumultuous dismay.

During the progress of this extraordinary convulsion, Marshal Junot was in the Palace of the Inquisition. He immediately went to the church of St. Domingo, and endeavoured to rally the fugitive prelates and nobles, who had fled to that sanctuary for protection. He perceived that it was most important that the procession should at all events take place, as the best means of allaying the apprehensions of the people. Without waiting to inquire into the causes of the disorder, he gave the strongest assurance that the French troops should afford protection from violence, and declared his intention of joining the *cortege*. The procession accordingly again set forth, and symptoms of disorder were again manifested. The ceremonies of the day, however, were at length concluded with decency and order. On the return of Junot to head-quarters, amid throngs of people, a few voices saluted him with cheers,—the last he was ever destined to receive in Portugal.*

* The causes of this singular tumult, have never yet been discovered. Thiebault attributes it to an organized system of con-

Surrounded by increasing difficulties, Junot called a council of war, and the result of their deliberations, was, a resolution to concentrate the army in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, and abandon all the fortresses in the kingdom, with the exception of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Setubal. But even this resolution presented considerable difficulties in the execution. The communication, between the different branches of the army, was intercepted by the hostile population of the intervening provinces.

Loison was at Guarda, when he at length received one out of many despatches directing his return to Lisbon. In his attempt to reach Oporto he had been unfortunate. On the sixteenth of June, he had received orders to assume the command at Oporto; and, leaving a garrison in Almeida, under General Charlot, on the day following he commenced his march, with two battalions of light infantry, fifty dragoons, and six pieces of artillery.

spiracy; but this hypothesis is irreconcilable with many of the circumstances. The people were naturally suspicious of the designs and the good faith of their invaders. They saw themselves surrounded by an armed force, and at the mercy of its leader. In a multitude terror is contagious, and when the mine is laid, a spark is sufficient to explode it.

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During the first four days of his march, Loison encountered no impediment. On the twenty-first he crossed the Douro at Regora, and halted at Rezamfrio. There he learned that the mountaineers, in considerable force, were prepared to dispute the strong country in his front; and, under the influence of alarm, he determined on retreating. But even this measure was not unaccompanied with danger. His baggage had been already attacked; and masses of armed peasants flocked from the surrounding mountains to obstruct and harass his retreat. At Castro d'Airo an engagement took place, in which the peasants, from want of discipline, encountered considerable loss; and the march of the French army to Celorico was no longer molested. At Celorico, Loison divided his army, and despatched one half to Trancoso, while with the other he proceeded to Guarda, where his stay was cut short by the receipt of Junot's order, for the concentration of the army round the capital.

On the thirtieth of June, Loison halted at Pinhel, and on the day following at Almeida. In that city he left his sick, and a garrison of twelve hundred and fifty men; and, having dilapi-

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dated the fort Conceiçam, he commenced his retreat on Lisbon.

At Guarda, Loison had reckoned on a friendly reception. In this he was deceived. On approaching the city, he found a body of peasants drawn up, and prepared, with an old piece of rusty artillery, found in the rubbish of the castle, to dispute his entrance. An immediate attack was ordered. The approach of the French spread confusion through the ranks of the insurgents; and they were speedily driven from their position with great loss. The slaughter was unsparing,—above a thousand men were left dead on the field. The flying peasants were pursued along the streets of Guarda, which the French entered without further opposition; and their success was followed by the usual scenes of massacre and pillage.

On the fourth of July, Loison continued his retrogressive movement on Lisbon. On the day following, an engagement took place at Alpedrinham. The insurgents occupied a position of considerable strength, and had thrown up redoubts on the face of the hill leading to the village. But their flanks were unsupported; and

CHAP. X. a battalion having turned their right, the position became untenable; and, after a strenuous but fruitless resistance, the insurgents were put to flight. Their loss, on this occasion, was considerable, and included their leader, the Capitao Mor, whose body was discovered among the slain. From Alpedrinham, Loison encountered no further obstacle in his retreat, except that arising from the extreme difficulty of procuring supplies, in a country decidedly hostile. On the eleventh he reached Abrantes.

Jul. 11.

The Alentejo had now risen in arms. At Villa Viçosa the people attacked a detachment of French troops, quartered in the town, and forced them to retire into the castle. General Leite, who had lately governed the province, was now selected as military leader; but that officer, aware of the narrow extent of the resources which the natives could oppose to the power of the intruders, declined the responsibility of command. The choice of the multitude then fell on Antonio de Lacerda, an old officer, who took such measures as seemed best suited to the danger of the time. Messengers were despatched to solicit aid from Badajos; and

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marksmen were stationed on the top of the Conceiçam church, and other points which commanded the castle.

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General Kellerman, who commanded in the province, no sooner received intelligence of these events, than he despatched a force to relieve the troops driven into the castle. A dreadful massacre took place. The insurgents were routed; and the French, entering the city at the charge, put the inhabitants to the bayonet without discrimination. Upwards of two hundred were killed in the streets; the place was given up to pillage, and twelve of the prisoners were put to death as ringleaders, in what, by a singular abuse of language, was designated *rebellion*.

Jun. 25.

Lacerda fled to Olivença with a few followers, where he found a Spanish force, under command of General Moretti. By the latter, an attack was immediately determined upon the fort of Juramenha, which commands the passage of the Guadiana. This was successful. Moretti received assistance from Badajos; and Kellerman, not aware of the weakness of the garrison, did not venture on any serious attempts to regain possession of the fort.

CHAP. X. The fortunate result of this operation, and the hurried evacuation of Algarve by the enemy, gave spirit to the people. Proclamations, exciting the population to take arms, were circulated on all hands; and it became evident, from the increasing resistance in every quarter to French authority, that the cruelties perpetrated at Villa Viçosa had signally failed of their anticipated effect.

No change of policy, however, took place. The people of Beja rose against the enemy, and massacred two French soldiers, belonging to a detachment which the day before had entered their city. This criminal excess was followed by a dreadful retribution. Maransin defeated the insurgents and entered the town. It was pillaged and burned, and a great proportion of the inhabitants put to the sword. Upwards of twelve hundred slain were found in the streets. The loss of the French on this occasion amounted only to thirty killed and fifty wounded.*

* There is something, we think, approaching to the facetious, in the gravity with which General Thiebault obtrudes the following anecdote upon the credulity of his readers. "Il y eut même à Beja une circonstance qui peut être rapportée. Un brave religieux de cette ville ayant profité du triste tableau qu'elle offroit après le combat, pour faire sentir aux habitans combien ils avo-

CHAP. X. But it was not alone to such barbarous excesses, and the unsparing exercise of the strong arm of military violence, that Junot trusted for the subjugation of Portugal. He endeavoured to enlist religion in his cause, and prevailed on the Patriarchal Chapter to denounce excommunication against all those who should venture, directly or indirectly, to encourage the spirit of rebellion which had gone abroad. To oppose the usurpation of Napoleon was declared to be a crime against God; and the divine mission of the French Emperor to regenerate Portugal, was obtruded as an article of faith on the credulity of the people.

This ecclesiastical missive failed of its intended effect, and was treated with contempt, if not ridicule, by those to whom it was addressed. Ignorant and credulous as the people were, they could not swallow the monstrous absurdity, that the Deity was enlisted in the

ient provoqué leur malheur, produisit un si grand effet, que tout l'auditoire fondit en larmes, et qu'on le députa à l'unanimité auprès du général en chef, pour lui présenter une adresse, dont le but étoit d'implorer sa clémence, et de jurer fidélité."

To produce such an effect upon such an occasion, the *brave religieux* of General Thiebault must indeed have been an accomplished and eloquent master of pulpit rhetoric.

CHAP. X. cause of rapine and oppression; or that men,
 1808. who disgraced humanity by the perpetration of
 July. the most criminal atrocities, could be held invested with peculiar sanctity, as the favoured instruments of the divine will. Above all, they remembered that these men had insulted their religion, and extended robbery even to the altar; and the denunciation of a timid and obsequious hierarchy, was attributed to its true cause, and served rather to exacerbate than soften the hostile feelings of the people.

It was, in truth, to the very ignorance and superstition of the Portuguese nation, that much of the ardour and confidence which supported them, in the almost hopeless struggle in which they had embarked, may be attributed. They knew nothing of the relative strength and resources of nations. They were unable to calculate the ordinary probabilities of ultimate success or failure. Their reliance was not merely on human instruments of defence. The army of saints militant were enlisted on the side of freedom and religion. They fought with the conviction, that the justice of their cause would be vindicated by miraculous interposition.— Even amid the depression of multiplied de-

feats, their confidence was unabated. The CHAP. X.
 swords of the seraphim were seen waving in
 1808. the sky, ready to cleave their oppressors to the
 July. dust. Secret ministers of vengeance were preparing terrible retribution for the blood of their slaughtered countrymen. The legends of St. Sebastian, which had long slumbered in the hearts of the people, were remembered in the days of their oppression; and the belief spread, that the hour of their accomplishment was at hand. The people flew to arms with the deep and immutable conviction, that their long lost monarch was again to appear; and, leading his subjects to the field, should scatter their invaders, like chaff before the wind, and re-establish their monarchy in glory and freedom.

This was the idle creed of an oppressed, an ignorant, and a superstitious people. Sebastian came not; but in their own courage and constancy, they found a nobler deliverance. In the annals of the struggle they maintained, they have left the world a memorable lesson, which conquerors will do well to remember, and the conquered never will forget.

Nearly at the same time with the event we

CHAP. X. have narrated, a body of insurgents had collected at Leiria; and Junot, willing if possible to effect by conciliation their return to obedience, despatched emissaries from Lisbon, with promises, in case of immediate submission, that past offences should be forgotten. No good consequences, however, ensued from the mission. The messengers were driven back by the populace; and General Margaron, with a force of about four thousand men and six pieces of cannon, was directed to quell the insurrection.

On the second of July, that officer set out from Lisbon. On the fourth he arrived at Leiria. A mob of peasants, the greater proportion of whom were without fire-arms or military equipments, alone presented itself to oppose him. A few musquet shots were fired, and the peasantry took to flight. This was the signal for slaughter. The troops of Margaron entered the city on all sides, and the unresisting inhabitants were indiscriminately massacred. Mercy was implored in vain. Neither the claims of age nor sex were respected. The savage and unnatural fury of the victors, spared not even women and babes,—all were butchered. When

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the slaughter in the streets had ceased, the houses, the churches, and the gardens were ransacked for victims, who were carried to a small square in front of the church of St. Bartholomew, for the purpose of being more compendiously massacred. There the scene of Jaffa was repeated, with additional circumstances of atrocity. The slaughter of these miserable wretches commenced with the bayonet and sword, and was concluded by the bullet and the butt-end of the musquet.

If the infamy of proceedings, so utterly diabolical, can be aggravated by a gratuitous superfoetation of insulting falsehood, even to this extent does General Margaron stand convicted. He addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants, claiming gratitude for his clemency. While the streets of Leiria were yet red and reeking with the blood of the unresisting victims of a general and atrocious butchery, he declared himself to have been actuated only by the dictates of a godlike mercy. "Examine," says this smooth-tongued barbarian, "without partiality, your own conduct and mine; and decide whether those best promote your interest, and are most worthy of your confidence, who, abusing the

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CHAP. X. sacred name of country and religion, provoke
 1808. you to murder and insurrection; or he who,
 July. even when provoked by outrage, limits his severity to the moment of a just and legitimate defence, and only makes you conscious of your errors in order to pardon them." It was by such means that the iron of oppression was made to enter most deeply into the hearts of the gallant Portuguese.

Under these circumstances, the tide of insurrection flowed onward with augmented force and rapidity. In Alentejo not more than twenty days had elapsed since Kellerman's departure, and the province was again in arms. By the influence of the Spanish General Moretti, and of General Leite—who had at first refused to sanction the resistance of the populace at Villa Viçosa, but had subsequently joined the standard of his country—a Junta was formed at Evora, by which supreme authority was to be exercised over the provinces on the south of the Tagus. By this body such troops as could be collected were assembled round the city, and circular letters were despatched to the local Juntas, demanding recognition and obedience.

But Loison was already advancing to quell

the insurrection in this quarter. For this purpose he had been recalled from Leiria; and with a force of about five thousand men, was directed to put down the insurgents in Alentejo, to victual Elvas; and then, crossing the Tagus at Santarem or Abrantes, to proceed against Coimbra, in order to inflict severe punishment on the rebellious inhabitants of that city.

Loison had already crossed the Tagus, and was rapidly approaching Evora, before the inhabitants of that city became aware of their danger. Applications were immediately made for assistance from Campo Mayor and Badajoz, but without effect. The French came on. When they approached Montemor Novo, a body of troops, which had been stationed there by General Leite, rapidly retreated, and were met by a reinforcement of four hundred men, then marching to their assistance. Both fell back to Evora, and entered the city, exclaiming they were betrayed. The cry flew from lip to lip; the spirit and hopes of the people were suddenly depressed, and they became violent and tumultuous. The Corregidor, who had become the peculiar object of popular suspicion, escaped from the city; and a small reinforcement

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CHAP. X. of Spanish troops having arrived during the night, order was again restored. The amount of the patriotic force was about eighteen hundred men, of which more than one-half consisted of peasants newly embodied, and ignorant of military discipline.

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Jul. 29. On the following morning, the enemy was seen approaching Evora; and General Leite immediately placed his troops in position, and made preparation for battle. The ground thus occupied was about a mile in front of the city, and consisted of a range of heights extending from the Mill of San Bento to the Quinta dos Cucos, near the ruined Castle of Evora. The Spanish troops were formed as a reserve, behind the hill of San Caetano, on which rested the centre of the army. The artillery, partly Spanish and partly Portuguese, was stationed somewhat in the rear of the left.

Loison, having reconnoitred the position thus occupied, directed an immediate attack. General Solignac, accordingly, advanced to turn the right of the insurgents, while Margaron's brigade, divided into two bodies, made a simultaneous attack on the front and left. Both were successful. The Portuguese infantry fought

well, and were only overpowered after a strenuous resistance, in which the cavalry afforded them no support. The latter fled without waiting for attack, and, accompanied by General Leite, reached Olivença. The infantry, driven from their position, fell back on the city, where they again attempted a stand. Cannon were placed in battery to defend the gate of the Rocio, the only one which had not been walled up. But the works of the city were old and ruinous, and the brigade of Solignac effected an entrance with facility. In these circumstances, the Spanish troops fled; and many even of the Portuguese, scared by the terrors of an assault, were glad to escape from the city without offering resistance. Yet Evora was not gained without a struggle. War was waged on the assailants from the roofs and windows of the houses; and a body of volunteers, commanded by Gallego, offered desperate resistance in the streets.

At length, however, the scene of contest became one of massacre and pillage. All that remained in the city were slaughtered in cold blood; and the fugitives, in their endeavour to escape, were charged by the cavalry, and put unsparingly to the sword. No sanctuary was

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CHAP. X. respected. Thousands of unfortunate wretches
 1808. were dragged from their places of refuge,
 July. and became the victims of a licentious soldiery,
 animated by an ungovernable desire of plunder
 and revenge. In this affair, the loss of the Por-
 Thiebault. tuguese amounted to eight thousand killed or
 wounded in the battle and subsequent massacre.

From Evora, Loison advanced to Elvas, in
 order to drive back the numerous Spanish par-
 ties which infested the neighbourhood of that
 fortress, and form magazines of provisions for
 the supply of the capital. From thence he re-
 turned to the right bank of the Tagus, and had
 reached Thomar, when the execution of his
 projected operations was arrested, by intelli-
 gence that an English army had already landed
 on the coast.

CHAPTER XI.

FIRST CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

ON the twelfth of July, 1808, an armament, CHAP. XI.
 whose destination was the Peninsula, sailed from
 Cork. It consisted of about twelve thousand
 1808.
 July. men, and was commanded by Sir Arthur Wel-
 lesley, whose fame, as the conqueror of Assaye,
 had marked him out as a fitting leader on a ser-
 vice so difficult and perilous.

The expedition sailed; but it had no sooner
 cleared the coast, than Sir Arthur Wellesley
 separated himself from the fleet, and repaired in
 a frigate to Corunna, where he arrived on the
 twentieth. At Corunna he received intelligence
 Jul. 20. that the Spaniards had sustained a signal defeat
 at Rio Seco, and that the French were thus en-
 abled to prevent all communication between

CHAP. XI. Galicia and the country to the south and east of the Douro. The chief object of Sir Arthur Wellesley was to confer with the provincial Junta, and concert with them a scheme of operations, by which the armament he commanded might act with the greatest efficacy and advantage to the general cause. The offer of immediate co-operation, made by the British general, was declined by the Junta. Their only wants, they said, were money, arms, and ammunition. They were already rich in brave hearts and sinewy frames, though poor in those resources by which alone the ardour and devotion of the people could be brought to exercise an immediate and decisive influence on the circumstances of the war. They suggested Portugal as affording a preferable sphere for the operation of the British army, and represented the expulsion of the enemy from that kingdom, as the most acceptable and important service which Sir Arthur Wellesley could render to the patriots of the whole peninsula. The Junta likewise recommended that he should land in the north of Portugal, in order to effect a junction with the Portuguese troops, which the gov-

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ernment of Oporto were known to have collected in the neighbourhood of that city.

In compliance with the wishes of the Gallician Junta, Sir Arthur sailed for Oporto, where he arrived on the twenty-fourth, and had an immediate conference with the Bishop and chief military authorities. By them he was informed that the force in Oporto amounted altogether to about three thousand men, and that a body of five thousand regulars was stationed at Coimbra, on the co-operation of which, though deficient in arms and equipment, Sir Arthur Wellesley was assured he might rely. He was likewise informed, that the remainder of the Portuguese troops, amounting to about fifteen hundred men, and a Spanish force somewhat greater in number, then on its march from Galicia, were to be employed for the defence of the province of Tras os Montes, against Bessieres.

At Oporto, Sir Arthur Wellesley received a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, soliciting an interview, before the point of debarkation for the army, or the plan of its subsequent operations should be finally arranged. On the morning of the twenty-fifth he quitted Oporto, and having directed the fleet to rendezvous off the Mondego,

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CHAP. XI. proceeded to Lisbon, where he found despatches from General Spencer, stating that, in compliance with the request of the Supreme Junta, he had landed his corps at St. Mary's, near Cadiz; but had not consented to commit his army by forming a junction with Castanos. Sir Arthur, rightly judging that the general success of the war would be best promoted by the concentration of the British forces, instantly despatched orders to General Spencer to embark his troops without delay, and join the armament on the coast of Portugal, unless he should be engaged in an operation which could not be relinquished without compromising the safety of the Spanish army.

After mature deliberation, Sir Arthur determined on landing in Mondego Bay. The coast of Portugal, between the Tagus and the Douro, affords few facilities for the debarkation of an army. The shore is in general rugged and dangerous, and the entrance of the rivers is almost uniformly obstructed by bars, which prevent their being found serviceable in navigation. Under such circumstances, it would have been peculiarly dangerous to have attempted so difficult and precarious an operation as that of land-

ing the troops, in the immediate neighbourhood of a considerable body of the enemy. A part of the army might have been attacked on shore while the state of the weather prevented the debarkation of the remainder; and it was certain, that by commencing operations in the vicinity of Lisbon, the English army, for a time at least, would be deprived of the expected co-operation of the Portuguese troops. The Fort of Peniche, which stands on a small peninsula, about seventy miles north of Lisbon, alone offered a bay equally safe and accessible; but the anchorage was completely commanded by the guns of the fort, and a landing in that quarter could not have been effected without considerable loss. The choice then fell on Mondego Bay; and fortified in his selection of this point by the opinion of the Admiral, Sir Arthur again joined the fleet, then off the mouth of the Mondego.

By despatches from England, Sir Arthur learned that a reinforcement of five thousand men, under command of Brigadier-General Acland, might be speedily expected; and that the force then acting in Sweden, under Sir John Moore, was likewise directed to repair to Portugal. The command of the army, thus power-

CHAP. XI. fully augmented, Sir Arthur was likewise in-
 1808. formed, would be assumed by Sir Hew Dal-
 August. rymple.

The landing of the troops commenced on the first of August, and was not completed without difficulty. The wind had been fresh for several days; and the surf—from which the shelving of the Bay afforded little protection—beat on the shore with such violence as to render the service one of difficulty and danger.

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On the sixth, the army was augmented by the arrival of the force of General Spencer, who, without waiting for orders, had immediately quitted Cadiz on learning the surrender of Dupont. In the meanwhile, the weather had become more moderate, and the landing of the whole army was effected on the seventh.

Before the British army commenced its advance, Sir Arthur Wellesley held a conference with the Portuguese generals, at Montemor Velho. He then acquainted them with his plans; and informed himself, by personal inspection, of the numbers, discipline, and equipment of their troops. In order to render them as effective as possible, he offered such a sum, from the military chest, as the exigencies of his

own army enabled him to spare. This offer, CHAP. XI.
 however, notwithstanding the poverty of their
 1808. own resources, was declined, and the assistance
 August. received from the British general was limited to arms and ammunition.

Since his arrival at Oporto, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been actively employed in endeavouring to procure the necessary means for moving the stores, baggage, and provisions, with a view to the immediate commencement of operations. Though, in this respect, he had not been altogether unsuccessful, yet it was judged more prudent to march on Lisbon, by the coast, in order to keep up a communication with the fleet of victuallers and store-ships, which were directed to follow the movements of the army. As this, however, was liable to continual interruption, from the state of the weather, the dangers of the coast, and the operations of the enemy, it was judged prudent that the army should be accompanied by a supply of such articles as were of more immediate necessity, that it might be rendered as independent as possible of the contingencies of war or weather.

Before quitting the Mondego, Sir Arthur

CHAP. XI. Wellesley left instructions for the corps of General Acland to proceed along the coast, and form a junction with the army. For the information of Sir John Moore, he also left a statement of his opinions as to the most advantageous employment of the force under his command, to be delivered to that officer on his arrival. Sir Arthur strongly recommended that his corps should be marched on Santarem, to narrow the communications of Lisbon; and, if necessary, to operate to the southward of the Tagus, in order to cut off the retreat of the French army through the province of Alentejo.

Aug. 9. On the ninth of August, the advanced-guard of the army moved onward from the Mondego, and reached Leiria on the tenth. On the eleventh, it was followed by the main-body, which, Aug. 13. on the thirteenth, advanced to the neighbourhood of Batalha. Before proceeding further, it may be well to give a slight sketch of the distribution of the French army, at the moment when hostilities, with a new and more formidable enemy, were about to commence.

When intelligence first reached Marshal Junot, of the landing of a British army, he anticipated that its first movement would be on the

CHAP. XI. Zezere and the Tagus, in order to effect a separation between the corps of Loison and the capital. General Delaborde, therefore, was immediately detached from Lisbon, with two brigades of infantry, about six hundred cavalry, and five pieces of artillery, with directions to proceed by Villa Franca, Rio Mayor, and Condieiros, with a view to watch the motions of the British general, and cover the advance of Loison, with whom he was directed to effect a junction. Learning, however, that Loison had already crossed the Tagus without opposition, and that Sir Arthur Wellesley was advancing by the road along the coast, he proceeded to Alcobaca, with the view of retarding, as much as possible, the progress of the British army.

Loison, with a force of about eight thousand men, was advancing rapidly from Abrantes, in expectation of effecting a junction with the corps of Delaborde at Leiria. The sufferings of his army, during his march through Alentejo, are described to have been dreadful. Wherever they went, the towns and villages were deserted. The heat was unusually great; and numbers of the soldiers sank exhausted, from privations which it was found impossible

CHAP. XI. to supply. All stragglers were destroyed; and many, suffering from excessive thirst, died of drinking stagnant and unwholesome waters, to which the natives had directed them. The occupation of Leiria by the British, had disappointed the calculations of the French generals; and Loison was obliged to make a considerable detour before he could effect his intended junction with Delaborde, who, remaining unsupported in front of the enemy, was liable to sustain the attack of his whole force.

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Junot was at Lisbon, with such force as he deemed sufficient to control the inhabitants, busied in making every practicable provision for the defence of the capital. The garrison was ordered to be withdrawn from Setubal; and instructions were issued for the immediate abandonment of all the French posts to the south of the Tagus, with the exception of Palmela.

Such was the relative position of both armies, when Sir Arthur Wellesley had to encounter new difficulties in the conduct of the Portuguese authorities. Before the army commenced its march from the Mondego, it had been demanded, by General Bernardin de Freire, that the

force under his orders, should be furnished with supplies by the British commissariat, a proposal most unreasonable in itself, and one to which, in the circumstances of the army, it was impossible to accede. It was, therefore, met by Sir Arthur Wellesley with a strong remonstrance; and the unreasonableness of the demand was represented to de Freire in its true colours. For some time there was reason to hope that the explanations of the British general had been received with tacit acquiescence. But this was not so. When the army reached Leiria, the demand was renewed even more peremptorily than before, accompanied by the threat, that unless it was complied with, the Portuguese forces should instantly separate themselves from the British, and advance to Santarem, by way of Thomar.

Sir Arthur Wellesley did everything in his power to change the resolutions of de Freire. He represented the strong impolicy of withdrawing himself from the British army, and the dangers to which he must necessarily expose his troops by adhering to his projected scheme. He urged him to relinquish it by all that was dearest and most sacred to a soldier and a patriot;

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CHAP. XI. and conjured him not to compromise his own
 1808. honour, and the safety of his country, by violat-
 August. ing, on so flimsy a pretext, the engagements into which his government had already entered. In part only were these remonstrances successful. De Freire consented to remain safe, though inglorious, at Leiria, instead of prosecuting his original design of advancing to Santarem. This at least was something gained; yet it cannot be questioned, that the presence of the Portuguese army would have carried with it a moral influence and support, perhaps, in such circumstances, even more valuable than a large accession of mere military force.

The truth we take to be, that, at the period in question, the zeal and heartiness of England in their cause, were the object of considerable doubt with the patriots of the Peninsula. She had not then impressed, on the continental nations, the character she has since borne of a great military power. On land, her warlike operations had generally been undertaken for some limited and petty object, and conducted on a small and inadequate scale. It was imagined too, by the allies of England, that her interference in their behalf, proceeded rather from some underhand

motive of individual advantage, to be secured by CHAP. XI.
 their co-operation, than from hearty and zealous 1808.
 adoption of their cause, or disinterested anxiety August. for their liberation. They knew that should adverse circumstances occur, the English could always find—and they doubted not their intention of seeking—a refuge in their ships. It was familiar too, as a proverb in the mouths of all Europe, that the English were a great maritime power, but insignificant on shore. The truth of this aphorism has since been tested; yet we should take but a partial and imperfect view of the difficulties which Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the very outset of his operations, was called on to combat and surmount, were we to pass unnoticed the moral impression of our character and objects, which induced the patriots to receive our offers of assistance with jealousy and distrust.

That the Portuguese authorities were influenced by such motives, it seems impossible to doubt. It was probably calculated by the Junta, that, whichever of the parties might be successful in the approaching contest, it was more for their advantage to possess an army fresh and uncrippled, in order to reap the full benefit of vic-

CHAP. XI. tory, or repair the consequences of defeat. It may be supposed, therefore, that de Freire was glad of a plausible excuse for remaining at Leiria, while two more powerful combatants were about to try the fortune of battle. It was even with difficulty, that he consented to place one thousand four hundred infantry, and two hundred and fifty cavalry, at the disposal of the British general.

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Aug. 14. On the fourteenth, the English entered Alcobaça, from which the enemy had retired on the preceding night, and on the following day moved onward to Caldas. At Brilos, a village in the neighbourhood, the first blood was shed. The post was attacked by some companies of riflemen of the sixtieth and ninety-fifth regiments, who carried it with trifling resistance on the part of the enemy, whom they incautiously pursued for several miles. The detachment, however, was in turn attacked by a superior force, which endeavoured to cut off their retreat; and it was only by the prompt assistance of General Spencer that this object was defeated. The loss of the British is stated in the official returns to have amounted to twenty-six killed, wounded, and missing.

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August. On the same day, the army reached Caldas, and the advance, under Brigadier-General Fane, moved on to Obidos, and drove the enemy's piquets from the town. General Delaborde, in the meantime, had retired to a position in front of Roliça. The heights on which this village is situated form the boundary of a valley commencing at Caldas, and about three leagues in extent. Nearly in the centre stand the town and old Moorish fort of Obidos; and every favourable post on the high ground, on either side of the valley, was occupied by detachments of the French army. The main body was posted on a plain, which overlooked the valley as far as Obidos.

On the morning of the seventeenth, Sir Arthur Wellesley advanced to the attack. Columns were sent out on either flank; and, on the approach of these, Delaborde, without offering resistance, fell back to the heights of Roliça, where he again placed his army in position.

The ground thus occupied was strong; and having been closely reconnoitred by Sir Arthur Wellesley, he made immediate preparation for attack. His army, with this view, was formed into three columns. The right, consisting of twelve

CHAP. XI. hundred Portuguese infantry, and fifty Portuguese cavalry, was intended to turn the left flank of the position, and penetrate into the mountains in the rear. The left, consisting of Major-General Ferguson's and Brigadier-General Bowes's brigades of infantry, three companies of riflemen, and about forty cavalry, British and Portuguese, was destined, under command of General Ferguson, to ascend the hills at Obidos, in order to turn the posts which the enemy still held on the left of the valley, as well as the right of his position at Roliça. This corps was likewise directed to watch for the approach of Loison, who was known to be in the neighbourhood, in order to prevent the junction of his force with that of Delaborde. The centre column, commanded by Sir Arthur in person, and consisting of Major-General Hill's, Brigadier-General Nightingale's, Brigadier-General Crawford's, and Brigadier-General Fane's brigades, with four thousand Portuguese light infantry, and the main body of the British and Portuguese cavalry, was ordered to assemble in the plain, and attack the front of the position.

Such was the order of attack. It was morn-

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ing, and a calm and quiet beauty seemed to linger on the scene of the impending conflict. The heights of Roliça, though steep and difficult of access, possessed few of the sterner and more imposing features of mountain scenery. The heat and droughts of summer had deprived them of much of that brightness of verdure which is common in a colder and more variable climate. Here and there the face of the heights was indented by deep ravines, worn by the winter torrents, the precipitous banks of which were occasionally covered with wood; and below, extended groves of the cork-tree and olive; while Obidos, with its ancient walls and fortress, and stupendous aqueduct, rose in the middle distance. To the east the prospect was terminated by the lofty summit of the Monte Junto, and on the west by the Atlantic.

As the centre column commenced its advance towards the steep acclivity in front, the enemy gave no demonstration of hostility; and all was still and peaceful, as when the goat-herd tended his flock on the hilly pastures, and the peasant went forth to his labours, carolling his matin song in the sunrise. Such was the scene about to be consecrated in the eyes of posterity by the first

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CHAP. XI. considerable outpouring of British blood, in a cause as pure, just, noble, and generous, as any of which history bears record.

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The position of the enemy could only be approached in front by narrow paths, winding through deep and rocky ravines, and surrounded by masses of brushwood, in which Delaborde had stationed his light infantry. Till reaching the bottom of the heights, the British troops were protected by the cork and olive woods from the fire of the enemy's artillery. But in their ascent, the troops had to encounter a resistance, which became at every stage of their progress more fierce and vehement. A heavy fire was opened on the assailants from the brushwood on either flank, and at every point at which they became exposed to the action of artillery, a shower of cannon-shot came sweeping down the ravines with terrible effect.

Even in these difficult and disheartening circumstances, no symptoms of confusion were manifested in the British columns. The advance of General Nightingale's brigade was led by the twenty-ninth regiment, with singular bravery and resolution. They beheld themselves suffering from attacks which it was impossible to re-

pel; but the high discipline of the regiment enabled it to surmount every obstacle; and, under every disadvantage, they kept on their way steady and unbroken. The Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Lake, by whom it was commanded, fell, as the head of the column reached the summit of the hill, and became exposed to a heavy and destructive fire from the vineyards occupied by the enemy. The grenadier company of the twenty-ninth were in the act of forming, when a French battalion, after pouring in a volley, advanced to the charge, and succeeded in overpowering the small but gallant body, which had already crowned the heights. This success was temporary. The remainder of the regiment came up; and, supported by the ninth regiment, the colonel of which was also killed, they drove back the enemy, and succeeded in maintaining their position, against every effort to regain possession of the heights.

The success thus gallantly achieved was rendered more decided by the brigade of General Hill, which had already formed on the heights, and the appearance of the column of General Ferguson, which at first had taken a wrong direction, but was now observed to be traversing

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CHAP. XI. the right flank of the enemy's position. Delaborde's situation had now become one of extreme peril; and he was too skilful a general not at once to perceive the necessity of immediate retreat. Precipitately abandoning his position, he retired to the village of Zambugeira, where he again made demonstration of resistance. From this, by a most gallant charge, he was driven by General Spencer.

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The loss of the French, in this engagement, was six hundred killed and wounded; among the latter of which was their brave and skilful leader. That of the English was somewhat less. It is stated by the official returns to have amounted altogether to four hundred and eighty-two. The force of Delaborde, in the action, is known to have amounted to five thousand men.*

Such are the details of the first action fought

* The force of the enemy was estimated by Sir Arthur Wellesley at six thousand men, which tallied exactly with the statement of a French officer, wounded in the action. Reasons, in our judgment, satisfactory, have induced us to make a lower estimate. The number actually in the field, is stated, by Thiebault, to have been only nineteen hundred men. Foy makes it two thousand two hundred men. Neither are entitled to credit. It is truly said, by Colonel Napier, that such puerile misstatements can only tend to throw ridicule on a deed of arms, in itself honourable to the talent of the general, and the discipline and courage of his army.

by British troops in the great cause of the Peninsula. It is memorable, as affording the earliest opportunity of displaying, on a new scene, the spirit, gallantry, and discipline of English soldiers; and perhaps not less so, as constituting one of those rare occasions, in which the judgment and prudence of the greatest general of the age may fairly be called in question. It is now admitted, we believe, by all military men, that the attack on the front of the second position at Roliça, was injudicious. The columns of General Ferguson and Colonel Trant were alone sufficient to have dislodged the enemy, who must instantly have retired on their appearance. It is indeed difficult to conceive how Sir Arthur Wellesley, the reinforcement of whose army depended on contingencies beyond his control, with a force barely equal to make head against the combined army of his opponents, should, in such circumstances, have been so rashly lavish of the lives of his soldiers. They were brought into action with every possible disadvantage, and fought for an object which a skilful general could unquestionably have obtained without bloodshed.

It is probable that Sir Arthur Wellesley was

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CHAP. XI. unprepared for the obstinate and vigorous resistance which the enemy opposed to the columns of Hill and Nightingale; and that his object was to press Delaborde in his retreat more closely than could otherwise have been done. If so, he paid the penalty of his miscalculations. It cannot be doubted that the sight of seventy English prisoners, sent in triumph to Lisbon, must have produced an injurious moral influence on the minds of the people, and have led them to give credit to the exaggerated rumours which it was the policy of the enemy to set afloat.

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The numbers of the troops on both sides, actually engaged, were nearly equal. Before the appearance of the columns of Trant and Ferguson, the enemy had already been dislodged from his position; and the brigades of Hill and Nightingale were in a condition, unaided, to have driven him from the village of Zambugeira. Considering the disadvantages under which they fought, and the magnitude of the obstacles overcome, the achievement was one unquestionably highly honourable to the troops.

The talent shewn by Delaborde, throughout his operations, must be admitted, by all parties, to have been very great. His chief object

was to retard the advance of the English army, in order to gain time for a junction with Loison; and the union of boldness and skill, by which his manœuvres for this purpose were conceived and executed, is, unquestionably, indicative of a highly-gifted commander.

Driven from the village of Zambugeira, Delaborde retired with his army, by the road to Torres Vedras. It was the intention of Sir Arthur Wellesley to have lost no time in following the enemy; but having learned that the expected reinforcement under General Acland was in the offing, he changed his resolution, and moved onward by the coast road, in order to cover the landing of the troops, and receive supplies from the shipping.

On the eighteenth, the army halted at Lourinha. On the nineteenth, it moved onward to Vimiero; and on the twentieth, was joined by the brigade of General Anstruther; and the landing of the remainder of the corps was effected, with some difficulty, in the course of the night. Delaborde could not oppose the debarkation, but sent on his cavalry, in hopes of attacking the troops on their march. This was foreseen. A detachment, under General

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CHAP. XI. Spencer, was stationed at Lourinha for their protection, and no annoyance was attempted by the enemy.

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It was known at head-quarters, that a junction had taken place between the corps of Delaborde and that of Loison, on the eighteenth, and that their united force was concentrated in position at Torres Vedras. The enemy daily sent forward patrols of cavalry into the neighbourhood of the British army; and their superiority in that arm was too decided to admit of opposition. Of the position occupied by the French army, Sir Arthur Wellesley could learn nothing, except that it was very strong, and accessible only by a long and difficult defile.

Under these circumstances, he had formed the resolution of advancing rapidly along the coast-road to Mafra, and thus turning the position of Torres Vedras. By this movement, he calculated on forcing the hostile army to an immediate retreat, and on enjoying an opportunity of attacking Loison and Delaborde in a new position, before they should gain time to occupy it with advantage. To this plan of operations many objections have been stated. It has been said that the flank and rear of the army, when in

march, would have been exposed to the chance of attack from an enemy greatly superior in cavalry, and one not likely to be deceived by any boldness of manœuvre. The road to Mafra, for about six leagues, runs nearly parallel to a steep and rocky coast, and passes through a series of defiles, which afford no spot on which an army could form in order of battle. Had an attack been made, therefore, in such circumstances, on the army, lengthened out in a long column on the march, it cannot be doubted, that it must have contended with the enemy, under a mass of almost insurmountable disadvantages.

On the other hand, it may be urged that before the French general could have received intelligence of the contemplated movement, the British army would have been considerably advanced on their march. That the country intervening between the direct road to Mafra, and that by which Junot, on the morning of the twenty-first, was marching on Vimiero, was of a character extremely difficult and almost impervious, and that failing in the object of attacking the British army on the march, the only alternatives which remained, were those of carrying the formidable position of Mafra, under every disadvantage, or of falling

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CHAP. XI. rapidly back, by the Cabeça de Montichique, with the view of covering the capital. In either case, the difficulties of the enemy would have been prodigiously increased. Considering the character and circumstances of the armies, it is more than improbable that an attack on the position of Mafra, which did not admit of being turned, would have been attended with success. And in the attempt to cover Lisbon, the proximity of a hostile capital, the population of which would probably be roused into acts of aggression by the near hope of deliverance, must have added exceedingly to the perils and embarrassment of Marshal Junot.

When we consider, too, that the plan in question was the deliberate adoption of a general, who has never since been known to commit his army, by any flagrant error of calculation, we shall probably be disposed to admit the conclusion, that the operation in question was founded on sound data, and that had it been carried into execution, the acquisition of Lisbon might have been effected with smaller loss, and with circumstances more honourable to our arms, than by the more timid policy which led to the convention of Cintra.

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On the evening of the twentieth, however, a frigate, on board of which was Sir Harry Burrard, arrived in Marceira Bay. Sir Arthur Wellesley, thus suddenly superseded in command, lost no time in reporting to that officer the situation and circumstances of the army, and the plan of operations which it had been his intention to pursue. Of the latter, Sir Harry Burrard expressed his disapprobation. He directed the cessation of any active movements, until the army should have been still further increased by the arrival of Sir John Moore, which might be expected in a few days.

Against this unfortunate decision of his superior, Sir Arthur, in vain, remonstrated. He assured him that the army was already fully equal to cope with that of the enemy; that, situated as it then was, an engagement was inevitable, and that the only consequence of present inaction, would be that of yielding to the enemy the privilege of choosing the moment of attack, while the greatest disadvantage would accrue from the sudden assumption of a line of operations merely defensive. Sir Arthur likewise stated his decided conviction, that the corps of Sir John Moore would more beneficially contribute to the

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CHAP. XI. common cause, by marching on Santarem, and thus narrowing and obstructing the communication and retreat of the French army, than by uniting itself to a force already fully adequate to all the purposes it was intended to effect. Of the consequences to be dreaded from any demonstration of vacillation or timidity, Sir Arthur also spoke strongly, but in vain. Sir Harry Burrard remained fixed in his decision; and the order, which had already been issued to the army for resuming their march, was countermanded. Instructions were likewise despatched to Sir John Moore, directing him to move down in his transports to Marceira Bay, which had been determined as the point of debarkation for his troops.

Such were the measures adopted by Sir Harry Burrard on the assumption of his brief command. That they were timid and injudicious cannot be denied. Yet, while we condemn the decision by which the projects of a greater military genius were at once overthrown, let us not be unjust, and blend our dispassionate regrets with the severity of personal censure. Thrown accidentally and unawares into what could only be considered as a situation of transient command, it was per-

haps scarcely to be expected that his measures should be marked by the confidence and boldness of purpose, which might have contributed so greatly to the success of the campaign. It was certainly not unnatural, that a person so situated should be unwilling to incur the responsibility of directing operations, of the propriety of which, and the chances of success which they afforded, he could form but a partial and imperfect judgment. Called summarily to decide in difficult and unexpected circumstances, Sir Harry Burrard will probably be considered to have decided wrong; yet he unquestionably decided to the best of his judgment. Fault, therefore, can be attributed only to those who sacrificed the interest of their country, by placing a man of narrow capacity, yet of honest intentions, in a situation for which he was manifestly unfit. That officers of such acknowledged talent and pretensions as Sir John Moore and Sir Arthur Wellesley, should have been superseded in command by Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard, is a tolerably convincing proof that the selection of military leaders, was, in those days, regulated by principles very different from that of *detur digniori*.

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CHAP. XI. Early on the morning of the twenty-first, Sir
 1808. Arthur Wellesley visited the advanced posts,
 August. but could discern no sign of an approaching
 enemy. About seven o'clock, however, a cloud
 of dust was observed in the extremity of the
 horizon, slowly moving towards the position of
 Aug. 21. the British; and at eight o'clock a strong body
 of the enemy's cavalry was observed on the
 heights to the southward. In a short time a
 strong column of infantry appeared on the road
 from Torres Vedras to Lourinha; and it became
 evident that a general engagement was on the
 eve of taking place between the armies.

The village of Vimiero stands in a valley,
 watered by the little rivulet Maceira, at the eas-
 tern extremity of a high mountainous range,
 which extends westward to the sea. In front of
 the village is a hill of inferior altitude, terminat-
 ing in a plateau of considerable extent, and com-
 manded from several points. On the left is an-
 other strong ridge of heights, stretching to the
 eastward, and terminating on the right in a deep
 ravine. Over these heights passes the road to
 Lourinha, through the villages of Fontanel and
 Ventoso.

Such were the more prominent features of the

ground. It was thus occupied by Sir Arthur
 Wellesley: Six brigades were stationed on the
 mountain to the westward of the village. The
 advanced-guard, under General Fane, and the
 brigade of General Anstruther, with six pieces
 of artillery, occupied the plateau. The cavalry
 and reserve of artillery were posted in the val-
 ley, between the heights, ready to support the
 troops on the plateau, should that part of the
 position be attacked. The Lourinha road was
 guarded by the Portuguese troops and a small
 body of riflemen. The ground having been
 taken up on the previous evening, rather with a
 view to temporary convenience than military de-
 fence, a piquet only had been stationed on the
 ridge to the westward. As it was obvious, how-
 ever, from the enemy's demonstrations, that the
 left and centre were about to become the chief
 theatres of conflict, the brigades of Generals
 Ferguson, Nightingale, Acland, and Bowes,
 were successively moved from the mountain on
 the west to the heights on the Lourinha road,
 in order to strengthen what was evidently the
 most vulnerable part of the position.

At nine o'clock the action commenced. Mar-
 shal Junot had formed his army in two divisions.

CHAP. XI. The first of these, consisting of about six thousand men, was commanded by General Delaborde.
 1808. The second, under Loison, was nearly equal in
 August. amount. The reserve, composed of four battalions of grenadiers, was commanded by General Kellerman, and acted as a connecting link between the two principal divisions. The cavalry, under General Margaron, was stationed partly in rear of the reserve, and partly on the right of Delaborde's division.

The two divisions continued their advance, across the rough and wooded country in front of the position, towards the plateau in the centre. On approaching the scene of action, however, each division separated into several minor columns, which commenced nearly simultaneous attacks on different portions of the British line. The most vehement was that headed by Delaborde in person, who first came in contact with the brigade of General Anstruther, which occupied the left of the plateau, and the village of Vimiero. During its advance, this body was exposed to a destructive fire of artillery, which it bore with great steadiness and gallantry, and rapidly forced back the skirmishers who had been stationed in the woods on either flank. A

check, however, was soon given to the progress CHAP. XI.
 of the assailants, who, having reached the summit of the plateau, were met by a destructive
 1808. volley from the fiftieth regiment, which afterwards rushed on to the charge, and drove them
 August. in confusion, and with great slaughter, down the face of the hill. The attack on General Fane's brigade was no less decisively repulsed; and a regiment, which was advancing on the village, by the church, was opportunely attacked in flank by the brigade of General Acland, then moving to its position on the heights. A most gallant charge, by the small body of cavalry led by Colonel Taylor, completed the discomfiture of the enemy in this quarter. They fled in utter confusion, and were vigorously pursued, by Colonel Taylor and his squadron, for nearly two miles; when General Margaron, who commanded the French cavalry, observing the small number of the assailants, advanced to the charge; and the remnant of this brave band were compelled to retreat, with the loss of their leader. General Kellerman, having rallied the fugitives, made a last effort with the reserve to retrieve the fortunes of the day. A column, strongly supported by artillery, was again sent forward to gain

CHAP. XI. possession of the village of Vimiero. In advancing by the road, it was encountered by the forty-third regiment; and, after a short, but desperate struggle, was driven back. No farther attempt was made on this part of the position; and the enemy retired, leaving seven pieces of artillery, and a great number of prisoners, in possession of the victors.

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While these events were passing in the centre, an attack, no less resolutely supported, was made on the left of the British, which occupied the heights, on the Lourinha road. In that quarter, General Ferguson, whose brigade had been moved from the right to the left of the line, had scarcely taken up his ground, when he found himself assailed by a strong body of infantry, supported by cavalry. The engagement was fierce, and resolutely maintained on both sides. The troops of Ferguson remained immovable under every effort to dislodge them; and, on the coming up of the eighty-second and twenty-ninth regiments, the enemy were charged with the bayonet, and driven back in confusion. The French cavalry endeavoured to retrieve the misfortune of the infantry by several charges, but in vain. They were uniformly repulsed with

unshaken steadiness, by the brigades of Ferguson and Nightingale, and at length ceased from farther attack.

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The fruit of this achievement was the capture of six guns; and General Ferguson, leaving the seventy-first and eighty-second regiments to guard these honourable trophies, was in full pursuit of the discomfited enemy, when the brigade of Brenier, suddenly emerging from the ravine, attacked the two battalions, and for a moment succeeded in retaking the captured artillery. But the regiments instantly rallied; and by a desperate charge with the bayonet, at once drove back the brigade of Brenier into the ravine, and remained masters of the guns. In this charge, General Brenier was made prisoner.

Affairs were in this situation on the left, when General Ferguson received an unexpected order to desist from the pursuit. His corps was accordingly halted; and the enemy taking advantage of this unlooked-for supineness of their opponents, were rallied by General Thiebault, and withdrawn, under protection of the cavalry, to a position in rear of Toledo. In the subsequent retreat of the army to Torres Vedras, it was re-

CHAP. XI. enforced by the junction of two battalions, which
 1808. had not come up in time to be of service in the
 August. action.

The results of this brilliant victory were, the capture of a general officer and several hundred men, thirteen pieces of cannon, and twenty-three waggons loaded with ammunition. The total loss of the enemy, in the battle, has been estimated at three thousand. Generals Foy and Thiebault do not admit it to have exceeded eighteen hundred. But, considering all the circumstances of the action, the latter calculation will probably be held to be as much below the truth as the former is above it.

With regard to the relative numbers of the armies, there exists also much difference of statement. There can be no doubt that the British army was numerically superior to its opponent; but Foy and Thiebault, in estimating the amount of the French force at only nine thousand two hundred men, are, unquestionably, not entitled to credit. A French order of battle, found on the field, gave a total of fourteen thousand men present under arms; and this amount accords too accurately with other estimates, and also with observations made at

Napier.

the time, to leave any doubt of its authenticity and correctness. CHAP. XI

1808. While the battle was yet in progress, Sir
 August. Harry Burrard arrived on the field; but, from motives of delicacy, declined assuming the command till the enemy were repulsed. Towards the close of the action, when the ultimate success of the British arms could no longer be considered doubtful, Sir Arthur Wellesley was naturally anxious to reap the full fruits of his victory, and represented to his superior in command the importance of following up with vigour the advantages already gained. But to this measure, Sir Harry Burrard, actuated by an unfortunate dread of responsibility, refused his consent. It was urged to him, in vain, that the enemy, severely beaten and discomfited, had already commenced a hurried and confused retreat; that one half of the British army had borne no part in the action, and was, consequently, in a condition to follow up the pursuit with vigour and effect; that the road to Torres Vedras being already in possession of General Hill, it was now in our power to anticipate the enemy by the occupation of that important pass, and even to reach Lisbon before

CHAP. XI. him. But these arguments produced no beneficial consequence on the resolution of Sir Harry Burrard. With the caution of an aged commander, and the diffidence of an inexperienced one, he declined encountering the risks attendant on the brilliant scheme of operations proposed for his adoption, and declared his determination of awaiting, in the position of Vimiero, the arrival of Sir John Moore.

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General Ferguson, on receiving, in the full career of success, the mortifying order to desist from farther operations, immediately sent his aid-de-camp to represent the great advantage to be anticipated from continuing the pursuit, and to state, that he himself might have cut off a considerable body of the enemy. Sir Arthur carried the aid-de-camp to Sir Harry Burrard; but this second representation likewise failed of effect.* The accounts he had received of the state of the Portuguese troops, was such as,

* There is something sufficiently characteristic in the following anecdote to merit record:—Sir Arthur Wellesley, having in vain used every argument and persuasion to change the determination of his leader, was heard to exclaim, on retiring from the conference, "Well then, we have now nothing to do but to go and shoot red-legged partridges."

in his opinion, to preclude all hope of their being found serviceable. The artillery horses were, or were supposed to be, inefficient; and the want of cavalry appeared an insuperable objection to undertaking such operations as those contemplated by Sir Arthur Wellesley. These difficulties, in the mind of Sir Harry Burrard, were decisive. The army remained in their position; and the French were suffered to retreat unmolested, and to re-organize at leisure their broken and fugitive troops.

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It may perhaps be considered as not wholly uninteresting to indulge in a brief speculation on the probable consequences, that would have resulted from a vigorous prosecution of the advantages which the victory of Vimiero had placed in our power.

In the first place, it should be remembered, that the whole army of Junot had been defeated, when not above one half of the British had been engaged. With regard to the enemy, we are assured by General Foy, that every corps—every soldier—had fought; and, such were the necessities of Junot, that even the volunteer horse-guard, composed of French merchants of Lisbon, was made to bear its part in the engage-

CHAP. XI. ment. The whole troops of the enemy, therefore, were tired and dispirited, while a very large proportion of the British was fresh and untouched, and ready for any operation which its leader might judge serviceable to the cause.

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Before the conclusion of the action, the division of General Hill was in possession of the direct road to Torres Vedras—that by which the enemy had advanced being a circuitous one. It was, therefore, quite practicable to have occupied Torres Vedras before the French could have reached it; and this would have been effected with greater facility, had the enemy, by a vigorous pursuit, been prevented from rallying their scattered forces, while General Hill was in full prosecution of his march. The ground around Torres Vedras is extremely strong; and there is no reason to doubt that he could have maintained his position, under every effort to dislodge him, till he had been enabled to open a communication with the main body of the army.

It is indeed true, that the troops on their march would have been liable to the attacks of the French cavalry, which had suffered comparatively little in the previous battle. But when we consider the qualities of British infantry,

which have since been tested in a long course of service, and the confidence in their own prowess, which the recent victory must have inspired, it is impossible, we think, to lend to this objection all the weight which was yielded to it in high quarters, at the moment of decision.*

The consequences, therefore, of this movement, would probably have been to cut off the retreat of the French army on Lisbon; to gain possession of their baggage and military stores; and, what was more important than either or both of these, to have saved the British arms from the stigma which attached to them in the eyes of Europe, from the unfortunate Convention of Cintra.

On the morning after the battle, Sir Hew Dalrymple landed in Marceira Bay, and assumed the command of the army, which still remained on the field of Vimiero. In the course of the day, a large body of French cavalry was observed approaching our out-posts; and the

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* It is but fair to Sir Harry Burrard, to state, that his opinions were supported by those of Sir Henry Clinton and Sir George Murray. With the exception of Wellington, the service boasts no higher names.

CHAP. XI. whole line was immediately ordered under arms.

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The object of the enemy, however, was pacific; and the cavalry was soon ascertained to constitute the escort of General Kellerman, who came with a flag of truce.

General Kellerman was immediately ushered into the presence of the Commander-in-chief. He stated his object to be the proposal of a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the total evacuation of Portugal by the French army. Sir Arthur Wellesley was directed to arrange the terms of an armistice; and, in the course of the day, the basis of a definitive agreement was arranged between the parties, subject, however, to the chance of being rendered void by the veto of Sir Charles Cotton, whose approval was declared necessary to the validity of the treaty. In this preliminary compact, no reference was made to the provisional government of Portugal, which was neither informed of, nor consulted on, proceedings in which the interests of their country were so deeply implicated.

App. No. 14. The chief stipulations of the document were as follows:—

I. That a suspension should immediately take place, with a view to negotiate a convention

for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army. CHAP. XI.

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II. That a day should be appointed by the Generals-in-chief of the two armies, and the commander of the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus, for the negotiation and conclusion of the proposed convention.

III. That the river Sizandra should form the line of demarkation between the armies.

IV. That the British Commander-in-chief should undertake to include the Portuguese armies in this suspension; and that for them the line of demarkation should extend from Leiria to Thomar.

V. That the French should not, in any case, be considered prisoners of war; and that all the individuals composing the army, "*should be transported to France, with their arms, baggage, and the whole of their private property, from which nothing should be excepted.*"

VI. That no individual should be called to account for his political conduct; that property should be respected; and that all who were desirous to quit the kingdom should be suffered to do so unmolested.

VII. That the port of Lisbon should be re-

CHAP. XI. cognised as neutral for the Russian fleet; and
 1808. that the principles of maritime law, in respect
 August. to the privileges of neutral ports, should be
 strictly observed by the British squadron.

VIII. That the horses of the cavalry, and the
 artillery of French calibre, should be transported
 to France with the army.

IX. That the suspension of arms should not
 be broken on either side, without forty-eight
 hours previous notice. By an additional article
 it was likewise stipulated, that the French gar-
 risons and fortresses should be included in the
 convention, in case they should not have capi-
 tulated before the twenty-fifth of August.

On communicating the agreement to Sir
 Charles Cotton, that officer declined yielding
 his assent to that part of the convention which
 related to the Russian fleet, but declared his
 readiness to enter on a separate treaty with the
 admiral in command.

The conditions of the preliminary agreement
 being thus found incapable of execution, Sir Ar-
 thur Wellesley strenuously recommended to the
 Commander-in-chief, at once to put an end to
 the armistice, and advance on Lisbon, leaving
 it to Marshal Junot to renew the negotiation on

a different basis, if he thought proper. This ad- CHAP. XI.
 vice, however, was rejected. Sir Hew Dalrym-
 ple considered that, under all the circumstances,
 1808. it was more prudent and honourable to pursue
 August. the negotiation; and Colonel Murray was de-
 spatched to Lisbon, with full powers to conclude
 a definitive convention.

At every step, however, new difficulties arose.
 The French, emboldened by the concession of
 such favourable preliminaries, brought forward
 new demands, and endeavoured, through diplo-
 matic subtility and evasion, to secure advantages
 by the pen, which they were unable to acquire
 by the sword. To give some idea of the char-
 acter of the claims pertinaciously put forward
 by the negotiators, it may be sufficient to state,
 that they insisted on being suffered to carry off
 two Portuguese frigates, and required that
 French troops should be given in exchange for
 Spanish prisoners. It is, indeed, probable, that
 pretensions, so entirely inadmissible, were urged
 rather with the view of procrastination than any
 hope that they could be acceded to by the Bri-
 tish generals. All delay was in their favour.
 The ships, on which the army depended for its
 supplies, were at anchor on an iron-bound coast,

CHAP. XI. without a harbour, and liable to all the contingencies of weather.

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Sir Hew Dalrymple, therefore, felt called on to transmit a distinct notification to Marshal Junot, that unless the terms of the convention, already specified, were immediately accepted, he should, in forty-eight hours, recommence hostilities. On the same day the army moved forward to Ramalhal.

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The decided tone thus tardily assumed by the British general, produced an immediate effect. It became evident to the French negotiators, that evasion was no longer possible; and, on the following morning, the convention, duly signed, was forwarded from Lisbon.

Aug. 30.

The question concerning the Russian fleet was settled by a separate treaty between Admiral Siniavin and Sir Charles Cotton. It was agreed, that the ships should be held as a deposit by Great Britain, during the war, and that the crews should be conveyed to their own country in British ships, without any stipulation regarding their future services.

While these events were in progress, the corps of Sir John Moore had arrived in Marceira Bay; and having, with some difficulty, effected a land-

Aug. 25.

ing, it joined the army. By this large accession the British force amounted to about thirty-two thousand men; but the increase of his numbers had not the effect of inducing the British general to exact more severe conditions from his opponents, and the treaty, forwarded from Lisbon, was immediately ratified by Sir Hew Dalrymple.

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Of the terms of the convention, the Portuguese generals were loud in their complaints; and by the nation it was regarded with extreme disgust and indignation. De Freire, of whose conduct during the active operations of the campaign the reader has already been informed, now spoke out in a tone at once decided and uncompromising. He disclaimed, for himself or his government, any share of the responsibility which the British general had not hesitated so rashly to incur. He complained loudly of the absence of that proper deference and respect to which his Sovereign, as an independent prince and an ally of Great Britain, was entitled, and of the disregard which had been shewn, in the recent proceedings, to the honour and interests of the Portuguese nation. He particularly objected to the article which stipulated the surrender of the fortified places, stores, and ships, to the

CHAP. XI. British forces, without a solemn declaration, on the part of their commander, that this surrender was only temporary, and that the earliest opportunity would be seized of restoring them to the government of Portugal. He objected also to that article which secured pardon and impunity to all political offenders; because this was an unwarranted interference between a prince and his subjects, and deprived the former of his undoubted right to punish such breaches of allegiance as he might think proper. It likewise afforded matter of complaint, that, in the convention, no notice whatever was taken of the troops in the Alentejo, nor of the Spanish army which had crossed the frontier.

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Although it must be admitted that these objections, among many others, were urged by a person whose previous conduct entitled him to no very flattering construction of his motives, they cannot be considered in the light of mere groundless invective. With a degree of neglect, almost amounting to insult, the Bishop of Oporto was not informed of the armistice until three days after it had been signed; and even then he was merely told, by Sir Arthur Wellesley, that it contained nothing remark-

able, except a provision for securing the neutrality of the port of Lisbon, and the Russian fleet. Now, conceding that the Junta of Oporto was not entitled to be considered in the pending negotiation, as the existing government of Portugal, it had unquestionably a right to be treated with the deference due to a body of decided patriotism, which had rendered great services to the cause, and whose authority was at least acknowledged by a considerable portion of the kingdom.

The objection urged by de Freire to that article which provided that the fortified places held by the enemy, should be surrendered to the *English*, was one rather applicable to the form than the substance of the stipulation. It does not admit of question, that these strongholds of the kingdom ought to have been delivered up, either to the troops of that sovereign to whom they rightfully belonged, or to the *English acting in his name and behalf*; but in the circumstances of a nation without any general and acknowledged government actually in force, torn by jealousies and contentions within, and threatened externally by an enemy, to whose invading force they could of themselves have offered no

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CHAP. XI. effectual resistance, it was undoubtedly more prudent that the important fortresses, which constitute, as it were, the very keys of the kingdom, should be held by hands of greater vigour, and of firmer grasp. With a view to allay the jealousy betrayed on this subject by de Freire and the Junta, Sir Hew Dalrymple published a manifesto, declaring, that he considered himself as the commander of an army strictly auxiliary to the Sovereign of Portugal; that he held himself bound to promote the dignity and security of his government by every measure in his power; and disclaiming, on the part of Great Britain, all intention or desire of territorial aggrandizement. In the same document he gave public assurance, that the fortresses in question should be considered only as a trust, to be sacredly guarded, and honourably restored, so soon as the restoration could be made with safety to the interests of the country.

Sep. 2. On the second of September, the headquarters of the British were established at Oyeras, and the army were put in possession of the forts on the Tagus. On the tenth, the Castle of Belem was evacuated by the French; and on the Sep. 12. twelfth, a division was stationed on the Campo

Sta. Anna, sending a detachment to garrison the citadel of Lisbon, and to maintain order in the city. It had been proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, that an article should be introduced into the convention, with the view of "making the French generals disgorge the church plate which they had stolen," and for limiting, by a more particular description, the property which the army were to be allowed to abstract from the country under the name of *baggage*. This proposal, however, was not carried into effect, because it was represented by General Kellerman, that the introduction of such a stipulation, would be reproachful to the French army, and unpleasant to its commander. General Kellerman pledged himself, at the same time, that such an abuse of the terms of the convention should not take place. The consequences of this forbearance were soon apparent. It became known that the French, under cover of the second article of the preliminary agreement, and the fifth of the convention, which guaranteed the undisturbed removal of their private property, were carrying off the spoils of churches and palaces, of the royal library, the arsenal, and the museum; and that every species of fraudulent abstraction and covert pillage,

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CHAP. XI. was employed by the departing army. The
 1808. knowledge of such facts could scarcely fail to
 September. rouse the indignation of the people. Popular
 tumults were the consequence; deep and intense
 curses were cast on the degraded robbers, whose
 unprincipled and oppressive tyranny had, by the
 remissness of the English, been suffered to ter-
 minate in flagrant and successful pillage. The
 flame of hatred towards their invaders, which
 had long burned in the bosoms of the Portu-
 guese, now sent forth its full volume to the gaze
 of the world. Songs of insulting triumph were
 sung in the streets of Lisbon. Many of the
 tradespeople refused to sell to a Frenchman
 even the necessaries of life. Hordes of deprav-
 ed wretches took advantage of the temporary
 anarchy, and came forth to rob, and to assassin-
 ate. Constant patrols were sent out into the
 streets to repress violence and tumult. Yet
 these were only partially successful. The bodies
 of French officers and soldiers were every day
 found dead in the streets, where they had been
 trampled and spit upon by the passengers. And
 so great was the insecurity of the French army,
 that piquets were regularly posted, and all who
 ventured to approach their quarters in the night

were fired on. In this manner several Portu-CHAP. XI.
 guese were shot.

In order to prevent, as much as possible, the
 successful exercise of the unprincipled system of
 pillage, in which the French were engaged, a
 Commission, of which General Beresford was
 the chief, was directed to superintend the strict
 execution of the terms of the Convention. The
 commissioners entered on their duties with be-
 coming firmness. Through their exertions, the
 spoils of the museum and the royal library were
 restored; and the money abstracted from the pub-
 lic treasury was ordered to be refunded. Yet it
 was found altogether impossible to put a stop to
 many unwarranted and shameful acts of furtive
 spoliation which were hourly taking place, in de-
 fiance of an order with difficulty obtained from
 Marshal Junot, that all stolen property should be
 restored. By an unfortunate oversight, a divi-
 sion of the French army was suffered to sail
 before the extent of the depredations they had
 committed could be ascertained, and it became a
 matter of delicacy, as well as of difficulty, to
 deal more harshly with the remaining portion of
 the army, than with that which had been suffered
 to escape.

CHAP. XI. On the fifteenth, the first division of the
 1808. French army sailed. The Spanish prisoners in
 September. the hulks were disembarked, and the liberation
 of the country was announced by the elevation of
 the national standard. On this occasion, the joy
 and enthusiasm of the inhabitants were raised
 to the highest pitch. The city seemed to send
 forth one mighty shout of triumphant thanks-
 giving. Innumerable banners were displayed in
 every quarter of the city. The ships in the river
 were decorated with the proud symbols of
 national independence; and repeated salvoes of
 artillery proclaimed that the iron rod of the op-
 pressor was at length broken. For nine succes-
 sive nights the city was universally illuminated;
 and all was joy and festivity in Lisbon.

These rejoicings having ended, the destina-
 tion of the Spanish troops naturally became an
 object of attention to the British general. Des-
 titute alike of money and arms, it was quite
 evident they could not be brought to act as an
 efficient body, unless the means of organization
 and equipment were furnished from the funds of
 the British army. This was done. A sum of
 twenty thousand dollars was advanced from the
 military chest, and the troops were soon brought

into a state of complete readiness for service. CHAP. XI.
 The first project entertained, was that of sending
 them to Badajos; but, on the representations of
 two Catalan deputies, it was thought more ad-
 vantageous to the general cause to land them in
 Catalonia, where their presence could not fail to
 produce an immediate influence. The Spanish
 corps, in number about four thousand, was ac-
 cordingly embarked, and set sail for that des-
 tination.

In attempting to arrange the details of a civil
 government in Portugal, Sir Hew Dalrymple
 became involved in a task of singular delicacy
 and difficulty. The Junta of Oporto were
 known, for some time, to have been engaged in
 intrigues to secure the extension and continu-
 ance of their power. Making a pretext of the
 troubled state of the capital, they expressed their
 wishes to the British General, that Oporto might
 be made the temporary seat of government;
 and that deputies from the different provinces
 should be directed to repair thither, to arrange
 the interests of the kingdom. It was likewise
 stated by the Bishop of Oporto, that he had ac-
 cepted authority, only in the hope of promoting
 the restoration of his sovereign; but if his con-

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September. tinuance in office should be thought conducive to the national interest, he intimated that his duty would not suffer him to quit Oporto, unless in compliance with a direct order from the Prince Regent. He strongly urged the advantages which would accrue to the kingdom, from the proposed arrangement; and that the opposition to its execution would be greatly obviated, were the measure to be suggested by the British General.

The finesse of the Bishop was somewhat too flimsy to prove successful. Though aware of his popularity, and the services which he had rendered to the cause of his country, Sir Hew Dalrymple declined lending his sanction or support to the proposed arrangement. He replied, that his sovereign could not, in the peculiar circumstances of Portugal, consent to the unqualified restoration of the Council of Regency, some members of which had incurred suspicion of being attached to the interest of France. On the other hand, it was unquestionable, that those members who had kept their fidelity unstained during the period of struggle, were fully entitled to be reinstated in authority.

Without entering into any detail of the petty

intrigues, which had their origin in private interests and individual cupidity of power, it will be sufficient to state, that, after many difficulties, a Council of Regency was appointed, of which the Bishop of Oporto was a member. The Junta of Oporto then formally declared its functions at an end, with a proviso, that should the Regency be overthrown by any new invasion of the enemy, their body should be held, *de facto*, to have resumed its authority. The other provincial Juntas were, in like manner, dissolved; and the authority of the Regency was universally acknowledged throughout the kingdom.

In England, the intelligence of the Convention of Cintra was received with a general burst of indignation and disgust. The sentiment pervaded all classes, that the British arms had sustained a deep and imperishable tarnish, and the voice of the nation called loudly for inquiry. By the government, the demand of millions was not, and could not be, disregarded. Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard were recalled from Portugal, and a court of general officers*

* The members of the court were as follows:—Sir David Dundas, President; Generals Craig, Lord Moira, Lord Heathfield; and Lieutenant-Generals Lord Pembroke, Nugent, and Nichols.

CHAP. XI. was directed to assemble at Chelsea, in order to
 1808. inquire into the causes which led to the armis-
 tice and subsequent convention; and to report,
 September. on a full consideration of the whole proceedings,
 whether the conduct of Sir Hew Dalrymple, or
 that of his subordinate officers, was such as to
 render them justly amenable to military cen-
 sure.

Nov. 14. On the fourteenth of November, the Board
 held its first sitting. A minute investigation of
 all the circumstances took place; but the report
 contained little more than a summary of the
 operations of the army, as detailed in evidence,
 and a concluding expression of opinion, that
 no farther military proceeding was necessary on
 the subject; "because, however some of the
 members might differ in their sentiments re-
 specting the fitness of the convention, in the
 relative situation of the armies, it was their
 unanimous opinion, that unquestionable zeal
 and firmness had throughout been exhibited
 by Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard,
 and Sir Arthur Wellesley; and that the ardour
 and gallantry of the rest of the officers and
 soldiers had, on every occasion during the ex-
 pedition, done honour to the troops, and re-
 flected lustre on his Majesty's arms."

This report was not considered satisfactory by the government. The Court was accordingly
 CHAP. XI. reassembled, and the members of it were re-
 1808. quired to declare whether "the armistice was
 September. advisable in the relative situation of the two
 armies, on the twenty-second of August; and,
 if so, whether the terms were such as ought
 to have been agreed upon; and whether, when
 all the British forces were landed, it was advisa-
 ble to form a convention; and, if so, whether
 the terms were such as ought to have been a-
 greed upon." It then appeared that the mem-
 bers of the court were divided in opinion. Six
 generals approved, and one (Lord Moira) dis-
 approved of the armistice. With regard to the
 Convention, opinion was more nearly balanced;
 four generals expressed their approbation of the
 policy of that measure; and three (Lords Pem-
 broke, Moira, and General Nichols) dissented
 from that conclusion.

Thus were the opinions of the people left
 as much at large as ever, by the dubious con-
 clusion put forth by the Board of Inquiry.
 The public indignation was not quieted, though
 partially withdrawn by the interest of the new
 events which were about to take place on the

CHAP. XI. theatre of war. In the meanwhile, the King, abstaining from any observations on the military points of the question, publicly expressed his disapprobation of those articles of the Convention, in which stipulations were made affecting the interests of his allies. "His Majesty deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorized admission into military conventions, of articles of such a description, which, especially when incautiously framed, may lead to the most injurious consequences."

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Thus closed all judicial proceedings on this memorable convention.

In reviewing the operations of the short campaign, of which we have just detailed the more prominent events, it must be admitted, we think, on all hands, that the conduct of Sir Arthur Wellesley, while in command, was marked by a degree of skill, boldness, promptitude, and fertility of resource, which can only be found united in a mind of the first order. Like an early sketch of a great master, it is perhaps possible to detect in it some error of conception, or fault of execution; yet he must be blind indeed, who does not perceive, in the general vigour

and boldness of the design, promise of lofty excellence and splendid achievement. The measure of landing his army, without waiting for reinforcements, has been condemned by men of different mould, as rash and imprudent. Never was an objection more futile urged against the measures of a great commander; and when stated by Sir Hew Dalrymple, in his defence before the Court of Inquiry, it drew forth a most triumphant refutation from Sir Arthur Wellesley. The truth is, that the determination of Sir Arthur Wellesley to engage his army in immediate operations against the enemy, was the result of the nicest and most accurate calculation, and of a deep and well-grounded conviction, that his force was fully adequate to the expulsion of the French army from the capital. Had the projects of Sir Arthur Wellesley been carried into effect, by those who succeeded him in command, there can be little doubt that the campaign would have been conducted to a more glorious result. To say nothing of the advance on Mafra, on the morning of the twenty-first, it was the decided opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, expressed in the Court of Inquiry, that by a vigorous prosecution of the victory of Vimiero,

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CHAP. XI. and pushing forward the right wing on the
 1808. road to Torres Vedras, we might have anticipated the enemy in reaching Lisbon, and have
 September. at once placed Junot in a situation in which another defeat must have terminated in unconditional surrender.

To say that an operation of this bold and splendid character, was attended by hazard, is, in fact, to say nothing. All warlike operations are so. But the point is, did the one in question hold out a fair and reasonable prospect of success, and was the object to be attained of magnitude and importance sufficient to justify the risk. These are questions which gave rise to much difference of opinion at the time, and on which it would ill become the most gifted writer to express his conviction with anything approaching to dogmatism. Yet we know not why we should conceal our own decided belief, that the conclusions of those military reasoners who would answer these questions in the negative, are founded on narrow and timid views, by which it was more than improbable, that a genius like that of Sir Arthur Wellesley could be influenced.

On Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Bur-

rard we would cast no censure. Successively CHAP. XI.
 called on to assume the command of the army in 1808.
 the immediate neighbourhood of an enemy, of September. whose strength and situation they knew nothing; in a state of utter ignorance of the localities of the country, and the temper of the inhabitants, these officers were placed, by the bungling mismanagement of government, in a situation of difficulty, which it conveys no imputation, to assert they were unequal to overcome.

Up to the period of the armistice, the chief impediments felt in all the operations of the army arose from want of cavalry, and the miserable condition of the artillery horses. Why, we may ask, were these things so? Why was an expedition, thus crippled and incapacitated for vigorous operation in the field, sent forth to encounter difficulties, which might so easily have been avoided? It was solely owing to our deficiency in cavalry, that Delaborde was enabled to effect an orderly and unmolested retreat from the position of Rolica; and had our strength in that arm been greater, not only would the advantages acquired by the victory of Vimiero have been prodigiously increased, but all obstacle to a vigorous pursuit would at once have been re-

CHAP. XI. moved. Whatever degree of lustre, therefore,
 1808. the operations which terminated in the field of
 September. Vimiero, may cast on the skill of the general, or
 the valour of his troops, they can contribute
 nothing to the honour of a ministry, by whose
 negligence or incapacity so many important
 advantages were lost to the country.

On the subject of the armistice and subse-
 quent convention, we have a few—and but a few
 —observations to make. In favour of the princi-
 ple of the convention, and of its sound policy in
 the circumstances of the armies, the weight of
 evidence so decidedly preponderates, as almost
 to preclude a doubt with regard to a subject, on
 which we know that the highest military authori-
 ties entertained none. All the Generals of the
 army in Portugal, whose general or local informa-
 tion could lend weight to their opinions, declared
 their decided conviction that the Convention was
 founded, in the main, on a sound view of the sit-
 uation and resources of the enemy, and of our
 own means of offensive operation. From the
 very commencement of hostilities, it is known
 to have been the decided opinion of Sir Arthur
 Wellesley, that the general interests of the
 cause, would be best promoted by adopting the

most speedy measures for the expulsion of the CHAP. XI.
 French from Portugal, and bringing a British 1808.
 force to co-operate with the Spaniards on the September.
 Ebro. That it was in the power of the British
 army—numerically superior as it was to the
 enemy—to have expelled him from Portugal by
 force of arms, has never been denied. But it
 as little admits of a negative, that when the
 event of another battle should have compelled
 Junot to evacuate Lisbon, the province of Alen-
 tejo was open for his retreat, and that maga-
 zines had been already formed for the supply of
 his army during its retreat to the frontier. The
 strong fortress of Elvas was in his possession;
 and the difficulty of provisioning the British
 army, in advancing into the interior, must have
 materially retarded the vigour of pursuit. It
 was judged too—and we think rightly judged—
 that the cause of the Spanish patriots would be
 more efficaciously promoted by the presence of
 thirty thousand British soldiers, and of four
 thousand liberated prisoners, than it could suffer
 disadvantage from twenty thousand additional
 French troops being thrown, at no very remote
 period, into the country.

So much for the principle of the Convention.

CHAP. XI. That many of its details were objectionable cannot be denied: and here alone it is that censure can fall justly on Sir Hew Dalrymple. It was certainly incumbent on that officer to have insisted on a specific stipulation by which the French should have been forced to disgorge their disgraceful plunder, and to have taken strict measures for securing its execution. It became Sir Hew Dalrymple, we think, and it was due to the character of the army he commanded, to have assumed a higher moral tone in demanding all possible reparation from the infamous marauders, who had proved themselves alike destitute of principle and honour. That the armistice and preliminary convention were concluded without the knowledge or participation of the Portuguese general, we hold to have been another error. It ought not to have been forgotten that we stood in a relation of singular delicacy to the Portuguese Sovereign and people; and it should have been the object of the British general, to regulate his conduct in such a manner as to avoid exciting either jealousy or distrust, in a nation whose cordial co-operation was so essential to the successful prosecution of the war. Sir Hew Dalrymple must have known,

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that the patriots of the whole peninsula were abundantly ready to misinterpret both the motives and actions of their allies; and he must likewise have been aware, that an union of sentiment between the authorities of the two nations, was, on such an occasion, above all things desirable.

On the whole, it will probably be admitted that the stipulations of the treaty were more favourable to the French than it was either prudent or politic to grant. To have gained the confidence of the Spanish nation in the purity of her motives and the prowess of her soldiers, was, to England, worth more than a victory. This, however, the Convention of Cintra did not tend to acquire for her. With an army flushed with recent victory, and greatly superior in numbers, and with the whole nation on our side, we shewed too plainly that the vanquished enemy was still formidable to the victors. The moral impression throughout Europe, arising from the measures in question, was decidedly unfavourable to our arms. Our military reputation was lowered; and the British generals were regarded as having scandalously sacrificed the interest of their allies. This impression may now, in a great measure, be re-

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CHAP. XI. garded as unfounded; yet we believe that no
 1808. Englishman looks back with pride on the Con-
 September. vention of Cintra, or would not feel happy
 could all record of it be erased for ever from
 our annals.

CHAPTER XII.

OPERATIONS ON THE EBRO.

It is now necessary to revert to Spain.—CHAP. XII.
 Though the attachment of the nation to the
 cause of liberty was still unabated, yet their ef-
 1808. forts had not been attended by any of those bril-
 September. liant results which had been confidently antici-
 pated. No man of unquestioned patriotism and
 commanding talents had arisen to guide the ener-
 gies of the Spanish people, and direct them into
 a salutary channel. Each Junta had become an
 isolated and independent government, acting
 without concert, and on narrow views, and only
 influenced in its policy by petty considerations
 of personal or local interest. The govern-
 ment throughout Spain had devolved on the pro-
 vincial noblesse and higher orders of the clergy,

CHAP. XII. — classes of men who, from their deficiency of
 1808. information, their habits, and their prejudices,
 September. were peculiarly unfitted for the task they had
 assumed. On the first appearance of success,
 jealousies sprang up between the rival authorities;
 and so powerful was the feeling of hostility thus
 excited, that it was even proposed in the Junta
 of Seville, to enforce submission to its supremacy
 by the sword. Fortunately for Spain, the firmness
 of Castanos saved it from the impending horrors
 of a civil war. On hearing the proposal, he at once
 declared, that the troops under his command
 should not be employed against any but the common
 enemy.

When the French evacuated Madrid, the reins
 of authority were, for a time, assumed by the
 Council of Castile. This body, which, by the
 tardy yet firm resistance which it opposed to
 the intruder, had regained some portion of its
 former influence with the nation, put forth an
 elaborate manifesto, vindicating the line of
 policy it had pursued in the difficult circumstances
 of the country. It declared its readiness to
 co-operate with the Provincial Juntas, in any
 measures conducive to the general defence, and
 limited its own pretensions, as a public body, to

guiding and stimulating the national ardour into
 beneficial action. As the peculiar circumstances
 of the country did not admit of the Cortes
 being immediately assembled, it was recom-
 mended, by the Council of Castile, that the
 Provincial Juntas should despatch deputies to
 the capital, in order to decide on the im-
 mediate wants of the nation, and the mode by
 which they could be most advantageously sup-
 plied.

A temporary form of government, founded on
 these propositions, was adopted by the Junta of
 Seville, and followed by the approbation of the
 great body of the nation. The deputies were
 consequently elected, and installed at Aranjuez,
 with much formality, in their delegated func-
 tions. Count Florida Blanca was elected pre-
 sident; and a circular missive was despatched,
 requiring recognition and obedience from the
 different authorities of the kingdom.

One of the first acts of the Provisional Gov-
 ernment, was to vindicate their authority, which
 had been publicly set at nought by Cuesta.
 That general was unfavourable to the sway
 of the Juntas, and desirous of preserving the
 authority of the Captains-general and Royal

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CHAP. XII. Audiencias, which had, in a great measure, been nullified by the establishment of these petty governments. Endowed with more than an ordinary share of the national obstinacy and pride, this haughty leader was prepared, if necessary, to support his opinions by the strong arm of military force. The Junta of Leon and Castile, which he had appointed as a subordinate council for the regulation of the district, had, subsequently to the battle of Rio Seco, erected themselves into an independent government; and, protected by Blake, issued orders to Cuesta to transfer his cavalry to the army of that officer. The proceedings of the Junta were accordingly declared void; and Cuesta issued orders for the immediate assembly of a new Junta. He ventured even to seize the Leonese deputies on their way to Aranjuez, and detain them as prisoners. One of them, named Valdes, made known the circumstances of his arrest to Florida Blanca, who, willing to avoid the fatal consequences of civil dissension, wrote mildly to Cuesta, requesting the release of the deputies thus unlawfully arrested, and that their conduct should be left to the judgment of the Supreme Government. Castanos also interfered to prevent the evil conse-

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quences of intestine discord; and addressed a letter to the General, containing a strong remonstrance on the violence and impolicy of his conduct.

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In his answers to Count Florida Blanca, and Castanos, Cuesta entered on a laboured vindication of his conduct; and concluded, by declaring his resolution of holding his prisoners in strict custody, till the Central Junta should have assembled. It was to that body alone, he said, that he owed, or would pay, submission.

The Council of Castile was then called on to interfere, with the view of restoring harmony; but their efforts, for this purpose, were unsuccessful. Cuesta persisted in declaring, that the *soi-disant* Junta of Castile and Leon was an unlawful authority; that he considered his own power, as Captain-general, could only be superseded by the decree of a Sovereign Regency; and that as Valdes held the rank of general in the Spanish army, it was his intention to deliver him over to be tried by a military tribunal.

On the first meeting of the Central Junta, deputies from the Junta of Valladolid were sent, by the influence of Cuesta, to demand admission into that body. This was refused. Cuesta was

CHAP. XII. summoned to appear at the bar of the Junta, to answer for his conduct ; and peremptory orders were issued for the release of the prisoners. On this occasion, the influence of Mr. Stewart, the British agent, was exerted to reduce Cuesta to obedience. That general at length thought it prudent to comply with the demands of the Junta ; and, releasing his prisoners, he repaired to Aranjuez. The result was, that Valdes was admitted to the exercise of his privileges as a member of the Assembly ; and that Cuesta remained at the seat of government, in a state of temporary obscurity.

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The Central Junta, thus peaceably installed in their functions and authority, at first gave fair promise of a beneficial exercise of their power. But the prospect, so gratifying to the friends of liberty, soon vanished. Their president, a man in the last stage of decrepitude, was unfitted, by his decaying powers, for the task of guiding the deliberations of such a body, or of enforcing the necessary subordination in its members. Their time was wasted in useless formalities and frivolous debates ; and it soon became apparent that the Assembly inherited all the defects of the Provincial Juntas, without their

local influence. Its authority, though not openly questioned, was viewed by these bodies with jealousy and aversion ; and the measures which it adopted were too little marked by vigour and decision to suit the character of the crisis. Feebleness of purpose, and tardiness of execution, were its besetting sins, and were partly perhaps inseparable from its constitution. The members, in general, were men of untarnished character ; but, drawn from different provinces of the kingdom, they were unacquainted with each other, and deficient in the knowledge necessary to the successful exercise of their new duties. For a national convocation, their numbers were too few ; for an executive government, too many.

The more enlightened members were by no means unaware of the almost inevitable deficiencies of the new government. It was the opinion of Jovellanos that a Regency of five persons should immediately be appointed, and that the Junta should be reduced to one half of its original number. That the power of the latter should cease on the assembling of the Cortes, which was to be convoked as speedily as was found prac-

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CHAP. XII. ticable in the circumstances of the country.

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It was scarcely to be expected that the Junta should decree the abrogation of its own powers; and the propositions of this distinguished patriot were not carried into effect.

But the measure admitted by all to be most indispensable in the circumstances of the country, was the appointment of a Commander-in-chief, who might consolidate the national troops, and direct their efforts with unity of purpose and effect, against the common enemy. To the accomplishment of this object, however, there were many impediments. Spain afforded no general whose claims to so distinguished a command were pre-eminent and acknowledged. The local governments, swayed by petty interests, were discordant in their sentiments; and it was found impossible to unite the voices of the people in favour of any individual on whom the appointment could be bestowed. Under these circumstances, the Junta endeavoured to supply the place of a General-in-chief by a Military Commission, of which Castanos was destined to be president. Yet this measure, too, was frustrated by unforeseen difficulties; and time passed on without the

final adoption of any efficacious steps for the improvement and consolidation of the national forces.

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In the meanwhile, the confidence of the people in their own prowess and resources, had been increased, by the victory of Baylen, to a pitch of exultation almost ludicrous. In their eyes, the contest was already at an end, and it only remained to reap the full harvest of their glorious resistance. It was impossible to impress on them that the safety of their country still depended on their adoption of a system of firm, unrelenting, connected, and continuous resistance. They were unable to appreciate the dangers which surrounded them, and remained equally intractable to advice or persuasion. The Central Government, instead of exerting itself to dispel the unfortunate illusions of the people, were smitten with the epidemic delirium, and endeavoured, by exaggerated statements of its military force, to deceive both the nation and its allies. At the very moment when the troops already organized were in want of almost every necessary, they proclaimed, in the true spirit of bluster and bravado, their immediate intention of augmenting the army to

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CHAP. XII. half a million of infantry and fifty thousand
 1808. cavalry; a force not larger, perhaps, than was
 September. requisite in the circumstances of the country, but
 one which it was quite impossible they could
 possess the means to organize and equip.

While such was the course of events in Spain, Napoleon was making vigorous exertions to retrieve the disasters of the preceding campaign. Had the efforts of the Spanish people been directed by a general government with vigour and judgment, it is probable he might have been induced to resign the task of subjugating the peninsula in despair. But the ignorance and imbecility of the numerous chaotic and ephemeral governments, which the revolution had called into existence, gave a prospect of success to his efforts, which led him to renew the contest with increased hope.

At the period in question, Europe might be said to be overspread by the armies of Napoleon. The French eagles were flying in Italy, in Dalmatia, in Prussia, in Denmark, in Poland, on the Rhine, the Danube, and the Elbe; and the annals of modern history afford no parallel instance of a dominion so widely extended, yet apparently so firmly established, as that which

a long course of victory had acquired for CHAP. XII.
 France.

The internal government of Napoleon was one
 1808. of trickery and deception. It was part of his policy,
 September. that the nation should studiously be kept ignorant of the real state of Spain. The French newspapers indeed did, occasionally, mention that disturbances had taken place in the peninsula; but they were described as altogether trifling, and originating only in the vulgar, who had been led astray by motives of faction, or the intriguing agents of England. All the higher orders of the nation, the nobility and the public authorities, were represented as rejoicing in the new dynasty, and faithful in their allegiance.

The cabinet of the Thuilleries, however, were aware that the deception, thus practised on the credulity of the nation, was too flimsy to be long successful. A narrative, containing a distorted account of the events in Spain, was therefore published on the sixth of September. In
 Sep. 6. this paper, the disturbances were exclusively attributed to the artifices of the priests, and of the English faction. It touched on the political circumstances of the country, in a manner the most desultory and unconnected, and an impen-

CHAP. XII. etrable obscurity prevailed the military details.

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Skirmishes were magnified into battles, and the disasters of the French armies were passed over with a negligent rapidity intended to conceal their importance. The account of the transactions at Zaragoza was brought down only to the period when the French were in occupation of a large portion of the city, and no notice was taken of their subsequent abandonment of the siege. The details of the battle of Rio Seco were given with studious exaggeration. The Spanish army was declared to be annihilated; and though it was admitted that the disasters in Andalusia were of some importance, it attributed the retreat of Joseph to the Ebro to the extreme *heat of the weather*, and to the desire of locating the troops in a district which *afforded better water* than New Castile!

Dated
Apr. 24.

It was in such circumstances that two reports from M. Champagny, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were laid before the French Senate. The first of these documents contained a strong recommendation that, in order to contribute to the overthrow of British power, the Emperor should seize on Spain; and boldly asserted the legitimacy of every measure by which an object

so desirable to the peace and tranquillity of the world could be effected. From her geographical position, it was declared that Spain must necessarily be considered either as the most important ally or the most dangerous enemy of France. When either was engaged in war, the situation of the other did not admit of neutrality; the two nations must be united by intimate alliance, or separated by implacable enmity. It was for the interest of Spain, as well as of France, that her government should be regenerated, at a time when a feeble and dissolute administration had led her to the brink of ruin. It had been the policy of Louis XIV. to unite Spain to France, by an alliance which placed a Bourbon on the throne. That policy should again be pursued: Spain, by similar means, should once more be united to France. The increase of the Spanish army, before the battle of Jena, and the conduct of the government at that period, were in themselves a declaration of war. The commerce of France had been made to suffer by the laws of the Customs. The ports of Spain were open to the contraband merchandise of England, which, through her dominions, found access to the rest of continental Europe. What policy suggested, there-

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CHAP. XII. fore, justice demanded. It was an act of both, to conquer the territory of a power which had thus acted towards France.

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The second report—of four months later date than the former—was of similar import, and was intended to establish the same conclusions. It justified the conduct of Napoleon, in regard to Spain. The disturbances in that country had been excited by English gold. Would the Emperor permit England to say, "Spain is one of my provinces. My flag, driven from the Baltic, the North Sea, and the Levant, and even from the shores of Persia, rules in the ports of France." No, never! To prevent so disgraceful a consummation, two millions of gallant soldiers were ready to scale the Pyrenees, and chase the English from the peninsula. If the French fought for the liberty of the seas, it was first necessary to wrest Spain from the tyrant of the ocean. If they fought for peace, it could not be attained till the fomenters of war had been driven from the Spanish territory. If they fought for honour, they must inflict prompt and signal vengeance for the outrages committed against the French name in Spain. At last the English would be made to feel those evils

which they had so long inflicted on others. CHAP. XII. "They will be beaten," said M. Champagny, "destroyed, dispersed; or they will fly, as they did at Toulon, at the Helder, at Dunkirk, and in Sweden,—wherever the French armies have been able to find them! Their expulsion from Spain would be the ruin of their cause; it would exhaust their resources, and annihilate their last hope. In this contest the wishes of all Europe would be with France!"

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In a message to the Senate, the policy he intended to pursue with regard to the peninsula, was distinctly announced by Napoleon. "I am determined," he said, "to prosecute the war in Spain with the utmost vigour, and to destroy the armies which England has poured into that country. The future security of my subjects, a maritime peace, and the security of commerce, depend on the success of these important operations. Frenchmen, all my undertakings have but one object—your happiness, and the permanent prosperity of your children; and, if I know you aright, you will hasten to comply with this new call on your exertions, which is rendered necessary by the interests of your country."

CHAP. XII. Vast preparations were accordingly made for
 1808. the prosecution of the war. Eighty thousand
 September. soldiers of Austerlitz, and Jena, and Friedland, were withdrawn from Prussia and Poland, and directed to cross the Pyrenees. The contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine were likewise set in motion, and a levy of one hundred and sixty thousand conscripts was decreed by the Senate.

On entering France the veterans were received with public honours in every town along the line of their march. Deputations came forth to meet them with greeting and congratulation on their return, and they were feasted at the expense of the municipalities.

Such public demonstrations of respect to the soldiers of his army, were encouraged by Napoleon. They contributed to diffuse a military spirit throughout the nation. They were a cheap reward for past services, and an incitement to press onward in that career which had led to such honourable results. It was his uniform policy to impress on the people, that those who would pursue successfully the path of honour and distinction, must hew their way by the sword.

On the eleventh of September, the advanced-

guard of the army was reviewed by the Emperor at Paris; when, forming the officers in a circle, he thus addressed them :—

“Soldiers ! after having triumphed on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, by rapid marches you have passed through Germany. I now direct you to march through France, without a moment's repose. Soldiers ! I have need of you. The frightful presence of the Leopard contaminates the continent of Spain and Portugal. Let him fly terrified at your approach. Let us carry our triumphant eagles even to the pillars of Hercules. There also we have outrages to avenge ! Soldiers ! your fame has transcended that of all modern warriors. But have you equalled the glory of the Roman legions, who, in one campaign, were conquerors on the Rhine, the Euphrates, in Illyria, and on the Tagus ? A lasting peace, and permanent prosperity, shall be the reward of your exertions. A true Frenchman cannot, and ought not, to taste repose till the ocean has been freed from its tyrant. Soldiers ! all that you have already done, all that you will yet do, for the happiness of France and my glory, shall be eternally engraven on my heart.”

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CHAP. XII. A force, amounting nearly to two hundred
 1808. and fifty thousand men, of all nations, languages,
 September. and religions, thronged the roads to Spain; diverse in all of thought, motive, or expression, and united only by the strong bond of military discipline. A struggle, more vehement and deadly than that in which Spain had hitherto been engaged, was evidently approaching. Every nerve and muscle would be strained to regain the grasp which France, by the disasters of the former campaign, had been forced to loosen. It was the last and decisive contest between tyranny and freedom; and all hopes—those alike of the slave and the freeman—were absorbed in the event.

While to all eyes the horizon of Spain was thus hourly becoming more dark and overcast, Napoleon set out for Erfurth, to hold a conference with the Emperor Alexander. The consequences of this meeting were a treaty of alliance between the sovereigns, and a proposal for peace to Great Britain. The latter was accompanied by a joint letter from the two Emperors to the King of England. "The circumstances of Europe," they said, "had brought them together; and their first object was to yield to the wishes

and wants of all nations, and to seek, in a general peace, the most efficacious remedy for the common miseries of Europe. The long and bloody war which had ravaged the continent was at length at an end, and could not be renewed. Many changes had taken place in Europe; and many states had been overthrown. Of these the chief cause was the distress and convulsion produced by the stagnation of maritime commerce. Still greater changes might take place against the policy of the English nation. Peace, therefore, was the interest of England, as well as of the continent. We write to entreat your Majesty," observed the potentates, in conclusion, "that, disregarding the dictates of the passions, you would listen to the voice of humanity. That you would at length resolve to conciliate all interests, and, by so doing, preserve the existing powers, and ensure the happiness of Europe, and of this generation, at the head of which providence has placed us."

This singular communication was answered by Mr. Canning, in two letters addressed to the Russian and French ministers, accompanied by an official note. The former contained a statement of the reasons, why his Majesty did not

CHAP. XII. think it proper to depart from the usual mode
 1808. of conducting negotiations between independent sovereigns. In the latter, the King's readiness and desire to negotiate a peace, on any terms not inconsistent with his own honour, and with the permanent security of Europe, were again asserted. If the condition of the continent had been one of agitation and convulsion—if many states had been subverted, and more were yet threatened with subversion, these calamities, it was declared, were not with any justice attributable to his Majesty. It was most true, that these dreadful wars were altogether in opposition to the policy of Great Britain, yet the King could not be expected to learn, with unqualified regret, that the system which had occasioned a stagnation of commerce so deplorable, had recoiled on its authors or its instruments. It was neither, however, in the disposition of his Majesty, nor in the character of the people over whom he reigned, to rejoice in the misery and privations even of the nations combined against him; and, therefore, he anxiously desired the termination of the sufferings of the continent. The sole object of the war in which his Majesty was engaged, was national safety; but in its

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progress, new obligations had been imposed on CHAP. XII.
 him, in behalf of those powers whom the aggressions of a common enemy had compelled to unite their cause with his, and of others who had solicited his assistance and support in the vindication of their national independence. The interests of Portugal, Sicily, and Sweden, the document went on to state, were inseparably connected with those of his Majesty; and for these powers he claimed a participation in the negotiations. With Spain, indeed, no formal treaty had been executed; but he had contracted, in the face of the world, engagements with that nation not less sacred than the most formal treaties; and it was, therefore, indispensable that the government, acting in name and on behalf of the Spanish monarch, should be admitted as party to any negotiation in which his Majesty might engage.

The issue of this unpromising attempt to effect the general pacification of Europe is well known. The Russian minister, in his reply, declared the resolution of his Sovereign not to recognise the insurgent government of Spain as an independent power. The Emperor had already acknowledged the title of Joseph Buona-

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CHAP.XII. parte to the crown of Spain. He had united his interests with those of Napoleon, and was resolved to adhere to his engagements. The reply of M. Champagny was insulting. "How is it possible," said he, "for the French government to entertain the proposal of admitting the Spanish insurgents to the negotiation? What would the English government have said had it been proposed to them to admit the Catholic insurgents of Ireland? France, without having entered into formal treaties, had been in communication with them, and had frequently sent them succours."

The lameness of this attempt, at analogical reasoning, was ably exposed by Mr. Canning in his reply; and the correspondence concluded, as probably was expected by both parties, without any beneficial result.

Oct. 18. On the eighteenth of October, Napoleon returned to Paris; and on the twenty-fourth, he opened the session of the legislative body, by a speech from the throne, in which, after a brief and compendious review of the political situation of Europe, he made known his resolution of proceeding to Spain, "in order, with the aid of God, to crown his brother in Madrid, and to

plant his victorious eagles on the towers of Lisbon." CHAP.XII.

Before Napoleon set forward with this purpose, above an hundred thousand French troops had already entered Spain, in order to reinforce the existing armies in that country. The flight of Joseph from Madrid had terminated at Vittoria; and there the head-quarters of the army were established.

It is now necessary we should turn to the previous operations of the Spanish armies.

Why a victory, so decisive as that of Baylen, should have been the signal for the universal inactivity of the Spanish armies, it is difficult to understand. The intrusive monarch had fled, terror-stricken, to the country behind the Ebro, where he could not muster above fifty thousand men. Had a speedy union been effected by the armies of Blake, Palafox, Castanos, Llamas, and Cuesta, their united force would have exceeded one hundred thousand men—a body, had their operations been directed with skill, at least numerically sufficient to have expelled the remains of the French army from the Spanish territory. But time passed on, and the French were suffered to remain un-

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September.

CHAP. XII. annoyed in their cantonments. The Murcian

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September.

The period of successful action was suffered to escape; and before anything approaching to a concentration of the Spanish forces had been effected, reinforcements had crossed the Pyrenees, and a total revolution had taken place in the prospects of the campaign.

It was not till the month of August, that the Biscayans, overawed by their proximity to France and the presence of a considerable force, had been able to take part in the general struggle for freedom. At length, deriving confidence from the favourable progress of events, the standard of resistance was raised throughout the province, and a Junta established at Bilboa. In order to restore obedience, a considerable body was despatched against the place, which routed and dispersed the patriots, and established in authority a Junta, whose members were known to be in the interest of France. This success was temporary. On the
 Sep. 20. twentieth of September, Bilboa was retaken, by a force under the Marquis de Portazgo, and the French garrison with difficulty effected their escape. But large bodies of the enemy had

already passed the Pyrenees; and Marshal Ney, CHAP. XII. who had assumed the provisional command

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of the armies, determined, by another effort, to regain possession of the city. In order to deceive Portazgo, he first made demonstration of retiring on Vittoria, and then, by a rapid movement, advanced against Bilboa. The Spanish general was not deluded by the stratagem. He withdrew the garrison from the city, and fell back on Valmaseda, where he was joined by a detachment of the Gallician army. Preparations were immediately made for the recovery of the place; but General Merlin, whom Ney had left in command, aware of the difficulty of maintaining himself in an unfortified city, withdrew his troops without waiting for attack.

Oct. 11.

In the return of the Marquis de la Romana and his army, the Spanish nation had to rejoice in an event most favourable and important to their cause. When the insurrection first broke forth, that officer was in command of a corps of about fifteen thousand men, serving with the French army in Denmark. He had at first been induced to declare allegiance to the new government; but on receiving, from Sir

CHAP. XII. Richard Keats, the British admiral commanding
 1808. on the station, intelligence of the real character
 October. of the events then passing in Spain, he determined to return, and bear part in the noble struggle in which his countrymen were engaged. The army unanimously approved of the resolution of its chief; and a project for deceiving the vigilance of Bernadotte, the French commander in Jutland, and for the subsequent embarkation of the army, having been concerted with the British admiral, it was successfully carried into effect. Several battalions were surrounded and disarmed by the French army; but the remainder, amounting to about ten thousand, arrived safely at St. Andero, where they were disembarked.

When the Spanish army was at length concentrated on the Ebro, its position was as follows.

Blake, with the army of Galicia, occupied a line extending from Bilboa to Burgos, and constituted the left of the united army. He was directed to force the right of the French, and possess himself of the great road to Bayonne.

The centre, under Castanos, had its head-

quarters at Soria, and occupied Tarazona, CHAP. XII.
 Borja, and Tudela.

The Aragonese and Valencian forces were stationed on the side of Zaragoza, with their right extending to Sanguessa, and formed the right of the army.

The Conde de Belvidere, commanding the levies of Estramadura, had his head-quarters at Burgos, and was destined, when joined by the British army—whose arrival was speedily anticipated—to advance on the centre of the French army.

Morla was at Madrid with the reserve, consisting of about twenty thousand men.

At this period the left wing of the French army, commanded by Marshal Moncey, was posted along the Aragon and the Ebro, having its head-quarters at Tafalla.—Marshal Ney was at Guardia; Bessieres at Miranda; and Lefebvre, on the right, occupied the heights of Durango and Mondragon.

While the armies were thus stationed, the Spanish government and people, alike buoyed up by an overweening confidence, became impatient for action. The former despatched commissioners to the army, in order to accelerate the adoption

CHAP. XII. of active measures for the expulsion of the enemy. No folly could be more egregious. The Spanish generals required no Mentor to counsel them into measures of folly and imprudence. But, incredible as it may appear, the only apprehension which seems, at this period, to have haunted the imagination of the Supreme Junta, and poisoned their repose, was, that the French, by a speedy and total evacuation of the Spanish territory, might baulk the just vengeance which the injured nation was prepared to wreak on its oppressors.

Though the advanced-posts of the armies, almost in presence of each other, were at many points separated only by a rivulet, no engagement had yet taken place. But this period of inaction was soon destined to cease. Palafox and Castanos had concerted a project of operations, in pursuance of which detachments of the central army were pushed on to Lerin and Viana, while the Aragonese, by a flank march, were closing on Sanguessa, with the view of advancing on Roncesvalles, and thus cutting off the communications of the French army. Moncey, alarmed at these movements, detached a force of infantry, under Generals

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Oct. 25.

Habert and Razout, with General Wathier's brigade of cavalry, to thrust back the Spaniards, and regain the positions they had seized. An engagement in consequence took place. The Spanish detachments were driven back in confusion, and a battalion of light infantry, surrounded in Lerin, were made prisoners.

At the same time, Ney advanced on Logrono, which was occupied by the Castilian force under Pignatelli. After an obstinate resistance the city was taken; and the French, crossing the Ebro, continued the pursuit for several leagues.

The attempt of the Spanish army on the left being thus defeated, Moncey, while observing the motions of Palafox and Castanos, was ordered to wait the issue of the attacks on Blake and Belvidere, with the view of subsequently advancing on Zaragoza. Of these operations we must now speak.

The main body of the western army was posted in front of the heights of Durango and Mondragon, which commanded the great road to Bayonne. Blake, trusting that the Asturian General Azevedo would cut off the communication between Durango and Vittoria by Ochandiana, resolved to make an effort to gain possession of

1808.

October.

CHAP. XII. the heights of Mondragon, and thus to effect a
 1808. separation between the advanced-guard and
 October. main body of the army. With this view he
 advanced to Zornosa; and General Merlin, on
 his approach, thought it prudent to evacuate
 the town, and take post with his division on a
 range of heights in the rear. On the following
 day, a division of the Spanish army advanced
 from Rigoytia, with the intention of turning the
 right flank of Merlin's position, while the centre
 and right pushed forward to the attack in front.
 These measures were successful. The French
 abandoned the position, and fell back on Du-
 rango.

Lefebvre, alarmed by these movements, was
 induced to violate the orders of the Emperor,
 that he should content himself with keeping the
 enemy in check, and advanced with his whole
 force, amounting to about twenty-five thousand
 men, to the support of Merlin. For several days
 the armies remained inactive. On the thirty-first,
 Oct. 31. Lefebvre advanced to the attack. Blake's army
 was considerably inferior in number, and without
 cavalry or artillery. The issue of a battle, fought
 under circumstances so imprudent, may be antici-
 pated. After a gallant and strenuous resistance,

the Spaniards were defeated, and forced to retreat CHAP. XII.
 on Bilboa. This operation, though conducted in
 1808. presence of a superior army, was effected in good
 November. order; and, on the day following, Blake crossed
 the Salcedon, and took up a position at Nava.

The corps of Lefebvre, reinforced by that of
 Victor, continued to follow up the victory it had
 gained, and endeavoured to cut off the Asturian
 division of Azevedo. In this he was not suc-
 cessful; but Blake was driven from position to
 position. Encounters took place at Guenas, Val-
 maseda, and Espinosa; and his army, which for
 some days had been without provisions, and ex-
 posed to the most inclement weather, were at
 length thrown into confusion so complete, that,
 Nov. 9. on the fourteenth of November, when the Mar-
 quis de la Romana traversed the district of Las
 Montanas, he encountered only a half-starved
 rabble, trusting to individual exertion for safety
 and support, and without even the semblance of
 a military body.
 Jones.

In persisting in his operations against a supe-
 rior and continually increasing force, it is un-
 questionable that Blake was guilty of a capital
 error. The true policy of Lefebvre was, not to
 have fought him at Zornosa, but to have en-

CHAP. XII. ^{1808.} _{November.} ^{Nov. 8.} encouraged him to advance still farther from his resources, by which means his whole army might have been cut off. In the repeated engagements which took place, the troops of Romana particularly distinguished themselves. Brought into action, after the first defeat, piecemeal and without skill, these veterans displayed a hardihood and courage worthy of all admiration. The new levies, on the other hand, generally fled without waiting for attack. The disorganization of the army was at last complete; and, destitute of magazines, clothing, and money, it was evident that a long time must elapse before it could again be in condition to take the field.

Nov. 8. On the eighth of November, Napoleon arrived at Vittoria. He brought with him Marshal Soult; and that officer was immediately directed to assume the command of the second corps of the army. A few hours were sufficient to decide on the plan of operations to be adopted, and to direct the preliminary dispositions for its execution. It was determined to attack the centre, in order to isolate the two wings of the Spanish army; and, with this view, the corps of Marshal Soult was directed, by a rapid attack on Burgos, to drive back the Estramaduran

army under the Conde de Belvidere. On the ^{1808.} _{November.} ^{Nov. 10.} tenth, the second corps was concentrated at the plateau of Monasterio and the Quintana la Palla, and immediately set forward to attack the position of the Spanish army at Gamonal.

On approaching the position, the French were received with a heavy fire from a battery of thirty pieces of cannon. But this did not impede their progress. The division of Mouton made a powerful attack on the centre of the Spanish line, where the best troops of the army were posted, and at once drove them back in confusion. Bessieres followed with the cavalry, and, having routed the wings, by a vigorous pursuit prevented the possibility of a rally. Victors and vanquished entered Burgos in a mingled and confused mass; and, some resistance being attempted from the houses, the city was given up to pillage.

This unfortunate action cost the Spanish army nearly three thousand in killed and prisoners, a great part of their artillery, and the whole of the stores and ammunition which were stationed in Burgos. The greater part of Belvidere's force consisted of raw levies, which fled without firing a shot. A battalion of students from Salamanca and Leon, alone displayed distinguished courage.

CHAP. XII. Animated by youthful zeal, they twice repulsed
 1808. the enemy, and at length overborne by the ca-
 November. valry, by far the greater proportion were cut to
 pieces.

The victory he had thus easily acquired was
 vigorously followed up by Marshal Soult. Two
 corps of his army were detached in pursuit; one
 towards Lerma, another towards Palencia and
 Valladolid, while he himself marched towards
 Nov. 10. Reynosa and St. Andero, where he hoped to in-
 tercept Blake's line of retreat to the plains of
 Leon.

In this hope he was disappointed. In spite
 of the rapidity of his march, he did not reach
 Reynosa till the day after Blake had quitted it
 with the remains of his army, having been suc-
 cessively beaten by Lefebvre at Guenas and
 Valmaseda, and by Victor at Espinosa. Soult,
 therefore, continued his march on St. Andero,
 where he left a division of his army; and, spread-
 ing the rest of his forces over the Montagna
 district, he continued to attack and disperse the
 insurgent bodies to be found in that district.

The left and centre of the Spanish armies
 being thus broken, the piquets of the French
 were now upon the Douro, and their cavalry

covered the plains of New Castile. Under these CHAP. XII.
 circumstances, Marshals Ney and Victor were 1808.
 ordered to advance from Burgos, by Aranda November.
 and Soria, to take the position of Castanos in
 reverse; while Marshal Lannes, with about forty
 thousand men, should attack him in front.

On the approach of the French, Castanos
 abandoned Calahorra. On the twenty-third Nov. 23.
 Lannes appeared in front of his position near
 Tudela.

The Spanish army, in number about forty-
 five thousand, was posted on a range of easy
 hills, extending from Tudela to Tarazona,
 distant about two leagues. The army of Ara-
 gon, which had joined but a few hours before
 the commencement of the action, was stationed
 on the right. The Andalusian army was on the
 left; those of Valencia and New Castile, in the
 centre. The artillery, consisting of forty pieces,
 was distributed along the front of the line.

The weakness, arising from the extreme ex-
 tent of the position thus occupied, was too ap-
 parent not to be taken immediate advantage of
 by Marshal Lannes. The division commanded
 by General Maurice Mathieu, supported by the
 cavalry, commenced the action by a vehement

CHAP. XII. attack on the centre. This, after a short resistance, gave way ; and the cavalry, penetrating through the opening, wheeled up to the left, and thus succeeded in enveloping the right wing of the Spaniards. The Aragonese troops in that quarter had already repelled the attack of General Morlot's division, but were now thrown into irretrievable confusion. On the success of this manœuvre, an attack was immediately made by the division of Lagrange on the left. A detachment, occupying the town of Cascante, continued for some time to offer gallant resistance to the progress of the enemy ; but being at length driven back, the left wing was likewise dispersed, and fled in confusion to Tarazona, where three divisions of the army had been suffered to remain inactive during the action.

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The French cavalry pursued the fugitives towards Soria on the one side, and towards Zaragoza on the other. The troops of Valencia, of New Castile, and part of those of Andalusia, directed their flight towards Valencia. Those of Palafox escaped to Zaragoza, where, by a second splendid defence, they were destined yet farther to consecrate their fame in the eyes of

posterity, and make glorious recompense to their country for the defeat of Tudela. CHAP. XII.

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As soon as the wreck of the left wing had collected in Tarazona, Castanos directed the four divisions in that town, to retreat on Calatayud, by way of Borja. The march commenced at midnight, and was proceeding with all order and regularity, when a magazine blew up, and the report spread, that the French cavalry were at hand. A cry of treason arose, and was rapidly diffused among the dispirited soldiers. The columns were thrown into confusion, and the road to Borja was speedily covered with a disorganized and insubordinate crowd.

By the French accounts, the loss of the Spanish army, in the battle of Tudela, amounted to upwards of seven thousand men ; and thirty pieces of cannon were captured by the victors. Their own loss was comparatively trifling.

That any portion of the Spanish army was enabled to rally at Calatayud is, confessedly, owing to the dilatory movements of Marshal Ney. That officer was ordered to be at Agreda on the twenty-third ; and had he been so, the retreat of the fugitives on Madrid must have been cut off. The tardiness of his move-

CHAP. XII. ments, on this occasion, has been attributed, by
1808. some writers, to jealousy of Lannes, by others,
November. to a characteristic appetite for plunder, which
induced him to waste valuable time in the pil-
lage of Soria. But this is matter on which it
would be little interesting to speculate.


A British army was already in the field, to-
wards the movements of which it is necessary
that our attention should now be directed.

END OF VOLUME I.




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ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS:

FROM
MDCCCVIII TO MDCCCXIV.

BY THE AUTHOR OF CYRIL THORNTON.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, EDINBURGH: AND
T. CADELL, STRAND, LONDON.
MDCCCXXIX.

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ANNALS

OF THE

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.

"NUNC IGITUR, NUNC CŒLO ITERUM VICTRICIA SIGNA
(RES EGRET HIS ARMIS ET BELLATORIBUS ISTIS)
ELEVATA, ET ACCELERATA PUGILES ARMARE BRITANNOS."

BAPTISTA MANTUANUS.

ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTER I.

CAMPAIGN OF SIR JOHN MOORE.

ON the liberation of Portugal, by the Convention of Cintra, it was determined by the British government to despatch an expedition to the north of Spain. Preparations for this purpose were immediately set on foot by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and continued by Sir Harry Burrard, without any considerable progress being made in the equipment of the army for active service.

It was not till the sixth of October that Sir

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CHAP. I.
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CHAP. I. John Moore received official information of his being appointed to command the troops destined for this service. The despatch stated, that the officer commanding the forces of his Majesty in Portugal, was directed to detach a corps of twenty thousand infantry, with two regiments of German light cavalry, and a suitable body of artillery, to be placed under his orders, and that this force would be joined by a corps of above ten thousand men, then assembling at Falmouth, under command of Sir David Baird.

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Sir John Moore was directed to proceed, with the troops under his more immediate command, without any avoidable delay; and was instructed to fix on some place of rendezvous for the whole army, either in Galicia or on the borders of Leon. The specific plan of operations to be subsequently adopted, he was to concert with the commanders of the Spanish armies.

Sir John Moore had no sooner assumed the command, than he found he had considerable difficulties to overcome. Few effective preparations had been made for the equipment of the troops by his predecessors in command. Magazines were to be formed, and

means of transport to be provided, in an impoverished and exhausted country. The approach of the rainy season rendered it, above all things, desirable that the army should, as soon as possible, set forward on its march; yet all the complicated preliminaries, necessary for this purpose, were still to be accomplished. These formidable difficulties were overcome by the energy of Sir John Moore; and, in less than a fortnight from the period of his assuming the command, the greater part of the army was on its march to the frontier.

It formed part of the instructions of Government, that the cavalry should proceed by land; but a discretionary power was vested in the commander, to move the infantry by sea or land, as he might judge most advisable. Sir John Moore preferred the latter, because, at that season of the year, a coasting voyage was uncertain and precarious, and because he was informed that, at Corunna, there were scarcely means of equipment for the force under Sir David Baird, already destined for that port.

Considerable difficulties occurred in ascertaining the state of the roads; and, deceived by er-

CHAP. I.
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CHAP. I. roneous information on that point, Sir John
 1808. Moore determined on dividing his army, a
 October. dangerous arrangement, and one by which the
 period of concentration would of necessity be
 retarded. In consequence of this decision, the
 troops were ordered to march in three col-
 umns.

A corps of six thousand men, composed of
 the cavalry, four brigades of artillery, and four
 regiments of infantry, under command of Lieu-
 tenant-General Hope, were directed to pass
 through the Alentejo, and proceed by the
 route of Badajos, Merida, Truxillo, Talavera de
 la Reyna, and the Escorial.

Three brigades, under Lieutenant-General
 Fraser, marched by Abrantes and Almeida.

Two brigades, commanded by Major-Gen-
 eral Beresford, were sent by Coimbra and
 Almeida. As it was deemed imprudent, by
 Sir John Moore, that the two latter columns
 should be without artillery, a brigade of light
 six-pounders was likewise directed on Almeida.

The different corps of the army having com-
 menced their march, Sir John Moore quitted
 Lisbon on the twenty-seventh of October. On
 Nov. 8. the eighth of November he was at Almeida.

On the thirteenth he arrived at Salamanca, CHAP. I.
 where he received intelligence of the defeat and
 1808. dispersion of Belvidere's army before Burgos.
 November. This event seems to have inspired the British
 general with melancholy forebodings of the fate
 of the contest in which he was about to engage.
 On the second night after his arrival, he was
 awakened by an express from General Pigna-
 telli, conveying intelligence that the enemy had
 pushed on a body of cavalry to Valladolid, a city
 not above three marches from Salamanca.

The situation of Sir John Moore had thus
 suddenly become one of extreme peril. The
 enemy were in his front; and he had in Sala-
 manca only three brigades of infantry, and not a
 single gun. In these circumstances, he contem-
 plated again retiring on Portugal. He assem-
 bled the Junta of Salamanca; and laying be-
 fore them the information he had received,
 stated, that, should the enemy continue their
 advance on his front—now wholly uncovered—
 the British army had no option but retreat. On
 the arrival of intelligence, however, that the
 French troops had been withdrawn to Palencia,
 he determined on continuing his head-quarters
 at Salamanca; and directed Generals Baird

CHAP. I. and Hope to close on that city with their divisions.

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November.

Every day brought with it intelligence of fresh disasters. By the battle of Espinosa, Blake's army had been dispersed. The whole left wing of the Spanish army, which occupied a line reaching from Bilboa to Burgos, had thus been annihilated; and the flank of the centre, under Castanos, was laid open to the enemy.

The situation of Sir John Moore at Salamanca, with respect to the Spanish armies, was very extraordinary. He was at the vertex of a triangle, the base of which, at the distance of between two hundred and fifty, and three hundred miles, was the French position,—the points at the extremities of the base, that is the French flanks, were the positions of the Spanish armies.

The army of Castanos was, at this period, posted in the neighbourhood of Tudela, but on the opposite or north side of the Ebro, and about three hundred miles to the north-east of Salamanca. The French were thus completely interposed between the Spanish and British armies; and might, at any moment, advance on the latter in overwhelming force. For this state of things, Sir John Moore was unpre-

pared. All his arrangements had been framed on the assurance that the assembling of his forces would be protected by the Spanish armies. To effect the union of his isolated divisions had now become an operation of danger and difficulty. The position of these bodies was such as to prevent the possibility of immediate action. He was placed as a central point between the two wings of his army, and found it impracticable to approach the one, without hazarding the safety of the other.

Thus compelled to remain inactive at Salamanca, Sir John Moore endeavoured to stimulate the local authorities into the adoption of such measures of promptitude and vigour as were suited to the exigence of the crisis. In this effort he failed. The Spanish people, though still influenced by fierce and unmitigated hatred towards their invaders, were no longer animated by that uncalculating and convulsive energy which, in the commencement of the struggle, had goaded them like madness into furious resistance. The fierceness of the paroxysm had passed; and though, in the cause of their country, the hand of every Spaniard was prepared to gripe the sword, the blows it dealt

CHAP. I.
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CHAP. I. were directed with an erring aim, and by a
 1808. feebler arm. Their detestation of a foreign
 November. yoke was undiminished; but it had become a
 fixed and inert sentiment, rather than a fierce,
 uncontrollable, and all-pervading impulse.

Before entering Spain, every thing had contributed to conceal the real state of the Peninsula from the penetrating vision of Sir John Moore. The British government, itself deceived, had become, in its turn, the involuntary propagator of deception. At the commencement of the struggle, it had despatched military agents to the head-quarters of the different Spanish generals, to act as organs of communication, and transmit authentic intelligence of the progress of events in the seat of war. The persons selected for this service were, generally, officers undistinguished by talent or experience, and therefore little suited to discharge, with benefit, the duties of an office so delicate and important. They seem generally to have become the dupes of the unwarranted confidence and inflated boasting of those by whom they were surrounded; and their reports were framed in a strain of blind and sanguine anticipation, not deducible from any enlarged or rational view of the prospects

or condition of the people. Instead of true representations of the numbers, character, and state of efficiency of the armies, they were deluded into adopting the extravagant hyperboles of rash and vain-glorious men, and contributed what in them lay to propagate false and exaggerated notions of the military power of the Spanish nation. They did not venture to obtrude on the British Cabinet the unpalatable truth that the national army was, in effect, nothing more than a congregation of separate and independent bands, miserably armed, possessing but a scanty and ill-served artillery, and almost destitute of cavalry. Had they done so; and had they stated likewise, that this army was without magazines of any kind, without generals of talent or experience, without officers sufficiently versed in the details of war, to instruct and discipline the raw levies which constituted the greater part of its numerical strength; and, further, that the different leaders were prevented, by frivolous jealousies, and discordance of opinion, from cordially uniting in the execution of any great operation, the calamitous events on the Ebro would probably not have come like a thunderbolt to crush and stultify the combinations of a government, which was

CHAP. I. at least sincerely anxious to co-operate in the cause of freedom.

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England had furnished Spain with supplies; she had poured arms and munitions into the country with a profuse hand; but she had taken no efficacious measures for their judicious application. She exercised little influence on the counsels of the Spanish government; and even while providing the very thews and sinews of the war, her voice was seldom listened to with obedience or respect. Arms, placed at the disposal of men swayed by petty views and local interests, were wasted and misapplied, and the supplies of money, clothing, and ammunition, so liberally afforded, became a bone of contention and of petty jealousy to the rival authorities. In truth, the provincial governors were actuated by no liberal and enlarged views of the public benefit. Supine in danger, and vain-glorious in prosperity, at once untalented and unenlightened, no men could be more unfitted to direct the resources of a nation with vigour and effect.

In such men Sir John Moore could place no trust. His expectations had been deceived. He found supineness where he expected energy; a people not filled with an active spirit-stirring

enthusiasm, but reposing in a dull, immovable, and lethargic confidence in their own prowess and resources, even in the immediate neighbourhood of a triumphant enemy. His mind became not only perplexed but irritated by the disappointment of his hopes. At Salamanca he knew himself to be placed in a difficult and precarious position, unprotected in front, separated from the wings of his army, with nothing but a barren country to retire upon. To the concentration of his forces, he was aware, indeed, that no present obstacle existed; but how long such a state of things might continue, he had no data on which to form a judgment. The enemy at any moment might interpose a body which would prevent the possibility of a junction, for there existed no Spanish force from which he could anticipate protection.

To the other embarrassments of Sir John Moore must be added, the difficulty of receiving true and faithful intelligence of the events passing around him. On public and official reports no confidence could be placed, and of more authentic sources of intelligence he was in a great measure deprived. He had been sent forward without a plan of operations, or any data on which to

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CHAP. I. found one. Castanos was the person with whom
 1808. he had been directed to concert his measures ;
 November. but that officer had been superseded by Romana ;
 and of the situation of the latter, Sir John Moore
 only knew that he was engaged in rallying the
 remains of Blake's army, at a distance of about
 two hundred miles. Naturally distrustful of the
 apocryphal intelligence transmitted by the Bri-
 tish military residents, he could rely only on the
 reports of Colonel Graham and Captain Whit-
 tingham ; and these, in conjunction with the
 information which his own officers were ena-
 bled to procure, contributed still further to
 deepen the gloom by which his mind was
 overcast.

It was in such circumstances, and under the
 influence of such feelings, that Sir John Moore
 wrote to Mr. Frere, the new minister at Madrid,
 whose opinions he had been instructed to re-
 ceive with deference and attention, proposing as
 a question what course he should pursue, in case
 the army of Castanos, which yet shewed front to
 the enemy, should be defeated. Should that event
 occur, " I must," said Sir John Moore, in a letter
 Nov. 27. dated twenty-seventh November, " either march
 upon Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of

Spain, and thus run all risks, and share the for- CHAP. I.
 tunes of the Spanish nation ; or I must fall back 1808.
 on Portugal. In the latter case, I fall back upon November.
 my resources, upon Lisbon ; cover a country
 where there is a British interest ; act as a di-
 version in favour of Spain, if the French detach
 a force against me ; and am ready to return to
 the assistance of the Spaniards, should circum-
 stances again render it eligible."

On the day following the date of this commu-
 nication, intelligence arrived for which Sir John
 Moore was certainly not unprepared. Castanos
 had been defeated at Tudela with great loss, and
 the road to Madrid was now open to the French
 armies. In this state of things, without waiting
 for the answer of Mr. Frere, Sir John Moore
 determined on immediate retreat. With this
 intention, he transmitted orders to Sir David
 Baird at Astorga, and Sir John Hope at the
 Escorial. The former of these officers was direc-
 ted to retire on Corunna, the latter to push for-
 ward, if possible, to Salamanca. Sir David Baird
 was likewise directed to write immediately to
 England, that a supply of transports might be
 sent to the Tagus. " They will be wanted,"

CHAP. I. said Sir John Moore; "for when the French have Spain, *Portugal cannot be defended.*"

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Having thus formed his decision, the Commander-in-Chief directed a Council of General Officers to assemble at head-quarters. He laid before them a full statement of the intelligence he had received, and made known the resolution which it had induced him to adopt. His tone was manly and decided. He informed the generals that he had not called them together to request their counsel, or to influence them to commit themselves by giving any opinion on the course he had determined to pursue. He took the responsibility entirely upon himself; and he only required that they would immediately take measures for carrying the plan into effect.

When the resolution of their General was made known to the army, it was received by all ranks with more than murmurs of dissatisfaction and disgust. The British army had suffered no disaster; it had never been brought into contact with the enemy; and all felt that to retreat with untried prowess from the scene of contest, would fix a tarnish on our arms, and, by diminishing

the confidence of the Spanish nation in our zeal and devotion to their cause, would proportionally contribute to strengthen and consolidate the power of the usurper. Even the personal Staff of Sir John Moore did not attempt to conceal their dissatisfaction at the adoption of a system so adverse to their hopes. All lamented the order for retreat, all felt that it must cast a blight on that cause which they were prepared to defend by the outpouring of their blood.

In his reply to the letter of Sir John Moore, Mr. Frere protested strongly against the measure of retiring on Portugal. He assured him it was one most deeply deprecated by the Spanish government. He urged the expediency of advancing to co-operate in the defence of Madrid, by every argument in his power. "Of the zeal and energy of the people," said Mr. Frere, "I have no doubt. The government are new, and have been hitherto too numerous to be very active; but I trust that this inconvenience will soon be remedied. They are resolute; and I believe every man of them determined to perish with the country. They will not, at least, set the example which the ruling powers, and higher orders of other countries have

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CHAP. I. exhibited of weakness and timidity." In case,
 1808. however, the arguments which he most emphatically urged for an advance on Madrid, should
 November. not to Sir John Moore appear sufficiently conclusive to authorize the adoption of the measure, Mr. Frere suggested the alternative of taking up a position in the strong country around Astorga. "A retreat from Astorga to Corunna," said the minister, "would be less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon; and we ought, in that position, to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England, which would enable the army to act in the flat country which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castile."

The arguments of Mr. Frere did not succeed in changing the opinions of Sir John Moore. He still adhered to the resolution he had previously formed, and only awaited the arrival of Sir John Hope, to commence his retreat on Portugal. This general, when within sixty miles of Salamanca, had been compelled to make a considerable detour in order to avoid the enemy.

In the meantime, the Supreme Junta had despatched two Spanish generals to the head-

quarters of the British army, in order to concert CHAP. I.
 with its commander an united plan of operations. 1808.
 These missionaries corroborated the exaggerated November. statements of Mr. Frere with regard to the strength of the Spanish armies. They asserted that they were undismayed and increasing every hour; and that General San Juan was in possession of the pass of Somosierra, which he had fortified so strongly, as to render abortive all the enemy's hopes of reaching Madrid. Unfortunately for the credit of the generals, Colonel Graham had just arrived with intelligence that the pass had been already gained by the French. Sir John Moore was filled with perhaps merited contempt for their ignorance and weakness of character, and on that account felt less disposed to accede to their solicitations that he would form a junction with Romana, and thereby create a diversion favourable to the defence of the capital.

At the head of the Junta, was Don Thomas Morla, who had formerly succeeded Solano as Governor of Cadiz, and now exercised the chief influence at Madrid. The conduct of this man has been attributed to treason; of which the subsequent surrender of Madrid is considered—

CHAP. I. not uncolourably—as the overt consummation.
 1808. It has been supposed, therefore, that his object
 December. at this period was, by false representations, to draw the British army nearer to the capital, and thus to throw them into the hands of the French. On a review of the whole circumstances, however, we think the imputation unwarranted by proof. The truth we take to be, that Morla was a cold, unprincipled, and selfish man, not unwilling to resist, while resistance did not compromise his own safety, but ready to join the victors, whenever adverse circumstances should threaten to involve his own in the wreck of his country's interests. But even though acquitted of previous treason, enough of infamy will be connected with his name. His acceptance of service under the intruder admits of no palliation; and he will stand recorded as a man whose conduct is irreconcilable with honour or patriotism, and whose base desertion of a noble cause marks him as unworthy to have ever been numbered among its assertors.

From this person, and from the Prince of Castelfranco, Sir John Moore received, on the
 Dec. 5. fifth of December, a joint letter, informing him that about twenty-five thousand men of the army

of Castanos were falling back on Madrid; that
 CHAP. I. ten thousand from the Somosierra were likewise concentrating; and that nearly forty thousand other troops were prepared to join in the defence of the capital. With these forces Sir John Moore was strongly invited to unite his army, or else to take such a direction as would enable him to fall on the rear of the French. "The Junta," concluded the letter, "cannot doubt that the rapidity of your Excellency's movements will be such as the interests of both countries require."

Before Sir John Moore had made any decision on the contents of this letter, Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant in the British service, arrived with despatches from Mr. Frere. On the first of December, Charmilly had been in Madrid. He had witnessed the strongest and most unequivocal demonstrations of ardour among all classes of the people. The whole mass of the population was rising in arms; the streets were broken up, houses barricaded, and peasants from all quarters were flocking into the city, to bear part in the defence. The Duke del Infantado had commissioned him to make known this state of things to the British general, and to entreat

CHAP. I. him to make some movement that might operate as a diversion for the capital, which its defenders had determined to hold out to the last extremity.

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In passing Talavera, to which place the Junta and Mr. Frere had retired, the latter strongly enforced the same considerations, and intrusted Charmilly with a letter to Sir John Moore, urging him to relinquish the resolution of retreat. In case, however, this letter should prove ineffectual, he gave Charmilly another, to be delivered only in the event of the General still persisting in his determination.

The first letter of Mr. Frere contained a reiteration of his entreaties, that Sir John Moore would suspend his resolution of retiring on Portugal. The enthusiasm pervading Madrid, he said, so far transcended all his hopes, that he could not forbear urging, in the strongest manner, not only the propriety, but the necessity, of supporting the determination of the Spanish people by every possible assistance. "I have no hesitation," continued Mr. Frere, "in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach to this advice, as I consider the state of Spain to depend absolutely, for the present, on the reso-

lution you may adopt. I say, *for the present*; for such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of ultimate success."

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The resolution of Sir John Moore was at length shaken by these official statements. It was impossible to suspect that the Junta would deceive him in a mere matter of fact. He could not suppose that a person of Mr. Frere's known perspicacity had become the dupe of a mere flimsy delusion. Of the ardour and effervescence of the popular spirit, Colonel Charmilly declared himself to have been a personal witness. To discover the real state of affairs, under such representations, when cut off from all sources of more authentic intelligence, was beyond the power of human penetration.

Sir John Moore, therefore, decided on a change of plan. He sent immediate orders to Sir David Baird, directing him to stop his retrogressive march, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga. In these orders, the caution and prudence of the general were admirably displayed. "The city of Madrid have taken up arms, have refused to capitulate to the

Dated
Dec. 5.

CHAP. I. French, are barricading their streets, and say
 1808. they are determined to suffer every thing rather
 December. than submit. This arrests the French; and
 people who are sanguine entertain great hopes
 from it. I own, myself, I fear this spirit has
 arisen too late, and the French are now too
 strong to be resisted in this manner. However,
 there is no saying; and I feel myself the more
 obliged to give it a trial, that Mr. Frere has
 made a formal representation, which I received
 this evening. I must beg, therefore, that you
 will suspend your march until you hear from me
 again, and make arrangements for your return
 to Astorga, should it be necessary."

Dec. 6. On the day following, he wrote as follows :—
 "Let all your preparations, as far as provi-
 sions, &c. go, continue to be made for a re-
 treat, in case that should again become neces-
 sary. Establish one magazine at Villa Franca,
 and one or two farther back; to which let salt-
 meat, biscuit, rum or wines, forage, &c. be
 brought up from Corunna. Send me, to Za-
 mora, two regiments of cavalry, and one bri-
 gade of horse-artillery, keeping one regiment
 of cavalry, and one brigade of horse-artillery
 with yourself; and send your troops by brigades

to Benevente. The enemy have nothing at pre- CHAP. I.
 sent in that direction; and we must take advan- 1808.
 tage of it, and, by working double tides, make up December.
 for lost time. By means of the cavalry-patrols,
 you will discover any movements immediately
 near you; and I take for granted, you have got
 other channels of information; and both you and
 me, although we may look big, and determine
 to get every thing forward, yet we must never
 lose sight of this, that, at any moment, affairs
 may take that turn that will render it necessary
 to retreat."

The preceding order reached Sir David Baird
 at Villa Franca, late on the seventh of Decem- Dec. 7.
 ber, when in full retreat on Corunna; and the
 movement was immediately arrested. The po-
 sition of the army at Salamanca had now become
 materially improved. Sir John Hope, who, in
 order to avoid the enemy, had advanced by a
 circuitous route, was already at Alba de Tormes,
 and, by a movement to the left, the junction of
 the whole army was secure.

In the meanwhile, the change which had taken
 place in the mind of the general was unknown in
 Salamanca. Charmilly, supposing, from the tone
 of those around him, that the circumstances un-

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der which he was to deliver the second letter had occurred, presented it to Sir John Moore. It ran thus:—

“Sir,—In the event, which I did not wish to presuppose, of your continuing the determination already announced to me, with the army under your command, I have to request that Colonel Charmilly, who is the bearer of this, and whose intelligence has already been referred to, may be examined before a Council of war.—I have, &c. J. H. FRERE.”

That Sir John Moore should feel indignant at the receipt of such a letter was natural. He considered Mr. Frere as unwarrantably intruding on his office as Commander of the forces, and attempting to control him, by a Council of war, to act against the dictates of his judgment. He tore the letter in pieces, and dismissed the messenger from his presence. Nor did his resentment rest here. On the day following, Charmilly received an order to quit Salamanca, which, after a fruitless attempt to procure its revocation, he was compelled to obey.

On a calm review of the circumstances connected with this unpleasant collision, we feel little disposed to attribute blame to either party.

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—Both unquestionably decided on the purest and most conscientious motives. Both were animated by a vehement desire to act as might most contribute to the honour of their country, and the interest of the common cause.—The style of Mr. Frere, indeed, is somewhat less courteous than might have been expected from so accomplished a diplomatist; and the opinions of Sir John Moore were certainly entitled to greater respect than the minister seemed inclined to accord them; but the question on which they differed was one on which men, zealous for the same end, might arrive at dissimilar conclusions, without imputation on the motives of either.

In truth, the minds of Mr. Frere and Sir John Moore were of different mould and consistency. The one, ardent and enthusiastic, was disposed to rely with too facile a credence on the energy and devotion of the assertors of a noble cause. The other, too strongly disgusted perhaps, with repeated proofs of ignorance and imbecility in the Spanish leaders, regarded the scene around him with the eye of a general. He felt little disposed to anticipate a fortunate issue to the resistance

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which popular enthusiasm might oppose to military skill and highly disciplined troops. They beheld the same events through different *media*. In the picture of the one, the sun was mounting in the horizon, and the landscape was bathed in a flood of prospective radiance. In that of the other, the last rays of departing light had faded from the sky, and the face of nature lay hid in darkness.

The resentment of Sir John Moore however, strong as it might be at the moment of receiving the offence, did not lead him to forget the respect due to the minister of his Sovereign. His answer to Mr. Frere's communications was mild and dignified: "I shall abstain," said he, "from any remark on the two letters delivered to me last night and this morning, by Colonel Charmilly. I certainly did feel and express much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. These feelings are at an end, and I dare say they will never be excited towards you again. If Mr. Charmilly is your friend, it was perhaps natural for you to employ him; but I have prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him." He informed

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Mr. Frere, that the order for retreat had been countermanded, and that he had put himself in communication with the Marques de la Romana, at Leon. He declared his readiness to do every thing in his power for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause; but stated the impossibility of a direct movement on the capital, from the circumstance of the passes of Guadarama and Somosierra being already in possession of the French, and from the weakness of his army, until it should have formed a junction with the corps of Sir David Baird.

Having at length adopted the resolution to advance, Sir John Moore wrote to the Marques de la Romana, informing him of this change in his decision, and expressing a strong wish for the speedy junction of their armies, in order that combined efforts might be made for the support of Madrid. The account of his army, however, given by the Spanish General, was abundantly discouraging. He had twenty thousand men under arms; but they were stated to be in the very worst condition with regard to equipment. The soldiers were without havresacks, cartridge-boxes, or shoes, and many even with-

CHAP. I. out clothing; yet their spirit was undaunted,
 1808. and, if sufficiently provisioned, they would dis-
 December. charge their duty in the field.

The Marques likewise stated, that he would gladly have formed an immediate junction, with the view of advancing to the relief of the capital, were he not prevented from abandoning his present position by a corps of eight or ten thousand men posted between Sahagun and Almanza, the apparent object of which was to check his movements. Any approach to the British army would leave, to this corps, free ingress into Asturias, from whence he drew large supplies, and would likewise endanger Galicia. A combined movement with Sir David Baird, however, might oblige them to fall back on Reynosa, and, in that event, he should be ready to unite his army with the English.

Dec. 7. On the seventh, Sir John Moore was informed, by a communication from the Junta of Toledo, that they intended to reunite the dispersed armies in that quarter, and defend the city to the last extremity. In reply, he assured the Junta that, if the rest of Spain were animated by a similar enthusiasm, ultimate success was certain,

by whatever disasters its advent might be impeded or delayed. He assured them they might CHAP. I.
 rely on all practicable assistance from the army 1808.
 he commanded; and sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures for its defence. The word of promise, however, though liberally given to the ear, was broken to the hope; for the Junta, on the first approach of a column of the enemy, retired from the city, and it was occupied, without opposition, by the corps of Victor.

On the ninth, Colonel Graham, who had been Dec. 9.
 despatched to Madrid, returned, with intelligence of its being already in occupation of the enemy. His progress had been arrested at Talavera, where he encountered two members of the Supreme Junta. These informed him that Morla had entered into some agreement with the French, who had already gained possession of the Retiro and Prado of Madrid; that Morla was suspected of treason in this proceeding, having refused admission to the troops of San Juan and Hereida, whose presence would have enabled the inhabitants to defend the city; that Castellar, the Captain-General, and all the military officers of rank, had refused to ratify the capitula-

CHAP. I. tion, and had left the town, carrying with them
 1808. sixteen guns; that the inhabitants still retained
 December. their arms; that the French army, amounting to
 about twenty-five thousand, had sufficient occupa-
 tion in holding the people in subjection; that La
 Pena, with thirty thousand men, was at Guada-
 laxara; that fourteen thousand of San Juan's and
 Hereida's forces were assembling at Almaraz;
 and that Romana, in Leon, was in command of
 an army exceeding thirty thousand men.

The fall of Madrid, however, did not deter
 Sir John Moore from pursuing his projected
 operations. The great bulk of the French
 army, which might have been employed a-
 gainst him, had been carried into Catalonia,
 or towards Madrid; and Sir John Moore con-
 sidered that, by a forward movement, and ef-
 fecting a junction with Baird, he would be
 able to menace the communication of the enemy,
 thus creating a diversion in favour of those Span-
 iards who still remained in arms, and giving time
 for the raising and embodying of new levies
 in the south. He never ceased, however, to
 contemplate the necessity of retreat, whenever
 the British army should become the chief ob-
 ject of the enemy's attention.

It is now necessary that we should take a re- CHAP. I.
 trospect of the events more immediately con- 1808.
 nected with the advance of the French army to November.
 Madrid, and its consequent surrender.

After the battle of Tudela, General Maurice
 Mathieu entered Borja in pursuit of Castanos,
 having secured a great many prisoners on his
 march. On the day following he was joined by
 Marshal Ney. Castanos reached Calatayud in
 safety, where his followers were exposed to ex-
 traordinary privations. No magazines existed
 for the supply of provisions, the country was
 exhausted, and the military chest, containing
 two millions of reals, had been conveyed to
 Zaragoza. The soldiers, desperate with hunger,
 were no longer amenable to discipline; and the
 inhabitants fled from their dwellings, dismayed
 alike by the conduct of their countrymen and
 the vicinity of the enemy.

The position of Castanos at Calatayud was
 sufficiently advantageous. It enabled him to
 cover the preparations for defence then making
 at Zaragoza, and, in some degree, to menace the
 left flank of the enemy on his advance towards
 the south. From this station, however, he was
 recalled, by an order from Morla, to assist in the

CHAP. I. defence of the capital. On the twenty-seventh, therefore, he continued his retreat on Sigüenza, where he arrived on the day following. During his march the rear-guard, under Don Francisco Venegas, was attacked in the pass of Buvierca; but, after a severe contest, it succeeded in repelling the enemy, though not without considerable loss. At Sigüenza, Castanos received a summons from the Central Junta, and resigned the command of the army to Don Manuel de La Pena. This officer was subsequently superseded at Guadalaxara, by the Duke del Infantado. On its retreat towards Valencia, the army was pursued by a body of cavalry and infantry under Bessieres; and, after many difficulties, succeeded in reaching Cuenca, where it was enabled to rally unmolested.

The victory of Tudela at once determined Napoleon to march rapidly on Madrid, with the centre of his army, while the wings continued the pursuit of the defeated Spaniards on the right and left. The advance of the army was commanded by Marshal Victor, who, on the thirtieth, arrived in front of the defile of Somosierra, where the road crosses a mountainous chain, about sixty miles distant from the capital.

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He found the Spanish army, amounting to about eighteen thousand, strongly posted in the gorge of the mountain. Of these about six thousand were intrenched on the heights of Sepulveda; and General San Juan, with the remainder, occupied the pass. Sixteen pieces of cannon were judiciously placed in battery, on the highest part of the ridge flanking the ascent; and thus favourably posted, the Spanish forces awaited the approach of the enemy.

Marshal Victor at once advanced to the attack of the position of Sepulveda. In this he was repulsed; but the defenders, struck with panic, afterwards forsook their intrenchments, and fled in disorder towards Segovia.

On the day following an assault was made on the position of San Juan. Three battalions advanced on the right, three on the left, and three on the centre, under a heavy fire from the Spanish artillery. The heights on either flank were covered with Spanish light infantry, with whom the French maintained a warm, skirmishing fire, unattended by any decided result. At this moment Napoleon arrived, and, halting at the foot of the mountain, carefully examined the posi-

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CHAP. I. tion, amid the fire of the enemy. Having completed his observations, he immediately ordered the Polish lancers of his guard to execute a charge on a battery which enfiladed the causeway, by which alone the position was approachable. The first squadron of the column was driven back in confusion by the shower of grape-shot and musquetry which it encountered. Under cover of the succeeding squadrons, however, it was again rallied, and the regiment, sword in hand, charged up the mountain at full speed, and in a moment were in possession of the battery. The Spaniards fled on all hands, dispersing among the hills, with the loss of arms, baggage, ammunition, and artillery. The annals of modern war scarcely afford record of a more daring and singular exploit. The loss of the Polish regiment amounted only to fifty-seven men killed and wounded.

In Segovia, the defeated army united with the troops which had retired from Sepulveda, and, subsequently marching to Guadarama, effected a junction with the corps of Estramadura, under Hereida. With these forces, San Juan, unable to remain in occupation of the pass, from

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want of provisions, proceeded to the Escorial, where an order met him to march instantly on the capital.

While executing this order, insubordination spread among his followers, and the great body of the army forsook their ranks and dispersed. When the generals, therefore, approached Madrid, they had with them but a small band of followers; and, discovering that the city had surrendered, they retired on Talavera. To this place the greater number of the deserters had bent their march. By these San Juan was brutally murdered, and his army, being without a rallying point, dispersed.

While the events which we have already detailed, were in progress, the conduct of the government was marked by an inexplicable fatuity. Instead of vigorous measures to recruit and re-organize the scattered forces of their armies, the Supreme Junta busied themselves in establishing a special tribunal for the trial of persons suspected of treason; and directed an investigation into the conduct of those who had acknowledged the authority of the usurper. The principles, on which it was provided that the proceedings of this Commission should be

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CHAP. I. regulated, were unquestionably humane and liberal. Especial provisions were made to prevent secret arrest, or irresponsible imprisonment. The laws of trial were fair. Anonymous information was rejected; and in all the contemplated proceedings of this novel tribunal, the dictates of impartial justice were laudably observed.

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In this measure, and in others equally unsuited to the circumstances and character of the times, did the Junta waste the precious moments which should have been devoted to matters of deeper importance. But they did worse than this. They adopted the fatal system of deceiving the people with regard to the magnitude and imminence of their danger. Even while the French threatened the important pass of Somosierra, the Junta addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Madrid, declaring that the body by which the capital was menaced amounted only to eight thousand men. They declared that the enthusiasm, with which the soldiers were preparing to defeat the enemies of their country, was great beyond description; that the English were ready to advance from the Escorial, to defend the capital, and support the oper-

ations of the gallant army already gloriously engaged in achieving fresh triumphs. CHAP. I.

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As soon as the pass of Somosierra was forced, the Supreme Junta retired from Aranjuez to Badajos, leaving a Military Commission, under the presidency of the Marques de Castellar, to conduct the defence of Madrid. Judging from external demonstrations, the enthusiasm of Madrid rivalled that of Zaragoza. The people broke up the pavement in the streets, and intersected them with ditches, barricaded the doors and windows of the houses, erected batteries on the most commanding situations, and planted cannon in the squares and crossings of the streets. There were in the place sixty thousand men under arms, including six thousand troops of the line, all animated with a desire to defend the city to the last extremity.

Unfortunately, however, the people were without confidence in their leaders. A report spread that sand was mixed with the gunpowder in the cartridges. The Marques de Perales was the person upon whom the crime of treason was charged. The mob broke into his house; and before the Duke del Infantado could arrive to his assistance, Perales had been pierced with

CHAP. I. wounds, and his dead body dragged through
 1808. the streets, amid the exulting execrations of the
 November. rabble.

The near approach of the enemy struck the authorities with alarm. They felt little anxious that the city should be subjected to the horrors of a protracted siege, and agreed, should their hopes from without fail, to content themselves with such measures as might prevent the enemy from instantly forcing the town, and induce him to grant favourable terms of capitulation. A diversion by the British might operate in their favour. At all events, it was thought advisable to strengthen the garrison as much as possible. They counted on assistance from the fugitive troops of San Juan, many of which were hourly arriving; and despatched the Duke del Infantado to conduct La Pena's army, with all speed to the capital. On this mission he set out on the second of December.

On the day preceding, the corps of Marshal Ney effected a junction with the army of the centre, by Guadalaxara and Alcala, and head-quarters were advanced to St. Augustino. On the second, the cavalry under Bessieres came in sight of the city, and took possession of the heights. Ma-

drid was in the greatest fermentation. The bells of all the churches rung forth alarm, the priests called the population to arms in defence of their hearths and altars, and the shouting of multitudes, mingling with the loud trumpet peal, gave intelligible intimation to the enemy of the state of the capital. In truth, there were two parties in the city. One consisting of the military, of the armed peasants from the country, and of the poorer class of the people, had no property to lose, and were determined to defend the city to the last extremity. The other comprehended the merchants and principal tradesmen, and all the richer body of inhabitants. These were unwilling to hazard all on the fortune of a cast, and maintained the imprudence of exposing the capital to pillage, by an obstinate and protracted resistance. Jealousies, too, had broken out between the civil and military authorities, and valuable time was wasted in useless altercations, which the urgency of the crisis demanded should be otherwise employed.

In this situation of affairs, Bessieres sent an aid-de-camp into the city with a summons to the

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CHAP. I. authorities to open the gates. The mission was
 1808. one of danger. The officer was seized by the
 December. exasperated people, and had he not been oppor-
 tunely rescued by a party of soldiers, would un-
 questionably have fallen a victim to their fury.

Victoires et Conquetes. A Spanish general, with an escort of thirty
 men, was despatched to the out-posts of the
 enemy, with the answer of the authorities to
 this demand. It stated that the whole popula-
 tion of Madrid were prepared to die in defence
 of the city. In the meanwhile, the French army
 was approaching the scene of action. Towards
 evening, the corps of Victor was sent forward to
 gain possession of the suburbs on the northern
 approaches to the city, which, after considerable
 resistance, was accomplished; and, before night-
 fall, artillery was posted on the more prominent
 points of occupation.

At midnight, Berthier despatched a Spanish
 colonel of artillery, who had been taken prisoner
 at Somosierra, with a letter to the Marquis de
 Castellar, exhorting him not to subject the city
 to the horrors of an assault. To this communi-
 cation, Castellar replied that before he could
 give an explicit answer, it was necessary to

ascertain the sentiments of the authorities and CHAP. I.
 the people. For this purpose, he demanded a 1808.
 suspension of arms till the following day. December.

The request was not granted. On the morn-
 ing of the third, an attack was made on the
 Retiro, the favourite palace of Philip the
 Fourth, which stood on an eminence command-
 ing the city. The place was soon breached by
 the fire of thirty guns, and carried by assault,
 with the loss of a thousand of the garrison.

The French were not contented with this ad-
 vantage, but immediately pushing on, succeeded,
 with little difficulty, in gaining possession of the
 China Manufactory, the great Barrack, the
 Hotel de Medina Celi, and other buildings com-
 manding the entrances to several of the princi-
 pal streets.

The arrival of numerous deserters, chiefly of
 the Walloon guards, gave intelligence to the
 enemy of the state of feeling in Madrid. The
 continued success of the French had spread con-
 fusion and disorder. The calmness of resolute
 resistance was wanting, the population was not
 bound together by the strong tie of mutual
 confidence amid surrounding danger. In these
 circumstances, another message was sent into

CHAP. I. the city, stating that the Emperor, unwilling to
 1808. occasion unnecessary bloodshed, would suspend
 December. hostile operations till two o'clock. "To attempt
 the defence of Madrid," said Berthier, "is
 against the principles of war, and inhuman for
 the inhabitants. The Emperor authorizes me to
 send you a third summons. An immense artil-
 lery is already placed in battery; mines are
 prepared to blow up your principal buildings;
 columns of troops are at the entrances of your
 city, of which some companies of riflemen are
 already masters. But the Emperor, always
 generous in the course of his victories, suspends
 the attack till two o'clock. The city of Madrid
 may expect protection and safety for its peace-
 able inhabitants, for religion and its ministers.
 The past shall be forgotten. Raise a white flag
 before the expiration of two hours, and send
 commissioners to treat for the surrender of the
 city."

At five o'clock, Morla and Don Bernardo
 Yriarte arrived at head-quarters. They stated
 themselves to be charged to demand a cessation
 of hostilities during the remainder of the day,
 with the view of giving time to the authorities
 to dispose the people to surrender. These com-

missioners were ushered into the presence of CHAP. I.
 Napoleon. His reception of them was calcu-
 1808. lated to inspire terror. On Morla he particu-
 December. larly vented his indignation. He adverted in
 strong language to the violation of the capitula-
 tion of Baylen. His address concluded thus:—
 "To violate a military treaty is to renounce
 civilization; it degrades generals to the rank of
 the Bedouins of the desert. How dare you
 then to solicit a capitulation, *you* who have vio-
 lated that of Baylen? See how injustice and bad
 faith ever recoil on the guilty! I had a fleet at
 Cadiz; it was in alliance with Spain, and yet
 you directed against it the mortars of the city
 where you commanded. I had a Spanish army
 in my ranks, and rather than disarm it, I would
 have seen it embark on board the English
 ships, and be forced afterwards to precipitate
 it from the summit of the rocks of Espinosa. I
 would rather have seven thousand more enemies
 to fight, than be deficient in honour and good
 faith. Return to Madrid. I give you till six
 o'clock in the morning; come back at that hour
 to announce the submission of the people, or
 you and your troops shall all be put to the
 sword."

CHAP. I. It was the object of Napoleon, in his treatment of the deputies, to stimulate their fears, in order that the impression they carried with them might be diffused among the populace of Madrid. He was, above all things, anxious that the surrender of the capital should appear the voluntary act of the people—not the traitorous betrayal of their leaders. He felt the importance of propagating the belief that he had entered Madrid, not as an enemy, but amid the acclamations of the inhabitants.

Dec. 4. Early on the morning of the fourth, Morla, and Don Fernando de la Vera, returned to the French head-quarters, announcing that the peaceable inhabitants had consented to receive, with gratitude, the generous offers of the Emperor. At ten o'clock, General Belliard, at the head of a body of French troops, entered the city, and assumed the command. During the night, the armed peasants from the country had returned to their habitations: and Castellar, refusing to sanction the capitulation, with the main body of the troops and sixteen guns, marched out of the city, and effected his retreat.

Dec. 7. On the seventh, Napoleon issued a proclama-

tion to the Spanish nation. He declared they had been misled by perfidious men to engage in a hopeless struggle. What possible result, he asked, could attend even the success of a few campaigns? Nothing but an indefinite protraction of war on their own soil—an endless uncertainty of life and property. Was there one Spaniard amongst them so senseless as not to feel that the nation had been the sport of the eternal enemies of the continent, who took delight in witnessing the effusion of French and Spanish blood? It had cost him but some marches to defeat their armies; he had entered their capital, and the laws of war would justify him by a signal example in washing away, in blood, the insult offered to himself and his country. But he had listened to the voice, not of justice, but of clemency. His wish was to be the regenerator of Spain. All that obstructed their prosperity and greatness he had destroyed; he had broken the fetters which bent the people to the earth. Their destiny now was in their own hands. An absolute monarchy had been displaced by a free constitution. "It depends on yourselves whether this constitution shall continue in your land. But should all my efforts

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December. prove fruitless, and should you shew yourselves unworthy of my confidence, nothing will remain for me but to treat your country as a conquered province, and to establish my brother on some other throne. I shall then place on my own head the crown of Spain, and cause it to be respected by the guilty. God has given me the will and power to surmount all difficulties."

This proclamation was succeeded by a number of decrees on various subjects. No grant was in future to be made from the public revenue to any individual. The Tribunal of the Inquisition, feudal rights, and the jurisdiction of seigniorial courts of justice, were abolished. The number of convents was reduced to one-third. Most of the members of the Council of Castile were displaced, and declared unworthy of continuing the magistrates of a free nation; and, with few exceptions, a general pardon was granted to all Spaniards, on professing allegiance to the intrusive monarch.

Dec. 11. After the fall of the capital, the French still continued to follow up their successes. Toledo was occupied by Marshal Victor on the eleventh, and La Mancha became subject to the pillage of his ferocious soldiery. In the meanwhile, the

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December. southern Juntas were employed in fortifying the passes of the Sierra Morena, which were daily expected to become the object of attack. But at that moment the movements of the British army had the effect of diverting the attention of Napoleon; and it was probably expected that the force detached towards Badajos, in pursuit of the retiring Junta, would, in that direction, find easier access to Seville and Cadiz, than over the difficult and giant ranges by which Andalusia is bounded on the north.

When Sir John Moore, therefore, commenced his march from Salamanca, the different corps of the French army were disposed nearly as follows. Marshal Bessieres was pursuing the remains of the central army on the road to Valencia. Victor had entered Toledo. Lefebvre, with a strong division, was marching on Badajos. Mortier was preparing to besiege Zaragoza; Soult to enter Leon; while Napoleon, from Madrid, was ready to support all these movements, and complete the subjugation of Spain. The total of this force was estimated at one hundred and fifty thousand men. That of Sir John Moore amounted altogether to twenty-six thousand nine hundred infantry, and two

CHAP. I. thousand four hundred and fifty cavalry. The
1808. artillery was numerous, but of too small a cali-
December. bre. It consisted of about fifty guns, including
a brigade of useless three-pounders.

Dec. 12. On the twelfth, Sir John Moore moved on-
ward from Salamanca. On the thirteenth,
head-quarters were at Alaejos. The brigade of
General Beresford, and the cavalry under Lord
Paget, were at Toro. General Hope was at
Torrecillo; the brigade of cavalry, under Briga-
dier-General Stewart, at Rueda. By the latter,
a party of fifty infantry and thirty cavalry, had,
on the preceding night, been surprised and cut
off. The prisoners declared that it was believed,
in the French army, that the English were re-
treating on Portugal.

Dec. 14. On the fourteenth, Sir John Moore received
a despatch from Romana, expressive of his ap-
probation of the movements of the British army,
and of his intention to take immediate steps to
effect a junction.

On the same day a packet of intercepted let-
ters from the head-quarters of the French army
—the bearer of which had been killed by the
peasantry—was brought to Sir John Moore. It
contained a despatch from Berthier to Soult,

CHAP. I. directing him to occupy Leon, Benevente,
and Zamora, to drive the Spaniards into Gal-
1808. licia, and maintain subjection in the flat coun-
December. try. It stated that no annoyance need be
apprehended from the English, who were al-
ready supposed to be in full retreat on Por-
tugal. But should this not be the case, the
movement of the fourth corps on Badajos would
speedily realize the anticipation. It likewise
appeared from the letter, that Soult was at
Saldanha, with two divisions; and that another,
under Mortier, had received orders to march on
Zaragoza. The eighth corps, commanded by
Junot, was stated to have passed the Pyrenees,
and would probably be concentrated in Burgos.

It had been the intention of Sir John Moore
to push onward to Valladolid; but the intelli-
gence contained in the intercepted despatch, in-
duced him to alter his intention. By this it
appeared that the corps of Soult was stronger
than he expected; and removing his head-
quarters to Toro, he directed Sir David Baird
to concentrate his division at Benevente, from
which point an union, either by a flank or
forward movement, might at any time be ef-
fected.

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December. While Sir John Moore was at Toro, he received another communication from Mr. Frere, written in a tone of ardent remonstrance. Ignorant of the change which had taken place in the plans of the general, it reminded him of the immense responsibility which he assumed, in adopting a measure which must be followed by the immediate, if not the final ruin of our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources he was intrusted. "I am unwilling," continued he, "to enlarge on a subject on which my feelings must be stifled or expressed at the risk of offence, which, with such an interest at stake, I should be unwilling to excite. But this much I must say, that if the British army had been sent for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose."

In this letter Mr. Frere enclosed another from the Supreme Junta to himself, deprecating the resolution of retreat, and urging, in the strongest terms, the advantage of his immediately engag-

ing in active operations against the enemy. The Junta assured Mr. Frere that the enthusiasm of the Spanish people had not been diminished by the recent reverses of their armies, and promised that he should be promptly joined by fourteen thousand men from Romana's army.

The communication of Mr. Frere arrived too late to have any influence on the movements of Sir John Moore. His plans had already been decided. Against his better judgment he had engaged in operations from which he anticipated little beneficial result; and, still contemplating the probability of retreat, he declined assuming the chief command of the Spanish armies, which was at this time offered him.

The difficulties of Sir John Moore were increased by intelligence received from Sir David Baird, that the Marques de la Romana had actually commenced his retreat from Leon on Galicia. Such information could not fail of producing considerable vexation. Sir John Moore felt how materially his operations would be impeded by this unexpected circumstance; and, on his arrival at Castro Nuevo, he despatched a courier to Romana, soliciting him to retrace his steps, or else, by entering the

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CHAP. I. Asturias, afford protection to the left flank
 1808. of the communication on Corunna. To this,
 December. Romana replied that he had commenced his retreat in consequence of intelligence received from Sir David Baird; that he was anxious at the present to do every thing for the relief of Madrid; and prepared to unite in any operation with the English army.

Sir John Moore had now resolved, if possible, to attack Marshal Soult in his position at Saldanha, about eighty miles to the northward of Toro. He considered that even an unprofitable victory could scarcely fail to lend encouragement to the patriots; and, at all events, the forward movement would necessarily draw on him the whole French force in Spain, and thereby create a diversion, which would give the Spanish armies in the south time to rally and recover from the effects of the recent disasters.

Dec. 18. On the eighteenth Sir John Moore moved forward to Castro Nuevo. The head-quarters of Sir David Baird on that day were at Benavente, about forty miles distant. On the nineteenth the march of the army was continued on Villalpando and Valderas. On the
 Dec. 20. twentieth the junction with Sir David Baird was

formed at Mayorga. The total effective amount
 of the combined army, is stated to have been
 twenty-three thousand infantry, and two thousand five hundred cavalry. About one thousand seven hundred men were on detachment, and four thousand in hospital.

While head-quarters were at Mayorga, several skirmishes took place between the British cavalry and that of the enemy. In Sahagun a detachment of seven hundred French cavalry was reported to be lodged, and Lord Paget deemed it practicable to cut them off. The ground was covered with deep snow, and the weather intensely cold. Lord Paget, however, set forward on his march, and detaching General Slade with the tenth hussars along the Cea to enter the town, he wheeled off with the fifteenth and horse artillery to approach it by a different route. By day-dawn, Lord Paget had reached the town, in front of which he fell in with a piquet of the enemy. It was instantly charged, and all but one man cut down or made prisoners. The escape of this individual, however, gave the alarm; and before the fifteenth could advance, the enemy were discovered drawn up to receive them in an open plain.

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CHAP. I. Lord Paget immediately formed line and advanced to the charge. But the success of this manœuvre was prevented by a broad ditch or ravine, hitherto unobserved, which obstructed their progress. Some manœuvring took place between the corps, each endeavouring to gain the flank of the other. By superior skill, Lord Paget at length effected his object. The ravine was passed, and, coming down at full speed on their opponents, the fifteenth overthrew them in a moment. Many of the French were killed, and one hundred and fifty-seven prisoners, including two lieutenant-colonels, were brought back to the British camp as trophies of success. The loss of the fifteenth in this engagement was trifling.

Dec. 21. On the twenty-first the army moved to Sahagun, where Sir John Moore halted for a day to afford refreshment to the troops.

There he received a despatch from Romana, dated Leon, December nineteenth. The Marquis expressed his approbation of the measures of Sir John Moore, and his willingness to co-operate in the proposed attack on Soult; but the most extraordinary feature in the letter is, that the writer of it appeared wholly ignorant

of the surrender of Madrid, nearly twenty days before! Another letter, received on the day following, stated that the corps of Soult consisted of about ten thousand men, of which one thousand were cavalry, with eight or ten pieces of artillery; but that Soult, apprehensive of attack, had applied for reinforcements; and, in the meanwhile, had collected the nearest troops, which augmented his force to about eighteen thousand men. These he had posted behind the Carrion. In the proposed operation, Romana offered to unite with nine or ten thousand of his best men, and intimated his readiness to advance immediately on receiving the answer of Sir John Moore.

CHAP. I. This letter arrived late on the night of the twenty-second. Early on the following morning, Sir John Moore despatched a messenger to Romana, informing him that he would on the same night march to the town of Carrion, where he had reason to believe that a body of the enemy were collected. "To-morrow," said the General, "I shall march on Saldanha. If your Excellency would march from Mansilla, either direct on Saldanha, or pass the river a little above it, whilst I march on

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CHAP. I. from Carrion, I think it would distract the at-
 1808. tention of the enemy, and considerably aid my
 December. attack. My march from Carrion will probably
 be in the night. Any information of your move-
 ments, I shall thank you to address to me at
 Carrion, where I shall be at daylight to-mor-
 row."

In consequence of this determination, orders
 for an immediate advance were issued to the
 army. The march was to commence at eight
 o'clock in the evening in two columns. One of
 these was destined to force the bridge at Car-
 rion, and so penetrate to Saldanha; and this
 body was already on the road, when a letter
 arrived from Romana, stating that the French,
 on the side of Madrid, were in motion to the
 northward. This intelligence coincided with
 the information received by Sir John Moore
 from other quarters. The corps of the ene-
 my, which was directing its march on Badajos,
 had halted at Talavera. Large supplies of
 forage and provisions had been ordered in the
 villages around Palencia. It was said that Na-
 poleon himself, had set out from Madrid, with
 the avowed intention of proceeding to Bene-
 vente without a halt.

Under these circumstances, Sir John Moore CHAP. I.
 determined on retreat, and the march to Car- 1808.
 rion was countermanded. He considered that December.
 the beneficial object of his movement had already
 been attained. The progress of the enemy's ar-
 mies had been arrested in the south, and they
 were now advancing on all hands to surround
 him.

Sir John Moore, therefore, felt convinced that
 nothing but immediate retreat could extricate
 him from the difficulties of his situation. His
 intentions were communicated to the Marques
 de la Romana, in the following words: "I shall
 take immediate measures for retiring on Astorga.
 There I shall stand; as my retreat thence, if ne-
 cessary, will be secure. I shall be in the way to
 receive the supplies and the reinforcements which
 I expect from England. At the worst, I can
 maintain myself, and, with your Excellency's
 aid, defend the Gallicias, and give time for the
 formation of the armies in the south, and that
 which you command, to be prepared, when a
 joint effort may be made, which can alone be ef-
 ficacious."

As Sir John Moore had not yet resigned the
 intention of defending Gallicia, he determined

CHAP. I. on retiring in such a direction as would facilitate the execution of this measure, should it be found desirable. To effect this it was necessary, in the first instance, to cross the Eslar, which could be done by three routes. The first is by Mansilla, where the river is crossed by a bridge. The second by Valencia de San Juan, at which point there is a ferry. The third is by Castro Gonzalo, where there is likewise a bridge, and from whence a road passes to Benevente. As Mansilla was already occupied by the Spanish troops, the two latter routes were preferred, and Astorga was indicated as the place of rendezvous, where it was understood the army would make a stand. In the meanwhile, Romana was expected to keep possession of Mansilla, and defend the city of Leon to the last extremity.

Dec. 24. The day following was employed in preparations for retreat. In the evening, General Hope, with his own division and that of General Fraser, fell back to Mayorga, and Sir David Baird retired to Valencia de San Juan. To conceal this movement, strong patrols of cavalry were pushed on to the advanced posts of the enemy. On the twenty-fifth, the Commander-in-chief followed

General Hope with the reserve and two light brigades. Lord Paget was ordered to remain with the cavalry until the evening, and then to follow the reserve.

Much difficulty was anticipated by Sir John Moore in crossing the Eslar, from the melting of the mountain snows; but, on the twenty-sixth, Sir David Baird reached that river, and crossed it with trifling impediment. The other divisions of the army proceeded, without molestation, to Castro Gonzalo.

At this moment the British army had become almost girdled by the enemy. From the twenty-second to the twenty-fourth, Soult had received strong reinforcements, and his army alone was already superior in number to the British.

Junot, with the army liberated by the Convention of Cintra, had advanced from Burgos to Palencia, and threatened their right flank.

Napoleon, in person, had set out from Madrid with all the disposable force in that quarter; and on the same day that the van of the British quitted Sahagun, the advanced-guard of this army passed through Tordesillas, a town about fifty miles distant from Benevente.

The corps of Lefebvre had changed the di-

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December. rection of its march, and was now advancing on Salamanca. The retreat of the British army on Portugal was thus cut off.

The whole disposable force of the enemy, forming an irregular crescent, were thus advancing in *radii* on the British army, as a common centre. To cut off its retreat was now the chief object of Napoleon.

Dec. 26. On the twenty-sixth an engagement took place between the British cavalry and that of the enemy. Detachments from the army of Napoleon had been pushed on to Villalpando and Mayorga; and in the neighbourhood of the latter place a considerable force of the enemy was observed to be drawn up on the acclivity of a hill, with the view apparently of cutting off any stragglers who might wander from the line of march. Two squadrons of the tenth hussars were instantly ordered to dislodge them. These, under the command of Colonel Leigh, rode gallantly up the hill, and by a successful charge drove back the French cavalry in confusion. In this affair many of the enemy were killed and wounded, and above one hundred made prisoners.

On the same day the cavalry, the horse artillery, and a brigade of light infantry, halt-

ed at Castro Gonzalo; and the divisions under Generals Hope and Fraser marched to Benevente. On the twenty-seventh the rear-guard crossed the Eslar, and followed the same route, having blown up the bridge. The hardships to which the army were now exposed, tended greatly to increase the general feeling of dissatisfaction at the measures of their leader. The route lay over miserable roads, and through an exhausted country. The weather was more than usually severe; heavy showers of rain and sleet drenched the soldiers to the skin, and it was not always that even at night they could procure shelter from the elements.—Turbulence and insubordination broke forth in the ranks. The soldiers, indignant at the Spaniards, who generally locked their doors on their approach, and concealed their little stock of provisions, were guilty of violence and robbery. These criminal excesses increased the evil. Hatred and disgust sprang up on both sides; and frequent scenes of bloodshed were the consequence.

On the twenty-seventh of December the Dec. 27.
column reached Benevente; and Sir John Moore issued a general order to the army,

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CHAP. I. characterizing its excesses in strong language.

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He expressed his deep regret that the army should have forfeited its former praise for exemplary conduct and discipline. The atrocities committed in Valderas, he declared to have exceeded any thing he could have believed of British soldiers. The situation of the army was such as to call for the display of qualities the most rare and valuable in a military body. These were not bravery alone, but patience and constancy under fatigue and hardship, obedience to command, sobriety, firmness, and resolution, in every situation in which they might be placed. It was only by the display of such qualities that the army could deserve the name of soldiers,—that they could be able to withstand the forces opposed to them, or fulfil the expectations of their country.

From Benevente, Sir John Moore despatched a courier to Romana. In the communication of which he was the bearer, Sir John informed the Marques that the enemy were in full advance, and that, on the preceding day, their main-body had reached Valladolid, only three marches to the rear. "I shall continue," he said, "my movement on Astorga. It is there, or behind it,

we should fight a battle, if at all. If the enemy

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follows so far, he will leave himself more open to the efforts of the south. My opinion is, that

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a battle is the game of Buonaparte, not ours. We should, if followed, take defensive positions in the mountains, where his cavalry can be of no use; and there either engage him in an unequal contest with us, oblige him to employ a considerable corps to watch us, or to retire upon Madrid; in which last case we should again come forth upon the plain. In this manner we give time for the arrival of reinforcements from England, your army to be formed and equipped, and that of the south to come forth. In short, the game of England and Spain, which must always be the same, is to procrastinate and gain time, and not, if it can be helped, to place the whole stake upon the hazard of a battle."

While at Benevente, where the army halted for two days, intelligence was received that the army of Napoleon were endeavouring, by forced marches, to overtake the British. Under these circumstances, Sir John Moore hastened to continue his retreat. The stores of the army, for which no transport could be procured, were ordered to be destroyed.

CHAP. I. From Benevente to Vigo there are two roads ;
 1808. one passing by Orense, the other by Astorga.

December. The former, though the shortest, was impracticable for artillery, and the army were consequently compelled to retire by the latter. Orders were sent to Sir David Baird, who was still at Valencia, to continue his march on Astorga.

On the twenty-eighth, Generals Hope and Fraser proceeded with their divisions to La Banessa. On the twenty-ninth, Sir John Moore followed with the reserve ; and Lord Paget was directed to bring up the rear with the cavalry.

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The march of the cavalry, however, had not yet commenced, when a body of the enemy's horse were observed to be attempting a ford near the ruins of the bridge which had been blown up ; and presently between five and six hundred of the Imperial Guards plunged into the river and crossed over. They were instantly opposed by the piquets under Colonel Otway, which had been appointed to act as a rear-guard. Though this body mustered little more than two hundred men, they boldly advanced against the enemy, and continued bravely to dispute every inch of his advance. Repeated charges took place between the front

squadrons ; and upon the arrival of a small party CHAP. I.
 of the third dragoons, the front squadron, by a 1808.
 furious charge, broke through that of the enemy, and were for a time surrounded. By another charge, however, they soon extricated themselves from this dilemma, and re-formed with the rest of the detachments.

December.

Lord Paget soon reached the field, and Brigadier-General Stewart, assuming the command of the piquets, made repeated charges on the enemy, the squadrons being sometimes intermingled. In order to draw the enemy still further from the ford, General Stewart gave ground ; when the tenth hussars, which had already formed, advanced to the charge, and the enemy's line was in an instant broken. They fled in great disorder to the river, closely pursued by the tenth, leaving fifty-five killed and wounded on the field, and seventy prisoners, among whom was General Lefebvre, the commander of the Imperial Guard. Immediately on reaching the opposite side of the river, the enemy formed on the margin ; but a few rounds from the horse artillery, which came up at that moment, was sufficient to disperse them.

CHAP. I.
1808. The loss of the British in this affair, amounted to about fifty killed and wounded.

December. Towards evening the enemy brought up some field-pieces, and cannonaded the piquets from the heights on the opposite side of the river, but without effect. At night Lord Paget drew off the cavalry, and followed the reserve to La Banesa.

Dec. 30. On the day following, the British headquarters were at Astorga, where Sir David Baird's column, coming from Valencia, succeeded in effecting a junction with the main body of the army.

At Astorga another disappointment awaited Sir John Moore. He found the city already occupied by five thousand of the corps of Romana. This general had not destroyed the bridge of Mansilla. The guard he left there was charged by a party of the enemy's cavalry, and driven back in confusion. At Leon no defence had been attempted, and the unexpected presence of the Spanish army at Astorga, interfered materially with the arrangements of Sir John Moore. It had been his opinion that Romana would have most contributed to the good

of the common cause, by retiring on the Asturias; because, when the enemy proceeded to Galicia, he might have intercepted their convoys, or have compelled them to employ large detachments for their protection. But the passes of the Asturian mountains were blocked up by snow, and Romana was consequently obliged, on the approach of Soult, to push across to Astorga. The consequence was, that all the houses in Astorga were filled with Spanish soldiers; and the roads were literally obstructed with men, horses, cars, and all the other accompaniments of an army, which had foundered or broken down on the march.

It is scarcely possible to conceive any thing more wretched than the condition of Romana's troops. They wanted clothing, accoutrements, arms, ammunition, and even food. A malignant fever had broken out among them, and the number of sick was sustaining hourly augmentation. Never did any congregation of human beings exhibit less external semblance of a military body. The soldiers under arms little exceeded in number the sick borne on cars and mules; and as they passed slowly along, enfeebled and emaciated by disease, the procession had more the

CHAP. I.
1808.
December.

CHAP. I. appearance of an ambulatory hospital, than of
 1808. a force by which the country was to be de-
 December. fended.

Such was the condition of the army of Romana. Let it also be recorded, that this brave and suffering band bore their multiplied privations with unshrinking patience; that they uniformly displayed, even in the very depth of their misfortunes, a courage and devotion worthy of that cause, in behalf of which they were alike prepared to bleed or suffer.

Before his arrival at Astorga, Sir John Moore, notwithstanding his assurances to Romana, had resigned all thoughts of making a stand in the neighbourhood of that city. From the prisoners made by the cavalry on the preceding day, it was ascertained that the head-quarters of Napoleon's army, had, on the preceding evening, been at Villalpando, a village only sixteen miles distant. No defensive preparations had been attempted, and the General determined to continue the retreat on Villa Franca. Of this measure Romana disapproved. He declared himself ready to join the English army in defending the strong ground around Astorga, from whence a secure retreat would, in any event, be open

to them by the almost impregnable passes of CHAP. I.
 Manzanal and Foncebadon, which a small body 1808.
 might successfully maintain against any num- December.
 bers.

This project, however, did not meet the approbation of Sir John Moore. Instant preparations were made for retreat. The stores, of which Astorga had been made the depot, were destroyed or distributed among the Spanish troops, and the sick were abandoned to the enemy.

In the miserable condition of the Spanish army, it might have been supposed, that this half-naked, half-armed, half-famished, and diseased multitude, would have sought protection in their retreat from the English columns. It was not so. With a spirit which death alone could extinguish, this suffering but high-minded band, still confided in their own exertions to keep the field; and when Sir John Moore proposed to Romana that he should retire by Orense, the proposal was instantly acceded to. Romana only requested that the British troops might be restrained from the further perpetration of those acts of disgraceful violence, which had hitherto marked their progress: a request which it

CHAP. I. must have imbibited the spirit of Sir John
 1808. Moore to know that his power was inadequate
 December. to grant.

At Astorga, the light brigades under General Crawford separated from the army, and marched by way of Orense to Vigo, where Sir John Moore had directed transports to be sent for the embarkation of the army. This detachment preceded Romana's army in the line of march; and when the miserable band of patriots, after a halt of only one night, took their way to Orense, they found the country through which they passed already stripped of supplies. This completed the wreck of this gallant but unfortunate army. The infantry at length became completely disorganized, and Romana, with the cavalry and guns, retired to the valley of the Mincio.

1809.
Jan. 1.

On the first of January, Napoleon entered Astorga, and formed a junction with Marshal Soult. Leaving Ney, with eighteen thousand men, to keep Leon in subjection, he directed Soult by forced marches to continue the pursuit. This was done with uncommon vigour. On the night of the first, so closely did they already press on the rear of the British, that

their patrols fell in with the piquets of the re- CHAP. I.
 tiring army. In the meanwhile, Napoleon coun- 1809.
 termarched with the rest of his army, and in a January.
 few days returned to France.

It is melancholy to contemplate the condition to which the British had already been reduced. During the march to Villa Franca, the rain came down in torrents; men and horses, sinking through fatigue, covered the roads; and the soldiers whose strength still enabled them to proceed, maddened by the continued suffering of cold and hunger, were no longer under any subordination. In such circumstances pillage could not be prevented. Wherever they came, the inhabitants fled from their dwellings, and sought shelter among the mountains. Enormities of all kinds were committed. Houses, and even villages, were burning in all directions. The ravages of the most ferocious enemy, could not have exceeded in atrocity those perpetrated by a British army on their allies.

At Benevente, an order had been issued by the General, assuring the army, that the only object of the retiring movement was, not to evacuate the country, but to secure a more favourable position. It had, therefore, been con-

CHAP. I.
1809.
January. fidently expected, that a stand would be made at the almost impregnable defiles through which the army passed after quitting Villa Franca. The country had been traversed by Sir David Baird on his advance; and it was generally held incredible that the retreat should be continued beyond that point. The sufferings which the army had already endured, and the lamentable want of discipline to which the rapidity of the retreat had given rise, tended to strengthen the conviction that the General would gladly avail himself of the great defensive advantages which the country afforded. This hope was disappointed. Sir John Moore saw no safety but in embarkation; and the retreat was continued with unrelenting speed.

At every step of their progress, however, the misfortunes of this devoted army seemed to accumulate. The mortality among the horses was excessive; and no sooner did these noble animals become unable to proceed than they were shot, in order to prevent their being serviceable to the enemy. The ammunition-waggons, which had hitherto kept up, were falling one by one to the rear, and the ammunition they contained was destroyed. In the towns, many of the soldiers,

CHAP. I.
1809.
January. in the recklessness of despair, broke into the cellars, and giving way to the most desperate excess, were found dead by the enemy. During the marches, the number of stragglers was enormous. Under different pretexts, whole regiments strayed from their colours; and, as often as a store or wine-house was discovered, scenes of the most revolting character ensued. The enemy's cavalry was continually pressing on our rear, and, under such circumstances, no pause could be made to afford protection to those who, from intoxication or exhaustion of strength, were compelled to fall behind. At Bembibre, in particular, the town, on the departure of the reserve, was filled with these unfortunate wretches. Every effort was made to save them from the miserable fate which they so madly courted; but in vain. The rear-guard was at length compelled to march. A small detachment of cavalry still remained, in hopes that some, at least, of the victims might be rescued. But the enemy came on in force; and the French dragoons, charging onward through a crowd of men, women, and children, slashed to the right and left with their sabres, sparing neither age nor sex. Never did British troops gaze on a spectacle more appal-

CHAP. I. ling than those who, escaping death, came up
1809. bleeding and lacerated, and were, by order of
January. the General, paraded through the ranks as a
warning to their comrades.

It is well that these humiliating circumstances should be recorded. It is well that war should be gazed on in all its aspects, and not unprofitable, perhaps, that such episodes should be commemorated in the emblazoned volume of our victories.

Jan. 3. Since the affair of the twenty-eighth, no engagement had taken place. On the third of January, the advanced-guard of the enemy were seen advancing on Cacabelos. The town is divided by a rivulet, along the banks of which part of the reserve was stationed. On a hill, about half a league in front, were posted the ninety-fifth rifle-corps, and a piquet of cavalry. The General ordered the ninety-fifth to retire, through the town by a bridge. While this order was executing, the French cavalry came on in force, driving the piquet before them, and, charging the rear companies, which had not yet crossed the bridge, succeeded in making some prisoners. The enemy, imagining they had thrown our rear-guard into confu-

CHAP. I. sion, immediately advanced a body of dismount-
ed chasseurs, who, dashing forward through the
1809. stream with great spirit, attacked the ninety-
January. fifth, which had barely gained time to extend in
skirmishing order. The regiment received the
attack with admirable steadiness, and, retreating
up a hill in rear of the town, took post
among some vineyards, from which they continued
to gall the enemy by a well-directed fire. From
this position the French cavalry attempted to
dislodge them, but without success. The ninety-
fifth again repulsed them; and they retreated
with the loss of a considerable number in killed
and wounded. General Colbert, an officer of great
gallantry and distinction, was among the number
of the former.

In a short time after, a strong body of the enemy's infantry was observed on the opposite hills, in full march on our position. The artillery was instantly ordered to open its fire, which it did with such precision as to check the advance of the French column, which retired with considerable loss, and without firing a shot.

From Villa Franca, the country afforded no field for the action of cavalry; and it was therefore ordered to precede the infantry by forced

CHAP. I.
1809.
January. marches to Lugo, where the leading division was directed to concentrate. Towards this point, also, the infantry were pushed on with increased speed, and, if possible, with augmented suffering. The road was bestrewed by the bodies of men dead and dying. But the agonies of women were still more dreadful to behold. Of these, by some strange neglect, or by some mistaken sentiment of humanity, an unusually large proportion had been suffered to accompany the army. Some of these unhappy creatures were taken in labour on the road, and, amid storms of sleet and snow, gave birth to infants, which, with their mothers, perished as soon as they had seen the light. Others, in the unconquerable energy of maternal love, would toil on, with one or two children on their backs; till, on looking round, they perceived that the hapless objects of their attachment were frozen to death. But more frightful even than this, was the depth of moral degradation to which these wretched followers of the camp were frequently reduced. Nothing could be more appalling to the heart, than to hear the dreadful curses and imprecations which burst from the livid lips of intoxicated and despairing women, as they laid them down to die.

CHAP. I.
1809.
January. "I am well aware," says Lord Londonderry, himself a distinguished actor in the terrible scene, "that the horrors of this retreat have been, again and again, described in terms calculated to freeze the blood of such as read them; but I have no hesitation in saying, that the most harrowing accounts which have yet been laid before the public, fall short of the reality."

On the march to Lugo, detachments of Spanish troops, by whom this precipitate abandonment of their country had not been anticipated, were met escorting convoys of cannon, ammunition, clothing, and stores, to the front. These were assailed with outrage and abuse by the British soldiers; and, quitting their charge, were glad to escape with their cattle, leaving the carriages to encumber the road. A large convoy, of between thirty and forty waggons, with stores for the army of Romana, was met near Nogales. These were now useless. Some were distributed to the troops as they passed—the remainder was destroyed. Near Constantino the road crosses a hill, which Sir John Moore was apprehensive would be taken advantage of by the French, to annoy the descending

CHAP. I. column. The rifle corps and horse-artillery
 1809. were ordered, therefore, to halt on its summit,
 January. and obstruct the enemy's advance. The position, thus assumed, was formidable; and, in order to avoid exposure to the British guns, the French halted behind another hill for above half an hour. The reserve, in the meanwhile, continued its march; and no sooner had the rear crossed the bridge of Constantino, than the artillery and rifle corps suddenly retired, and the whole passed the river without loss. General Paget, with the reserve, then took post to defend the bridge. The enemy advanced their cavalry and dismounted chasseurs, and endeavoured, ineffectually, to force the post. They were driven back by a well-directed fire. At eleven at night General Paget received orders to fall back on Lugo.

The distance between Villa Franca and Lugo, was accomplished by the reserve in forty-eight hours. During this march, likewise, a quantity of valuable stores was destroyed, and two waggon-loads of dollars fell behind. Every effort for the further transport of the treasure having proved abortive, the casks containing it

were rolled down a precipice, in hopes that the snow might conceal it from the observation of the enemy.

But even with all these sacrifices, the necessity of repose to recruit the exhausted soldiers became at length apparent to Sir John Moore. At Lugo, the army halted on the sixth; and the General took up a position in front of the town, with the intention of offering battle to the enemy. Never did any measure produce a more striking and instantaneous revulsion of feeling in the troops. Insubordination was at an end,—stragglers hastened to join their regiments,—worn frames became reanimated with vigour,—and the promiscuous assemblage of disorderly soldiers, became again invested with all the attributes of a disciplined army.

It was at length ascertained by the General, that Corunna was a more eligible place for embarkation than Vigo; and as it besides possessed the advantage of being considerably nearer, it was determined to direct the march of the army on that point. Orders, therefore, had been despatched to recall the light brigades and the division of General Fraser, which had been previously directed to proceed to Vigo. These or-

CHAP. I.
 1809.
 January.

Jan. 6.

CHAP. I. ders were transmitted to Sir David Baird by a
 1809. staff-officer; but the orderly-dragoon who was
 January; employed by Sir David Baird to convey the
 despatch to its destination, unfortunately got
 drunk, and lost it. This occurrence was pro-
 ductive of the worst effects. General Fraser's
 troops had proceeded a full day on their march
 before the order reached them; and, in conse-
 quence, without food or rest, were compelled to
 retrace their steps, and arrived at Lugo with the
 loss of four hundred of their number.

The ground on which Sir John Moore pro-
 posed to receive the enemy's attack at Lugo,
 was selected with skill. The right of the posi-
 tion rested on the Tamboga; its front extended
 along the sides of a strong ravine; and the left,
 somewhat withdrawn, was protected by precip-
 itous acclivities.

About mid-day on the sixth, the French col-
 umns were observed to be advancing on the
 English position. Preparation was immediately
 made for their reception; but no engagement
 ensued. The French took possession of a strong
 mountainous ridge in front of the British; and,
 formed in order of battle, seemed to challenge
 attack. For several hours did the lines thus

continue gazing on each other, without hostile CHAP. I.
 movement on either side. The hope of battle
 1809.
 gradually faded; at last evening closed, and
 January.
 the troops returned to their quarters.

On the following morning the enemy ad-
 Jan. 7.
 vanced four guns, protected by a few squadrons
 of cavalry, towards the centre, and commenced a
 sharp cannonade. The fire was immediately re-
 turned by the English, with such effect, that
 one of their guns was dismounted, and the rest
 silenced. For above an hour no further hosti-
 lities took place. The enemy then made a feint
 on the British right, in order to cover the ad-
 vance of five guns, and a strong column of in-
 fantry on the left. Sir John Moore immedi-
 ately rode at full speed to that part of the line. In
 the meanwhile, a warm skirmish had taken
 place with the piquets, which were driven hasti-
 ly back. The enemy's column were already as-
 cending the height occupied by the seventy-sixth
 regiment, which gradually fell back, until joined
 by the fifty-first, when, after a few discharges of
 musketry, these regiments advanced to the
 charge, and drove back the French in confusion.
 The setting in of night again disappointed the
 hope of immediate engagement; and the British

CHAP. I.
1809.
January. army retired to their quarters, with the fervent wish that the dawn of morning might light them to battle.

Jan. 8. Sir John Moore was impressed with the conviction, that this wish would be realized. He considered the preceding attack as made only, by Marshal Soult, with the view of reconnoitring the strength of the force opposed to him, and expected that the day following would produce a more general engagement. In this he was disappointed. On the morning of the eighth the French were still observed in their position; yet hour after hour passed, and they made no movement. At length night fell, and with it fell all the fond hopes of battle which had been cherished by the army. In order to deceive the enemy, large fires were lighted along the line; and at ten o'clock the British army again commenced their retreat.

No sooner did Marshal Soult become aware of the evasion of his enemy, than the pursuit was immediately recommenced, and followed up with unabated vigour; but the British had already gained so much ground, that it was not till the evening that the enemy's advanced guard came up with the rear. The horrors of

CHAP. I.
1809.
January. this march were of the most aggravated description. The night was dark and stormy, the cold intense, and the sleet fell heavily. The troops, already jaded and half-famished, and many of them barefoot, marched along roads knee-deep in mud. Insubordination again spread among the ranks,—and the number of stragglers was enormous.

Jan. 9. About ten in the morning the army arrived at Valmeda. Here positive exhaustion compelled a halt; and the men lay on the open ground for several hours, exposed to the continual action of a heavy rain. But even this brief interval was not granted to undisturbed repose. A cry arose, from time to time, that the enemy were advancing; and, at each alarm, the troops were ordered to fall in. Such an intermission was little calculated to refresh the worn strength of the soldiers; and, towards evening, when they again resumed their march, little benefit was found to have resulted from the halt.

Jan. 10. On the tenth, the army halted at Betanzos; and General Paget, with the reserve, remained in position, a few miles in front of that town, for the protection of the stragglers. The con-

CHAP. I.
1809.
January. duct of this officer, and the troops he commanded, throughout the retreat, was such as to command the admiration of the army. The reserve marched better, and bore their sufferings with greater resolution than any other portion of the troops; and the skill, promptitude, and unwearied vigilance of General Paget, were, on every occasion, remarkable.

From Betanzos, the army accomplished its march to Corunna, with little molestation from the enemy. A bridge near the town was attempted to be destroyed, but without success. At Astorga the General had ordered the whole of the engineers' equipments to be burned; and the army were thus most imprudently deprived of the power of impeding the progress of the enemy, which the destruction of the numerous bridges would have afforded. Near Corunna, however, the bridge across the Mero was blown up, the necessary tools for the purpose having been brought from the town; but owing to the premature explosion of a mine, the superintending-officer of engineers was killed.

The army had now reached their destined point of embarkation, but the transports had not yet arrived from Vigo. Only a few ships lay in

the harbour, on board of which the sick, who CHAP. I.
1809.
January. preceded the army, were immediately embarked; and it became necessary that the army should assume a position, and once more shew front to the enemy. That this necessity was imposed on Sir John Moore, never to any Englishman can be matter of regret. It saved the British army from the disgrace of having quitted Spain like downcast and disheartened fugitives,—of having sought refuge in their ships from the hostility of an enemy, with whom they had never measured strength in combat.

Sir John Moore preceded the army on its march to Corunna, and surveyed the country in its neighbourhood. There were two ranges of heights in front of the town. The higher and more distant of these would, unquestionably, have afforded a position of considerable strength, had the numerical force of the army been sufficient for its occupation. But, as this was not the case, it became necessary to occupy the nearer range, though of inferior altitude. Such, however, were the disadvantages of this position, that some of the general-officers recommended Sir John Moore to propose terms to Soult, in order to induce him to permit the army to em-

CHAP. I. bark unmolested. Sir John Moore, however,
1809. declared himself averse from adopting this me-
January. lancholy and disgraceful alternative; and, be-
sides, was exceedingly doubtful whether any
such proposal, if made, would be attended with
success. Most fortunately, therefore, for his
own fame, and most fortunately for the honour
of the army he commanded, this degrading coun-
sel was rejected,—and England was not destined
to blush for her sons.

The enemy were now rapidly collecting on
the Mero, and it became necessary that arrange-
ments should be promptly made for the impend-
ing battle. The division of General Hope was
directed to occupy a ridge on the left, command-
ing the road to Betanzos, and sloping with a
gradual declivity towards Elvina. The post of
Sir David Baird's division was on the right, ex-
tending from Elvina along a series of heights,
which bent, in an oblique direction, towards the
front, and terminated in a valley, which divided
this range from another on the opposite side of
the Vigo road. The rifle corps was ordered to
form a chain across the valley. The reserve,
under General Paget, was posted at Airis, a
small village in rear of the centre.

CHAP. I. The left flank of this position was well pro-
tected by the high banks of the Mero, but the
right was weak; it rested on the village of El-
vina, situated low down, at the extremity of the
hills on which the front of the army was formed.
To remedy this defect, the division of General
Fraser was posted about half-a-mile in rear of
the right, on some high ground commanding the
road to Vigo. The artillery was disposed along
the front of the line.

During the whole of the thirteenth, Sir John Jan. 13.
Moore was occupied in making these disposi-
tions. Having completed them, he returned to
his quarters, and, writing his last despatch, di-
rected Brigadier-General Stewart to proceed
with it to England.

On the fourteenth, the enemy commenced a Jan. 14.
cannonade on the left, which was returned by
the British artillery, with such effect, that the
French at last drew off their guns.

In the evening the transports from Vigo hove
in sight.

On the heights, about a league distant from
the town, was a powder-magazine, which it was
deemed advisable to destroy. It contained a-
bout four thousand barrels of gunpowder, which

CHAP. I. had been brought from England some months before, and, by an unpardonable negligence, had been suffered to remain in store, while the Spanish armies were without ammunition! A few hundred barrels had, on the preceding day, been removed to Corunna—the remainder was directed to be blown up. The explosion was tremendous. Corunna shook as if convulsed by an earthquake. Huge masses of rock were cast from their pedestals. The calm waters in the bay became furiously agitated. A vast column of smoke and dust arose perpendicularly and slowly to a great height, and then bursting with a roaring sound, a shower of stones, and fragments of all kinds, reverted to the earth, killing several persons who incautiously had remained too near to the scene of peril. A stillness, only interrupted by the lashing of the waves on the shore, succeeded—and the business of war went on.

Napier.

On the arrival of the transports, preparations were immediately made for the embarkation of the army. With the exception of eight British, and four Spanish guns, the artillery was sent on board—the ground being considered unfavourable for its use. The dismounted cavalry and a

few horses were likewise embarked,—the remainder were shot.

The bridge of El Burgo having been repaired, two divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, passed the Mero, and, driving back the British outposts, marched into position. On the fifteenth, Delaborde's division followed, and took post on the height of Portoso, forming the right of the army. The ground thus chosen by the enemy, was the ridge of rocky and irregular heights by which the British position was nearly encompassed. Their right was placed on the Betanzos and St. Jago roads, and their left rested on a hill covered with wood, overlooking the British line, of which, after some resistance from the light troops, they succeeded in gaining possession.

In the evening Colonel Mackenzie of the fifth, perceived two of the enemy's guns not far distant, and imagined that by a sudden attack he might surprise them. The attempt failed. Colonel Mackenzie was killed during the advance, and his party were driven back with loss.

During the night of the fifteenth, Marshal Soult succeeded in establishing a battery of eleven guns, on the wooded hill at the extremity of his

CHAP. I.

1809.
January.

Jan. 15.

CHAP. I. left. This was an operation of great difficulty.
 1809. The ground was rugged; the French were in pos-
 January. session of no road, and the horses were weak
 and exhausted. By great exertion, however,
 the object was accomplished; and the French
 thus acquired a decided superiority in point of
 artillery.

Jan. 16. The preparations for embarking were com-
 pleted on the morning of the sixteenth, and Sir
 John Moore gave notice, that, in case the enemy
 should not move during the day, the embarka-
 tion of the reserve should commence at four
 o'clock. The tranquillity of the armies remained
 undisturbed till noon, when the General, mount-
 ing his horse, rode off to visit the outposts.
 He had not proceeded far, when he received
 a report from General Hope, stating that the
 enemy's line were getting under arms; and a
 deserter who came in at the same moment con-
 firmed the intelligence. He spurred forward.
 The piquets had already opened fire on the en-
 emy's light troops, which were pouring rapidly
 down on the right wing. A heavy fire was
 shortly opened from the French battery on the
 height; the piquets were driven rapidly back;
 and four strong columns of the enemy, supported

by a reserve, were observed descending the hill. CHAP. I.
 Two of these—one emerging from a wood, the
 other skirting its edge—threatened the right of
 1809. the position; another directed its march on the
 January. centre; and the fourth on the left. The two
 first of these columns advanced with rapidity,
 and, by a bold attack, at once carried the village
 of Elvina. Thus far successful, they endeavoured
 to turn the right of the position. It was
 defended by Lord William Bentinck's brigade,
 having the brigade of Guards in their rear. In
 order to prevent the success of this manœuvre,
 General Paget was ordered to advance with the
 reserve, and take post on the right of the line.

Lord William Bentinck's brigade received the
 attack with firmness; and the fourth regiment,
 being thrown back *en potence*, met the enemy
 with a well-directed fire. The order was at
 length given to charge; and the forty-second and
 fiftieth regiments advanced to regain the village
 of Elvina. The ground around the village was
 so intersected by walls and enclosures as to
 prevent any general collision. A severe but ir-
 regular fight ensued, which terminated in the
 French being driven back with great loss. The
 fiftieth regiment, led by Major Napier, rushed

CHAP. I. into Elvina, and with great gallantry drove out
1809. the enemy with the bayonet, and pursued him
January. for some distance beyond it.

In the meanwhile, from some misapprehension, the forty-second had retired; and the enemy being reinforced, took advantage of that circumstance to renew the conflict. Elvina became again the scene of struggle; the forty-second, after a brief but animating address from the General, returned to the attack; and the Guards being brought up to their support, the enemy gave way.

It was at this period of the action that Sir John Moore received his death wound. He was engaged in watching the result of the contest about Elvina, when a cannon shot struck him on the breast and beat him to the ground. He raised himself immediately to a sitting posture, and continued with a calm gaze to regard the regiments engaged in his front. Captain Hardinge threw himself from his horse, and took him by the hand; then, observing his anxiety, he told him the forty-second were advancing, and on this intelligence his countenance was observed to brighten.

His friend Colonel Graham now dismounted,

and from the composure of his features, entertained hopes that he was not even wounded; but observing the horrid laceration and effusion of blood he rode off for surgical assistance.

Sir John Moore was removed from the field by a party of the forty-second. As the soldiers placed him in a blanket, his sword became entangled, and the hilt entered the wound. Captain Hardinge attempted to take it off, but he stopped him, saying, "It is as well as it is, I had rather it should go out of the field with me." Sir David Baird had previously been disabled by a severe wound; and the command of the army now devolved on General Hope.

In the meanwhile all went prosperously in the field. The reserve pushed on to the right, and, driving back the enemy, continued advancing on their flank, overthrowing every thing before them. The enemy, perceiving their left wing to be exposed, drew it entirely back.

An attack made on the British centre, was successfully resisted by the brigades of Generals Manningham and Leith. The ground in that quarter being more elevated and favourable for artillery, the guns were of great service.

CHAP. I.
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January.

CHAP. I. On the left, the enemy had taken possession
1809. of the village of Palavio on the road to Betan-
January. zos. From this a fire was still kept up by
their troops, till Colonel Nichols, at the head
of some companies of the fourteenth, attacked it
and beat them out.

Day was now fast closing; and the enemy had
lost ground in all parts of the field. The firing,
however, still continued, and night alone brought
the contest to a close.

Thus ended the battle of Corunna. Let no
man say that it was fought in vain, because it
was attended with no result of immediate benefit
to the victorious army. It gave a glorious ter-
mination to an inglorious retreat. It vindicated,
in the eyes of Europe, the character of the army.
It embalmed the memory of their commander
in the hearts of his countrymen. It erased a
dark stain from the military blazon of England.
It gave to the world an imperishable proof, that,
after a retreat of unexampled suffering and pri-
vation, the firmness of British troops remain-
ed unshaken. The courage of her sons was
assayed by the ordeal of fire, and it is, and will
be, the pride of England, that it came forth pure
gold from the furnace.

While Sir John Moore was removing from CHAP. I.
the field, the expression of his countenance re-
mained unchanged, and he gave utterance to no
expression of pain. From this circumstance,
1809. Captain Hardinge gathered temporary hope
January. that the wound might not be mortal, and ex-
pressed it to the dying General. Hearing this,
he turned his head for a moment, and looking
steadfastly at the wound, said, "*No, Hardinge,
I feel that to be impossible.*" Several times he
caused his attendants to stop and turn him
round, that he might gaze on the field of battle,
and when the firing indicated the advance of
the British, he signified his satisfaction, and per-
mitted the bearers to proceed.

On examination by the surgeons, the wound of
Sir John Moore was at once pronounced to be
mortal, and from increasing pain he could speak
but with difficulty. Observing his friend Colo-
nel Anderson by his bed, he asked if the French
were beaten, and then said, "*You know, Ander-
son, I have always wished to die this way. You
will see my friends as soon as you can. Tell
them every thing. Say to my mother*"—Here his
voice failed from agitation, and he did not again

CHAP. I. venture to name her. When his strength was
 1809. fast waning, and little more than a glimmering
 January. of life remained, he said to Colonel Anderson,
*"I hope the people of England will be satisfied !
 I hope my country will do me justice."* After
 a while, he pressed the hand of Colonel Ander-
 son to his body ; and in a few minutes died with-
 out a struggle.

Thus fell Sir John Moore. Kind in feeling,
 generous in spirit, dauntless in heart,—no man
 was more beloved ; none more lamented. Other
 leaders have been more fortunate in life ; none
 were ever more glorious in death. Whatever
 may have been the military errors of such a man,
 however little the cast and temper of his mind
 may have fitted him for the task he was called
 on to discharge, at a crisis of peculiar difficulty,
 what is there in this,—what is there in any fail-
 ing which even malice has ventured to charge on
 Sir John Moore, that England should quench
 her pride in so noble a son ? Columns may rise
 to others, and temples and triumphal arches
 may consecrate a nation's gratitude in the me-
 mory of posterity to warriors of prouder fame
 and more brilliant achievement ; but the name

of Moore will *not* die. It will be loved and CHAP. I.
 honoured in all after generations, and his memo-
 ry will stand undimmed by time, *κτῆμα ἐς αἰ.*
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The night succeeding the action was passed
 in the embarkation of the troops. At ten
 o'clock they moved off the field by brigades, and
 marched down to Corunna. Major-General Ber-
 esford was posted with the rear-guard, on the
 lines fronting Corunna, to watch the motions of
 the enemy. Major-General Hill, with his bri-
 gade, was stationed on an eminence behind the
 town, ready to afford support to Beresford,
 if necessary. The embarkation proceeded ra-
 pidly during the night, and no attempt was
 made to molest the covering brigades. On
 the following morning, however, the enemy Jan. 17.
 pushed forward a corps of light troops to the
 heights of St. Lucia, which commanded the har-
 bour, and, planting a few cannon, fired at the
 transports. At three o'clock, General Hill's
 brigade was withdrawn, and at night the rear-
 guard embarked without molestation from the
 enemy.

At twelve o'clock, on the night of the six-
 teenth, the remains of Sir John Moore were
 removed to the citadel of Corunna. He had

CHAP. I. often said, that, if killed in battle, he wished to
 1809. be buried where he fell; and it was determined
 January. that the body should be interred on the rampart
 of the citadel. A grave was dug by a party of
 the ninth regiment, the Aides-de-camp attending
 by turns. No coffin could be procured; and
 the body, without being undressed, was wrapt
 by the officers of his staff in a military cloak and
 blankets. The interment was hastened, for,
 about eight in the morning, the sound of firing
 was heard, and they feared that, in the event of
 a serious attack, they might be prevented from
 paying the last duties to their General.

The body was borne to the grave by the officers of his family; the funeral service was read by the chaplain; the corpse was covered with earth; and Sir John Moore "was left alone with his glory."

During the retreat to Corunna, his country sustained a severe loss in the death of Major-General Anstruther. No man had more honourably distinguished himself by zeal, gallantry, and talent. He died of inflammation of the lungs, brought on by exposure to the extreme inclemency of the weather. His devotion to the service induced him to neglect the precau-

tions and remedies his situation required; and he continued to perform his duty till approaching dissolution rendered farther exertion impossible. When no longer able to mount his horse, he was placed in a carriage, and conveyed to Corunna. There he expired amid the universal regret of his fellow-soldiers; and his remains were deposited in a grave on the ramparts, near that of his commander.

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The campaign of Sir John Moore has perhaps given rise to greater differences of opinion than any other portion of the Spanish war. Almost every operation by which its progress was marked has been made to furnish matter for vehement and angry discussion. By one party, the combinations of the General have been indiscriminately lauded as a masterpiece of strategy; by another, the misfortunes of the army are considered to have solely originated in the vacillation and timidity of its leader. Friends have praised, enemies have abused, and both have at last rested in conclusions from which more unbiassed reasoners will probably feel inclined to dissent. The indiscriminating defenders of Sir John Moore are actuated by motives, generous though mistaken; his opponents, by somewhat more of

CHAP. I. personal and political prejudice, than can be
 1809. made to comport with the character of disinter-
 January. ested and impartial inquirers after abstract
 truth.

But, thank Heaven! party spirit is not eternal, though truth is. Twenty years have passed since the retreat to Corunna, and the time has at length come, when it is possible to write with strict justice and impartiality of Sir John Moore. In doing so, there is no fear of derogating from his just and well-earned reputation. The fame of Moore is not, as the injudicious eulogies of his friends would leave us to believe, a sickly and infirm bantling, which requires to be nursed and cockered into life by praise and puffery. The column of his honour rests, not on any single achievement of extraordinary genius, but on the broad pedestal of a life actively, zealously, and successfully devoted to his country's service, of a character marked by a singular combination of high and noble qualities, and of a death worthy of such a character and such a life.

Nothing, perhaps, can now be said of Sir John Moore's campaign which shall be found either new or original; and he who is neither influenced

by the zeal of a partisan, nor the hostile vehemence of a declared opponent, may be expected rather to restrict both the praises and the censures of his predecessors within due limits, than to furnish novelty of thought or illustration, on topics which have so frequently been made the subject of ardent and copious discussion. This fact is undoubted, that, in the very outset of the campaign, Sir John Moore was placed by his government in a situation of difficulty, to which no General should be deliberately exposed. He was sent into Spain without any concerted scheme of operations, or the possibility of forming one. He was left utterly in the dark, with regard to the plans of the Spanish Government. He was without any organized channel of communication with the chiefs of the armies; and the fundamental assumption on which he had been directed to rely, was soon proved to be fallacious. He was not enabled to concentrate his forces under the protection of the Spanish armies on the Ebro. These were successively defeated; and Sir John Moore, before he could effect a junction with the divisions of Baird and Hope, found himself exposed to an enemy, who

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CHAP. I. might at any moment take advantage of his situation and force him to retreat.

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At Salamanca, therefore, Sir John Moore was surrounded on all hands by circumstances of peril. Yet part of his difficulties must be admitted to have proceeded from his own arrangements. Deceived by an imperfect survey of the roads in Portugal, while the infantry proceeded by Almeida, the cavalry and artillery were directed to advance by Merida and Truxillo; and the consequence was, that the difficulty of collecting his army was prodigiously enhanced, and Sir John Moore was compelled to remain above a month inactive at Salamanca. Precious time was thus lost. The thoughts of the General were bent only on retreat. The army did not move till the eleventh hour, and action was unfortunately delayed till the precise period when action could no longer be available.

Had Sir John Moore, when he first announced the resolution of retiring on Portugal, adhered steadily to his purpose, we know not that the measure, in a merely military point of view, could be held liable to censure. An army on certain calculations had been advanced into Spain. These, by

a succession of unforeseen events, had been utterly nullified. The relative conditions of the hostile parties, which had formed the very basis of the measure, had undergone a sudden revolution. The Spanish forces had not only been defeated, but dispersed; and a retreat on Portugal might only be regarded as the withdrawal of an army from a point where its services could be of trifling avail, to another where it might operate with greater efficacy on the fortunes of the war.

But, in such a case, the measure of retreat cannot be regarded as an independent military operation. The moral influence it could not fail to exert must likewise be regarded. The Spanish nation would have considered it as a disgraceful dereliction of their cause. It would have depressed the spirit of the people; and thus would have operated injuriously in every quarter, where resistance was yet offered to the enemy. To that enemy it would have lent encouragement; nor do we think, in a comprehensive view of all the circumstances, the step would have admitted of vindication, unless it could be satisfactorily proved that the safety of the army imperiously demanded its adoption. It

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CHAP. I. is in *necessity* alone that a full justification of
 1809. retreat could be found; and it is by a reference
 January. to the existence or non-existence of such necessity, that its wisdom must be judged.

In this view of the question, it has been matter of regret to many, that Sir John Moore was not led to regard with a more favourable eye the project of defending Galicia. No part of Spain offers equal advantages for a defensive war. Its natural strength is very great; and, by judiciously occupying its almost impracticable defiles, an army could maintain its ground against an enemy of immense numerical superiority. The geographical position of Galicia is likewise highly favourable. By means of its numerous sea-ports, an easy and rapid intercourse, might be maintained with England. Protected by a strong frontier from the direct line of the enemy's operations, its proximity to it was still so great, as continually to endanger his communications. A victory achieved at any time by an army on the border of Galicia, must have paralysed the operations of the enemy throughout the whole peninsula. The mere presence of a British force in that quarter must have prodigiously increased the dif-

iculties of Napoleon. It would have demanded the continual employment of an army greatly superior, to watch its operations; it would have narrowed, cramped, and hampered the whole schemes of the enemy; it would have lent new spirit and vigour to the Spanish people; it would have constantly acted as a powerful diversion in favour of the Spanish armies in every part of the peninsula.

The documents given in the Appendix to Colonel Napier's history, abundantly prove that it was to this quarter that the anxieties of Napoleon were chiefly directed.* In the preceding campaign he repeatedly expresses his conviction that it was by the Gallician army alone that a blow could be struck by which Madrid might be endangered. In a communication, written under his dictation to Savary, he expresses his opinions on this matter very strongly. He declares that the occurrence of the smallest reverse to Marshal Bessieres—then commanding in Leon—would cut off the whole

* Vide page 233 of the first volume, in which some extracts relative to this subject are given.

CHAP. I. communications of the army, and even compromise its safety.

1809. Such being the importance of Galicia, and January. such the extended influence which an army, posted on its frontier, must have exercised on the war in every part of the peninsula, it will probably, we think, to an impartial observer, appear extraordinary, that Sir John Moore, with this important province within his grasp, should never have adopted any serious measures for its occupation. That the subject was brought under his consideration, the following extract of a letter from Sir David Baird, will shew.

Dated.
Dec. 8. "It has often occurred to me," says that distinguished officer, "that in the event of our being obliged to adopt defensive measures, it might be more advantageous for the combined British army to cover Galicia and part of Leon, than by my proceeding to join you at Salamanca, to abandon the defence of these provinces. The Asturias might be occupied by the troops of the Marques de la Romana, and, if you judged it proper, by a flank movement, to join us in the neighbourhood of Astorga, I entertain a confident belief that, by occupying the strong ground behind it, we should be able to cover the country in our rear, and might wait until it is seen what efforts

the Spanish nation is disposed and determined CHAP. I. to make in defence of the national independence. The royal road from Corunna to this place (Villa Franca) and Astorga is remarkably good, although mountainous; and, with the sea open to us, we should be able to receive with facility such reinforcements and supplies as the British Government might deem it proper to send. I do not think much difficulty would be experienced for a few months, from a want of provisions. The country abounds with cattle: bread indeed would be required; but flour might be obtained from England; and, in the meantime, Galicia would have an opportunity of arming under our protection, and our presence in Spain would furnish a rallying point, and act as a stimulus to the Spaniards, &c."

To the project, thus enforced by Sir David Baird, Sir John Moore stated no objection. His reply was as follows:—

"I am much obliged to you, for your opinion on the Gallicias and Vigo, and it is that which now probably I shall follow, should such a measure become necessary. I am, therefore, most anxious that magazines should be formed on that communication. I have written home to direct

CHAP. I. that all transports, &c. should call at Corunna, and go to Vigo, unless otherwise directed. Corunna must be the place for all supplies from England. The communication through Portugal is difficult and tardy."

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Unfortunately, Sir John Moore seems to have regarded the assumption of a defensive position on the Gallician frontier, and the permanent defence of that province, as a sort of *dernier resort*, to be adopted only when the more perilous experiment of advancing on Valladolid or Saldanha should have been tried. The experiment was tried, and failed. The British army retreated, not to defend Galicia, but to their ships. No minute and accurate knowledge was acquired of the localities of the country; no positions had been fortified; no depots established; and, indefatigably pursued by a powerful enemy, the contemplated project of defending Galicia—if seriously contemplated it ever was—at once vanished into thin air.

But Galicia did not afford the only sphere of operation, in which the army might have been employed with comparative benefit and safety. Sir John Moore might have retired across the Tagus, where, in a country of great strength

his army might have served as a rallying point, and a protection to the Spaniards in the southern provinces, to which the enemy had not yet penetrated. There it was that he was most dreaded by Napoleon, and there he would have created a diversion at least as efficacious as that of the advance on Saldanha, without incurring the inordinate risks by which that operation was attended. It is no objection to the policy of this measure to assert, that the opportunity thus afforded to the people of rallying round the standard of their country, would probably have been neglected. This may be so, and Sir John Moore was professedly a nullifidian in Spanish energy and patriotism; but the true question is, would not the army, if thus employed, have afforded a greater quantum of protection to our allies, with a smaller quantum of risk than was incurred by the advance to Sahagun, consequent on the concentration of the army.

Of that operation we would now speak. That it was one of extreme temerity is scarcely to be denied; that it was productive of the most calamitous consequences we unfortunately know.

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Rocca.
Victoires et
Conquetes.

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Sir John Moore had proceeded to Alaejos, with the intention of concentrating his forces in the neighbourhood of Valladolid, when the information derived from an intercepted despatch, induced him to change his plans, and advance against Soult at Saldanha, in hope of bringing him to action before the arrival of reinforcements. Never surely was an offensive operation undertaken on the chance of a more improbable contingency. Sir John Moore could scarcely calculate on the blunders of an opponent so skilful and experienced in the game of war. Yet, by some gross and inconceivable blunder alone, could Marshal Soult have suffered himself, in the circumstances of his army, to be drawn into a battle. Soult's policy manifestly was to retreat, not to fight; to induce his enemy to advance, and thereby give time for the coming up of forces, already on the march, by which his retreat would be cut off. On the advance of the British, Soult, as a matter of course, would have fallen back on Burgos, where his corps would have effected a junction with that of Junot. Nothing, therefore, could be more visionary than the prospect of defeating Soult, while nothing could be more imminent than the

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danger which the British were certain to incur in the attempt of bringing him to action. Indeed it was to the Spanish General alone that the British army was indebted for its safety. Had Romana not communicated the information that the enemy, under Napoleon, were in full march from Madrid, the advance on Carrion and Saldanha would have taken place, and the retreat of the army would, in all probability, have been cut off. As it was, Sir John Moore was barely able to extricate himself from the danger he had so imprudently courted, by a rapid and precipitate movement. But the very letters of the General afford abundant proof, that, even in his own opinion, the advance on Saldanha could be productive of no beneficial result. Why then was it undertaken? Why was a gallant army thus ingloriously perilled, and subsequently compelled to seek safety in one of the most calamitous retreats of which history bears record? *Not* with the hope of animating and invigorating the spirit of the Spanish nation, because that spirit was believed by Sir John Moore to have been utterly broken and subdued, but because it was considered "*necessary to risk the army, to convince the people of England, as well as*

CHAP. I. *the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had*
 1809. *neither the power nor the inclination to make*
 January. *any efforts for themselves !"*

Such was the object, for the attainment of which alone, the misfortunes attendant on the retreat to Corunna were inflicted on the British army and nation. Thank God that object was not attained. Had it been so, history would have been deprived of one of its most memorable lessons, and the brightest records of British glory would have been excluded from her annals.

Having said thus much on the previous operations of the army, we would say little of the retreat. That it was conducted with unnecessary rapidity, and that to this circumstance is attributable the greater part of its concomitant misfortunes, are points, we believe, on which the great majority of military authorities are agreed. Had the information of the General, with regard to the country traversed by his army, been more accurate and extensive, he would have known that there was no road leading to Betanzos and Corunna, by which the enemy could at any season have advanced with rapidity sufficient to have endangered his communications. In

fact, the roads on the right and left of that occupied by the British, most difficult at any season, must, at the period in question, when covered with deep snow, and intersected by swollen torrents from the mountains, have been utterly impracticable. At all events, no measures were taken to ascertain whether these roads were occupied by detachments of the enemy or not. Sir John Moore relied only for safety on the celerity of his marches; no attempt was made to impede the progress of the pursuers, by destroying the bridges which led across the numerous ravines; the soldiers, worn by incessant privation and fatigue to the lowest pitch of exhaustion compatible with life, became utterly demoralized; and all the proud attributes of a British army, save that of innate and indefeasible courage, were unnecessarily sacrificed.

We feel it to be superfluous to enter on more detailed criticisms on the minuter features of the retreat. Whatever may have been the errors of Sir John Moore, it must be admitted that fortune also was against him. The elements were his opponents; and those most deeply conversant in warlike operations, will be the first to acknowledge how easily the wisest calcula-

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CHAP. I.
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January. tions may be overthrown by the occurrence of contingencies which human prudence could neither foresee nor avert. During his retreat, Sir John Moore lost no trophy in fight. He led his army to their ships. He declined to sacrifice the honour of his country by proposing a convention. He closed a life of honourable and distinguished service on the field of battle; and his reward was the shout of victory which met his dying ear.

From the moment he entered Spain, Sir John Moore was surrounded by difficulties. He saw at once that the British Government were deceived with regard to the state of the peninsula. He was directed to co-operate with armies which seemed to melt at a breath, and retain nothing of material existence. He was thwarted in his schemes by those on whose opinion he had injudiciously been made dependent. He received no support from the authorities of the country. He felt it to be impossible to realize the expectations of the British Government and nation. His spirit, almost morbidly sensitive, shrank from the breath of censure which even blameless failure, for a time, might draw on his fair fame. Unfortunately, such feelings—the

feelings of a generous and proud soul—gathered force as the prospect darkened around him, and disposed his mind to despondency. Something perhaps he wanted of fitting confidence in his own great powers; something too of that elastic buoyancy of spirit, which danger and difficulty tend rather to stimulate than depress.

But enough. Such as Moore was, England is proud of him; and the moral perceptions of her people must indeed be blunted, when they shall cease to regard his memory with love and honour.

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CHAPTER II.

OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH ARMIES.

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CORUNNA capitulated on the twentieth of January, and was immediately occupied by the French troops. A division of the army was detached against Ferrol, which, notwithstanding its extreme strength, was treacherously surrendered.

In these places the French became masters of an immense supply of arms, artillery, ammunition, and stores of all descriptions, which enabled them to overrun the remainder of the province. Soult was then ordered to advance into Portugal, leaving the corps of Ney to secure the subjugation of Galicia. But it is necessary we should now turn our attention to the events passing in the interior of Spain.

The advance of the French armies had compelled the Supreme Junta to retire from Aranjuez to Talavera, and subsequently to Seville, in which city they assembled on the seventeenth of December. A strong edict was issued, pronouncing sentence of death against every officer or soldier who should fail immediately to rejoin his colours. All who harboured them were declared liable to confiscation of property; but amnesty was offered to those who, within fifteen days, should present themselves to the nearest authority, with the view of being forwarded to the army.

This decree was not without effect. A considerable number of the fugitives, from the Spanish armies on the Ebro, were again collected under General Galluzo, on the south of the Tagus, who made dispositions for defending the four bridges, by which alone the river can be crossed from the side of Talavera. Of these communications, that of Almaraz is the most important. On the approach of Lefebvre's corps, Galluzo attempted to destroy the bridge, but without success; and the French, under a demonstration of crossing at Arzobispo, effected their passage

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Dec. 17.

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December. at Almaraz; and, taking the Spanish divisions, too much separated, in detail, drove them as far as Merida. There the progress of Lefebvre was arrested, by an order to march northward in pursuit of Sir John Moore. Galluzo, whose incapacity had already been sufficiently established, was superseded in command by Cuesta.

1809.
January. Towards the close of January, the Estramaduran army, having greatly recruited its strength, was enabled to assume the offensive. It was posted with its van-guard on the left branch of the Alamonte, between Truxillo and Xaraicejo, about half a league to the south-west of the latter place. The French had pushed their advanced parties close to the Spanish army; but they were repulsed and driven beyond Miravete. Cuesta then took possession of the pass upon that mountain; and the French, not being in sufficient force to maintain their position on the left of the Tagus, crossed the river, and fell back on Talavera.

While these events were passing in Estramadura, the Duke del Infantado, with the wreck of the army of Castanos, augmented by the levies recently raised in Granada and Andalusia, advanced

from Cuenca, in hope of surprising a body of French cavalry at Aranjuez and Tarancon. Information of this movement no sooner reached Victor at Toledo, than he set out with his corps in search of Infantado and his army. The French directed their march on Ocana, and reached that town without gaining any intelligence relative to the object of their pursuit. But on the morning of the thirteenth, either by accident, or by some blunder of the guides, the French suddenly found themselves in front of a body of the Spanish army, under Venegas, which occupied the crest of a hill near the village of Ucles. The Spaniards were driven from their position by the bayonet, and fled in great disorder towards Alcazar. Here again fortune was against them. The division of General Ruffin had accidentally deviated from the line of march, and, unawares, had gained the rear of the enemy. The retreat of the fugitive Spaniards was thus cut off. The consequences were disastrous. Several thousands were made prisoners. The loss, in killed and wounded, was very great, and forty guns were captured by the enemy. The small remnant which escaped, throwing away their arms, dispersed in various directions. Had Latour

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Dec. 13.

CHAP. II. Maubourg's division of cavalry, which had been
 1808. in march from day-dawn, not been prevented
 December. by fatigue from following up the pursuit, the
 consequences would have been still more fatal.

The inhuman barbarity with which the prisoners, made in this unfortunate battle, were treated, merits record. These unhappy wretches were marched to Madrid. Many of them sank under their fatigue—others died of inanition. When they could proceed no farther, they were shot without mercy. The inhabitants of Ucles had taken no part in the action, yet their town was made the theatre of atrocities which humanity shrinks from relating. Plunder, murder, torture, and violation, were among the evils inflicted on this unhappy people.

Rocca.

Immediately after the defeat of Ucles, Victor, with his corps, entered the province of Cuenca; and, after some operations, terminating in no marked result, retired to Madrilejos and Consuegra, where his troops went into cantonments.

We now turn to the operations in Catalonia.

At this period, the events in that principality may rather be considered as an important episode, in the general progress of the war, than as

influencing, in any very powerful degree, the CHAP. II.
 general fate of the kingdom. Still, it cannot be
 1808. denied, that its possession would have eminently
 contributed to the consolidation of the French
 power in Spain; and it is the opinion of a high
 authority, that, at the commencement of the
 war, Napoleon would have acted more wisely
 had the greater proportion of his forces been
 employed for the reduction of Catalonia. St. Cyr.

No part of Spain, perhaps, opposes so many obstacles to an invading army. Its general character is rugged and mountainous; the plains are of small extent; and it abounds in regularly fortified places of great strength. Catalonia, therefore, was geographically strong, and yet stronger in the courage, hardihood, and fine spirit of her population. The prospect of becoming a province of France was one most repugnant to the pride of the Catalans,—and they were prepared by every sacrifice to avert the advent of so dreaded a misfortune. That Napoleon contemplated the dismemberment of Catalonia from Spain there can be no doubt. Its acquisition would have been most favourable to the augmentation of the commerce and naval power of France in the Mediterranean. With this view,

CHAP. II. he forbade his generals in the principality, to
 1808. correspond with Joseph or his ministers, though
 September. he deemed it prudent to refrain from any public
 annunciation of his design.

The efforts hitherto made for the reduction of Catalonia had signally failed. At the end of August the French only retained possession of Barcelona and Figueras. By the Marques Palacio new levies were organized with all possible rapidity. The leading Junta of the province had issued an ordinance, directing forty *tercios* or battalions of Miquelets to be embodied; and part of these were already in the field. Reinforcements had been received from Majorca, Minorca, and Granada; and these, with the four thousand troops which had recently arrived from Portugal, augmented the regular army in Catalonia to about twenty-eight thousand men, exclusive of the garrisons of Hostalrich, Rosas, and Gerona.

The chief object of the Catalans was to recover Barcelona; and the attention of Palacio was exclusively occupied with preparations for a siege. With this view he collected magazines at different points on the Llobregat; and, in order to secure their safety, he took up an in-

trenched position on a mountain in rear of San Boy. Duhesme, alarmed by these measures, CHAP. II.
 1808. determined on driving the army of Palacio from
 September. the Llobregat. With this purpose, on the night of the first of September, he marched out from Barcelona; and on the morning of the second commenced an attack on the line occupied by the enemy. A severe engagement ensued. The progress of the assailants was repeatedly checked by the courage of the Miquelets; but the camp of San Boy was carried, and three guns, with a considerable quantity of provisions, clothing, and other stores, fell into the hands of the French.

The Catalan army were far from being dispirited by this misfortune; and Palacio, having determined to proceed by blockade, took up a new position on the mountains in rear of St. Vicensa and Molino del Rey, which commanded the point of junction of the roads to Lerida and Tarragona. There are only two other principal *debouchés* from the plain of Barcelona. To guard these a division was encamped on the mountains in front of St. André. The other roads which traverse the high chain which extends from the Besos to the Llobregat, are im-

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October. passable for carriages ; but, in order to guard them, posts were established at suitable distances along the ridge, and along the two rivers, to the points at which they disembogue into the sea.

Palacio's head-quarters were at Villa Franca ; and hopes were entertained that, by a general rising of the inhabitants, the garrison would be forced to surrender. Magnificent offers were made to Lecchi, governor of the city, to induce him to betray his trust—offers which that General rejected with honourable indignation. In the meanwhile, the danger of Duhesme was daily increasing. His force was weakened to such a degree, by frequent contests with the blockading army, that he could no longer venture on a sortie. A deficiency of provisions was already felt in the city, and the prospects of the garrison were becoming daily more cloudy and unhopeful.

Such was the situation of affairs in Catalonia, when a new force, under command of General Gouvion St. Cyr, entered the province. It amounted to about eighteen thousand men, chiefly drawn from the army in Italy, commanded by Eugene de Beauharnois. During

September, and the early part of October, this corps had assembled at Perpignan ; but the requisite arrangements for its advance were so tardily completed, that the troops did not quit their cantonments till the beginning of November.

The first operation of St. Cyr was to invest the town of Rosas. Rosas stands at the lower extremity of a fine bay, about four leagues east of Figueras, where the plain of Ampourdan touches the skirts of the Pyrenees. The possession of this place was considered indispensable, because, while the fine anchorage which it commands was open to the British, it was nearly impossible to re-victual Barcelona by sea ; and the route by land was obstructed by Gerona and Hostalrich, both of which places were held by the Spaniards.

On the sixth, St. Cyr established his head-quarters at Figueras, where he formed a junction with the corps of Reille. To this General the conduct of the siege was committed, and, uniting the Italian division of General Pino to his own, Reille took up a position near the town. On the day following, the French took possession of the heights which encompass the whole bay ;

CHAP. II.
1808.
November.
Nov. 6.

CHAP. II. and the troops and peasants from the neighbouring villages were driven into the town.
1808.

November.

The works of Rosas were in a feeble and dilapidated condition. The injuries sustained in the former siege had been but imperfectly repaired. Yet the garrison were resolute, and animated with the determination of firm and unshrinking resistance. A small British squadron was in the bay. It consisted of the Excellent of fifty guns, and the Lucifer and Meteor bomb-vessels. In order to assist the defence, a small body of marines was sent into Fort Trinidad; and the remainder, with fifty seamen, were thrown into the citadel.

Reille had expected to carry Rosas by a sudden attack; but this hope soon vanished. Preparations were then made for a regular siege. The heavy artillery was brought up, though not without some difficulty from the state of the weather and the roads. General Souham's division was posted between Figueras and the river Fluvia, to watch the movements of the enemy on the side of Gerona. General Chabot was moved to Espolla Rabos, with the view of covering the rear of the besieging force, and keeping in check the hostile population.

On the sixteenth, an attempt was made on Fort Trinidad. It failed. The enemy, after a severe struggle to gain possession of the gates, were driven back. The progress of the besiegers was slow—for they appear to have been unprepared for the vigorous resistance which met them at every step of their advance. But time pressed. St. Cyr was aware that Barcelona, unless speedily succoured, must fall; and it became necessary that the operations should be pushed on with the greatest speed. The town was attacked on the night of the twenty-seventh. It was defended by five hundred men, who opposed the most resolute resistance to the assailants. These, however, were at length overpowered; and, of the whole number, fifty only succeeded in effecting their escape into the citadel.

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November.

Nov. 27.

The capture of the town was of material advantage to the besiegers. A breaching-battery was immediately established in front of a bastion formerly injured by the explosion of a magazine. Another was erected on the shore, by which the communication between the ships and the citadel was cut off.

Before the battery opened fire on the citadel,

CHAP. II. a summons was sent in by General Reille. The
 1808. garrison, however, refused to surrender; and
 November. the enemy continued to push on their operations. Fort Trinidad had already been breached; and the communication with the citadel was cut off.

At this juncture, Lord Cochrane arrived in the Imperieuse. With eighty seamen and marines he threw himself into the fort, and revived the sinking spirits of the garrison. On the
 Nov. 30. thirtieth, General Sanson, commanding the French engineers, pronounced the breach practicable; and at night it was directed to be stormed. The attack was made, and failed. Lord Cochrane had formed a rampart, within the breach, of palisadoes and barrels filled with sand and rubbish, which the assailants found it impossible to surmount.

In the meanwhile, the situation of General Souham had been one of alarm. Had the Spaniards advanced in force against him, the siege must inevitably have been raised. But they wanted cavalry; energy and promptitude were not the characteristics of their leaders; the opportunity of effective action was suffered to escape; and Souham, though subjected to frequent

annoyance from the Miquelets, was successful
 in maintaining his ground. CHAP. II.
 1808.

On the fifth of December, the citadel, having
 an open breach and being no longer tenable, December. consented to surrender; and the garrison, consisting of about two thousand men, were marched into France as prisoners of war. Sixteen bronze cannon were taken in the place. It then became apparent to Lord Cochrane that further resistance in the fort was impossible. He accordingly withdrew his men, blew up the magazine, burned the buildings, and quitted the Bay of Rosas with the squadron.

On the day after the capitulation, the French
 army commenced its march. On the eighth, the Dec. 8. whole force, destined for the relief of Barcelona, was collected on the Fluvia. It amounted to fifteen thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse; the division of Reille being ordered to remain in the Ampourdan, holding Figueras and Rosas, and guarding the communications of the army.

The numerical strength of the French was apparently inadequate to the object it was intended to effect. The Spanish army in Catalonia

CHAP. II.
1808.
December.

mustered upwards of thirty thousand; and had General Vives, by whom the Marques de Palacio had been superseded in command, concentrated his forces for one decisive effort, there can be little doubt that the projects of the French General would have been defeated. But St. Cyr calculated on the imbecility of his adversary, and, unfortunately, was not deceived in his computation.

The march of the French army to Barcelona was one of great difficulty and danger. In case of defeat, retreat was impossible; for it was necessary to pass over mountains covered with snow, through long and dangerous defiles; and the swarms of armed peasants which occupied the heights, though dispersed with facility by the advancing army, again united, like the waves of the sea when furrowed by the keel of a ship, and closed up all avenue of escape.

The road by the coast had been broken up; and the other, commanded by the Fort of Hostalrich, was not practicable for artillery. At La Bisbal, therefore, St. Cyr found it necessary to send back his artillery to Figueras; and, issuing four days provisions, and fifty cartridges, to each

soldier, with one hundred and fifty thousand cartridges carried on mules, the army continued their march on Barcelona.

CHAP. II.
1808.
December.

Don Juan Claros, with a body of Miquelets and Somatenes, had taken up a strong position at Col de la Grange, in order to oppose their march. From this he was driven by Pino's division; and the army proceeded to Val de Aro, without encountering other danger than that of receiving a few shots from the English ships, where the road near Palamos passes close to the shore.

On the thirteenth, the French halted at Vidreres. By his manoeuvres, St. Cyr had endeavoured to propagate the belief that his object was Gerona. Having now passed that city, the deception could continue no longer; yet he adopted every means of creating doubt as to the route he intended to follow, aware that every hour of delay, in the concentration of the hostile forces, was an important advantage.

Dec. 13.

On the fourteenth, St. Cyr took post in the neighbourhood of Hostalrich. Here, in order to avoid the fort, endeavours were made to find a path across the mountains, which were at length successful. The march was con-

Dec. 14.

1808.

December.

ST. CYR PASSES THE DEFILE OF TREINTA-PASOS.

tinued on the fifteenth, but not without annoyance from the garrison of Hostalrich, which, having discovered the vicinity of the enemy, came out and annoyed their rear. No sooner had these assailants been repulsed, than the neighbouring heights were observed to be covered with Somatenes, who kept up a continued fire on the flanks of the advancing column. Observing that it did not halt, they became more bold, and approached nearer to the line of march. The French loss during the day amounted to two hundred men.

In the evening, the troops, harassed and tired, arrived at Torderas. St. Cyr determined on pushing on through the defile of Treinta-pasos, in expectation of encountering the Spanish army on the following morning. The road was broken up and obstructed by *abattis*; but this strong and defensible defile, about two leagues in extent, was passed without opposition, and the army bivouacked on a plain, about a league in rear of Llinas.

While the French were engaged before Rosas, General Vives had been engrossed with preparations for the siege of Barcelona. He had taken none of the ordinary means for ob-

1808.

December.

taining prompt knowledge of the enemy's movements. He knew nothing of their strength or of their plans. He had neglected to exert the means in his power of opposing their progress. He suffered repeated opportunities to escape him of striking a signal blow,—of not only defeating, but utterly annihilating the French army. He knew nothing of the points to be occupied in the country traversed by the enemy. He was surrounded by men ignorant as their leader of all military knowledge; and, secure in the belief that the French could not advance without first becoming masters of Gerona, he remained in a state of deplorable inaction, till the opportunity of overpowering the enemy had passed.

At length, intelligence was received that St. Cyr, having sent back his artillery, was continuing his march, and doubt could no longer be entertained that Barcelona was his object. Instead of instantly marching with his whole force, Reding, with about four thousand men, was sent to oppose his progress. Succeeding advices confirmed the intelligence of the enemy's motions. A council of war was held, and Vives set forward with five thousand to join Reding,

CHAP. II. whom he overtook at Granollers. From that place he set out at midnight, when the French had just passed the defile of Treinta-pasos.

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It was the intention of Vives to occupy a position between Llinas and Villalba; but, owing to delays, the head of the column had only reached Cardedeu by six in the morning, when the fires of the enemy's bivouack were discerned. Vives continued his march; but, at eight o'clock, the advanced-guard gave information that the French were already formed in column.

Vives immediately ranged his army, fatigued and dispirited by a long night march, in order of battle. The position chosen was a range of flat eminences; the right was protected by a rugged and precipitous mountain covered with Miquelets, the centre by a deep and difficult ravine, and the left by a thick wood; twelve pieces of artillery were distributed along the line.

St. Cyr determined on immediate attack. The Marques de Lazan was advancing on his rear, and the delay even of an hour might prove fatal. Without artillery, he was exposed to every disadvantage; and he felt aware that

it was only by a combination of skill, promptitude, and audacity, that he could surmount the perils by which he was environed.

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The army was directed to advance in column, in order, by one powerful and united effort, to break the line of their opponents; and it was the positive order of the General, that not even a battalion should be deployed. General Pino's division led the column, exposed, during its advance, to the fire of the Spanish artillery. In direct disobedience of the orders of his General, Pino deployed his leading brigade, which advanced against the left of Reding's division, and, after a warm struggle, was compelled to give ground.

This circumstance occasioned considerable derangement in the plans of the French General. He directed Souham's division to attack the right of Reding, and turn it. Pino was ordered to advance with his remaining brigade in column, according to his original instructions. Two battalions were directed to make a false attack on the left, in order to distract the attention of the enemy from the other movements.

These arrangements were crowned with com-

CHAP. II. plete success. The Spanish line was at once
 1808. broken; panic spread among the troops, and
 December. they fled in all directions, relinquishing their
 guns and ammunition without further struggle.
 In this action, the French made two thousand
 prisoners, of whom eight hundred were wound-
 ed. The killed were about four hundred. The
 loss of the French amounted to six hundred in
 killed and wounded.

The triumph, thus easily achieved over his ignorant and vacillating opponent, at once extricated St. Cyr from all his difficulties. Without waiting to collect prisoners, or to engage Lazan, whose approach might be hourly expected, he continued his march to Barcelona. There was nothing in that quarter to oppose him. One column alone of the Spanish army had been enabled to quit the field unbroken. This was joined by Reding, who led it across the Llobregat to Molino del Rey. Vives lost his horse; and, escaping on foot across the mountains, reached Mataro, where he sought safety on ship-board. In a few days he re-appeared at Tarragona.

While these events were in progress, a sally had been made by Duhesme against the besieg-

ing force under Caldaques. It was bravely repulsed. But, on learning the result of the battle, Caldaques withdrew behind the Llobregat, relinquishing the large magazines which Vives had, with so much unfortunate industry, been long occupied in collecting.

On the seventeenth, St. Cyr entered Barcelona. On the twentieth, he took up a position on the left of the Llobregat, fronting that of the Spaniards. The latter were encamped on the right bank of the river; their centre ranged along the heights in rear of San Vicensa, their left was at Pelleja, and their right extended towards the little village of Llors. The headquarters of St. Cyr were at San Felici, his left at Cornella, his right at Molino del Rey.

The position of the Spanish army was strong; but, in order to prevent their being reinforced by the arrival of Lazan, St. Cyr determined to attack them. Their chief attention had been directed to the works defending the bridge at Molino del Rey; but, at daybreak on the twenty-first, the two divisions of Souham and Pino passed the river simultaneously, by the fords of San Felici, and San Juan d'Espi; while Chabran

CHAP. II.
 1808.
 December.

Dec. 20.

Dec. 21.

CHAP. II. kept up a warm cannonade on the bridge, and
 1808. excited the enemy's alarm in that quarter. The
 December. Spaniards were attacked with vehemence by
 Pino and Souham. Chabot, with three bat-
 talions, likewise passed the ford, and took up a
 position on the left of Pino, threatening the
 right of the Spanish army. To counteract this
 manœuvre, Reding extended his line; and, by
 so doing, weakened it. The consequence was,
 that the right was driven back behind the centre,
 and the centre, in its turn, behind the left. All
 then became confusion. The army fled, without
 order, towards the bridge; but in that quarter
 the retreat to Villa Franca was cut off by Cha-
 bot, and that to Martorell by Chabran, who had
 succeeded in crossing a detachment at a ford.
 Had Chabran, at that moment, forced the pas-
 sage of the bridge, all retreat for the Spaniards
 would have been cut off. But that General
 did not move till too late, though frequently
 urged to do so by General Rey.

The country, being rugged, woody, and full
 of ravines, was unfavourable for cavalry, and
 contributed to the escape of the fugitives. Not
 more than from one thousand to twelve hundred
 prisoners were taken. Among these, was Cal-

daques, who, during the progress of the opera-
 tions, had been uniformly distinguished by zeal
 and talent.

The rout of the Spaniards was complete. A-
 bout fifteen thousand were afterwards enabled
 to collect in Tarragona; but many continued
 their flight to the Ebro. All the artillery, con-
 sisting of about fifty pieces, was taken; and
 large stores of ammunition were found by the
 enemy in Villa Franca.

After this important victory, St. Cyr pushed
 on his cavalry to the walls of Tarragona. That
 city had scarcely twenty guns on the ramparts,
 and disorder and consternation reigned in its
 population. Vives, on his arrival there, was de-
 prived of his command, and thrown into a dun-
 geon. It was with difficulty that he escaped
 massacre. Some accused him of treason, others
 of imbecility; crimes undoubtedly of very dif-
 ferent magnitude and atrocity, yet nearly cer-
 tain, in such a case, to encounter the same re-
 compensate.

Reding, by the almost unanimous voice of
 the soldiers and the people, was appointed suc-
 cessor to the unfortunate Vives. This measure
 tended greatly to restore that confidence which

CHAP. II. the recent disasters had contributed to overthrow. Efficacious measures were taken to
 1808. re-organize the scattered troops. A reinforcement of three battalions was received from
 December. Grenada and Majorca; supplies were sent from Valencia; men came in from all quarters; and, before the middle of January, the force collected in Tarragona wore a formidable aspect.

CHAPTER III.

SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

THE sufferings of the gallant Zaragozans, CHAP. III.
 during the former siege, had not subdued the spirit of heroic devotion by which they had
 1808. been animated. Another trial awaited them, December.
 not less memorable and glorious, though less fortunate in its result.

After the defeat of Tudela, Palafox retired to Zaragoza, to make preparations for a second siege. He was not present in the action. The intelligence of its issue came upon him like a thunderbolt; and the refusal of Castanos to throw his troops into Zaragoza, instead of retreating on Madrid, put an end to those feelings of confidence and frankness which had hitherto existed between the Generals

CHAP. III. The multiplied disasters of the Spanish armies, however, so far from shaking the resolution of Palafox or the Zaragozans, appear only to have stimulated them to redoubled exertions in the service of their country. Proclamations were issued, commanding all women, old men, and children, to quit the city. Every inhabitant was imperatively called upon to make sacrifice, if necessary, of his life and property in the common cause; and the whole population were required, by their personal exertions, to contribute to the completion of the fortifications of the city.

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December.

The approach of the enemy cut short the preparations for defence. Neither women nor children left the place. Even these refused to seek safety at a distance from their fathers and husbands, and preferred participating in the danger and the glory which awaited them in Zaragoza, to wandering unprotected, through a troubled and a suffering country.

During the former siege, the defenders had been embarrassed by the presence of French residents in the city. These had been strictly guarded, with the double object of preventing any intercourse between them and the besiegers,

and of protecting them against the fatal effects of popular suspicion, to which, without such precaution, it is more than probable they would have fallen victims. In order to prevent the repetition of such danger and inconvenience, Palafox determined that these unfortunate persons should be removed from the city to other places of confinement. This was done, notwithstanding the hostility of the populace, though not until Palafox had issued a proclamation appealing to Spanish honour and humanity, and imploring the gallant Zaragozans not to stain the sacred cause of liberty and justice by the foul murder of these defenceless victims.

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December.

The aid of superstition was not wanting to strengthen the confidence of the Zaragozans. They relied on the miraculous protection of Our Lady of the Pillar, who had made their favoured city the seat of her peculiar worship. The successful termination of the former siege had given strength to their belief in the beneficent regards of the patron saint. Omens too had been observed in the sky. Approaching victory had been prefigured by unwonted conformations of the clouds; and celestial voices were heard in the elements offering divine promise of glory and protection.

CHAP. III. Fortunately, the Zaragozans were not induced, by their belief in these flattering portents, to disregard any of the human means of safety in their power. A continued line of exterior defensive works had been planned and executed, as far as time and circumstances permitted. Yet this, imperfect as it was, added little to the real strength of the city; and, in forming a just estimate of the zeal and courage of the defenders, Zaragoza should almost be considered as an unfortified town. The walls, originally built rather for the purpose of civic impost than defence, were surmounted by one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. Large stores of provisions had been formed. Arms and ammunition were in abundance; and the town contained upwards of twenty thousand regular troops, besides fifteen thousand armed peasants.

All the houses, within seven hundred toises of the place, were demolished, and the materials employed to strengthen the fortifications. The trees round the city were cut down. The greatest activity reigned on all hands:—the women were employed in making clothes for the soldiers,—the monks made cartridges; and all those

not employed in labouring at the works, practised the use of arms.

Measures were likewise taken for the defence of the city, in case the enemy, which was scarcely to be doubted, should effect an entrance. Traverses were cut across the streets. The doors and windows on the ground-floor were strongly barricaded. Communications were made between the houses; and parapets were constructed on the roofs. Every householder had in his dwelling an ample store of provisions, to enable him to continue his resistance when the enemy should gain possession of the streets. Thus prepared, the Zaragozans awaited the approach of the besiegers.

In the meanwhile, the corps of Marshal Moncey, which had been ordered to blockade the city, remained at Alagon, collecting materials, and awaiting the arrival of his heavy artillery from Pamplona. On the nineteenth of December it was joined by the corps of Mortier, and on the twentieth the united army appeared before Zaragoza. It consisted of about thirty-five thousand infantry, and was accompanied by a battering train of sixty pieces. A corps of

CHAP. III. cavalry was stationed at Fuentes, to keep the surrounding country in subjection.

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December.

The city was approached on both sides of the Ebro. Gazan's division, having passed the river at Tauste, marched, by the road of Cas-tejon, to Cuera and Villa Nuevo. That of Suchet took post on the right of the Ebro, near a convent about a league distant from Zaragoza, after driving in the Spanish outposts.

During the night, the enemy erected a batte-ry, which commanded the Torrero, and, in the morning, opened fire on the fort. Unfortunate-ly, a quantity of ammunition was blown up, by the bursting of a shell, which occasioned consi-derable disorder in the garrison. The French took advantage of this. A column crossed the canal by an aqueduct, of which, on the evening before, they had become masters, and entering the fort by the gorge, succeeded in maintaining the place against the efforts of the garrison. At the same time, a brigade of Morlot's division advanced up the ravine of the Huerba, and, pass-ing the canal under the aqueduct on which it crosses that river, gained possession of a work commanding the sluices of the canal. Two guns

were taken in this work. Three guns and one hundred prisoners in the fort. General St. Marc succeeded in withdrawing the rest of the garrison.

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On the twenty-second, General Gazan ad-vanced against the suburb, on the left of the river. He was encountered by about four thou-sand of the garrison, posted in the woods and gardens, from which, after a warm contest, he succeeded in dislodging them. Gazan then at-tempted to carry the suburb by a *coup-de-main*. In this he failed. Repulsed in all his efforts, after a long and fruitless contention, he, at length, withdrew his troops, pursued by the garrison, and with the loss of near one thousand men. The chief loss of the besieged consisted of a corps of Swiss, almost all of whom were killed or taken prisoners in a large building considerably in advance of the suburb.

For several days all was quiet. The enemy were now aware that it was necessary to make a regular investment of the place ; and the works, in all quarters, were pushed on with vigour. The besieged on their part endeavoured by ince-sant labour to complete the works of defence ;

Cavallero.

CHAP. III. batteries, were constructed to enfilade the principal approaches, the magazines were rendered bomb-proof, every outlet was palisaded and traversed; and, thus prepared, they waited with calm fortitude for the approaching struggle.

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December.

Dec. 30. On the thirtieth, Marshal Moncey addressed a letter to Palafox, summoning him to surrender the city, now entirely invested, and to spare the effusion of blood which must necessarily follow any further attempt at hopeless resistance. Moncey likewise informed him that Madrid had fallen; and that Napoleon, at the head of a great army, was then in the act of chasing the English to their ships.

To this Palafox replied, that if Madrid had fallen, Madrid had been *sold*. The works of Zaragoza were yet entire; but, were they levelled with the ground, the people and the garrison would rather be buried in the ruins of their city, than disgraced by surrender.

In the meanwhile, General Gazan succeeded in effecting the blockade of the suburb. One of his brigades extended on the right of the Zuera road, the other on the left to the bridge over the Gallego, on the road to Barcelona. On the

right bank, Suchet held the ground comprised between the high* Ebro and the valley of the Huerba. Morlot's division occupied the valley. That of Meusnier was encamped on the heights of Torrero; and the arc was continued to the low Ebro, by the division of Grandjean, whose right, by means of a bridge of boats, was in communication with Gazan.

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On the twenty-ninth, the trenches were regularly opened against three points, viz. the Chateau of the Inquisition on the left, the bridge of the Huerba in the centre, and the convent of St. Joseph on the right. The last of these was the principal object of the enemy, because the works in rear were destitute of a rampart, and it was intended to connect the attack with a simultaneous attempt to gain possession of the suburb.

Dec. 29.

The garrison, however, were not idle. The communication between the Convent and the city could not be interrupted; and the garrison of the former, being daily relieved, made frequent sallies, by which the progress of the

* To unmilitary readers it may be necessary to explain, that the *high Ebro* means the portion of the river above the city; the *low Ebro*, that below it.

CHAP. III. besiegers was materially retarded. On the
 1808. thirty-first, a general sortie, supported by the
 December, whole guns of the place, was made against the
 enemy's line. Though gallantly supported, it
 was unattended by any successful result. The
 repeated attacks of the garrison were repulsed;
 and, baffled in their efforts, they again entered
 the city. The loss on both sides was nearly
 equal.

1809.
 Jan. 2.

On the second of January, Moncey was su-
 perseded by Marshal Junot in the command of
 the besieging army. The latter was the bear-
 er of an order to Mortier, to move on Calatayud
 with Suchet's division, in order to keep open
 the communication with Madrid. This arrange-
 ment occasioned a material diminution of the
 besieging force, but no cessation of hostile op-
 eration. The works against the Convent of St.
 Joseph went on, and between the third and sixth
 of January the second parallel was completed.
 Jan. 10. Till the tenth no action took place; but on that
 day no less than eight batteries had been con-
 structed, and a tremendous fire from thirty guns
 was opened on the Convent. It was soon ren-
 dered untenable. But, amid the ruins, the gun-
 ners, covered by bags of wool, still continued to

exercise their vocation, and fired on the enemy, CHAP. III.
 till the walls were nearly levelled with the 1809.
 ground. Even then the post was not relinquish- January.
 ed without a gallant effort. At midnight a
 sortie was made against one of the batteries, in
 ignorance that two guns had been planted for its
 protection. The intention of the brave assail-
 ants was thus defeated; and, having suffered
 heavy loss from a murderous fire, both in front
 and flank, they again retreated to the city.

Even in the dilapidated condition of the Con-
 vent, it was not till the evening of the next day Jan. 11.
 that the enemy attempted to carry it by assault.
 At the same time a party, having turned the
 Convent, succeeded, by means of a wooden bridge
 which the besieged had omitted to destroy, in
 effecting an entrance; and thus did the French
 at length become masters of a heap of ruins, and
 of about an hundred gallant men by whom they
 were defended.

No sooner were the enemy in possession of
 St. Joseph, than they employed themselves in
 repairing the works, and completing the com-
 munication between the second and third par-
 allels, the latter of which they established on the
 right and left of the Convent. The garrison on

CHAP. III. that side were now compelled to remain within
 1809. their walls ; for the besiegers were secured against
 January. their efforts by the double obstacle of a river and
 an escarpment eight feet high.

Jan. 15. On the fifteenth, a second parallel was opened
 against the town ; and batteries were commenced
 in it, to enfilade the defences of the Augustine
 and Capuchin Convents, and that of Sta. Engracia.
 Yet neither the loss of their outworks, nor
 a tremendous bombardment, which the French
 kept up for several days, had the effect of diminishing
 the ardour of the inhabitants. The Zaragozans
 were not only actuated by that active and
 living energy which stimulates to deeds of high
 enterprize, but they possessed, likewise, that
 calm and passive fortitude, that buoyant upbearing
 of the spirit, which suffering cannot depress,
 nor misfortune overthrow.

But their cup was not yet full. The inhabitants
 of the part of the city most injured by the
 bombardment, were driven into the other quarters,
 where many of them took up their abode in
 cellars, which afforded comparative security from
 the shells. The consequence was, that these
 dark and miserable receptacles became the focus
 of infectious fever. The disease spread rapidly

among a crowded and redundant population. CHAP. III.
 Thus did death, on all hands, present itself to
 the unshrinking Zaragozans ; and the greater
 1809. part preferred exposing themselves on the ramparts,
 January. to breathing the infected air which pervaded
 the dark and noisome retreats in which they had sought refuge.

From the seventeenth to the twenty-first, the
 Jan. 21. besiegers were occupied in the construction of
 new batteries to overcome the defences of the
 garrison ; and the third parallel was extended to
 command two sides of the Convent of Sta. Engracia.
 In these circumstances, a sortie was made, in the hope
 of spiking the enemy's artillery. The fire of a battery
 of four mortars was found peculiarly annoying ; and
 eighty men, commanded by Don Mariano Galindo,
 volunteered to attack it. They boldly precipitated
 themselves on the guard of the third parallel,
 put them to the sword, and succeeded in entering
 the battery. At the same moment the enemy's
 reserve came up. There was no retreat ; all perished
 except the officers and a few wounded soldiers, who
 were made prisoners.

The movements of the numerous bodies of
 armed peasantry, in the surrounding country,

CHAP. III. occasioned great inconvenience to the besiegers.

1809.

January.

Bands were formed on all hands; which, though unable to resist the attack of disciplined troops, yet were sufficiently formidable to require perpetual vigilance, and numerous enough to narrow the supplies of the besieging army, in a very important degree. On the left of the Ebro, the Marques de Lazan and Don Francisco Palafox were advancing to the relief of the city. They occupied the country between Villa Franca, Licinia, and Zuera; and pushed forward parties to Caparoso to intercept the convoys, and surround the division of Gazan.

About this time, Napoleon, dissatisfied with the slow progress of the siege, sent Marshal Lannes to assume the command. This officer directed Mortier, with his division, to leave Calatayud, and to act on the left of the Ebro. Mortier attacked the force of Francisco Palafox, and succeeded in dispersing it with very considerable loss. Lannes, in order to depress the hopes of the garrison of external assistance, addressed a letter to Palafox, communicating this circumstance, and all the other disasters which had befallen the Spanish armies. But the mortifying intelligence thus conveyed did not shake the

firmness of the undaunted leader. He rejected CHAP. III. all compromise, and continued, with undiminished vigour, to oppose every possible obstacle to the progress of the enemy.

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All the outworks of the place had now fallen, except the castle of the Inquisition, which had been subjected to no serious attack. The newly raised works of the *Enceinte* had been battered by fifty-five guns; and, on the twenty-seventh, three breaches were declared practicable. One was near an oil-mill, which stood without the walls of the place, though but little removed from them. The second was to the left of this, between the Convent of St. Joseph and the town. The third was in the Convent of Sta. Engracia. All these were attacked. At mid-day, a column issued from the oil-mill, which had been occupied over-night, and, rapidly clearing the short distance which divided it from the walls, entered the breach, unbroken by the heavy fire to which they were exposed, and the explosion of two *Fougasses*. Having reached the summit, the assailants found an interior retrenchment armed with two guns, which the garrison had unexpectedly erected to obstruct their progress. They attempted, without success, to surmount this ob-

Jan. 27.

CHAP. III. stacle, under a shower of grape, musquetry, and
 1809. grenades. Forced to retire, the besiegers took
 January. advantage of the cover afforded by the exploded

Fougasses to effect a lodgment on the breach.

The breach in face of St. Joseph presented fewer obstacles to be overcome. The column of attack having reached the summit, succeeded in occupying the opposite house, which the artillery in firing on the wall had laid open. The houses adjoining were then gained; and on the right of the breach they found a gate which afforded another entrance into the town. Here, however, their progress was arrested by a battery of the enemy, commanding a court which it was necessary to pass. On the left a double *Caponnier*, which the garrison had used to communicate with St. Joseph's, was repaired and lengthened to the breach.

The attack on Sta. Engracia was yet more successful. After a severe struggle the assailants gained the breach of the Convent, but in attempting to advance further, they met a spirited repulse. Another effort was made, which terminated in their gaining possession of the building. The curtain leading from Sta. Engracia to the bridge of the Huerba was then enfiladed, and,

taking the *tête-de-pont* in reverse, the enemy at CHAP. III.
 once became masters of that important post. 1809.
 Here they were joined by fresh troops, and, January.
 pushing on within the curtain to the Convent of Mount Carmel, made an effort to gain possession of it, which met with a repulse. From thence they advanced rapidly to the Capuchin Convent, putting forty artillery men, who constituted the whole of its garrison, to the sword. The assailants then established themselves along the rampart in order to guard the posts they had been successful in acquiring.

A dreadful fire was soon opened on the besiegers from the houses commanding the rampart. From this they in vain sought shelter among the ruins of the half-demolished walls. Retreat became necessary, and the column was directed to retire on the Puerta del Carmen. The garrison, by a bold attack, regained possession of the Capuchin Convent; but two battalions coming up to reinforce the assailants, it was again taken, and maintained, though at a dear price, by the enemy.

During the night a strong but unsuccessful effort was made by the besieged to regain possession of the Convents of Sta. Engracia and the

CHAP. III. Capuchins. The results of these operations were the loss to the besieged of fifteen guns and two hundred prisoners, and that the enemy gained footing in the city at two different points. The loss in killed and wounded, by the French accounts, was nearly equal on both sides. It amounted to about six hundred.

The misfortunes of the Zaragozans were hourly accumulating. The Fever demon stalked through the city like a destroying angel, conquering and to conquer. The number of dead per day amounted to three hundred and fifty, without including those who fell the more immediate victims of war. The hospitals were too small to contain the host of patients, and the necessary medicines were exhausted. The burying grounds were choked with corpses; and large pits were dug in the streets, into which the dead were tossed indiscriminately. Heaps of bloated and putrescent bodies were piled before the churches, which were often struck by the shells; and the maimed and ghastly carcasses lay dispersed along the streets, a frightful spectacle of horror. Even under such evils the courage of the Zaragozans did not quail.

The city was now open to the invaders, and

the war as formerly was carried on in the streets and houses. Not one inch of ground was yielded by the besieged without a struggle; and when finally driven from a building, they frequently, by a desperate offensive effort, recovered it; and an equal resistance had again to be encountered by the assailants. Traverses were cut around the portions of the city occupied by the enemy; and at the sound of the tocsin, the garrison were always ready to rush to any quarter where hostilities had commenced.

Palafox, however, did not limit his efforts to obstructing the progress of the enemy; he made vigorous efforts to recover the ground already lost, and drive the assailants from their stations. Two attempts were made to regain the Convent of the Capuchins. Both failed. A third more powerful effort was made on the thirty-first. A breach was effected during the day, and at night the assault took place. The besieged advanced with signal resolution towards the breach, but owing to a ditch sunk by the enemy it was found impossible to mount it. They then threw themselves on the door of the church, and endeavoured to force it. In spite of the fire from

CHAP. III. the windows, and the grenades showered from the steeple, they maintained their ground, forced the door; but an epaulment within obstructed their progress; and fresh troops being brought up by the enemy, the project was at length renounced.

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Priests and women bore part in these operations. The former carried munitions, and gave ghostly succour to the dying, animating the soldiers at once by their words and their example. The latter bore refreshments to their sons, or husbands, or fathers; and sometimes when one of those dear relatives fell by their side, they seized his arms, determined to revenge his death or perish in the same glorious cause. In truth the contest lay between skill and enthusiasm; enthusiasm mingled indeed with superstition of the grossest character, yet active, firm, vigorous, and unshrinking; skill exerted in a struggle as unjust and degrading, as any by which the pages of history are contaminated and defaced.

Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the garrison, the French gained ground. The first of February was marked by the capture of the

CHAP. III. Convents of St. Augustin and St. Monica. Hav- ing been repelled in assaulting the breaches, the assailants sprung a mine, and by that means effected an entrance, and took in reverse the works erected for their defence. A deadly struggle took place in the church. Every chapel, every column, every altar, became a point of defence,—the pavement was strewn with blood, and the aisles and nave of the church were covered with the dead. During this terrific conflict, the roof, shattered by bombs, fell in. Those who escaped, renewed the contest on the bodies of the dead and dying. The French were at length successful, and advancing on the Rua Quemada, gained possession of several houses. From these, however, they were eventually compelled to retreat.

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At the same time, an attack was made on the houses near Sta. Engracia. Two mines, one on the left, the other on the right, of the Convent, were sprung by the besiegers; after which, two columns of Polish infantry succeeded in gaining possession of the ruins caused by the explosion. The loss of the besiegers was very considerable, and General Lacoste, commandant of engineers, was killed. He was an officer of

CHAP. III. great professional eminence, and untarnished
1809. character.

February.

During four days the besiegers were employed in constructing three galleries to cross the Rua Quemada. Two of these failed. By means of the third they succeeded in establishing themselves in the ruins of a house which formed an angle of the Cozo, and of the Rua del Medio. A building, called the Escuelas Pias, commanded several traverses, made for the defence of the Cozo. Aware of the importance of this post, the assailants made several unsuccessful efforts to gain possession of it. They then attempted the adjoining houses; but in this also they failed. The system of blowing up the houses, now adopted, was favourable to the besieged; for the enemy, who established themselves on the ruins, were thus exposed to the fire of the surrounding buildings. In the meanwhile, the continual succession of formidable and unforeseen obstacles, which presented themselves to the French soldiers, had considerably damped their ardour; while the spirits of the besieged, who had to contend against famine, fever, and the French army, were yet unbroken.

The inner town is encircled by the Cozo,

which reaches at both extremities to the river; CHAP. III.
and the French, in order to connect their operations with those of Gazan, on the left of the Ebro, determined, at all risks, to gain possession of it. The Convent of St. Francisco, therefore, became their immediate object. A mine was exploded, which brought down part of the building; and a severe contest ensued, which lasted for two days. The Spaniards were at length driven out by the bayonet—the superiority of physical, as well as of numerical strength, being on the side of the assailants.

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From the tower of this building, the French now commanded the street, for a musket-shot on either side. There, however, their progress was for a time arrested. The buildings in the Cozo were large and massive; and from their construction with roofs of arched masonry, nearly incombustible. Experience had perfected the Zaragozans in their defensive warfare; and the contest was continued with, if possible, augmented pertinacity. Three days were the French sappers successfully opposed in their endeavours to cross the Cozo. The University was partially breached by the explosion of two small mines. The besiegers then endeavoured to

CHAP. III. carry the building by assault; but they were
 1809. met by a fire so destructive as to compel them
 February. to retreat.

Hitherto the suburb on the left of the Ebro had been exempted from attack, since Gazan's failure on the first night of the investment. That officer, availing himself of some ambiguity in his orders, had declined to re-engage in active operations; nor was it till Lannes arrived, with authority to enforce his orders, that Gazan was induced to resume the offensive.

Feb. 7. On the seventh, the Convent of Jesus, on the left of the road to Lerida, was attacked. Trenches were opened against it; and twenty battering pieces having effected a breach, it was carried with little loss, the building not being considered by the besieged as of material importance. The enemy then succeeded in establishing a lodgment to the right and left.

Feb. 18. On the eighteenth, the suburb, after two unsuccessful efforts, was carried by assault. A tremendous fire from fifty guns soon laid open the way to the assailing columns. By mid-day a breach was effected in the Convent of St. Lazarus, commanding the bridge; and the defenders, after a strenuous resistance, were driven

from the building. All communication between CHAP. III.
 the suburb and the city was now cut off; and 1809.
 the French, immediately advancing to the river, February. intercepted the retreat of about fifteen hundred men, who, enfeebled by disease and suffering, were made prisoners. The capture of St. Lazarus necessarily involved that of the suburb, which was without ammunition or provisions, yet many of its defenders continued to wage a fierce but hopeless war in the streets. Many crossed the bridge under a shower of bullets, and effected their escape to the city. Others succeeded in passing the river in boats. Altogether, the loss of the besieged amounted to about two thousand. The brave Baron de Versage, who commanded on the left bank of the Ebro, was killed.

The loss of the suburb laid open to the enemy the only part of the town which had hitherto been exempted from direct attack. The besiegers, imagining that the courage of the garrison had been abated by this irreparable misfortune, continued their operations with vigour. By means of mining, two enormous breaches were made in the University—both of which were attacked and carried; and the traverses of the

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Cozo were at length abandoned by the Spaniards. In the meantime, Palafox had been smitten with the dreadful disease, whose ravages had been more widely spread than even those of famine and the sword. This admirable and heroic leader, who, for above a month, had been unable to quit the vault where he lay stretched on a bed of suffering, at length saw the necessity of resigning the command.

Feb. 19.

On the nineteenth, he transferred his authority to a Junta, of which Don Pedro Ric was appointed president. A council was immediately assembled to deliberate on the condition of the city, and the measures most proper to be adopted. At this meeting it was stated, by the General of cavalry, that only sixty-two horses remained, the rest having died of hunger. Of the infantry it appeared there were little more than two thousand eight hundred men fit for service. Ammunition was nearly exhausted; and should a shell penetrate the Inquisition, their only manufactory of powder would be destroyed. The fortifications were stated, by the chief engineer, to have been almost utterly demolished. There were neither men nor materials necessary for repairing them; and bags of

earth could no longer be formed from want of cloth.

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In order to ascertain the chances of external succour, the Duke de Villahermosa was sent to Palafox, to receive such information on the subject as he might be able to communicate. But fever was raging in his brain, and he could communicate nothing. His papers were examined; but these only tended to increase the conviction, that no relief could reasonably be expected from without.

With regard to the measures to be adopted, the Junta were divided in opinion. Twenty-six voted for capitulation; eight against it. The latter were averse to surrender, while even a possibility of succour remained. With proud gallantry of spirit the opinion of the minority was adopted by the Junta. A flag of truce was sent to the enemy, proposing a suspension of hostilities, with the view of ascertaining the situation of the Spanish armies; it being understood that should no immediate succour be at hand, the Junta would then treat for a surrender. This proposal was peremptorily declined by Marshal Lannes; and the bombardment recommenced.

CHAP. III. On the twentieth the garrison made a last and unsuccessful effort to recover two guns which the enemy had captured on the preceding day. Affairs were now desperate. The fifty guns which had been employed in the attack of the suburb, now opened fire on the city; and the streets in the neighbourhood of the quay were laid in ruins.

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Thus situated, the Junta ordered measures to be taken to ascertain the sentiments of the people with regard to the situation of their city. Two-thirds of it were in ruins. Fire, famine, and slaughter had done their work; and from three to four hundred persons were daily dying of the pestilence. Under such circumstances the Junta declared they had fulfilled their oath of fidelity,—and that *Zaragoza was destroyed*. A flag of truce was despatched to the French head-quarters, followed by a deputation of the Junta, to arrange the terms of capitulation. Marshal Lannes was at first disposed to insist on unconditional surrender. The proposal was indignantly rejected by the deputies; and Ric declared, that rather than submit to it the Zaragozans would die beneath the ruins of their city. “I, and my companions,” said this noble

patriot, “will return there, and defend what remains to us as best we may. We have yet arms and ammunition, and if these fail we have daggers. War is never without its chances; and should the Zaragozans be driven to despair, it yet remains to be proved who are to be victorious.”

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In this temper of the garrison, Lannes did not think it prudent to refuse granting terms. It was accordingly conceded that the troops should march out with the honours of war, that the heroic Palafox should be suffered to retire to any place where he might think proper to fix his residence, and that all persons, not included in the garrison, should be suffered to quit the city, in order to avoid the contagion.

On the twenty-first, the posts of the city were delivered up to the French, and thus terminated one of the most strenuous and extraordinary struggles of which history bears record. The resistance continued for fifty-two days with open trenches; twenty-nine of these were consumed by the enemy in effecting an entrance,—twenty-three in the war subsequently carried on in the streets and houses. By their own account the French threw above seventeen thousand bombs

Feb. 21.

CHAP. III. into the city, and expended above one hundred
 1809. and sixty thousand pounds weight of powder.
 February. More than thirty thousand men and five hundred
 officers perished in the defence, exclusive of a
 vast number of women and children, who sank
 the mute and suffering victims of fire, famine,
 pestilence, and slaughter. The amount of loss
 sustained by the besiegers was studiously con-
 cealed,—that it was very great, cannot be
 doubted; and the contemplated operations on
 Lerida and Valencia, for which the army was
 destined, were in consequence given up.

When the garrison quitted the city, only two
 thousand four hundred men were capable of
 bearing arms; the rest were in the hospitals.
 On the march to France, two hundred and
 seventy of these men, weakened by famine and
 disease, were found incapable of proceeding with
 the rapidity which their inhuman conductors
 considered necessary; they were butchered and
 left on the road, to serve as a spectacle and a
 warning to the succeeding divisions.

Among the prisoners, was Augustina Zarago-
 za, who had distinguished herself in the former
 siege. At the commencement, she had re-
 sumed her station by the Portillo gate. When

Palafox visited the battery, she pointed to the CHAP. III.
 gun she had formerly served with so much ef- 1809.
 1809. February. fect, and exclaimed, "See, General, I am again
 with my old friend." Once, when her wounded
 husband lay bleeding at her feet, she discharged
 the cannon at the enemy, in order to avenge his
 fall. She frequently led the assaulting parties,
 and with sword in hand, and her cloak wrapped
 round her, mingled in the daily conflicts which
 took place in the streets. Though exposed,
 during the whole siege, to the most imminent
 danger, Augustina escaped without a wound.
 On the surrender of the city, she was too well
 known to escape notice, and was made prisoner.
 But she had already caught the contagion; and
 being taken to the hospital, she subsequently
 succeeded in effecting her escape.

The record of female heroism must be yet
 further extended. During the struggle, the
 women of Zaragoza shrank from no ordeal,
 however terrible. In the combat, where the
 fight was thickest,—on the ramparts, where the
 fire was most deadly,—in the hospitals,—in the
 dark and airless dens of pestilence, breathing a
 tainted and noisome atmosphere,—there were
 they found, these "meek-eyed women, without

CHAP. III. fear," soothing the dying, ministering to the suffering, and exhibiting a proud and memorable spectacle of fortitude and virtue.

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The terms of the capitulation were shamefully violated by Marshal Lannes. Palafox was sent a prisoner into France; and the city became the scene of pillage and atrocity. The province, on the fall of Zaragoza, became comparatively tranquil. Fourteen thousand men, under Suchet, were left to maintain tranquillity; and the remainder of the besieging army, under Mortier, moved into Castile.

In the meanwhile, Europe rung with admiration of the noble defence of Zaragoza. Everywhere the pulses of the slave beat quicker and more strongly; and the heart of the freeman bounded proudly in his bosom. Poets and historians consecrated, in undying records, the virtue of her citizens; and Zaragoza, like Thermopylae, will remain eternally linked with associations of the purest patriotism and devotion.

CHAPTER. IV.

CAPTURE OF OPORTO BY SOULT.—BATTLES OF CIUDAD REAL, AND MEDELLIN.

WHILE the arms of France were thus successful in Spain, the Court of Vienna issued a protest against the unjustifiable treatment of the Spanish princes. Napoleon cherished views of ambition to the realization of which the subjugation of Austria was essential, and, therefore, probably was not averse from availing himself of the plea thus afforded, for declaring war against that power. Leaving instructions to his marshals to finish the conquest of the Peninsula by the occupation of Lisbon, Cadiz, and Valencia, he accordingly returned to Paris, in order to enforce, by his presence, the increased exertions which circumstances had rendered necessary.

The campaign had been disastrous to the Spaniards. The defeat and dispersion of their

CHAP. IV.

1809.

January.

CHAP. IV. 1809. February. armies, the submission of Madrid, the capture of Zaragoza, and the embarkation of the British, contributed to spread panic and alarm throughout the kingdom. These reached even to Lisbon. Sir John Cradock, on whom the command of the British army had devolved, made every preparation to embark his forces, whenever Victor—then at Alcantara—should advance against the capital. This movement, however, did not take place. Victor waited to receive intelligence of Soult; and the aspect of affairs in Portugal was soon destined to undergo a striking change.

The current of evil fortune, which had threatened to overwhelm the cause of liberty and justice in the Peninsula, did not dispose the British government to shrink from further exertions in its behalf. At the very time when the French armies were in the full career of success, a treaty was signed at London, between Great Britain and the existing government of Spain, acting in the name and on behalf of Ferdinand. By this it was stipulated that the contracting powers should make common cause against France; that Great Britain should acknowledge no sovereign of Spain but Ferdinand VII., or his lawful heirs; and the Spanish go-

vernment engaged never to cede to France any portion of the territory or possessions of Spain.

Notwithstanding this treaty, the Spanish government and people were by no means satisfied with the degree of zeal which Great Britain had manifested in opposing the invader. The Convention of Cintra had left an unfavourable impression on the people, which the subsequent operations of Sir John Moore had contributed still further to strengthen and diffuse. England, even in her most generous exertions, was considered only as pursuing a cold and selfish policy. Spain had not forgotten the base seizure and robbery of her treasure ships; and it is the natural consequence of such acts, that the offending should become to the injured nation, at once the object of suspicion and dislike.

These feelings were evinced, when, after the retreat of Sir John Moore, a corps, under Major-General Sherbrooke, was directed to proceed to Cadiz, to secure that important stronghold, and sustain the efforts of the patriotic forces in the south. The Supreme Junta, on their arrival, positively refused to admit the British within the walls of the city, alleging

CHAP. IV.
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Seville,
Mar. 1.

CHAP. IV. that, though their own feelings would have led
 1809. them unhesitatingly to rely on British honour,
 February. yet the confidence of the people in their ally was
 so entirely overthrown, that the presence of
 an English force could not but be productive of
 the worst consequences. General Sherbrooke,
 therefore, after much fruitless negotiation, re-
 turned to the Tagus, and the views of the Bri-
 tish government became principally directed to
 the defence of Portugal.

The government of that kingdom, conscious
 of their own limited resources, had thrown them-
 selves in sincerity and good faith on the protec-
 tion of England. Under her influence and guid-
 ance much had been done to model and dis-
 cipline the Portuguese army. General Beresford
 was appointed Marshal and Commander-in-chief
 of the whole forces of the kingdom; a body of
 ten thousand men had already been regimented
 under the direction of British officers, and half
 that number of recruits were in process of dis-
 cipline at the different depôts.

The services rendered by Sir Robert Wilson,
 at the head of a small band of volunteers, gave
 flattering promise of what might be expected
 from a Portuguese army when regularly dis-

ciplined and equipped. While affairs were at CHAP. IV.
 the lowest ebb in Spain, that enterprising officer
 advanced to the frontier; and, acting in con- 1809.
 junction with the Spaniards beyond the Agueda, February.
 by a series of spirited and judicious movements,
 kept open the communication with Ciudad Rod-
 rigo and Almeida, and held in check the ene-
 my's force in that neighbourhood. In the mean-
 while the French had been forced to re-cross the
 Tagus; and a division of Cuesta's army, under the
 Duke del Albuquerque, having gained consider-
 able advantages over Victor's force at Consue-
 gra and Mora, the career of that leader was for
 a moment checked. These events tended greatly
 to revive the confidence of the Portuguese peo-
 ple. Twenty thousand of the native troops were
 taken into the pay of England; the raising of
 fresh levies went on with increased vigour; and
 Sir John Cradock's force having been augment-
 ed to seventeen thousand men, the people once
 more began to regard the future fortunes of
 their country with confidence and hope.

On the northern frontier, however, the pros-
 pect had been gradually darkening. On the
 twenty-seventh of February, Soult crossed the
 Minho at Orense; and a few days afterwards,

CHAP. IV. attacked Romana in the neighbourhood of Monterrey, killed and made prisoners a large portion of his army, and captured the greater part of his baggage and artillery. Soult then prepared to enter Portugal, leaving Ney in Galicia. The French bulletins had announced that his army would cross the Minho from Tuy on the eleventh of February, and marching direct on Oporto and Lisbon, would reach the former city on the twentieth, and enter the capital by the end of the month. But though his progress was unopposed by any force but that of militia and the surrounding peasantry, his army had suffered too severely in the winter campaign, to enable him to realize the expectations of Napoleon. Provisions, too, were deficient, the hospitals were filled, and so limited were the means of overcoming the various impediments, to the immediate invasion of Portugal, that it was not till the twenty-sixth of March that Soult appeared before Oporto.

Mar. 26.

His march had not been accomplished without opposition. Several engagements took place; and the peasants, flocking from all quarters, joined the militia, and demanded to be led against the enemy. This, however, was not the policy

of General de Freire. He determined to retire before the French, and occupy a strong position in the neighbourhood of Oporto. A mutiny was the consequence. De Freire was suspected of treason, and brutally murdered by the troops; and Baron D'Eben, a German officer in the service of England, was appointed his successor. With about twenty-three thousand men, of whom two thousand were regulars, this officer endeavoured to oppose the advance of Marshal Soult. The attempt was a vain one. The Portuguese force, undisciplined, and without subordination, was speedily routed; and the French having found one of their fellow-soldiers horribly mutilated by the natives, no mercy was shewn in the pursuit.

Baron D'Eben vainly endeavoured to rally the fugitives, and embody them for the defence of Oporto. An army composed of such materials, though it may be dispersed at a breath, can only with extreme difficulty be rallied. Soult experienced little further opposition till he reached Oporto; and that city was carried by assault, on the twenty-ninth of March. A scene of dreadful carnage ensued. The cavalry charged through the streets, slaughtering the in-

CHAP. IV.
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March.

Mar. 29.

CHAP. IV. habitants without discrimination of age, sex, or party. Terrified by the sight of such horrors, the people fled in crowds to the bridge, but were encountered there by showers of grape-shot and musquetry. Others endeavoured to cross in boats; these, too, were fired on; and above three thousand of the inhabitants were either drowned or shot in this quarter of the city. Altogether, the slaughter was very great, and would undoubtedly have been still greater, had not Marshal Soult exerted himself with honourable zeal to put a stop to the excesses of his troops.

Oporto, which had thus easily been occupied by the enemy, might, under a better organized system of defence, have opposed a very formidable obstacle to the French armies. The garrison consisted of about twenty thousand men, and the city had recently been covered by a line of detached works, extending from the Douro to the sea, on which were mounted about two hundred pieces of artillery. But want of discipline and subordination again proved fatal. Several of the superior officers, who endeavoured to restore obedience, were murdered by the soldiers, under charge of treason. No further

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March.

efforts were made to regulate the defence. CHAP. IV. During two days an useless fire was kept up on the enemy, while busied in preparations for the assault. The soldiers acted on the impulse of individual courage, but without concert or obedience.

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Thus was it that the second city of the kingdom fell, almost without a struggle, into the hands of the enemy. But Soult, notwithstanding his success, did not deem it prudent to advance immediately on Lisbon. The hostility of the natives rendered the communication between the French corps destined for the reduction of Portugal, at once difficult and precarious; and before quitting Oporto, he wished to receive intelligence of the movements of Victor and Lapisse, the latter of whom, with a corps of five thousand men, was directed to threaten the frontier between the Douro and Almeida; and subsequently to join Victor whenever Soult should have advanced on the capital. No intelligence, however, of either of these leaders reached Oporto; and Soult, averse to commit his army by any uncombined movement, applied himself to secure and con-

CHAP. IV. ciliate the portion of the kingdom already over-
run by his armies.

1809.

March.

Mar. 25. In the meanwhile, the division of native troops, under General Silveira, were not idle. That General had succeeded in regaining possession of Chaves, and capturing about thirteen hundred of the garrison. He then made every effort to cut off the communication of the French army with Spain, by securing the bridge of Amarante, and strengthening the line of the Tamega. The activity of Silveira, who succeeded in repulsing the enemy in several attacks, tended greatly to raise the hopes of the Portuguese. The peasantry again took arms, and came in crowds to the field. Colonel Trant, who commanded at Coimbra, took the field at the head of a body of militia and volunteers; and Romana, who had received a reinforcement of three thousand men, already threatened the enemy's communications in Asturias.

We must now turn to England. The disasters attendant on the retreat of Sir John Moore, and the wretched condition to which his army had been reduced, materially deranged the projects of the British government. The troops

embarked at Corunna, instead of sailing direct
for Lisbon or the south of Spain, had been
under the necessity of returning to England,
and the hope of successful resistance to the
French power in the Peninsula had become
more feeble in the minds of all.

The British ministry, however, were not disheartened by the reverses of the preceding campaign. They served only to stimulate them to renewed exertions, and, at the close of February, Sir Arthur Wellesley, then Chief Secretary for Ireland, resigned his office and seat in Parliament, to assume the command of the British forces in the Peninsula. It was determined to reinforce the army in Portugal; and in March the expedition with Sir Arthur Wellesley sailed for Lisbon. His instructions were, in case that city should have been evacuated by Sir John Cradock, to proceed to Cadiz, and land there, if the government would consent to the admission of British troops into the garrison. The contemplated alternative, however, did not occur. Sir John Cradock had been engaged in preparations for the defence of the city; and that officer, on being superseded by Sir Arthur Wellesley, was appointed governor of Gibraltar.

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March.

CHAP. IV. In Spain, the current of events had been unfavourable to the patriots. In La Mancha, the Duke del Albuquerque had distinguished himself in some affairs, of which the results would have been greater, but for the ill-judged interference of Cartoajal, in whom the chief command was vested. The utter incompetence of this person was fully evinced at the battle of Ciudad Real, where his army was completely routed by Sebastiani. In this engagement no strenuous resistance appears to have been made. The Spaniards were at once driven from their position in utter confusion. Three thousand of their number were killed in the pursuit, and four thousand prisoners and eighteen guns were captured by the enemy.

On the day following, a disaster still more fatal befell the Estramaduran army, under Cuesta. On the eighteenth, Victor had succeeded in forcing the defences of the Puente del Arzobispo, and drove back the troops, which had been posted there, to Miravete. He then succeeded in re-establishing the bridge at Almaraz, which, owing to the cowardice or treachery of Henestrosa, who commanded at that point, was effected without difficulty. Victor was thus enabled to pass over

his artillery, and collect his whole army at Trux-CHAP. IV.
illo, where he gained possession of the mag- 1809.
azines of the Spanish army. March.

Cuesta, having retired to Santa Cruz, was reinforced by a detachment of about four thousand men, under the Duke del Albuquerque, and at length determined to give battle. With this view, he took up a position near Medellin, forming his whole force in a single line, about a league in extent, without any reserve. The ground thus occupied, was singularly ill-chosen. It consisted of a wide and open plain, without cover of any kind; and the same unhappy qualities which had distinguished Cuesta at Rio Seco, were again conspicuously displayed at Medellin.

The Spanish army consisted of about twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry. The left wing was commanded by Henestroza, which occupied ground somewhat higher than the rest of the position. The centre was commanded by Don Francisco Trias; the right by Don Francisco de Equia. The cavalry were on the left, where the enemy presented the greatest force.

The army of Victor, though infinitely superior

CHAP. IV. in the quality of the troops, was somewhat
 1809. numerically inferior. It consisted of about
 March. eighteen thousand foot and two thousand five
 hundred horse, and was formed in an arc, extending between the Gaudiana and a cultivated ravine, which reaches from Medellin to the village of Mengabril. Victor placed his cavalry on the right, and the front was covered by six batteries, each of four guns.

Mar. 28. The action commenced by an attack on the Spanish centre, supported by a brigade of cavalry. This was gallantly repulsed, and the Spanish line advancing, succeeded in taking one of the enemy's batteries on the left. The French left wing gave way, and was followed with effect for two hours. The cavalry was ably manoeuvred by General Lasalle, who retired slowly, and having gained a favourable position, turned on the Spanish horse, and put them to the rout. The attack on the centre was then renewed, and the infantry disheartened gave way. Panic spread through the ranks, and the soldiers, casting away their arms, sought safety in flight. Every effort of Cuesta to restore order proved abortive. The French followed up their success, giving no quarter in the pursuit.

In this disastrous battle the loss of the Span- CHAP. IV.
 iards was very great. It has been stated at 1809.
 twelve thousand killed, and seven or eight thou- March.
 sand prisoners; but this is probably an exaggeration. Nineteen pieces of cannon were taken by the French, whose loss in the action amounted, by their own account, to four thousand.

Calamitous as the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real unquestionably were, neither the Supreme Junta nor the people were disheartened by the misfortunes of their armies. The proceedings of the former evinced no symptom of alarm or despondency; a vote of thanks was passed to Cuesta and his army; and so little had that General declined in the opinion of his countrymen, that he speedily received the appointment of Captain-General of the province. In the meanwhile, he retired to Almandrelejo, where he succeeded in collecting a force nearly as imposing as that with which he had encountered the enemy at Medellin.

CHAPTER V.

ATTACK AND CAPTURE OF OPORTO
BY THE BRITISH.

CHAP. V. ON the twenty-second of April, Sir Arthur
1809. Wellesley reached Lisbon, and was invested
April. with the supreme command in Portugal. From
the period of that event a new era commences
in the war. His appointment gave unity of ac-
tion and purpose to the British and Portuguese
forces, and at once put a stop to those unfortun-
ate jealousies and distractions, which had already
occurred but too frequently between the leaders
of the allied armies.

The forces of the enemy, against whom he
was to act, were on the other hand divided.
Soult had concerted with Victor a combined at-
tack on the unconquered provinces of Portugal.
The former was preparing to advance through
Coimbra upon Lisbon, while Victor was to co-

operate by marching from Alcantara on Abran-
tes, and, having secured that fortress, to continue
his progress to the capital.

Many delays occurred, however, in the ex-
ecution of this project, which, had it been
promptly carried into effect, must, in all proba-
bility, have caused the embarkation of the Eng-
lish army, and given a new aspect to the war.
But Soult remained long inactive at Oporto, in-
fluenced at once by the dread of committing his
army by an unsupported operation, and by the
increasing embarrassments of his position. The
bridge of Amarante was in possession of the
Portuguese, and thus his only line of communi-
cation with Spain to the east had been cut off.

A body of six thousand men, under Delaborde
and Loison, were accordingly despatched with
orders to gain possession of the bridge, at any
sacrifice. General Silveira was at Penafiel, from
which town he withdrew on the approach of the
enemy, and fell back to the Campo de Manhufe.
On the two following days some skirmishing took
place, and Silveira deemed it prudent to fall back
to Amarante, and limit his efforts to defending
the passage of the bridge. The town, which
stands on a declivity on the right bank of the

CHAP. V.
1809.
April.

CHAP. V. Tamega, was instantly attacked and carried by the enemy. Every effort was then made to gain possession of the bridge; but so firm was the resistance of the Portuguese troops, and so strong were the works by which it was defended, that the enemy were uniformly repulsed, and at length driven from the town. In this affair Lieut.-Colonel Patrick, an English officer, who had recently accepted a commission in the Portuguese service, was killed.

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April.

On the day following, the French regained the town, and a fortified convent in front of the bridge. The Portuguese, however, still kept possession of the suburb on the other side of the river, and their batteries commanded the approach. Delaborde, despairing of success from the heavy loss he had already sustained, had issued orders for the construction of a wooden bridge at some distance from the town; but an officer of engineers, having proposed the construction of a mine, the experiment was tried with success. A breach was effected in the works, which the French infantry successfully assaulted; and the cavalry, having crossed the river, drove the Portuguese from the suburb on the opposite bank. In these engagements the

native troops behaved with distinguished gallantry and resolution.

The reader must now be aware of the general state of affairs in the Peninsula, when Sir Arthur Wellesley landed in Portugal. He at once perceived that the numerical superiority of the enemy was neutralized by the separation of their corps; and while the movements of Lapisse and Victor were cautious and hesitating, he determined, by a prompt and rapid advance, to attack Soult, and drive him from Oporto. This resolution was communicated to Cuesta, who was requested to content himself with keeping Victor in check, until the return of the British from Oporto, when the two armies might act in combination on the south of the Tagus.

In pursuance of the project thus ably conceived, a division, commanded by General Mackenzie, and a brigade of heavy cavalry under General Fane, were left at Abrantes, to watch the movements of Victor; and the rest of the army was put in motion on Coimbra. In that city, the whole British force was assembled on the fifth of May; and on the ninth it continued its advance. The division of General Hill was directed to embark at Aveira for Ovar, in order

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1809.
April.

May 9.

CHAP. V. to take the enemy in flank, and force them back
 1809. from the Vouga; and Beresford, with a strong
 May. detachment, chiefly composed of Portuguese, moved upon Vizeu, to cut off the retreat of Soult by Amarante. The main body proceeded by the direct route; and on the tenth encountered the enemy's advanced posts, which were
 May 11. driven back. On the day following, two divisions, strongly posted on the heights above Grijon, were dislodged from their position, and pursued with success till nightfall, when the British army halted with their advance, on the heights beyond Cavalleros, about two leagues from the Douro. During the night the enemy continued their retreat.

In the meanwhile, the object of Sir Arthur Wellesley in these movements, could not be supposed to escape the penetration of Soult. He saw the danger of being speedily enclosed in the north of Portugal; and determined to extricate himself from the increasing perils of his position, by evacuating the country. Measures were accordingly adopted for this purpose. Preparations were instantly set on foot for removing the sick and the baggage; and having destroyed the pontoon-bridge across the Douro, and given orders that

all the boats should be brought to the right bank of the river, he imagined himself secure from immediate attack. He imagined, too, that Sir Arthur Wellesley would avail himself of his maritime resources, and embarking his troops, endeavour to effect a landing near the mouth of the Douro. This would have allowed time for the leisurely retreat of the army; and orders were despatched to Loison, requiring him to maintain his ground at Mezamfrio and Peza da Ragoa, in order to prevent the passage of the river being effected at either of these points.

Had the calculations of Soult been realized, with regard to his enemy's intentions, no obstruction would have existed to his retreat into Galicia; or by advancing on Beresford with his whole force, he might have crossed into Beira. But Sir Arthur Wellesley had bolder measures in contemplation. He determined at once to cross the river, and drive the enemy from Oporto. With this view, General Murray was detached to Avintas, a ford about five miles higher up, where he was directed to cross the river with his brigade, and send down any boats which he might be able to procure. The brigade of

CHAP. V. Guards, under General Sherbrooke, received
 1809. orders to cross the ferry below the city at Villa
 May. Nova. The main body, under his own immediate command, were to attempt a passage at the Convent of St. Augustino da Serra, which occupies a height nearly opposite to the town. The Douro was at that spot nearly three hundred yards broad, extremely rapid, with considerable heights on the right bank, and a large unfinished building designed for the Bishop's palace, which could be made serviceable as a post of defence by those who first landed, till sufficient numbers should have crossed the river to enable them to advance on the town. To protect the passage, several guns had been planted in the garden of the Convent.

May 12. By aid of the inhabitants, two boats had been procured from the opposite side of the river, and in these, three companies of the Buffs immediately passed the river. Other boats were speedily despatched by the zeal of the people; and the embarkation of the troops was rapidly continued. General Paget was among the first detachment; he immediately took possession of the unfinished building already mentioned, and defended it with great gallantry, till

the arrival of the forty-eighth, sixty-sixth, and a Portuguese battalion, when the contest was continued on more equal terms. Early in the engagement General Paget lost an arm, and the command devolved on General Hill, who was still warmly contesting the ground, when the brigade of Guards and the twenty-ninth regiment appeared on the enemy's right; and in the opposite direction the troops were seen approaching from Avintas.

Under these circumstances, the enemy's columns fell back in confusion. The British charged up the streets of Oporto, making many prisoners, amid the most animated demonstrations of joyful welcome from the inhabitants. Handkerchiefs were waved from the balconies and windows,—blessings were breathed on the brave deliverers of the city, mingled, on all hands, with shouts of joyful and triumphant greeting.

Confusion and disorder had spread through the whole French army. The panic seemed even to increase when they gained the open country; and Major Harvey, with a single squadron of the fourteenth dragoons, charged through three battalions of French infantry,

CHAP. V. marching in a hollow road, and brought off many prisoners, without sustaining any considerable loss.

1809.
May.

Unfortunately, however, it was found impossible to take full advantage of the panic of the enemy, by continuing the pursuit. The army were without supplies of any kind; the rapidity of the advance from Coimbra having outstripped the most active exertions of the commissariat. The fatigue the troops had undergone rendered repose necessary; and the pursuit was, therefore, relinquished at the approach of evening. Had these obstacles not intervened, there can be little doubt that the whole army of Marshal Soult would have been destroyed.

As it was, however, nothing could exceed the boldness and the brilliance of the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley. The Douro had been passed in open day, in the very face of a powerful enemy. One of the ablest and most experienced of the French Marshals had been taken by surprise, and his army driven from Oporto, with the loss of its sick and wounded, of a great part of its baggage, and of a considerable number of guns.

In truth, the very boldness and danger of the attempt contributed to its success. British Generals had acquired the reputation of being cautious, and averse from that daring policy which seeks great achievement through great hazard. So little, indeed, did the enemy contemplate even the possibility of Sir Arthur Wellesley attempting the passage of the Douro, that when a *chef de bataillon* gave notice that the English were passing, his assertion was disregarded. Nor did Marshal Soult receive intelligence of the event, till General Foy, who was severely wounded in the action, from the height opposite to the Convent, observed the troops actually crossing, and the Portuguese making signals to them from the walls. Never was so complete a victory obtained at a smaller expense of life on the part of the victors. The loss of the English army amounted only to twenty-three men killed, and ninety-eight wounded.

Driven from Oporto, Soult's first object was to effect a junction with Loison, and retire through Amarante on Zamora. But at Penafiel he learned that Beresford, having effected a junction with Silveira, had dislodged Loison from his position on the Tamega, and thus suc-

CHAP. V.
1809.
May.

CHAP. V. ceeded in cutting off his intended line of retreat.

1809.

May.

The situation of Soult was now in the highest degree precarious; and, marching hastily on Braga, he directed Loison to retire in that direction.

At Guimaraens, Soult learned that the English army were endeavouring, by forced marches, to reach Braga before him, and thus cut off his retreat on Galicia. Pressed on all sides, by hourly-increasing difficulties, Soult promptly determined to sacrifice his artillery, his baggage, and even his military chest, and escape by paths across the mountains impassable for a regular army.

May 16. In the meanwhile, Beresford had directed his march on Chaves, to intercept the enemy in that quarter, while the British pushed forward on the other roads. At Salamonde a skirmish took place with the rear-guard of the French, and some prisoners were made. Soult continued his retreat with unrelenting rapidity along the main road, to a point where a footpath, branching off to the left, enabled him to avoid Chaves, where the Portuguese waited his approach.

Though it was impossible for Sir Arthur Wel-

lesley to come up with an enemy, who, for the

CHAP. V. sake of rapid movement, had sacrificed everything which constitutes an army; yet the French army, during the whole retreat, was subjected to very serious losses, by the armed peasants of the country. Masses of the people continually hovered on their flanks, and fired on them from every favourable position. A body of peasants, on the seventeenth, were endeavouring to destroy the bridge of Saltador, which crosses the Cabado, when the advanced-guard of the French came up. They were driven back with facility; and the army was proceeding on its march, when the sound of cannon was heard from the rear, and panic instantly spread through the whole column. The cry arose that the British were at hand. The cavalry pushed on through the ranks of the infantry, increasing the confusion. All were anxious to pass the bridge to escape from the approaching enemy. The army became a vast mob. The greater part threw away their arms, and everything which could encumber their movements. Many were precipitated into the torrent and drowned,—and many also were slain by the peasants, who con-

1809.

May.

May 17.

CHAP. V. tinued firing from the rocks. All the baggage,
 1809. which had escaped destruction at Guimaraens,
 May. was here lost.

In this lamentable and disgraceful state, the French army continued its march along foot-paths, frequently indented by the furrows of mountain torrents, and obstructed by masses of rock which the cavalry found great difficulty in surmounting, and at night reached Montelegre, a town about a league distant from the Gallician frontier. Here Soult discovered that the rapidity of his movements had been barely sufficient to secure his escape. The fires of the Portuguese were seen on the mountains, in the direction of Chaves; and leaving the cavalry to protect the rear from attack, Soult, after a few hours' halt, pushed forward across the frontier in the direction of Orense.

Here the pursuit terminated. Other and more important objects claimed the attention of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the south; and the army, by leisurely marches, retraced its steps.

Thus terminated this brief but glorious campaign. It comprised but a period of ten days; yet how much of honourable achievement is comprised within that narrow space! The liberation

of Portugal had been effected. The enemy had been chased from its frontier with the loss of their sick, baggage, and artillery; and Soult, with his dispirited, disorganized, and fugitive band, was forced to seek refuge in the very province from which, but a few months before, he had witnessed the disastrous embarkation of a British army.

Though the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the first moment when he put his army in motion on Oporto, are worthy of all admiration, they can scarcely with safety be considered as a precedent for future generals. To pass, in open day, a river so broad, so deep, and so rapid as the Douro, by means of a few boats, and in presence of a powerful enemy, must be held one of those felicitous violations of military rule, which it occasionally belongs to genius to make, but which men of more limited powers can scarcely hope to imitate with success. The power of detecting at a glance the moment when the ordinary rules of art may be happily disregarded, is the exclusive attribute of a bold, original, and powerful mind. Yet the triumph of Oporto is not more attributable to the skill and promptitude of Wellesley, than to the ne-

CHAP. V. gligence of his opponent. That Marshal Soult
 1809. should have suffered himself to be taken by sur-
 May. prise, and that the requisite precautions were
 not adopted for the safety of his army, must
 remain a blot on his military reputation. From
 the commencement of his retreat, however, all
 his operations are marked by talent and deci-
 sion. A commander of lower qualities would
 probably have sunk under the difficulties by
 which he was environed; Soult rose and over-
 topped them. He unhesitatingly adopted the
 only measure by which his army could be res-
 cued from their danger; and by the prompt
 sacrifice of his artillery and baggage he suc-
 ceeded in evading his pursuers.

CHAPTER VI.

OPERATIONS IN GALLICIA AND
CATALONIA.

THE expulsion of the enemy from Portugal
 was followed up by successes almost of equal
 magnitude in Galicia. CHAP. VI.
 1809.

March.

Soult had no sooner entered Portugal, than
 Romana, who had succeeded in recruiting a
 considerable force, put himself in motion against
 the corps of Ney. Towards the end of March
 a force, under Murillo, with a body of Por-
 tuguese, invested Vigo; and with the assist-
 ance of a British frigate, succeeded in for-
 cing the garrison to surrender. It amounted to
 thirteen hundred men. On the day following,
 a French battalion, that approached the town in
 ignorance of its surrender, was attacked, and
 nearly the whole of its number perished. Roma-
 Mar. 27.
 Mar. 28.

CHAP. VI. na likewise, by a successful movement, surprised
 1809. a body of the enemy in Villa Franca; and two bat-
 April. talions, which attempted to maintain the palace
 Apr. 17. of the Duke of Alva, were made prisoners. He
 then crossed into Asturias; and, leaving his
 army under the command of Don Nicholas
 Mahy, he proceeded in person to Oviedo, for the
 purpose of dissolving the Junta, whose imbecili-
 ty had become apparent, and appointing a coun-
 cil more competent to the administration of
 affairs.

On learning this movement, a scheme of
 combined operations was concerted by Marshal
 Ney and the French commanders in Leon, for
 the purpose of surrounding him. The former
 had assembled about twelve thousand men at Lu-
 go, and entered Asturias by routes almost im-
 passable, in expectation of surprising the Spanish
 army. General Bonnet, at the same time, ad-
 vanced along the coast from the East; and Kel-
 lerman, with about six thousand men, entered
 by Pajares.

The scheme, however well concerted, did not
 succeed. Mahy, fortunately apprised in time of
 the enemy's approach, retired into Gallicia. The
 French then advanced on Oviedo, occupying all

the avenues to that city, with the view of securing CHAP. VI.
 the person of Romana. That leader, however, 1809.
 succeeded in effecting his escape, and reached May.
 Gijon, where he embarked for Gallicia.

Some skirmishes took place between the As-
 turian troops, under Ballasteros, and the French,
 in the course of which the city of St. Andero
 was taken, and almost immediately retaken,
 with considerable loss on both sides.

In the meanwhile, Mahy, with the Gallician
 army, had made a rapid march on Lugo. Some
 skirmishes took place between the garrison and
 the besiegers, which terminated in favour of the
 latter; and the place would probably have fall-
 en, had not Soult unexpectedly appeared with May 22.
 his army, and compelled the Spaniards to retire.

Alarmed by these indications of nascent vi-
 gour in his opponents, Ney resolved to attempt
 the re-capture of Vigo, and then forming a junc-
 tion with Soult's force at Orense, to endeavour
 by a combined attack to effect the destruction of
 Romana's army. With this intention, he mov-
 ed on Santiago, with eight thousand infantry
 and two thousand five hundred horse. On his
 approach, a corps of Romana's army, under
 General Noronha, fell back on Caldas and Ponte-

CHAP. VI. vrada, where they passed the river Sotomayor, and formed on the other side, having previously destroyed the bridge at St. Payo. During the whole of the seventh of June, the French made vigorous efforts to effect the passage of the river, but their attempts uniformly encountered repulse. The attack on the bridge was renewed on the day following, but with similar success; and Ney, at length, found himself compelled to retreat, under circumstances which not only precluded his proposed junction with Soult, but rendered it necessary to take measures for the evacuation of Galicia.

June 8.

June 21. Accordingly, on the twenty-first, Ney gave up Corunna and Ferrol, and retired from the province through Lugo, Villa Franca, and Astorga.

Soult had not been more successful. Though almost daily within sight of Romana's army, the superior activity of his opponent, and his more accurate knowledge of the country, defeated all his efforts to bring him to battle. With an army harassed and exhausted by three weeks of incessant marching, Soult at length gave up his abortive pursuit, and retreated to Sanabria, where having recruited the worn strength of

June 24.

his soldiers, he proceeded to Zamora, in order to co-operate with the other armies.

We shall now give a brief sketch of the occurrences in Catalonia.

General Reding, who commanded in that province, had wisely determined to confine his efforts to the maintenance of a desultory warfare, without risking his army by a general engagement. Vigorous measures were adopted for the embodying of new levies, and every fifth man in the province was called on to bear arms. The French army having exhausted the resources of the country, was obliged to quit its position at Martorel and Villa Franca, and draw nearer to Tarragona.

Had Reding adhered to the prudent line of policy which his judgment dictated, there is little reason to doubt its being eventually crowned with success. But the popular voice was against it. The people were anxious for more immediate and striking results than could be expected to follow the more sure and cautious policy of their leader.

Against his better judgment, therefore, Reding consented to embark the army in a scheme for surprising Barcelona. A line of posts was

CHAP. VI.

1809.

February.

CHAP. VI. taken up, extending from Martorel through the
1809. Col de St. Christina to Tarragona; the head-
February. quarters of the whole, under Don Juan de Cas-
tro, being established at Igualada.

The project, however, was soon frustrated. The intention of the Spanish leader was anticipated by St. Cyr, who, on the sixteenth of February, when a general movement was about to be commenced, attacked the left of their line, which had been too much extended, and drove it back on Igualada, where large magazines had been most imprudently collected. These were taken by the enemy. The Spanish army, having neglected to occupy the road Llacuna in sufficient strength, were attacked in rear, and fell back, dispirited and in confusion, in the direction of Cervera, Cardona, and Manresa.

In consequence of this disaster, Castro was removed from the command, and subsequently disgraced his character by entering the service of the intruder.

No sooner did Reding receive intelligence of the defeat of Castro, than he determined to collect the scattered troops, and conduct them to Tarragona. Accordingly, with a Swiss battalion, three hundred horse, and six pieces of

light artillery, he set out, on the twentieth of February, to execute his important mission. He was speedily joined by the troops which were retreating from the Col de St. Christina, and by a body of twelve hundred men, who, after bravely defending themselves in the Monastery of Santa Cruz, had succeeded in cutting their way through the enemy. He then proceeded to St. Colonna de Queralt, where he effected a junction with Castro, by which his army was augmented to about ten thousand men.

At this moment, however, Reding received intelligence that Valls was already occupied by the enemy, with a view of intercepting his retreat. Had Reding then moved on Igualada, and subsequently on Montbuy, as St. Cyr was apprehensive he might, the French detachment at the former place, would probably have been cut off. But measures of promptitude and vigour were alien to the character of Reding. A council of war was held, by which it was decided that the army should proceed to Montblanch, where they arrived on the twenty-third. During the day, a reconnoitring party of the enemy had been observed in their rear; and thus certain

CHAP. VI.
1809.
February.

Feb. 23.

CHAP. VI. that their motions were known to the enemy, a
 1809. second council of war was held, at which it was
 February. determined to pass the Col de Riba, and thence
 retreat as they best could to Tarragona.

The movement thus about to be attempted, was
 one of great danger. It was to be made in a very
 difficult country, and in face of an enemy very
 superior both in numbers and in the quality of
 Feb. 25. his troops. In passing near to Valls the army of
 Reding was attacked by the division of Souham,
 by whom that town was occupied. That Gen-
 eral allowed the advanced-guard and part of the
 centre to pass unmolested, in the hope of cutting
 off the rear. In this manœuvre, however, he
 was foiled by the able dispositions of Reding,
 who rallying his troops which had been thrown
 into temporary confusion by the unexpectedness
 of the attack, succeeded in repelling the enemy
 with considerable loss.

Feb. 26. On the following day, the retreat to Tarrago-
 na was continued. The French, however, again
 came up with augmented force, and an engage-
 ment followed. The Spanish position was forced,
 yet the troops retreated from the field in good
 order for a considerable distance. Panic then
 seized them, and subordination was at an end.

The greater part of the soldiers, however, suc- CHAP. VI.
 ceeded in reaching Tarragona, being favoured 1809.
 by the darkness. Reding arrived there on the February.
 night of the action. This brave but unfortunate
 leader had received several wounds, of which he
 made no mention in his despatches. One of
 these subsequently proved mortal. The artillery
 and baggage fell into the enemy's hands.

After the battle of Valls, St. Cyr remained
 for about three weeks in the plain of Tarragona,
 where he experienced continual annoyance from
 the attacks of the Miquelets. This circumstance
 and the difficulty of feeding his army in a situa-
 tion where his communications and foraging par-
 ties were continually liable to be cut off, at
 length induced him to retire towards the Llo-
 bregat. The retreat of the French was of the
 greatest importance to the inhabitants of Tarrago-
 na. A fever had broken out in the city, and
 the departure of the enemy gave room for the
 distribution of the sick, and opportunity to re-
 lieve the over-crowded population collected with-
 in its walls. Reding died of his wounds. He
 was a Swiss by birth, and brother to the cele-
 brated patriot, Aloys Reding. Theodore fell in
 April.

CHAP. VI. the cause for which Aloys had fought—the cause
1809. of freedom.

April.

On the death of Reding, the Marquis de Coupigny succeeded to the temporary command of the Catalan army. He was superseded by Blake, whose powers were more extensive than those of his predecessors, being appointed Commander-in-chief in Catalonia, Valencia, and Arragon. The loss of nearly all the fortresses, and the dispersion of the armies, compelled him for a time to limit his views to the re-organization of the troops, and the encouragement of that species of harassing warfare for which the character of the country afforded such peculiar facilities.

Having succeeded in collecting a considerable force, the views of Blake became more extended. His first operations were fortunate. A French detachment, of about one thousand men, were cut off in an attempt to regain the fortress of Monzon. Blake then resolved to attempt the recovery of the city of Alcaniz, a position of considerable importance, as it intercepted the communication between Mequimenza and Tortosa, and commanded the high road to Valencia. May 28. In this, Blake was again successful. The town

was taken; and the enemy, commanded by Suchet, were repulsed in their most powerful efforts to regain it. After four attacks, the French army were compelled to retreat with great loss. CHAP. VI.

1809.
June.

The next object of Blake was the recovery of Zaragoza. With the united armies of Arragon and Valencia, he attacked the enemy under Suchet, who were strongly posted in front of the town. Here his good fortune failed. His troops were repulsed with considerable loss; and, harassed in his retreat by the French army, he took up a position on the heights of Sta. Maria, above Belchite, and resolved to stand the issue of a battle. Jun. 15.

This too was unfortunate. The raw Valencian troops gave way with little resistance. The panic spread, and the whole army soon fled in confusion, leaving their arms, artillery, and ammunition on the field. To this disgraceful conduct of the troops, a single regiment alone afforded an exception. They rallied at a short distance from the field, but were speedily cut to pieces. Jun. 18.

Suchet rapidly followed up the advantage he had thus easily acquired. He entered Alcaniz,

CHAP. VI. Calanda, and Carpe, making many prisoners, and dispersing everything opposed to him. In Aragon resistance was no longer attempted, and Blake retired into Catalonia, where he endeavoured to re-organize his scattered army.

1809.
June.

It was at this period that the system of Guerilla warfare, which had spontaneously sprung up in different parts of the Peninsula, became so widely extended as to exercise an important influence on the character of the contest.

When the French first attempted the subjugation of Spain, so pervading was the hostility of the natives, that it was found necessary to divide their armies into small bodies, in order to procure subsistence, and maintain subjection in the towns and villages. Inferior officers were thus raised into commanders; and, restrained by no feeling of responsibility, plunder, cruelty, and oppression, on the one hand, were followed by hatred and desire of vengeance, on the other. Thus strife, of the most deadly and inveterate character, was daily waged between the invaders and the native population. Many of the latter, rendered desperate by the destruction of their property, fled to the mountains, where they remained, unless when compelled

by necessity to descend to the neighbouring villages in search of provisions. When at these times they chanced to encounter a small party of the enemy, an irregular fight ensued. No quarter was given on either side, and the bloody character of these contests tended still further to increase the feelings of animosity on both sides. The French, indignant at the slaughter of their countrymen, by men whom they at once feared and despised, continued to wreak their vengeance on the defenceless inhabitants. These were driven in greater numbers to join the desperate and lawless bands in the mountains; and thus arose that general and extended system of warfare, which carried with it results far greater and more important to the cause of Spain, than the greatest successes which her armies had been able to achieve.

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The augmented atrocities of the invaders, tended only to deepen the hatred of the nation, and to impress more indelibly the necessity of resistance. Unity of sentiment and purpose brought with it a certain unity of action in the undirected efforts of the people; and to regular warfare succeeded a system of war in detail,—a species of organized disorder,—of petty but fe-

CHAP. VI. 1809. rocious contests, at once suited to the circumstances of the country, and the fierce and untamed spirit of its population. These bands, in their character and objects at once predatory and patriotic, were joined by active and enterprising men of all classes. Intelligence of their successes, exaggerated by frequent repetition, spread like wildfire through the country, stimulating the hopes, and increasing the confidence of the people; and the French soon found themselves assailed by an instrument of tremendous power, to which no efficacious resistance could be offered.

The Guerillas were without uniform and without pay. Having a perfect knowledge of the country, they assembled or dispersed at pleasure; and thus while they were always prepared to co-operate for the destruction of such bodies of the enemy as approached their district, they in a moment became intangible to any superior force detached in pursuit.

In the different provinces, leaders of distinguished talent and enterprize occasionally arose, who gave to this desultory warfare additional vigour and effect. The names of men, who contributed so powerfully to the liberation of their

country, merit record. In Old Castile the Guerillas were commanded by Juan Diaz Martin, better known by the title of the Empecinado. In Asturias, the chief of this body was Juan Diaz Porlier. In Navarre, Don Mariano de Renovales, who had distinguished himself by the defence of the Convent of St. Joseph, during the siege of Zaragoza, collected a band of mountaineers, and occasioned much annoyance to the enemy. High offers were made, in hope of inducing him to join the French service; but the patriotism of Renovales was inflexible.

Last, not least, was Xavier Mina. This celebrated leader brought the system of Guerilla warfare to its greatest perfection. In the northern provinces he occasioned the most important losses to the enemy, by his boldness and perpetual vigilance. The most strenuous efforts were repeatedly made to surprise and annihilate his force; but in vain. His band was like the Giant, in Ariosto, whose limbs, when severed by the sword of Astolfo, again united, and presented an antagonist, whom the most powerful efforts of hostility could not subdue.

In the year following, Mina was taken by the enemy, and sent prisoner into France.—

CHAP. VI. His uncle, Espoz y Mina, succeeded him in command; and, by that leader, the system of desultory warfare was carried on with undiminished vigour and success.

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On the whole, since the commencement of the year, a material improvement had taken place in the prospects of the Spanish nation. The enemy had been compelled to a disgraceful abandonment both of Portugal and Galicia; a supply of money had been received from the American colonies; Napoleon, in the prosecution of the war with Austria, had at Essling encountered a severe reverse, and a British army was preparing to advance into Spain, with the view of driving the invaders from the capital.

In the succeeding portion of this work, Spain will no longer be found exclusively dependent on her own energies and resources. From the period when Sir Arthur Wellesley returned to the Peninsula, a mightier agent was continually at work for her deliverance. It is to the operations of the British armies that the attention of the reader will henceforth be chiefly directed; and the narrowness of our limits demands that the efforts of the native troops—rarely attended by important or permanent success—should be noticed with comparative brevity.

CHAPTER VII.

CAMPAIGN OF WELLESLEY AND CUESTA.

ON their return from Oporto, the British army concentrated on the Tagus. Victor had withdrawn from the frontier of Portugal to Talavera de la Reyna, where he was kept in check by Cuesta. Sir Arthur Wellesley, therefore, found himself at liberty to engage in operations for the liberation of Spain.

At the period in question, the distribution of the French armies was nearly as follows:—Victor, with about twenty-three thousand men, was on the Tagus; a corps of eighteen thousand, under Sebastiani, was in La Mancha; the corps of Ney, Mortier, and Soult, amounting in all to about sixty thousand men, were in Galicia, Leon and Old Castile; ten thousand were in the neighbourhood of Madrid; in Ar-

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CHAP. VII. ragon and Catalonia there were about forty thousand; and, in addition to the force already enumerated, there was a division of cavalry, under Kellerman, in Old Castile, employed in maintaining the communication between Madrid and Burgos. Neither the army in Catalonia nor the force of Kellerman, however, could be considered as disposable for the general purposes of the war, unless in cases of the greatest emergency.

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The allied armies were disposed in the following manner:—The British, consisting of about nineteen thousand infantry, and fifteen hundred cavalry, were, in the neighbourhood of Abrantes, preparing to enter Spain; the Estramaduran army, under Cuesta, occupied the left bank of the Tagus, and commanded the bridge at Almaraz,—it consisted of about thirty-seven thousand men; a force of nearly eighteen thousand, under Vanegas, was in the Carolinas; the army of Romana, about fifteen thousand strong, was in Galicia, and might be expected to hold in check the corps of Ney. Blake, with about twenty thousand men, was in Valencia.

Such was the relative position of the hostile armies. The plan of operations concerted by Sir

Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta was as follows:—CHAP. VII.

The British army was to march on Placentia, and having formed a junction with that under Cuesta, the combined armies were to advance on Madrid, with the view of liberating the capital. Twelve thousand Portuguese, under Beresford, with a Spanish force of about ten thousand men, commanded by the Duke del Parque, were to watch the operations of Soult, from the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and detachments of the Spanish army were, likewise, to be posted at Perales and Banos, to maintain these important passes, and check Soult's advance on Placentia. Vanegas was to descend from La Mancha, and advance on the capital from the south.

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We would now say something of the country which is about to become the scene of operations, at once memorable and important.

The frontier of Spain, between the Douro and the Tagus, presents but two lines which an invading army can follow in advancing upon Madrid. The one runs by Salamanca, where it crosses the Tormes; the other by Placentia and the valley of the Tagus. The whole of the country between these two points is impracti-

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CHAP. VII. cable for artillery. The long chain of mountains, which take their rise towards the sources of the Tagus, follow that river in its course to where it enters the frontier of Portugal, and form an immense and almost impassable barrier from Segovia to Placentia. Between these mountains and the river lies what is called the valley of the Tagus, at some places only a few miles wide, at others enlarging in latitude according to the inflections of the river. Along this valley runs the principal road from Placentia to Madrid.

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A country, which is bounded on one flank by a deep river, and on the other by a range of lofty mountains, must naturally be supposed to afford strong stations of defence. It does so at Oropesa, at Maqueda, and at Santa Cruz; and by defending these positions, the French would have been enabled to oppose very powerful obstacles to the advance of the allies.

The northern road to the capital, leading by the Douro, was defended by the army under Soult, consisting of his own corps, and those of Ney and Mortier, which could be concentrated by a few marches. Victor's force occupied the road leading by the valley of the Tagus. These

armies communicated across the intervening mountains, by the roads in the neighbourhood of Segovia, while by that leading from Salamanca to Placentia, either Victor or Soult would be enabled to act offensively against the rear of an enemy who should advance against the other. The immediate object of both leaders was to cover the capital, the possession of which, in every point of view, was of the greatest consequence to the invaders.

On the twenty-seventh of June, the British army broke up from its cantonments on the Tagus, and, in two columns, directed its march on Placentia. Of these, one, consisting of three divisions of infantry, and the whole of the cavalry, advanced by way of Coria; the other column proceeded by a different route, and the whole army were concentrated at Placentia about the tenth of July. The Lusitanian legion, under Sir Robert Wilson, with several Spanish battalions of light infantry, were stationed on the Tietar, in order to act independently on the flank or rear of the enemy, as circumstances might direct.

From Placentia the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley might, with equal facility, be directed

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CHAP. VII. against either Soult or Victor; and, while the

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British army remained in that neighbourhood, no decided indication had been given of the intention of its leader. But the moment it commenced its march from Placentia, the object of the allies could no longer remain concealed; and one of the French armies would, from that moment, find itself at liberty to engage in operations in support of that threatened with attack, either by effecting a junction by the passes of the Guadarama, or by moving towards Placentia, and thus placing itself in rear of the allied armies.

While the army remained at Placentia, Sir Arthur Wellesley went to the Spanish headquarters, and held an interview with Cuesta. He found that leader decidedly averse from the project of dividing his army, and anxious that the passes of Perales and Banos should be occupied by the British, in order that his own force might enjoy the chief honour of defeating Victor in the contemplated engagement. On these points, however, he was at length overruled, but the force eventually detached was altogether inadequate to the object. The plan of operations failed, too, in another particular. The orders

sent to Vanegas were countermanded by the CHAP. VII.

Junta; and thus did the corps under that General remain inoperative, at the moment when its services were most necessary to the success of the campaign.

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In the meanwhile, the most confident promises were made by Cuesta, that no difficulty would be found in provisioning the armies in the country they were about to enter; and on the return of Sir Arthur Wellesley, rapid preparations were made for continuing the advance on Madrid.

On the eighteenth, the army broke up from Jul. 18.

Placentia, and halted at Majadas; thus clearly indicating that the corps of Victor was about to become the immediate object of hostile operation. On the twentieth, the British headquarters were at Oropesa, where a junction was effected with Cuesta's army. On the twenty-second, the advance was continued; and the enemy were driven from the town of Talavera de la Reyna, across the Alberche, where Victor placed his army in position.

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Sir Arthur Wellesley was anxious to attack the enemy on the morning of the twenty-third, but to this measure Cuesta refused his

CHAP.VII. assent. In vain did the British General urge
 1809. the inevitable dangers of delay in the precarious
 July. position of the armies, and entreat that
 time so precious should not be wasted in inaction. Cuesta could neither be swayed by argument nor influenced by entreaty. He was obstinate and lethargic; fell asleep during the conference; and Sir Arthur Wellesley felt the full extent of his misfortune, in being thus dependant on a man, who, however honest in principle, was evidently wanting in all the qualities of a General.

In the meanwhile, Sir Robert Wilson quitted
 Jul. 23. his position on the Tietar on the fifteenth, and
 on the twenty-third reached Escalona, a town
 about eight leagues distant from Madrid, and in
 rear of Victor's army. In consequence of this
 movement, the French army fell back during
 the night in the direction of Toledo.

Other circumstances likewise contributed to
 thwart the views of Sir Arthur Wellesley. The
 promise that his army during its advance would
 be furnished with the necessary supplies by the
 authorities of the country, had not been fulfilled.
 The troops had suffered considerably from want
 of provisions; and Sir Arthur, thus circumstanced,

deemed it right to inform Cuesta, that unless CHAP.VII.
 furnished with the articles which he had hitherto
 repeatedly and vainly demanded, he could not
 1809. consent that his army—utterly deficient both
 July. in means of transport and subsistence—should
 advance to a greater distance from their resources.

This notification contributed still further to
 derange the cordiality of the allied leaders.
 Cuesta expressed his determination to pursue
 the enemy, even if unsupported by the British;
 and on the twenty-fourth of July, he put
 Jul. 24. his army in motion by Santa Olalla, where he
 arrived on the morning of the twenty-fifth.

Early on the twenty-sixth, the van of Cuesta's
 Jul. 26. army was attacked by the enemy, and after considerable
 resistance driven back in confusion. The Duke
 del Albuquerque advanced with his division to
 their support; and by a gallant charge repulsed
 the enemy, and thus enabled the defeated troops
 to rally. This timely success saved the army;
 for the road was blocked up with baggage and
 provision waggons, and panic had already begun
 to diffuse itself in the ranks.

After this engagement the Spanish army was
 suffered to fall back unmolested to the Alberche,

CHAP. VII. where a British force was stationed for its support. The ground on which Cuesta halted his army was low and unfavourable, with the river in its rear; yet in this position he determined to give battle. At daybreak, Sir Arthur Wellesley entered the Spanish camp, and sought an interview with Cuesta. The General he found asleep in his tent, and the troops in that state of disorder, into which an imperfectly disciplined army is almost necessarily thrown, by an unforeseen and hasty retreat. Every persuasion was adopted to induce Cuesta to quit his present dangerous position, and retire to the high ground on the opposite side of the Alberche. The old Spaniard, however, was deaf to argument. His constant reply was, "in these times a retiring army is always beaten;" and he therefore determined to maintain his ground.

Annoyed at the unreasonable and perverse obstinacy of his coadjutor, Sir Arthur Wellesley declined committing his army by any participation in a project so absurdly perilous, and fell back to a strong position in the neighbourhood of Talavera. Thus left unsupported, the eyes of Cuesta were at length opened to the danger which awaited him; and on the approach

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of the enemy, he retired across the Alberche, and again united his army with the British.

Intelligence of the movements of the allied armies had no sooner reached Madrid, than Joseph, accompanied by Marshal Jourdan, who acted as Major-General to the armies, set out from Madrid with all his disposable troops; and effected an union with the corps of Victor and Sebastiani, in the neighbourhood of Toledo. Immediate orders were despatched to Marshal Soult, to form a junction with the corps of Ney and Mortier; and, with this combined force, to advance, by rapid marches, on Placentia, with the view of intercepting the line of operations of the allied armies, and cutting off their retreat.

The situation of Sir Arthur Wellesley had now become critical in the extreme. The army in his front amounted to about fifty thousand men; that advancing in his rear was considerably stronger. In such circumstances, had the army under Joseph remained—as it was their obvious policy to have done—on the defensive, no choice remained to the British General but to attack them under all advantages of position, or to retreat. In the former case,

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CHAP. VII. he could have derived little support from the Spanish army, whose want of steadiness and discipline disqualified them from manœuvring in presence of an enemy enjoying all the advantages of ground. In the latter case, the only road open was to the southward of the Tagus; and, to effect the passage of that river, when closely followed by a powerful enemy, would necessarily have been an operation of great difficulty and danger.

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The plan of the campaign, therefore, appears to have been radically vicious. The allies were placed in a situation from the perils of which they could be extricated only by retreat. While every hour improved the situation of the French, it necessarily darkened the prospects of their opponents. In truth the utmost that could be hoped was, that the talent and promptitude of Sir Arthur Wellesley, would be found sufficient to extricate his army from its perilous position, after signalizing the prowess of British soldiers, by the acquisition of a barren though honourable victory.

Such was the situation of Sir Arthur Wellesley before the battle of Talavera. From

much of its danger, he was fortunately extricated by the blunder of the enemy, who determined on attacking the allied armies in their position.

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The ground occupied by the allies, was about two miles in extent. The Spanish army was on the right, the British on the left of the line. The position of the former was extremely strong, being almost unapproachable, from the mud enclosures of olive grounds and vineyards in their front; and they were so posted in the ravines which abounded, as to be sheltered from the enemy's artillery. Their right was *appuyed* by the Tagus; their left by the British.

The ground on the centre and left of the line was more open, but intersected with roads leading to the town; and the front of the whole position was covered by a ravine formed by the winter torrents, but then dry. The left flank of the British rested on an eminence of considerable boldness, and their right on another somewhat lower, on which a redoubt had been begun, in order to secure the connexion of the armies, but was not sufficiently advanced to add much to the security of the troops stationed for defence of the height. These consisted of two brigades of infantry, under Brigadier-General

CHAP. VII. Campbell, supported by a battery of about ten
1809. guns. The Guards, General Cameron's brigade,
July, and the German legion, formed the centre, under
Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke. The division
of General Hill was on the left, where two bri-
gades of artillery were posted for defence of the
hill in which the position terminated. The re-
mainder of the guns were distributed on the most
favourable points along the line.

The cavalry was commanded by Lieutenant-
General Payne. Major-General Cotton's light
brigade supported the right and centre. Briga-
dier-General Anson's, and the heavy brigade
under General Fane, were on the left.

The Spanish infantry was formed in two lines,
and in rear of the left the Duke del Albuquerque
was stationed with the main body of the Spanish
cavalry. Subsequently a detachment of about
three thousand light infantry, under Don Luis
Bassecourt, was moved to the valley below the
British left, in order to observe the movements
of a body of the enemy which appeared in the
mountains beyond, but at too great a distance to
exert any influence on the contest.

A division of infantry and a brigade of caval-
ry, under General Mackenzie, had been stationed

in a wood on the right of the Alberche, which CHAP. VII.
covered the left of the British army. About 1809.
noon, this advanced force was suddenly attacked July.
by the enemy, who succeeded in penetrating be-
tween the two brigades of which it was com-
posed. Some confusion ensued, but order was
speedily restored by the exertions of the officers,
and the retreat was finely covered by the bri-
gade of Colonel Donkin, which retired and took
up its position with perfect regularity and stea-
diness. The division of General Mackenzie was
then posted as a second line in rear of the centre.

In this affair Sir Arthur Wellesley narrowly
escaped being made prisoner. He had ascended
a tower immediately in rear of Mackenzie's divi-
sion, to observe the motions of the enemy. For-
tunately, he observed the troops to falter, and
descended barely in time to escape, by throwing
himself on his horse in the midst of the affray.

In the meantime, the enemy continued to
push on his columns, and a partial action en-
sued along the whole front of the line. A divi-
sion of cavalry advanced towards the right of
the allies, and threatened the town of Talavera.
But the difficulties of the ground, and the fire of
the Spanish batteries, soon obliged them to re-

Jul. 27.

CHAP. VI. treat. A body of about five thousand Spaniards,
 1809. however, though posted in the strongest man-
 July. ner, threw down their arms and fled.*

Under these circumstances, the whole French army, in number about fifty thousand, assembled in front of the position occupied by the allies. Towards evening, a resolute attempt was made to gain possession of the hill on the left, which was regarded as the key of the position. The enemy advanced at double-quick to the assault, covered by a heavy cannonade. The attack being unexpected, was for a moment successful, and the French gained possession of the height; but the forty-eighth and twenty-ninth regiments being brought up by General Hill, poured in a volley; and the twenty-ninth, by a most splendid charge, drove back the enemy in confusion, and established themselves on the summit.

In the course of the night another attempt

* So indignant was Cuesta at this dastardly conduct, that after the action he ordered the division to be decimated; and it was only at the earnest entreaty of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that he consented to a second decimation of those on whom the lot had fallen. In consequence, only six officers, and about thirty men were executed.—JONES.

was made to carry this important post. This CHAP. VII.
 too was unfortunate. Colonel Donkin's brigade 1809.
 had been moved up to support the troops on the July.
 hill; and the enemy were repulsed with little difficulty. The loss on both sides during these attacks was considerable. General Hill was at one time surrounded by the enemy, and received a wound in the shoulder.

The troops lay all night upon their arms in expectation of attack. At two in the morning, the Spanish line was alarmed by the approach of the enemy's light troops, who were received by a brisk discharge of musquetry, which ceased in about ten minutes; and the silence of night again prevailed on the field of battle.

At length day broke on the contending armies, drawn up in battle-array, in the positions which they respectively occupied at the commencement of the action on the preceding evening. At five o'clock, two strong columns of the French were formed in front of the height on the left, which they had already twice vainly attempted to carry. Under cover of a tremendous fire from fifty pieces of cannon, the columns advanced across the ravine, which ran along the front of the position, and ascended

CHAP.VII. the acclivity on which were posted the brigades of General Tilson and General Richard Stewart. By the troops under these officers, they were received with the utmost gallantry and steadiness. A heavy fire of musquetry on both sides was followed by a charge from the British; and the assailants were driven back at the bayonet's point, with great slaughter. The British cavalry were ordered up to charge the right flank of the retiring column, but unfortunately it was at too great a distance.

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The object, however, was too important to be lightly given up by the enemy. The attempt on the height was repeatedly made, and repeatedly terminated in a similar result, till, disheartened by the uniform failure of their efforts, they retired from the scene of contest, leaving the ground covered with their dead.

About eleven o'clock the firing ceased. A period of truce was tacitly recognised by both armies, which the French employed in cooking their dinners, while the British reposed on the ground, apparently regardless of the presence of their enemy.

During this interval, likewise, the wounded on both sides were conveyed to the rear. From

the closeness of the engagement, they lay intermingled on the field; and while engaged in this humane and peaceful duty, a friendly intercourse took place between the French and English soldiers; and, shaking hands, they mutually expressed admiration of the gallantry displayed by their opponents.

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About one o'clock, it became evident, from several heavy clouds of dust, that the enemy's columns were again advancing. At two, the work of havoc recommenced with a heavy cannonade, followed by a general attack on the whole front of the British line. The enemy's infantry came on in four distinct columns, covered by their light troops, while the cavalry, drawn up in rear, waited only for the first appearance of confusion to complete the victory by an overwhelming charge.

Notwithstanding the destruction which the French artillery occasioned in their ranks, the British did not open fire till the close approach of the columns enabled them to do so with effect. That on the right, under General Sebastiani, was suffered nearly to reach the summit of the hill crowned by the redoubt, before any obstruction was made to their progress.

CHAP.VII. A heavy fire was at length opened by General Campbell's brigade, and two Spanish battalions, posted on the height. The British then charged, and in gallant style drove the enemy before them; and, carrying a battery, took thirteen pieces of cannon. The broken column, however, having rallied, was again advancing, when it was charged in flank by a Spanish regiment of cavalry, and compelled once more to retreat in confusion.

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In the meantime two columns on the enemy's right, consisting of Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions, supported by cavalry, again endeavoured to gain possession of the hill on the left. They were directed to support the attack on the front, by marching along the bottom of the ravine, and turning the flank of the position; while a body of light troops, by a wide movement across the mountains, were to threaten an advance on the rear. To watch the movements of the latter, a body of Spanish light infantry were moved into the valley, in rear of the left of the position.

These formidable preparations for the attack of what was unquestionably the most important point in the whole position, naturally excited apprehensions for its safety. The conical shape

of the hill did not admit of its being occupied by any considerable body of troops, and Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to derange, if possible, the combinations of the enemy, by a charge of cavalry. General Anson's brigade, consisting of the twenty-third light dragoons, and the first regiment of German hussars, supported by the heavy cavalry under General Fane, were accordingly ordered to charge the enemy's column, at the moment when emerging from the valley they should attempt to deploy.

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These regiments advanced with great gallantry, regardless of the fire of several battalions of infantry. Unfortunately, the front of the enemy was protected by a deep ravine, which had not been perceived, and which was found impassable for many of the horses. Confusion ensued in consequence. A considerable body of the twenty-third, however, led by Major Ponsonby, succeeded in crossing it, and passing between the divisions of Ruffin and Villatte, fell with irresistible impetuosity on two regiments of mounted chasseurs, which at once gave way. The twenty-third was then charged by some regiments in reserve, surrounded, broken, and almost destroyed. A few only escaped (among

CHAP. VII. whom was Lord William Russel) by passing at full speed through the intervals of the French columns.

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This charge was the only unfortunate occurrence of the day. It was ill-timed and injudicious. The ground had not been reconnoitred. Sir Arthur Wellesley's intention was, that the cavalry should charge when the enemy, by deploying, had extended and exposed their flank. When the charge was actually made, the enemy were still in column, and too strongly posted to afford any prospect of success. Yet notwithstanding its failure, the French were so astonished at the boldness and gallantry of the attempt, as to desist from all further effort to gain possession of the hill; and this imposing movement, which at first threatened to compromise the safety of the whole army, was in effect attended by no important result.

In the meanwhile, the entire corps of Marshal Victor advanced against the centre. One column, composed chiefly of Germans, deployed on the level ground before they attempted to ascend the position. The point selected for attack was immediately on the right of the ground occupied by General Hill's division, which form-

ed the extreme left of the line. On the first indication of the enemy's intention, General Sherbrooke gave orders that his division should prepare for the charge. The assailants came on, over the rough and broken ground in the valley, with great resolution, and in the most imposing regularity, and were encountered by the British with their usual firmness. The whole division, as if moved by one powerful and undivided impulse, advanced to meet them; and pouring in a most galling and destructive fire, their ranks were speedily broken, and they gave way.

The impetuosity of the troops, however, was not to be restrained; and the Guards, having advanced too far in the ardour of pursuit, were powerfully attacked in flank by the enemy's reserve. The period was critical. In a few minutes the Guards had lost above five hundred of their number; their ranks were mowed down by the fire of the enemy's artillery; and the destruction of the whole brigade appeared inevitable. But the prescience of Sir Arthur Wellesley retrieved the army from the consequences of this misfortune. He had foreseen the danger to which the impetuosity of the Guards was likely to expose them, and ordered the forty-eighth re-

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CHAP. VII. giment, and the cavalry under General Cotton, to
 1809. advance to their support. Under the cover thus
 July. afforded, the Guards, entirely broken, were enabled to effect their retreat. The enemy then directed their efforts against the forty-eighth; but that regiment bravely stood its ground, till the Guards again rallying advanced with cheers to its support. The French then gave way, and were pursued for a considerable distance, though covered in their retreat by a strong body of cavalry and artillery.

Thus foiled at all points, the enemy withdrew their columns, and again concentrated on their position. But the fire of their artillery did not cease till dark. A dim and cheerless moon then rose, and threw a pallid lustre on the field, covered by the dying and the dead. Parties were sent out to bring in the wounded. The enemy was similarly employed, and large fires were lighted along the whole front of his line.

The loss of the British army in this battle was severe: it amounted in killed, wounded, and missing, to five thousand three hundred and sixty-seven, and was occasioned chiefly by the close and well directed fire of the French artil-

lery, which was kept up with little intermission throughout the day. Great as this amount of CHAP. VII.
 casualties unquestionably was, in an army whose 1809.
 numerical force did not exceed nineteen thousand July.
 men, it would have been incalculably greater had not Sir Arthur Wellesley directed the different brigades to lie extended on the ground behind the crest of the ridge, and only exposed them to the full action of the guns on the approach of the attacking columns.

In this action, Major-General Mackenzie, and Brigadier-General Langworth, fell; Major-General Hill, and Major-General R. Campbell, were wounded.

The loss of the French, however, was much greater than that of the allies. It amounted to about ten thousand men. The loss of the Spaniards did not exceed twelve hundred and fifty in killed and wounded. The latter were only partially engaged; but the little which devolved on them to perform, was performed well.—Their presence in position prevented a considerable body of the enemy from becoming disposable for attack on the British. A body of Spanish artillery on the left was excellently

CHAP. VII. served; and their cavalry made a gallant charge, which was entirely successful.

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About six o'clock in the evening, a dreadful occurrence took place. The long, dry grass took fire, and the flames spreading rapidly over the field of action, a great number of the wounded were scorched to death. For those who escaped, a large hospital was established in the town of Talavera.

During the night, the soldiers lay upon their arms, without provisions of any kind. It was expected that the French would remain in their position, and renew the battle in the morning. But this anticipation was not realized. Under cover of the night they retired, leaving in the hands of the British twenty pieces of artillery. One standard was taken, and one destroyed, by the twenty-ninth regiment. At daybreak, the rear-guard, consisting of cavalry, was alone visible.

Jul. 29.

In the course of the twenty-ninth, the army was reinforced by the arrival of a troop of horse-artillery, and a brigade of light troops from Lisbon, under General Crawford. Under the circumstances of his situation, however, it was im-

possible for Sir Arthur Wellesley to follow up his victory. The position he occupied was still one of extreme peril. A powerful enemy was advancing on his rear; and no reliance could be placed for the supply of his army, either on the promises of the Spanish General, or of the Junta.

The army of Vanegas, which, in obedience to the orders of the Supreme Junta, had advanced from Madrilejos, was engaged, during the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth, in endeavouring, to dislodge the French garrison from Toledo. His advance pushed on during the night to the neighbourhood of Madrid, and took prisoners some patrols of the enemy. Vanegas, however, no sooner learned from the prisoners that Joseph and Sebastiani were approaching, than he recalled the parties which had crossed the Tagus; and, moving on his right, desisted from any further offensive operations.

The intelligence that Vanegas had failed in executing the part allotted to him, was speedily followed by information that Soult had with facility driven the Spaniards from the passes leading from Salamanca to Placentia. It was in consequence arranged between the Gen-

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CHAP. VII. 1809. July. erals, that the British army should immediately march to attack Soult, and that Cuesta should remain in the position of Talavera, to protect this movement from any operation of Victor. The wounded likewise were to be left in charge of Cuesta, who declared himself delighted with this mark of confidence, and promised, that, if by any chance a retrogressive movement should become necessary, his first care would be the safety of the British committed to his protection.

Aug. 3. On the morning of the third of August, the British accordingly commenced their march on Oropesa. On his arrival there, Sir Arthur Wellesley received intelligence that Soult was already at Naval Moral, thus cutting off the communication with Almaraz, at which place he was informed the Spaniards, in their retreat from Banos, had crossed the river, and destroyed the bridge.

The information thus brought, did not, however, change his intention of advancing against Soult, and bringing him to battle. But, shortly after, a courier arrived from Cuesta, announcing, that, as the enemy were stated to be advancing on his flank, and as it was ascertained that the corps of Ney and Mortier had been united un-

der Soult, he had determined on quitting his position, and joining the British army at Oropesa. This movement was executed the same night; and nearly the whole of the British wounded were left unprotected in the town of Talavera.

CHAP. VII. 1809. August. The conduct of Cuesta, in this precipitate retreat, is altogether indefensible. He had suddenly abandoned the position intrusted to him, without any urgent necessity; for it subsequently appeared that Victor was then at some distance, and not engaged in any movement on the Spanish army. Nothing indeed but the presence of a superior force, and the impossibility of providing for their safety, could justify his relinquishing the British wounded. The distance which separated the allied armies was only five leagues, and in the course of a few hours he could have exchanged communications with Sir Arthur Wellesley. But Cuesta, acting on his first impulse, put his army at once in motion; and, so regardless was he of the sacred trust which had been confided to him, that he allotted but seven waggons for the transport of the wounded. By indefatigable exertion, and by the sacrifice of much baggage, Sir Arthur Wellesley succeeded

CHAP. VII. in procuring about forty more, by which the greater number of the sufferers were rescued.

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In quitting the position of Talavera, Cuesta had abandoned the only situation in which the advance of Victor on the British rear could be resisted with any prospect of success. By this unexpected movement, the whole circumstances of the armies had been changed. Whether, had Cuesta remained faithful to his engagement, the projected scheme of operations was likely to be crowned with success, is a speculative question, on the discussion of which we shall not enter. This at least is certain, that by the vacillation of the Spanish leader the whole calculations of Sir Arthur Wellesley were at once overthrown. With a powerful enemy, both in front and rear, who, by a combination of movements, might bring an overwhelming force against him, one course only remained. The bridge of Almaraz had been destroyed, and Sir Arthur determined to throw his army across the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo, which the retreat of Cuesta had left open to the enemy.

Before quitting Oropesa on the morning of the fourth, Sir Arthur Wellesley had an interview with Cuesta, and represented to him that,

Aug. 4.

situated as the armies then were, the only prudent measure was to take up the line of the Tagus, and, in a strong defensive position, to await the collection of stores, and the occurrence of more favourable prospects. But the Spaniard, who, but the day before, had been driven by his fears to a precipitate retreat, now felt his courage restored by the presence of the British, and vehemently urged the propriety of giving battle to the enemy. He refused to accede to the proposal of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who tired with combating the reasons of so shallow and obstinate an opponent, at length thought it necessary to state, that whatever course the Spanish leader might pursue, he certainly would not expose the army under his orders to foolish and unprofitable hazard. On the conclusion of the conference, orders were accordingly given for the march of the British, who on the same day crossed the Tagus at Arzobispo.

On the fifth, the army pursued its march through a country of extreme difficulty, and halted in the neighbourhood of Valdela Casa. On the seventh it reached Deleytosa, where a halt was found necessary, in order to refresh the troops, whose sufferings had been very great,

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CHAP.VII. from the extreme heat of the weather, insufficient nourishment, and the miserable condition of the roads.

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On the same day, Victor entered Talavera, where he behaved with the utmost humanity and kindness to the wounded British. Joseph, when it was ascertained that Sir Arthur Wellesley had crossed the Tagus, went to Aranjuez. Mortier and Soult marched on Arzobisbo, and Ney on Almaraz, with the view of cutting off the retreat of the Allies. But this object was defeated by the precaution of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had posted the division of General Crawford to prevent the passage of the river.

In the meanwhile, Cuesta had followed the British in their retreat to the bridge of Arzobisbo, and leaving the Duke del Albuquerque with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to defend it, he withdrew the remainder of his army to Paraleda de Garben. The French, however, having taken post on the opposite side of the river, soon succeeded in discovering a ford by which they crossed, and surprising the Spaniards, drove them at once from the works, with the loss of thirty pieces of cannon. After this, Cuesta with his whole force

fell back on Deleytosa, while the British moved to Xaraicejo.

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Frustrated in his hopes of passing the Tagus at Almaraz, which would have placed the allies in a situation of great danger, Soult was desirous of again uniting the corps of Ney and Mortier to his own; and, by a rapid march, to interpose his army between those of Wellesley and Beresford, while two divisions of the corps of Victor should guard the passages of the Tagus from Talavera to Almaraz. Soult then proposed to push on to Abrantes; and having gained possession of that important stronghold, to advance on Lisbon, entertaining little doubt of the immediate submission of the capital.

This plan, however, did not meet the approbation of Jourdan. The corps of Ney was ordered to Salamanca, in the neighbourhood of which the Spaniards, under the Duke del Parque, were actively engaged in the prosecution of a desultory war. Soult himself, was directed to remain at Placentia, and to leave the corps of Mortier to guard the Tagus.

Meanwhile, Sir Robert Wilson, who, at Escalona, found himself cut off by the enemy from Arzobisbo, moved rapidly to his right,

CHAP. VII. crossed the Tietar, and scrambling over the mountains, gained with difficulty the pass of Banos, at the very moment when the corps of Ney was discovered to be approaching on its march from Placentia to the North. Sir Robert Wilson, with his usual enterprize and gallantry, determined to make an effort to defend the pass; but, after a spirited resistance of several hours, the superior numbers of the enemy prevailed, and the Lusitanian legion was dislodged with great slaughter, and its fugitive remnant with difficulty escaped to Castello Branco.

Vanegas, after relinquishing his attempt on Toledo, remained with his army in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez. On the fifth of August, he succeeded in gaining a decided advantage over an advanced division of the enemy. On learning the retreat of Cuesta, he subsequently fell back to Madrilejos, and opened a communication with that General, who directed him on no account to risk an action, but to remain prepared to combine his movements with those of the allied armies. But between Cuesta and the Supreme Junta there was no unity of purpose; and harassed by

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inconsistent orders, Vanegas was unfortunately induced again to advance, and give battle to the corps of Sebastiani at Almonacid. This engagement, though many of the Spanish troops behaved with great gallantry, terminated in the complete defeat of the army of Vanegas. It was driven to the Sierra Morena, with the loss of all its baggage and artillery.

With this action terminated the campaign which had been undertaken for the relief of Madrid, and the expulsion of the enemy from the central provinces of Spain. The British army at Xaraicejo, still served as a shield to the southern provinces, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, (whom the gratitude of his country had now ennobled,) considered it of importance to maintain the position he then occupied. But the total failure of supplies rendered this impossible, and about the twentieth of August he fell back through Merida on Badajos, in the neighbourhood of which he established his army.

At this period all operations in concert ceased between the English and Spanish armies. The Supreme Junta complained bitterly of the retreat of the former, which left the road to Se-

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Aug. 11.

Aug. 20.

CHAP.VII. ville and Cadiz open to the enemy, while the
 1809. Marquis Wellesley, then ambassador in Spain,
 August. made strong representations of the privations
 to which the British army had been exposed, by
 the inattention and neglect of the authorities.
 In the correspondence which ensued, it appeared
 that the measure of retreat had been forced on
 Lord Wellington, by the absolute impossibility of
 supporting his army in the ground he occupied ;
 and that so far from shewing a contemptuous dis-
 regard of the wishes of the Junta, it was in com-
 pliance with their earnest entreaty that he had
 retained his army in the neighbourhood of Ba-
 dajoz, notwithstanding the well-known unhealth-
 iness of the situation.

By these unpleasant discussions, however, a
 spirit of temporary estrangement was generated
 between the nations, and jealousies were excited
 which could not fail to operate injuriously on
 the interests of the common cause.

Thus ended the campaign. Of its policy we shall
 say little, because, in truth, little remains to be
 said. The calculations of the allied Generals ap-
 pear throughout to have been founded on prin-
 ciples radically vicious, and it seems impossible
 that any permanent and important benefit could,

under the most favourable circumstances, have CHAP.VII.
 resulted from the execution of a project so rash
 and precarious. Fortunately there was no con-
 cert in the operations of the adverse Gene-
 rals. The battle of Talavera was fought by
 the enemy, in utter recklessness and ignorance
 of the advantages they possessed. Had Lord
 Wellington been induced to proceed another
 march towards Madrid, and had the advance of
 Soult been accelerated by a single day, the re-
 treat of the British army would have been cut
 off, and the most fatal consequences must have
 ensued.

In all the details of the campaign, however,
 abstracted from the error of its general concep-
 tion, we find the same skill, promptitude, and
 unhesitating self-reliance, by which the character
 of Lord Wellington has been uniformly marked.
 The ground which he selected to receive the
 enemy's attack was admirably chosen. His ma-
 nœuvres during the battle were those of a great
 general, at once perceiving and preserving the
 full advantages of his situation. His subsequent
 determination of attacking Soult, while Cuesta
 should keep Victor in check, was one which
 could have originated only in a mind of the

CHAP. VII. highest energy and vigour. All these things
 1809. are admirable; yet it may be safely asserted,
 that but a small part of Lord Wellington's military reputation, will be found eventually to rest on the campaign of Talavera.

CHAPTER VIII.

OPERATIONS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES.

THE utter incapacity of Cuesta had been CHAP. VIII
 strongly represented to the Spanish government, and that officer was at length removed
 1809. from his command. He was a man of strong passions and of narrow mind, who too often mistook rashness for courage, obstinacy for firmness, and procrastination for prudence. Buoyed up under every reverse by the most overweening self-confidence, he was disqualified, by narrow bigotry of opinion, from profiting even by the dear-bought lessons of experience. His measures uniformly failed, because they were uniformly adopted on the dictates of temporary impulse, rather than of any patient calculation of probabilities. Yet with all his defects, Cuesta was a man of upright intentions

CHAP.VIII and untarnished honour. While too many of
 1809. his associates were disposed to truckle to the
 October. usurper, Cuesta trod steadily in the path of patriotism and honour. He adhered to the cause of his country through every misfortune; and the sincerity of the zeal with which he laboured to promote its success, has never, we believe, been questioned by friend or enemy.

On the retirement of Cuesta, the command of his army was assumed by General Eguia, who, in conjunction with Vanegas, could bring into the field an army of about fifty thousand men. Blake, after his defeat at Belchite, had only been able to re-assemble a corps of about six thousand men, with which his main object was to relieve Gerona. There were in Galicia about fifteen thousand men, under Noronha, but without cavalry or artillery. The Duke del Parque had nine thousand, at Ciudad Rodrigo.

Such was the disposition and strength of the Spanish armies. The disposable force of the French amounted to about one hundred and twenty-five thousand men, exclusive of garrisons. Of these about thirty-five thousand were occupied in Arragon and Catalonia; the remainder were in the two Castilles and Estramadura.

Ney's head-quarters were at Salamanca; and
 CHAP.VIII part of his corps was stationed at Ledesma and
 1809. Alba de Tormes. Soult's were at Placentia; and he occupied Coria, Galesteo, and the banks of the Tietar and the Tagus, to the bridge of Arzobispo. The corps of Mortier was at Talavera, Oropesa, and Naval Moral. Victor's head-quarters were at Toledo, his advanced posts at Daymiel. The corps of Sebastiani extended from Aranjuez to Alcala. Marshal Jourdan had been recalled, and Soult appointed Major-General of the armies. This appointment gave offence to Ney, who, in consequence, solicited leave to quit the army; and the command of his corps was assumed by General Marchand.

It was in this state of things, when the enemy had a force of above seventy thousand men immediately disposable for its defence, that the Junta adopted the insane project of advancing on Madrid, with the armies of Vanegas and Eguia. The former leader had been superseded by General Arisaigo, a very young man, without talent or experience; and to this person the command of this perilous enterprize was entrusted. In Arisaigo the Supreme Junta calculated on finding a submissive instrument of their schemes; and by

CHAP.VIII these wretched calculators it was thought possible, by a rapid advance, to gain possession of the capital, and thus to strike a signal blow, by which the grasp of the invader would at once be loosened.

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November.

Without any communication with Lord Wellington, therefore, and without concerting any combined movement with the other armies, Arisaigo put his force in motion against the capital. The French were unprepared for the suddenness of this advance; and Latour Maubourg, who commanded a considerable body of horse at Madrilejos, on learning that the Spaniards were entering the town, with difficulty effected his escape. The Spanish army were successful in several skirmishes; and on the sixteenth of Nov. 16. November Arisaigo reached Santa Cruz de la Zorza, where he encamped his army on the heights.

On receiving intelligence of this movement, Joseph Buonaparte immediately advanced with the main body of his forces to bring the enemy to battle. In order to deceive the Spanish General, the French at first made demonstrations of acting only on the defensive; but Arisaigo, learning that a large force

had assembled at Toledo, on his flank, became CHAP.VIII alarmed at the peril of his situation, and marched towards Ocana, in order to occupy the great road from Seville to Aranjuez. In the neighbourhood of that town he was attacked on the day following, by the army under Joseph.

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November.

Arisaigo waited his approach in a position of which the town of Ocana formed the centre. The country being flat, his wings were without support, the right terminating in an olive-grove, the left extending across the road from Aranjuez. The town was covered by a ravine which ran along its front. The artillery, consisting of about sixty pieces, was chiefly disposed in batteries on the right and left; and the cavalry were formed in a body, a little in advance of the right flank. The second line was posted so near to the first, that, in case of the latter being thrown into disorder, there was no room for it to rally.

About ten o'clock the French commenced their attack. A column, under General Leval, supported by artillery, advanced on the right flank of the Spaniards.

They were received with so heavy a fire, that Leval's division, in attempting to deploy, fell

CHAP.VIII into confusion, and two pieces of artillery were
 1809. dismantled. At this critical moment, a division
 November. in reserve was ordered to advance through the
 intervals of the discomfited columns, and form
 line in front of them. This was immediately
 done, and a change soon took place in the fortune
 of the day. The cavalry, under Sebastiani charg-
 ed, and the whole right wing of the Spaniards
 at once went down.

The left wing, however, was untouched, and
 an able General might yet have secured a retreat.
 But Arisaigo, utterly confounded, quitted the field,
 desiring this portion of the army to follow him.
 Lord Macduff, who was present in the action,
 entreated the second in command to assume the
 direction; but the French cavalry broke through
 the centre, and the rout became complete. The
 surrounding county was flat and open to the
 action of cavalry, which vigorously pursued the
 fugitives, and cut them down on all sides. Vic-
 tor, whose corps came up at the conclusion of
 the action, continued the pursuit all night.
 In this unfortunate battle the Spaniards lost all
 their baggage and artillery, and about thirty
 thousand stand of arms. The number of killed
 and wounded was about four thousand. Eigh-

teen thousand were made prisoners; and, by CHAP.VIII
 many, the number has been estimated still higher. 1809.
 The loss of the victors amounted only to seven- November.
 teen hundred.

Lamentable, in every point of view, as this de-
 feat unquestionably was, it carried with it disgrace
 rather to the General than the troops which he
 commanded. The latter displayed courage; and
 the right wing received the onset of the French
 with firmness and resolution. The artillery was
 excellently served; and several regiments shew-
 ed an unshaken front to the enemy, when above
 half their number had fallen. Had the army,
 thus sacrificed, been reserved for defence of the
 Sierra Morena, Andalusia would probably have
 been rescued from the grasp of the enemy.
 But thus it was, by ignorance, obstinacy, and
 mismanagement, that the hopes of Spain were
 blighted, and the blood of her sons unprofitably
 wasted.

This disastrous battle, which, at a blow, laid
 open the southern provinces, was speedily fol-
 lowed by another scarcely less ruinous. The
 Duke del Parque, with an army augmented by
 recent levies to about twenty thousand men, had,
 for some time back, kept his ground in the neigh-

CHAP.VIII bourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, where, being joined by Sir Robert Wilson, he had succeeded in causing great annoyance to the enemy. In the middle of October, General Marchand advanced against this army, with the view of bringing it to action, and found it strongly posted near Tamames. The force of Marchand consisted of ten thousand foot, twelve hundred cavalry, and fourteen pieces of cannon. Despising his opponents, who enjoyed all advantages of ground, he attacked them with an imprudent impetuosity, which terminated in the defeat of his army. After this engagement, in which he lost about three thousand men, Marchand retreated on Salamanca. There he was followed by the Duke, and Marchand withdrew his force across the Douro.

For some time after this event, the Spanish army remained inactive at Salamanca; and the defeated corps having received reinforcements, again advanced, under General Kellerman, to retrieve its disaster. The Duke del Parque, elated by victory, determined on again standing the hazard of a battle. It took place near Alba de Tormes. The Spaniards were driven from the high ground which they occupied, but retreated on Tamames in tolerable order. On the following

1809.
October.

November.

Nov. 17.

morning, when within two leagues of that town, a small body of French horse came up, and made a charge on the rear. The whole army then fell into confusion, and dispersed. Fortunately, the enemy were not near enough for immediate pursuit; and, on reaching the Pena de Francia, in that secure position a considerable body of the fugitives were collected.

By this victory, the French were enabled, without further obstacle, to direct their views against Ciudad Rodrigo, and threaten Portugal. Lord Wellington, in consequence, removed his army from their unhealthy station in the neighbourhood of Badajos; and crossing the Tagus, fixed his head-quarters at Vizeu.

While the Supreme Junta were wasting the national resources in ill-concerted endeavours to regain possession of the capital, the defence of Catalonia was left to the unaided efforts of its inhabitants. A French fleet had succeeded in escaping the English squadron, and in re-victualing Barcelona. This done, preparations were set on foot for the siege of Gerona. General Reille who was to have commanded the besieging army, was at this period superseded by General Verdier. The force under St. Cyr, which

1809.
November.

CHAP.VIII was destined to act as a corps of observation, occupied the fertile country around Vich.

1809.
May.

On the sixth of May, the besiegers appeared before Gerona; and taking possession of the heights of Casa Roca, and Costarroja, began to form their lines without opposition. The garrison of the city, which amounted only to three thousand four hundred men, was commanded by Don Mariano Alvarez; and the inhabitants, encouraged by having twice driven the enemy from their walls, were again prepared to signalize their patriotism by a strenuous and unshrinking defence.

Since the period of the former siege, the fortifications of the place had been considerably strengthened. The three advanced redoubts, of which the enemy, in eighteen hundred and eight, had gained easy possession, were now in a complete state of defence; and much labour had been expended in increasing the security of the other works.

When the lines were completed, a summons was sent into the city, exhorting Alvarez to avoid the evils which could not fail to result from resistance. All terms, however, were rejected, and the siege went on.

On the night of the thirteenth of June, the bombardment commenced. This event had not been unprovided for by the inhabitants. The alarm sounded; and the women, the aged, and the children, sought refuge in cellars, and other places of comparative security, which had been prepared for their reception. On the seventeenth, an ill-judged sally was made by the besieged, which, though successful, was yet attended by a loss of life which more than counterbalanced the benefit it produced.

1809.
June.

Jun. 17.

The bombardment continued, and spread devastation through the buildings of the city. Several hospitals were destroyed; and the difficulty of providing accommodation for the sick and wounded, became daily greater. Fever and disease broke out among the inhabitants, yet their spirit remained firm and unbroken.

In the meanwhile, St. Cyr, who had hitherto remained in his position near Vich, moved his head-quarters to Caldas de Malavella, in order to prevent succours being thrown into Gerona; and his army occupied a line, extending from the Ona to San Feliu de Guixols, from which place the Spaniards, after an obstinate resistance, were driven on the twen-

Jun. 21.

CHAP.VIII ty-first. While thus stationed, the General

1809.

June.

received official intelligence that Marshal Augeran was about to supersede him in the command of the seventh corps; and this circumstance contributed to deprive him of the influence which he would otherwise naturally have exerted on the operations of the siege. He objected to the manner in which Verdier had conducted his advances against the town, and his neglect of many salutary precautions. But his opinions were disregarded, and Verdier continued to prosecute the siege, in full expectation of speedily becoming master of the place.

July.

The redoubts in advance of Mont Jouy, were carried by assault, and with a facility which tended to increase the contempt with which the French army regarded their opponents. Emboldened by this success, they determined to assault a breach which a battery of twenty guns had opened in one of the bastions of Mont Jouy.

Jul. 4.

The attack was made in the night of the fourth of July, and terminated in the complete repulse of the assailants.

Jul. 8.

During the three following days an incessant fire was kept up on the breach; and on the eighth, it was again assaulted. The French

columns were received with a fire, so well directed and destructive, that, after several ineffectual efforts, the troops were withdrawn in confusion, with the loss of eleven hundred of their number.

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August.

From this time forward the siege was conducted with greater prudence. Batteries were opened on three different sides of the fort, and every precaution was adopted to ensure success. An entire month passed in the dispute of a ravelin, which, when at length carried by the enemy, was found untenable from being exposed to the musquetry from the fort.

With the contests for possession of the ravelin personal conflict ceased between the garrison of Mont Jouy and the besiegers. Though the defences were daily suffering by the enemy's mines and artillery, yet the fort was not abandoned till the walls had been nearly levelled with the ground, and the whole guns had been silenced. In this situation, the ruins were resigned to the enemy; and on the night of the eleventh of August, the garrison effected its retreat.

Aug. 11.

In defence of the town an equal share of resolution and gallantry was displayed. By the

CHAP.VIII surrender of Mont Jouy, the French were enabled to throw up works nearer to the *enceinte*, and a tremendous fire was opened from their numerous batteries.

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August.

Towards the end of August, several breaches had been made, and the garrison was greatly reduced by the casualties of war and disease. The hospitals were already crowded, and unable to contain the patients whose situation demanded admission. The ravages of the fever were hourly increasing, and the want of provisions began to be severely felt. Yet no proposal of surrender was heard in the city. The determination of all ranks to resist the enemy to the last extremity remained unshaken by calamity.

At this critical period, Blake having, by a series of skilful manœuvres, succeeded in deceiving St. Cyr as to his intentions, was enabled to throw three thousand of his army, with a supply of provisions, into the city. By this timely reinforcement the spirits of the garrison were raised; and the besiegers, from a want of ammunition, were compelled for a time to suspend their operations. The interval thus afforded was employed in strengthening and repairing the dilapidations of the place.

Sep. 1.

On receiving the expected supplies, the besiegers redoubled their quantity of fire, and on the eighteenth of September three breaches were declared practicable. On the day following, the assault was made, and the struggle, which was long and severe, at length terminated in favour of the garrison. The French were repulsed in all their efforts, and having suffered great loss, were at length withdrawn in disorder.

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1809.
September.

Sep. 19.

The besiegers were dispirited by this signal defeat of their greatest effort. It was determined to convert the siege into a blockade, and to reduce those by famine whom they could not conquer by the sword. This was done. The situation of the garrison and the inhabitants of the city, was one of accumulating suffering. Famine was in their dwellings. The supply of corn was small, and the mules and horses were slaughtered at the shambles. The fever, which the heats of summer had rendered more virulent and fatal, was raging in its fury, and other forms of disease, scarcely less destructive, assailed those whom the pestilence had spared.

It is not in the breach or on the battle-field,—it is not amid the inspiring and glorious accompaniments of hostile struggle, where death

CHAP. VIII comes suddenly if he comes at all, and the heart
 1809. which panted for victory, and the lips which
 September. shouted triumph, in a moment become mute and
 motionless,—it is not in such circumstances that
 the courage of the human soul is most severely
 tested. In Gerona, the period of active strug-
 gle had passed away. All that now remained
 to its inhabitants, was to exert that calm and
 passive fortitude, that firmness of endurance,
 which shrinks from no suffering which duty de-
 manded they should encounter. This highest,
 rarest, and noblest description of courage, was
 not wanting in the Geronans. Amid famine
 and pestilence they remained unshaken, hoping
 the best, yet prepared to brave the worst; look-
 ing for succour, but determined on resistance.

Relief—enough only to prolong their suffer-
 ings—came. General O'Donnel, with one hun-
 dred and sixty mules loaded with provisions,
 succeeded, on the side of Bispal, in breaking
 through the enemy and reaching the town. The
 same officer, by a bold and skilful manœuvre,
 Oct. 13. subsequently succeeded in passing the besieging
 army, and retreating with his troops.

The joy of the inhabitants at this seasonable
 relief was at first great. It raised hopes of

support from without, which were not realized. CHAP. VIII
 Marshal Augerau had assumed the command of
 1809. the besieging army. Convoys of provisions ar-
 October. rived from France, accompanied by a large rein-
 forcement of troops; and a detachment which
 had been sent against Hostalrich, drove the
 Spaniards from the town, and became masters
 of the large magazines which had been formed
 there.

The hope of external relief no longer existed
 in the city. A fearful mortality was raging with-
 in its walls. The burial-places were choked with
 corpses, and the deaths sometimes amounted
 even to seventy a day. Augerau straitened the
 blockade, and persevered in bombarding the city.
 He likewise sent letters into the city, to commu-
 nicate his victory at Hostalrich, the defeat of
 Blake's army, and the peace with Austria. With
 a humanity highly honourable, he even offered
 to grant an armistice for a month, and suffer
 supplies immediately to enter the city, provided
 Alvarez would capitulate at the expiration of
 that period, should the city not be relieved.

The Geronans, however, were prepared to bear
 all, and would not, for the sake of shortening
 their own sufferings, consent to aught that might

CHAP.VIII injure their country. They knew that, should
 1809. they accept the proposal of Augerau, a large pro-
 November. portion of the besieging army would become
 disposable for other operations. The offer,
 therefore, was declined. The records of history
 present few instances of more pure and memor-
 able heroism.

Notwithstanding the sufferings of the be-
 sieged, few cases occurred of desertion. But in
 one instance ten officers—two of whom were of
 noble birth—went over to the enemy. At length,
 however, suffering reached such a pitch, that
 many of the inhabitants, determined to risk death
 in the field rather than await his slow approach
 in the city, attempted to escape through the
 enemy's lines, and in some instances succeeded.

Nov. 29. Towards the end of November, Samaniego,
 the chief surgeon to the garrison, delivered a
 report to Alvarez on the state of health in the
 city. Aware of the nature of its contents, Al-
 varez directed Samaniego to read it, observing,
 "This paper will inform posterity of our suffer-
 ings—should there be none left to recount
 them."

The report was a dreadful one. In the whole
 city there did not remain a single house unin-

jured by the bombardment. The people bur-CHAP.VIII
 rowed in cellars, vaults, and crevices of the ruins.
 The water stagnated in the streets which were
 1809. broken up. The sick were frequently killed in
 November. the hospitals. The dead bodies, which lay rot-
 ting in holes amid the ruins, poisoned the atmos-
 phere. Even vegetation was affected by it.
 Trees withered in the gardens, and esculents re-
 fused to grow. Within three weeks five hundred
 of the garrison had died in the hospitals. The
 sick lay upon the ground without beds, and al-
 most without food. Nearly the whole fuel and
 provisions had been exhausted. "If by these
 sacrifices," concluded Samaniego, "worthy to be
 the admiration of history,—and if by consummat-
 ing them with the lives of those of us who by
 the will of Providence have survived our com-
 rades, the liberty of our country can be secured,
 happy shall we be in the bosom of eternity, and
 in the memory of all good men, and happy will
 our children be among their fellow country-
 men."

The breaches, which ten weeks before had
 been assaulted, were still open; and the be-
 siegers having learned that the ammunition of
 the place was exhausted, determined on bolder

CHAP.VIII operations. All the outworks were carried, and
 1809. a gallant sally of the garrison, though successful
 December. did not materially amend their situation.

The besiegers had now advanced close to the walls, the breaches were open, and the enemy were evidently preparing for another assault.
 Dec. 4. In this state of things, the brave Alvarez became smitten with the prevailing epidemic. He resigned the command to Don Julian De Bolivar, who summoned a council to determine what measures should be adopted in the extremity to which the city had been reduced.

The meeting was of opinion that further resistance was hopeless, and it was resolved to treat for a capitulation. Marshal Augerau granted honourable terms. The garrison were to march out with the honours of war, and be sent prisoners into France, to be exchanged as soon as possible for an equal number of French prisoners then detained at Majorca, and other places. None but those who ranked as soldiers were to be considered prisoners. The French army were not to be quartered on the inhabitants. The public records of the city were neither to be removed nor destroyed. The inhabitants were to be at liberty to quit Gerona, taking

with them their property. The heroic Alvarez CHAP.VIII
 was to be allowed to choose any place of residence on the French frontier. He afterwards
 1809. retired to Figueras, where he died.
 December.

When the garrison, reduced by famine and disease, marched out, in presence of the French army, their shrunk forms, their glazed and hollow eyes, their wan and meagre countenances, excited even the compassion of their enemies. On entering the city, it was found that most of the guns had been fired so often as to have become useless. Brass itself, observed Samaniego, had given way before the constancy of the Geronans. It may be added, that brass will be found less durable than the tribute which shall be paid, by all noble and generous spirits, to the heroism and devotion of these intrepid patriots.

After the battle of Ocana, the Central Junta displayed little of that energy which, on former occasions, had contributed to bear them through increasing difficulties. They endeavoured to conceal from the nation the full extent of their misfortunes. The discovery of a conspiracy for a change of government contributed yet more to their alarm. They knew themselves to have

CHAP.VIII
1809.
December.

become unpopular with the nation. Libels were poured forth on them in all quarters ; and the chief efforts of the Junta were directed rather to the maintenance of their own precarious authority, than to any measures of effective resistance to the enemy.

Yet for such measures the time imperatively called. The enemy threatened Andalusia ; and it was evident that by nothing but a rapid and vigorous concentration of the national efforts could his projects be successfully opposed. Under these circumstances, the Junta issued proclamations to the people, couched in the same high tone of chivalrous patriotism which had formerly produced so animating an effect. But it was already apparent that the nation had lost confidence in the government. The Provincial Juntas had in many places resumed their authority ; and Spain was probably on the verge of relapsing into the state of confusion from which the formation of the Central Junta had delivered it, when the progress of the enemy put a stop to these intestine dissensions.

So unpopular indeed had the Junta become, that no officer of reputation would consent to serve under them. In Gallicia, the Conde de

Noronha had already reared the standard of rebellion. Romana, to whom the chief command of the armies had been offered, declined its acceptance. The Duke del Albuquerque, who commanded a corps of about twelve thousand in Estramadura, was an object of fear and jealousy to the Junta. Castanos was in disgrace at Algesiras ; and the chief command in Andalusia, at a crisis so important, was, almost from necessity, intrusted to the imbecile Arisaigo. Worse placed it could not be.

CHAP.VIII
1809.
December.

CHAPTER IX.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

CHAP. IX. THE year had closed in Spain triumphantly
 1810. for the French arms, as it had commenced. The Spanish armies had sustained a series of unparalleled defeats. The British had retired into Portugal; and the efforts of Lord Wellington were, for the present, limited to the defence of that kingdom. England had wasted her resources in a fruitless and ill-judged expedition to the Isle of Walcheren, where disease had done the work of the sword. A triumphant peace had been concluded with Austria; and the whole of the immense forces of the French empire were thus disposable for the reduction of Spain.

At Paris, Napoleon, in a speech to the senate,

recounted the triumphs of the year, and inti-
 mated his intention of returning to Spain, to
 complete the conquest already almost achieved.
 "When I shall shew myself beyond the Py-
 renees," said he, in metaphor somewhat staled
 by frequent repetition, "the frightened Leo-
 pard will fly to the ocean to avoid shame, de-
 feat, and death. The triumph of my arms will
 be the triumph of the genius of good over that
 of evil,—of moderation, order, and morality,
 over civil war, anarchy, and the evil passions!"

The war minister reported, that, of the con-
 scriptions already decreed, there still remained
 eighty thousand men uncalled into service. Of
 these, thirty-six thousand were to be immedi-
 ately embodied. Thirty thousand men, collect-
 ed at Bayonne, were ready to repair the casual-
 ties which had diminished the French armies
 in Spain; and an additional force of twenty-five
 thousand, raised from the conscription of the
 year following, would be at the disposal of the
 Emperor.

Such was the threatening aspect of affairs at
 the commencement of eighteen hundred and
 ten. Yet Lord Wellington did not despair of
 the cause in which he had embarked. When

CHAP. IX. he entered Spain, but a few months before,
1810. he had done so in co-operation with an army of considerable strength, against a comparatively small and extended body of the enemy. Since that period, the Spanish armies had been routed and dispersed; and, whatever ideas he might have previously formed, it was now evident, that neither the talents of their leaders, nor the character of the troops, gave any prospect of vigorous and effective resistance to the progress of the enemy. But Lord Wellington likewise knew, that the security of Spain did not depend on the conduct of her armies,—that an indomitable spirit of hostility was abroad among her people,—that a desultory but destructive war was carrying on in all her provinces,—and that the expense of life, at which the French maintained their hold on the country, was one which could not fail gradually to enfeeble the invaders, and call for a succession of efforts, of such magnitude, as France, in the precarious state of Europe, might soon be unable to support.

In the meantime, it was obvious that defensive war was the only one which could be waged with any prospect of success. It was

the policy of England to protract the contest; to CHAP. IX.
lead the enemy to divide his forces by distracting
1810. his attention, and thus to subject him to the full operation of that petty but pervading hostility which was ever wasting his numbers. For the present, therefore, Lord Wellington determined to confine his efforts to the defence of Portugal, yet to stand prepared on the occurrence of more favourable circumstances, again to widen the sphere of his operations, and advance into Spain.

On crossing the Tagus, he moved his headquarters to Vizeu; and the army went into cantonments, extending from Coimbra to Pinhel, while the corps of General Hill remained at Abrantes and its neighbourhood. In this position, the troops remained for some time inactive, in order to recover the effects of the preceding campaign, and the sickness which had been engendered by the unhealthy station to which they had subsequently removed.

At this period, Marshal Soult, with an army of about fifty thousand men, was preparing to advance into Andalusia. The Junta, blind to the approaching danger, felt secure that the giant range of the Sierra Morena

CHAP. IX. would oppose an impenetrable barrier to the progress of the enemy. The passes of these mountains had been fortified with care, and a force of about twenty thousand men, under Arisaigo, was posted for their defence. But on the

1810.
January.

Jan. 20.

twentieth of January, the pass of Despena Perros was forced, with but little resistance from the troops, whose spirit was depressed by the remembrance of Ocana. In order to distract the attention of Arisaigo, Soult divided his army into three columns, which advanced simultaneously on the three principal *debouchés* of the Sierra. The right, under Victor, by Almaden; the centre, under Mortier, by the road from Madrid; the left, under Sebastiani, by Villa Nueva. Several mines had been placed by the Spaniards at the narrow parts of the defile, but the explosion of these produced little effect. On the twenty-first, Soult's headquarters were at Baylen; and, on the twenty-ninth, the corps of Victor effected its junction with the army before Seville.

Jan. 29.

In Seville—where, till now, nothing had been heard but the sound of presumptuous boasting—all was confusion. The Junta fled to Cadiz; no measures had been taken to put the

city in a condition for effective resistance; and, after a negotiation of two days, it surrendered. On the thirty-first, Seville opened her gates, and the intrusive monarch made his triumphal entry on the same day. The French thus became masters of nearly two hundred pieces of serviceable cannon, of immense magazines, and of the great cannon foundry, which was left uninjured.

CHAP. IX.
1810.
February.

In truth, the resistance offered in Andalusia to the progress of the French arms was so slight, as to lead Joseph to believe that the spirit of the people had at length been effectually humbled. Jaen, which boasted every preparation for defence, submitted, without a struggle, to Sebastiani. Granada followed the disgraceful example, after an impotent attempt to check the progress of the enemy by Arisaigo. A feeble effort was subsequently made in defence of Malaga, but this too failed; and on the fifth of February, the French took possession of the city.

Feb. 5.

At Seville the army remained for two days inactive, when a corps, under Mortier, was detached into Estramadura, for the reduction of Badajos, and Victor was directed to march on

CHAP. IX. Cadiz. Had the latter been at once pushed forward, with that celerity of movement for which the French army is generally remarkable, and to which it has been indebted for many of its most splendid successes, there can exist little doubt that Cadiz would have fallen. The city, in truth, was utterly unprepared for attack; the garrison was insufficient to man the works, and there were not a thousand men in the Isla de Leon. The governor, General Vanegas, was unpopular and distrusted; he accordingly resigned his authority, and a Junta of eighteen householders was elected by ballot to govern the city.

1810.
February.

In such circumstances was it, that Cadiz was saved from her impending danger by the vigour and promptitude of the Duke del Albuquerque. That General, placing little faith in the talent and prudence of the Supreme Junta, no sooner received intelligence that the French had passed the Morena, than, disregarding the orders of the Junta, who directed him to repair to Cordova, he marched on Cadiz with the greatest rapidity, and threw himself into the Isla de Leon, with a body of about eight thousand men, in time to barricade the bridge of Zuazo before the head of Victor's column came

Feb. 4.

up. Thus was Cadiz saved, and Spain spared from a misfortune which could not but have been followed by the most disastrous consequences.

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1810.
February.

The unpopularity of the Supreme Junta had now reached its height. On their arrival in Cadiz, they attempted to resume their authority; but neither the Local Junta, nor the army, nor the populace would obey their decrees. The personal safety of its members was even endangered by the violence of the mob; and, making a merit of necessity, the Junta at length resigned the shadow of that power which in reality they had long ceased to possess. A Council* of Regency, consisting of five members, was appointed to wield the reins of authority till the Cortes should be assembled; and the Junta closed their career by issuing a farewell address to the people, claiming credit, amid all their misfortunes, for purity of intention, and unshaken devotion to their country.

* The Council consisted of the following members:—Don Pedro de Quevedo y Quintana, Bishop of Orense; Don Antonio de Ascano; General Castanos; Don Francisco de Saavedra, late President of the Junta of Seville; and Don Esteban Fernandez de Leon, who was afterwards changed for Don Miguel de Lardizabel.

CHAP. IX. Let this much be granted them:—Let it not
 1810. be assumed, because deficient in intellect, that
 February. they were likewise corrupt in heart. If the
 Junta partook largely of the defects of the
 national character, they partook also of its
 virtues. Their career was unmarked by any
 base truckling or subserviency to the enemies of
 their country. Amid the storm of misfortune
 they had stood unbending and erect, animating
 their countrymen by their voice, and urging
 them to renewed efforts. The task of govern-
 ing the nation at so arduous a crisis was one
 for which they were little qualified by know-
 ledge, talent, or experience. But their inten-
 tions were honest; and the integrity of but few
 of its members has ever been considered liable
 to suspicion.

Even the resignation of their authority did
 not protect the members of the Junta from
 persecution. The voice of the whole nation was
 against them; they were treated as criminals.
 The Council of Castile, which had repeatedly
 temporized with the intruder, declared their
 power to have been a violent and unconstitu-
 tional usurpation. The mob accused them of
 peculating the public money; and to gratify the

public appetite for vengeance, some of the more CHAP. IX.
 obnoxious were imprisoned; and the rest—in-
 cluding the respectable Jovellanos—were ban-
 1810. ished to the provinces, and placed in a state of
 March. *surveillance* by the local authorities.

Disappointed by the activity of the Duke del
 Albuquerque, in the hope of gaining Cadiz, the
 French for some months remained in possession
 of the chief cities of Andalusia, yet subject to
 continual losses and annoyance from the bands
 of Guerilla smugglers which abounded in the
 mountains. In the meantime, efforts were
 made by Great Britain, to assist the patriots in
 defending the Isla de Leon and Cadiz. Sup-
 plies of all sorts were liberally sent from Gibrat-
 ar, and about six or seven thousand British and
 Portuguese troops, under Lieutenant-General
 Graham, were landed on the Island.

The Island or Isla de Leon, is somewhat tri-
 angular in form, bounded on two sides by the
 sea, and on the third by the Santi Petri river,
 of considerable depth, and varying in breadth
 from eighty to one hundred and fifty yards.
 This side is strongly fortified, and is besides na-
 turally strong. The Santi Petri can be crossed
 only by the bridge of Zuazo, flanked by batteries,

CHAP. IX. and connected with the mainland by a causeway,
1810.

leading across a broad and swampy marsh, by which the channel of the river is almost everywhere bounded. There are two towns on the Isla de Leon; one which bears the same name, containing about forty thousand inhabitants; and another called San Carlos, consisting almost entirely of barracks and other government buildings.

At the extremity of a long and narrow isthmus projecting from this island towards the north of the bay, stands the city of Cadiz. The portion of the sea enclosed within this isthmus, the Isla, and the mainland, constitutes the harbour of Cadiz, which, opposite to the city, is about three miles broad. Cadiz is on three sides washed by the sea, and is strongly fortified on all. By land it can be approached only from the Isla de Leon, and along the narrow isthmus already mentioned, for defence of which, forts and batteries of great strength had been erected. When an enemy should have surmounted these, he would still find himself opposed by a regular front of fortification, extending from sea to sea, on which no expense or labour had been spared.

The first care of Marshal Soult was to occupy all the outlets from the Isla, and to reduce Fort Matagorda, a small insular work, which was occupied by a detachment of British, and by means of which he would be enabled to annoy the shipping in harbour. The heavy fire of his artillery soon rendered the work untenable, and on the twenty-third of April the garrison was withdrawn by the boats of the squadron under Admiral Purvis.

In Cadiz, dissention had unfortunately broken out between the Duke del Albuquerque, who had been appointed Governor, the Regency, and the Local Junta. The first in his exertions to strengthen the fortifications of the place, was not seconded either by the people or the authorities. The inhabitants remained indolent and lethargic spectators of the labours in which the garrison were engaged. The Junta would do nothing to supply the necessities of the troops, and the time and energies which should have been devoted to their high and important duties, was wasted in frivolous contentions with Albuquerque and the Council of Regency. The former, utterly disgusted, at length resigned the command, and quitted a scene where his

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1810.

Apr. 23.

February.

CHAP. IX. endeavours could no longer be useful, to assume the functions of Ambassador to England.

1810.

April.

Notwithstanding the apathy by which on all hands he was surrounded, Sir Thomas Graham did everything which his vigorous mind could suggest to add still greater security to the defences of Cadiz. A canal was cut across the isthmus which connects it with the Isla. The works along the river Santi Petri were improved, and new ones thrown up, and the river frontier of the island soon presented a front of almost unassailable strength. The French on their side were not idle. They fortified the towns of Rota, Puerto Real, Puerto Sta. Maria, and Chiclana; formed entrenched camps in the intervals between them; and at the point of Trocadero established batteries, from whence by means of huge mortars, constructed for the purpose at the cannon foundry of Seville, they succeeded in throwing shells into the city. In this immense line of batteries, extending from Rota to the mouth of the Santi Petri, the enemy had upwards of three hundred pieces of cannon.

In the meantime, the country was scoured by moveable columns of the enemy, which, though they frequently suffered severely from the arm-

ed bands of smugglers which haunted the mountains, succeeded in quelling all attempt at insurrection, and in establishing the ascendancy of French dominion throughout the southern provinces.

At this period, a new and unheard of principle of war was attempted to be established by the French leaders. It was declared by Marshal Soult, in a public edict, that none but regular armies had a right to defend their towns, their houses, and their families, from violence and plunder; and that as no legitimate Spanish army could exist but that of his Catholic Majesty, Joseph Napoleon, all bodies of armed Spaniards, of whatever number or description, which existed in the provinces, should be treated as banditti, whose object was robbery and murder. Every individual taken in arms was immediately to be condemned and shot, and his body exposed on the highway.*

* The utter and disgraceful recklessness of national law displayed by the French throughout the war in Spain, may here receive another corroboration. Prisoners of war were actually tried by a military tribunal, and put to death, on the simple charge of attempting to escape. Lest this most atrocious fact should not otherwise gain credit, the following extracts from

CHAP. IX.

1810.

May.

CHAP. IX. When it was discovered by the Regency that
 1810. this most infamous decree was actually carried
 May. into effect, they reprinted it with a counter decree, in French and Spanish, declaring, that in these times every Spaniard, capable of bearing arms, was a soldier; and ordaining, that for every person who should be murdered by the enemy, the first three Frenchmen taken in arms should be hanged; three should also be executed for every house burned, and three for every one who should perish in the flames. Soult himself they declared unworthy of the

orders on this subject are given. The originals are in the possession of Lord Wellington.

"(General Beliard. Madrid, 27 Novembre.)—L'intention du Roi est qu'il soit formé à Madrid une commission militaire, composée de sept membres, par-devant laquelle vous ferez traduire les prisonniers de guerre. Les jugemens de la commission emporteront la peine de mort, et seront sans appel."

"(General Solignac. 5 Decembre.)—Il m'a été rendu compte que quelques prisonniers s'étaient échappés dans la marche. Faites les rechercher, et ordonnez à l'égard de ceux qui seront pris, qu'on met en exécution l'ordre du 27 Novembre."

"(Ministre de la Guerre à Paris. 14 Decembre.)—Les Espagnols ont tant de facilité pour se déguiser, et ensuite pour se dérober à la surveillance, que malgré la sévérité qu'on exerce envers eux, on n'est pas toujours assuré de les garder, quoiqu'ils soient prévenus que les tentatives pour s'évader, leur font encourir la peine capitale, et que des nombreux exemples aient été faits."—*Campaign of 1809.*

law of nations till this decree had been repealed. CHAP. IX.
 ed; and orders were issued that, if taken, he
 1810. should be treated like a common robber.
 May.

In the bands of Guerillas, which now existed in every mountainous district of the country, the Regency found willing agents in the execution of their retributive enactments. Few acts of outrage on the part of the enemy escaped without reprisal. In one instance, a Guerilla leader hung several Frenchmen on the trees bordering the high road near Madrid, in retaliation for several of his own men, whom the invaders had put to death; and made known his intention of treating in a similar manner all the superior officers who should fall into his power. Thus did blood beget blood, and cruelty on the one side generate exasperation on the other. Of this truth most of the French leaders, by degrees, became convinced; and, alarmed at the prospect before them, the system of extermination was happily allowed to sink into desuetude.

In the state of feeling which existed, however, between the hostile parties, it was impossible but that acts of cruelty and vengeance should take place on both sides. Indignant at the losses they sustained from the Guerillas, many indivi-

CHAP. IX. duals were summarily put to death by the

1810.

French, on mere suspicion of being connected with those who annoyed them by a warfare so destructive and pertinacious. Yet it is but justice to record, that the measures we have just detailed, which cannot fail to cast a deep shadow of ignominy on those by whom they were projected or enforced, are in no degree understood to have emanated from him, whose regal authority they were intended to establish. Joseph, constitutionally mild, disapproved of all acts of gratuitous violence and bloodshed. But his personal influence, even in the affairs of his own kingdom, was small. The French commanders knew themselves to be amenable to a higher power, and were solely guided in their policy by its influence and control. The ministers of Joseph, aware that his amiable and placid character was appreciated by the people, were not without hopes, that he might eventually acquire a place in their affections, when the storm of resistance should have passed. But this expectation was never realized. Joseph, though not hated, was the object of popular derision. His indolence, his addiction to the pleasures of the table, his want of military qualities,

and his low origin, were all unfavourable to his

acquiring any personal favour among a people so proud, so acute, and so haughty as the Spaniards. The higher and better qualities by which his character was honourably distinguished were seldom called into public and apparent action; and Joseph, to the end of his career as a monarch, remained to the Spanish nation an object of unmitigated contempt.*

After the defeat of Blake at Belchite, Suchet established his head-quarters at Zaragoza, and busied himself in preparations for the vigorous prosecution of the war. He established maga-

1810.

* Though somewhat out of place, the following passage from a letter to Napoleon, written in March, 1812, and which was intercepted by the capture of a convoy in the defile of Salinas, will exhibit the character of Joseph in a better light than that in which it has generally been regarded:—

“SIRE,—Les evenemens ont trompé mes esperances; je n’ai fait aucun bien, et je n’ai pas l’espoir d’en faire. Je prie donc V. M. de me permettre de déposer entre ses mains, les droits qu’elle daigna me transmettre, sur la couronne d’Espagne il y a quatre ans. Je n’ai jamais eu d’autre but en l’acceptant, que celui de faire le bonheur de cette monarchie. Cela n’est point en mon pouvoir.”

Let it be remembered, that when Joseph signed this honourable renunciation of the crown, Spain was occupied by a numerous and triumphant army; and that the Russian campaign, by which the throne of Napoleon was shaken to its base, had not yet commenced.—*Memoires du General Hugo.*

CHAP. IX. zines of all sorts, and disposed his army so as at

1810. once to maintain his communication with France, and to keep in check the numerous bands which had lately been strongly reinforced by the fugitives from Belchite. "Thus it was," says a French writer, "that the Spaniards, always beaten but never subdued, animated by a courage which misfortune could not depress, because founded on the love of country, opposed to the French throughout the whole Peninsula, but especially in Arragon and Catalonia, the same resistance which their gallant ancestors had offered to the Romans, to the Goths, and to the Moors,—to Charlemagne, and Louis the Fourteenth." Thus it was, too, that even in defeat were sown the dragon's teeth, which afterwards sprung up into armed men.

Victoires et
Conquetes.

Memoires
de Suchet.

The difficulty of Suchet's situation was considerable. The Guerilla bands were in possession of all the valleys in the mountainous districts. Detachments of his army were continually cut off. His couriers and convoys of provisions were intercepted; the country was intimidated, and those who would willingly have remained neutral in the struggle, were forced by threats to join their countrymen in arms. The

French army were kept in a state of continual CHAP. IX. vigilance and alarm. Partial engagements took place on all hands, nor was it till the month of 1810. November that even the semblance of tranquillity could be restored. All the towns and strong places were then occupied by the French, and Suchet levied heavy contributions on the whole province.

Navarre too was far from tranquil, and Suchet next directed his efforts to the pacification of that kingdom. He accordingly repaired to Pampeluna, and rectified many of the abuses, Jan. 20. which had been suffered to grow up under the administration of the Duke de Mahon, who had been sent as civil governor from Madrid. He published a severe edict, denouncing punishment on all inhabitants in whose possession arms should be found; and having dispersed the band of Mina, the flame of insurrection was for a time smothered.

Such was the situation of Arragon and Navarre, when Suchet received orders from Marshal Soult, in his capacity of Major-General, to march rapidly on Valencia in two columns, one proceeding by Teruel and Segorba, the other by Morella San Mateo, and the road leading along

CHAP. IX. the coast. Though these orders were at variance with his instructions from Paris, which directed, as preliminary measures, the siege of Lerida and Mequinenza, Suchet did not conceive himself at liberty to disobey. Accordingly, he repaired to Teruel, leaving General Musnier, with eight battalions and two hundred and fifty horse, to maintain tranquillity in Arragon. A column under General Habert proceeded by the coast. That under his own immediate command encountered the Valencian force at Alventosa. The Spaniards were strongly posted, with a ravine in front, along the bottom of which flowed the deep and sluggish river Minjares. The road leading along the left bank of the stream was broken up and obstructed, and on the other side the village of Alventosa extended round a precipitate and rugged height crowned by a ruined castle, which commanded the surrounding country.

Suchet determined to attack the left flank of this formidable position, and succeeded by a considerable detour in passing the river nearer to its source. The Valencians did not long withstand the attack of the French columns. They retreated with the loss of five guns and a portion of

1810.
February.

Feb. 25.

their baggage. At Murviedro a junction was effected with Habert, and the army pushed on to Valencia.

The garrison of Valencia consisted chiefly of the soldiers who had fled disgracefully from Belchite. Suchet addressed a letter to General Caro, the Governor, in hope of inducing that officer to surrender the city. He assured him that he had not come to make war on the fine capital of the most beautiful of the Spanish provinces, but to offer peace and protection, such as Jaen, Granada, Cordova, and Seville, were at that moment enjoying. It was inhuman, he said, to prolong a contest, maintained at a vast expense of human suffering, where the issue was inevitable; and he called on General Caro to prove himself a benefactor to his country by surrendering the city of Valencia to the French arms. A proclamation was likewise issued to the people, declaring the anxiety of the French General to avoid effusion of blood, and exhorting the people to assist in the attainment of this humane wish.

To this an answer was returned, stating, that Valencia had repulsed Marshal Moncey, and was prepared to repulse General Suchet; and that if

CHAP. IX.
1810.
March.

Mar. 5.

CHAP. IX. the latter was sincere in the laudable desire he
 1810. had expressed to avoid bloodshed, it was for him to consider, whether the best and surest method of attaining that object was not to abstain from attack.

In truth, the force of Suchet, consisting only of twelve thousand men, and thirty field-pieces, was altogether inadequate to the enterprize in which he had engaged; and, having remained for five days in front of Valencia, he found it necessary to retrace his steps to the Ebro. He then made preparations for a systematic reduction of the strong places held by the Spaniards, with the view to facilitate his future efforts for the reduction of the eastern provinces.

February. Blake having been appointed Governor of Cadiz, O'Donnel succeeded to the chief command in Catalonia. The skilful and daring operations in which he had successfully engaged, had acquired for him the confidence of the people. Augerau had supposed that little more remained, after the reduction of Gerona, than to complete and rivet the subjection of the province. In this he was mistaken. A combat took place, in the neighbourhood of Vich, between a body of Spaniards, under O'Donnel,

and the division of General Souham. The former CHAP. IX.
 bore themselves with courage, and assailed the enemy with a steadiness and resolution to which 1810.
 they were unaccustomed. Never, by the confession of their own officers, was the courage of the French army more severely tested than in this action. O'Donnel, however, at length judged it prudent to retire, leaving the enemy in possession of the field. February.

Souham, imagining the Spaniards had fled from fear, prepared to pursue. O'Donnel then commenced a series of skilful manœuvres, by which, having led his enemy forward, he succeeded in achieving several brilliant and important successes. The French losses in these engagements were very heavy, and they were still further aggravated by desertions from the foreign troops, who went over to the enemy in considerable numbers.

In the meanwhile, the French prosecuted the siege of Hostalrich. The town had already fallen; but the fort, which is strongly situated on a craggy height, still held out, and the garrison were animated by the best spirit. An attempt was made by O'Donnel to afford relief

CHAP. IX. to the besieged, but without success, and that leader fell back on Tarragona.

1810.

May.

Disappointed in their hopes from without, the garrison still continued to defend the fort with the most honourable fortitude and zeal. The besiegers kept up a dreadful bombardment, and the walls were gradually demolished by the fire of the batteries. They still, however, continued successfully to contest the possession of the place till the twelfth of May, when, having undergone a siege of four months, and consumed the whole of their provisions, these brave men determined to cut their way through the enemy's lines. In this bold attempt, about three hundred fell, and among these the heroic Don Julian de Estrada, their commander. The remainder succeeded in effecting their escape.

May 12.

These results were far from satisfactory to Napoleon. Marshal Augerau had boasted, in his despatches, that the Ampurdan was completely subdued; but the comment of succeeding facts on this assertion had not been favourable to its credit with the Emperor, and Augerau was superseded by Marshal Macdonald.

The loss of Hostalrich was succeeded by an-

other of some consequence. The islands and CHAP. IX. fortress of Las Medas, forming an important maritime post, were surrendered to the French without resistance, through treason or cowardice. Lerida also yielded without adequate resistance. Suchet opened his batteries against it on the seventh of May. On the twelfth, a magazine exploded in the town, and formed a breach. By this the French assaulted the town and carried it. On the day following the castle surrendered.

1810.

May.

May 13.

Success followed the arms of Suchet, whenever he was not induced to transgress the rules of his art. The fort of Mequinenza, notwithstanding its strength, became an easy prize. After five days resistance it capitulated, and the subjection of Arragon being now fully assured, Suchet found himself at liberty to extend the sphere of his operations.

June 8.

The peace with Austria having rendered disposable the greater part of the force employed in Germany, large bodies of troops were thrown into Spain, and every corps was augmented. That of Junot, composed of the troops liberated by the Convention of Cintra, consisted of three divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, amount-

CHAP. IX. ing altogether to about twelve thousand men.

1810.

March.

Hitherto this force had been employed in dispersing the irregular bands which abounded in Biscay, Navarre, and Old Castile. But on receiving reinforcements, Junot advanced into Leon, with the view of protecting that kingdom from the incursions of the Gallician army. Astorga was garrisoned by about three thousand Spanish troops; and an attack made upon it, in the preceding September, had been gallantly repulsed by Santocildes, who still acted as Governor. The city was not strong, yet considerable efforts had been made to improve and repair the works. The walls were ancient and massive, and the suburbs, to the north and south, were covered and connected with the body of the place by a line of retrenchment. Astorga contained large magazines of all sorts; and its acquisition, at this period, was held of great importance to the intended operations in Portugal, as it commanded a *debouché* leading into the north of that kingdom.

Mar. 21.

On the twenty-first of March, Junot invested Astorga. The defence of the city was resolutely maintained for upwards of a month, when, at length, having repulsed their assailants at the

breach, the garrison surrendered, only when the near exhaustion of their ammunition rendered further defence hopeless. The French suffered heavily in this siege, though the amount of their loss has been variously represented. This is certain: The expense of life at which Astorga was acquired, and the gallantry of its defenders, had a greater effect in animating the people, than its reduction in depressing them.*

On the fall of Astorga, a detachment of Junot's corps reduced the castle of Sanabria, while the remainder proceeded to invest Ciudad Rodrigo. The Asturias had been reduced to submission; so that, at the end of April, of the whole western frontier of Spain, Galicia and Badajos alone remained free. The latter had been secured by the promptitude of Romana, when the corps of Mortier was approaching

1810.

April.

* Long after the capture of Astorga, a song was popular among the middling and lower classes, recounting the achievements of the besieged, each stanza of which terminated in a sort of choral chant, declaring that "*Astorga was the tomb of Frenchmen.*" We merely allude to this, as an indication of that buoyancy of spirit, which enabled the Spanish people to bear up amid so many and severe reverses, and to discover matter of exultation even in disaster.

CHAP. IX. from Seville, in expectation of carrying it by a
 1810. *coup-de-main*. Baffled in this attempt, the
 April. French retired to Merida, Zafra, and Santa
 Marta, followed by a division, under Don Carlos O'Donnel.

CHAPTER X.

INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY MASSENA.

SINCE the commencement of the year, the CHAP. X.
 campaign had hitherto been one of almost un-
 interrupted disaster. The Spaniards, had no
 1810. army of any magnitude in the field; their
 most important fortresses were reduced or
 blockaded; and three-fourths of the kingdom
 had been overrun. The southern provinces had
 fallen, with scarcely the semblance of resistance.
 The wealth and resources of Andalusia had
 passed, without a struggle, into the hands of the
 enemy; and Spain beheld the chief nursery of
 her armies, the provinces from which fresh bands
 of patriots might still have gone forth to combat,
 if not to conquer, in her cause, at once torn from
 her grasp. The British army had been com-
 pelled to limit its exertions to the defence of

CHAP. X. Portugal; and it was already evident that a
1810. mighty effort would soon be made for the reduction of that kingdom.

Never at any period had the cloud which lowered on the cause of Spanish liberty shed a darker or more impenetrable gloom. Those whose confidence in the zeal, the devotion, the native and untamed energy of the Spanish people had led them to predict a successful termination to the contest, now wavered in their hope. The British government, urged by the enthusiasm of the people, had at first rushed blindfold into the contest. The vast resources of England had been ineffectually wasted; her utmost efforts had been found unequal to arrest the progress of the French arms; and the lamentable expedition to the Scheldt, had exposed the counsels of her rulers to the ridicule of Europe.

Under such reverses, the enthusiasm of the British nation had begun to subside. The bright and glowing colours, which in their eyes had beautified the prospect, gradually faded into fainter and more sober hues. True, indeed, the voice of England was still for war; there was no flinching or faintness of heart among her sons,—but it was not as heretofore, for sudden,

desultory, and ill-judged operations,—for hasty CHAP. X.
advance and precipitate retreat—for profuse ex-
penditure of blood and money in pursuit of
“*British objects*,”—objects indeed, generally so
truly British that no other government on earth
would have thought them worth the expense
and hazard of pursuit.

Thus the blunders and incapacity of the ministry had in a great measure lost them the confidence of the country. Even their warmer partisans—those who exonerated the men, did not venture to vindicate their measures. The government had to encounter a strong and vehement opposition both in Parliament and in the country. The policy of withdrawing our army from the Peninsula,—of husbanding the resources of England, till time and circumstances should be more favourable for their efficacious exertion, found many advocates among the greatest and most enlightened statesmen of whom England could boast.

But party spirit was abroad in its violence; and the doctrine of opposition, though generally salutary, was scarcely applicable to the crisis at which England had arrived. At all events it was carried too far. Pertinacity on one side had gene-

CHAP. X. rated exaggeration on the other. Prudence is not a popular virtue; and the tame doctrine of temporary inaction, though supported by a considerable body of the nation, was but little in harmony with the pugnacious appetite of the majority. The Whigs were distrusted and disliked; and many who condemned the ministry, were still anxious to retain them in power. In Parliament a trial of strength took place on the debate on the Walcheren Expedition, and the Tories triumphed. The government, aware of the necessity of retrieving the disgrace of former failures, determined to prosecute the war with increased vigour. At the expense of nearly a million sterling, the Portuguese subsidiary force was augmented to thirty thousand men, and all the troops immediately disposable were sent out to augment the army of Lord Wellington.

In the meanwhile, strong reinforcements had crossed the Pyrenees, and the French at this period had a force in Spain, of not less than three hundred thousand men, distributed over the whole surface of the country; Galicia, Valencia, and Murcia, being the only provinces which remained free. Had even half of this force been concentrated, there was nothing in

the Peninsula which could oppose its progress; but the nature of the warfare waged by the Spaniards, required its subdivision into numerous small bodies, to maintain the subjection of the conquered provinces, and to scatter the irregular bands which occupied the mountain strongholds, and rarely suffered an opportunity of successful action to escape. These objects were not to be accomplished without heavy and continual losses. The animosity of the people was working in silence the destruction of the invaders; and Napoleon, in a country which his leaders had represented as *conquered*, beheld his armies gradually melting, and his efforts rendered nugatory, by the silent operation of causes which he could neither mitigate nor control.

But the most prominent and immediate obstacle to the success of his projects, was the presence of a British force in the Peninsula. Till the "Leopard should have been driven into the sea," a large army in Spain was required to watch its movements. The force thus employed could lend no aid towards the general object of extending and securing the submission of the people to French authority. Its efforts were necessarily directed to one sin-

CHAP. X. gle and paramount object ; and till that had been
1810. accomplished, it was for all other purposes en-
May. tirely useless.

Lord Wellington, therefore, at once perceived that the force at his disposal was not strong enough for offensive operations ; and he knew, besides, that the loss attendant even on a victory, might be ruinous in its consequences. Determined to abandon the Peninsula only in the last extremity, he waited therefore the approach of the enemy, prepared to take advantage of every circumstance which might contribute to his security, and enable him to baffle the powerful efforts of a superior enemy.

In the beginning of May, Lord Wellington was apprized of some movements in the French army, which indicated their intention of advancing against Ciudad Rodrigo. He accordingly moved towards the frontier, establishing his head-quarters at Celorico, and his divisions at Pinhel, Alverca, Guarda, Trancoso, and along the valley of the Mondego, as far as Cea ; and on the opposite bank of that river, at Fornos, Mangualde, and Vizeu. The corps of Sir Rowland Hill remained in the neighbourhood of Abrantes, to check any operation on the part

of Regnier. In this position Lord Wellington CHAP. X.
determined to watch the movements, and await
the approach of the enemy. 1810.

May.

During the long period of tranquillity which had elapsed, both parties had been engaged in great and important preparations.* Under command of Massena, perhaps the most celebrated of the great captains of Napoleon, a powerful army was assembling for the invasion of Portugal. It consisted of the corps of Marshals Ney and Junot, and of General Regnier ; while the corps of Mortier threatened an advance on the frontier of Alentejo. Besides these, General Montiniere was at Valladolid, with nine thousand infantry and four regiments of cavalry ; and to give still greater importance to this imposing demon-

* At this period a change took place in the organization of the French armies. The first, fourth, and fifth corps, which had invaded Andalusia, formed the army of the south, and was commanded by Soult, having under him Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier.

The army of the centre, under the immediate orders of Joseph, was composed of the Royal Guard, of several corps which had been raised in his service, and of the French garrisons within the district allotted for its occupation.

The army of Portugal consisted of the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of Massena.

CHAP. X. 1810. May. stration, a strong body of the Imperial Guard crossed the Pyrenees, and the remainder was held in readiness to follow,—circumstances conveying a strong intimation that Napoleon intended to assume the personal command. On his side, Lord Wellington directed the works of Almeida and Abrantes to be strengthened and repaired, and determined to obstruct the progress of the enemy by every means in his power. Though anxious as long as possible to prevent the tide of war from rolling onward from the frontier, he had determined, on the advance of the enemy, to fall back on his resources, and thus to add materially to the difficulties of his opponent, by compelling him to weaken his force in the occupation of distant provinces, and extend the line of his communications through a hostile country.

The numerical force of the hostile armies may be thus calculated :—

British and Portuguese Army.

The corps with Lord Wellington,	30,000
The corps with Lieutenant-General Hill,	14,000
Carried over,	44,000

Brought over,	44,000
The reserve under Major-General Leith,	10,000
	54,000

In co-operation with this force was

A corps of Portuguese Militia,	10,000
The Spanish troops under Romana,	10,000

Making a grand total of 76,000

Army under Massena.

The infantry of the 2d, 6th, and 8th corps,	62,000
The Cavalry,	6000
The Artillery, &c.	4000

Total, 72,000

To this were afterwards joined

Two divisions of the 9th corps under Drouet,	10,000
The remaining division of this corps under General Claperede,	8000
The corps of Mortier co-operating on the south of the Tagus,	13,000

Making a grand total of 103,000

CHAP. X. By those who would form a just estimate of
 1810. the relative strength of these armies, the descrip-
 May. tion of troops of which they were composed
 must be taken into calculation. The Portu-
 guese were yet untried. By the exertions
 of Marshal Beresford, they had indeed been
 brought into a state of comparative discipline,
 but it was impossible to place any sanguine
 reliance on their conduct in the field. To
 give them confidence in themselves, Lord Wel-
 lington had directed the troops of the two
 nations to be brigaded together, in the pro-
 portion of one Portuguese to two British re-
 giments. Of the regular troops, therefore,
 hopes might be entertained; but the Portuguese
 militia were so entirely defective in organiza-
 tion, as to be utterly unfit for the active opera-
 tions of a campaign.

The French army, on the other hand, was
 composed of troops accustomed to conquer, and
 in the highest state of discipline; while that of
 Lord Wellington might be compared to a piece
 of tessellated Mosaic, pleasing to the eye, yet
 far inferior in strength to a surface composed of
 one uniform and unbroken material.

Lord Wellington had early foreseen that the

attack of the enemy would be on the eastern CHAP. X.
 frontier of Portugal, by the way of Lower Beira. 1810.
 There were only two other routes by which it May.
 was practicable to penetrate into the kingdom:
 the one by Elvas and the Alentejo, the other
 through Gallicia on the north. By the first of
 these it was impossible to reach Lisbon, from
 the intervention of the Tagus. The second was
 obstructed by impenetrable ranges of gigantic
 mountains, which crossed every possible line of
 march. That Massena would invade the king-
 dom by either of these lines was utterly improb-
 able.

Certain therefore of the route that would be
 followed by the enemy, Lord Wellington made
 his dispositions accordingly. Looking on Ciud-
 dad Rodrigo, and Almeida, as the points of
 which Massena must become master, before he
 could march either upon Lisbon or Oporto, he
 took up a position on the frontier mountains of
 Beira, in form of the segment of a circle, of
 which the convex part was presented to the quar-
 ter from which the enemy must approach. The
 defensive line was about thirty miles in extent,
 but its circular form gave it this advantage, that
 its several points were not distant from each other

CHAP. X in proportion to the length of its circumference.
 1810. The several posts, moreover, were very strongly
 June. secured by the nature of the ground. The Coa, with its tributary streams, flowed along the front of the line through the greater part of its extent.

Jan. 11. In the beginning of June, Massena advanced from Salamanca, to commence the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. He brought with him a considerable train of artillery; and the speedy surrender of the place was confidently anticipated. Notwithstanding the importance which had always been attached to this fortress, it was not in the best state of defence. The works were old, and in many points defective; there were no bomb-proofs; and the town itself, though built partly on a rock and washed by the Agueda, was not strong, being commanded from many points, and particularly by a height called the Teson. Some new works, however, had been added on the side on which it is most easily accessible; a ditch had been dug flanked by two bastions, and exertions made to render the convents without the walls available for [the defence of the approaches. The garrison, under command of General Herrasti, consisted of four

thousand nine hundred and fifty men, chiefly
 of the new levies. The population of the town
 did not much exceed the garrison in number.

CHAP. X.
 1810.
 June.

The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was undertaken with two corps only, that of Regnier being detached to the left of the Tagus for the greater facility of procuring subsistence. Early in June the place was in a state of complete investment. The trenches were opened on the night of the eleventh, and the enemy continued to push on the parallels till the twenty-fourth. The convents of Santa Cruz and St. Francisco, situated without the walls, were carried by assault; and, on the morning of the twenty-fifth, the enemy opened a heavy fire on the body of the place from a battery of forty-six guns planted on the Teson. By this, and by riflemen stationed in pits, the fire of the garrison was kept down, and the sap was pushed to the glacis. The besiegers' batteries were then within sixty toises of the place, and the effects of the fire became infinitely more decisive. Nothing, however, could exceed the steadiness and resolution of the garrison. Every inch of ground was manfully disputed, and frequent sorties were made which occasioned great loss.

Jan. 24.

CHAP. X. to the besiegers. The place held out till the
 1810. tenth of July; and capitulated only when several
 July. practicable breaches had been effected, the principal defences destroyed, and the enemy had assembled in the trenches for the assault.

The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was carried on almost in the very presence of the British army. The outposts were near enough to hear even the report of musquetry; but, with every temptation to relieve the brave garrison of the place, Lord Wellington declined assuming the offensive. With so large a proportion of his troops half-disciplined and untried, and with so mighty an interest at stake, he could not, without imprudence, have encountered an enemy so greatly superior in numbers. It was not his object to risk his army for the sake of petty or temporary triumph; and having already laid down a plan by which Portugal would eventually be rescued, he could not be induced to swerve from it by any circumstances, however painful to his feelings, or apparently derogatory to his reputation.

On the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, Massena detached a portion of his army to the relief of Astorga, which had been placed by General

Mahy in a state of blockade. This object was easily effected; and General Echevarria, who was engaged at Alcanizas in organizing a body of raw levies, was surprised by a detachment under General La Croix, and his force was nearly annihilated.

On crossing the frontier, Massena issued a proclamation to the Portuguese. The Emperor, he declared, had placed one hundred and ten thousand men under his orders; to take possession of the kingdom, and expel the English. It was the wish of Napoleon to conciliate and promote the true interests of the Portuguese people. The English—that insidious people, who for selfish purposes, had involved the country in war and disaster—were their only enemies. “Let the arms they have put into your hands be turned against themselves. Resistance is vain. Can the feeble army of the British General expect to oppose the victorious legions of the Emperor? Already a force is collected sufficient to overwhelm your country. Snatch the moment that mercy and generosity offer! As friends you may respect us, and as friends become the object of our respect. As foes you must dread us, and in the

CHAP. X.
 1810.
 July.

CHAP. X. conflict must be subdued. The choice is now
 1810. before you, to meet the horrors of a bloody war,
 July. to behold your country desolated, your villages
 in flames, your cities plundered; or to accept
 an honourable and happy peace, which will ob-
 tain for you every blessing, that by resistance
 will be lost for ever."

On the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, the enemy ad-
 vanced against Almeida. Fort Conception was
 blown up on their approach; and General Craw-
 ford, with the light division, took post with his
 left flank resting on the fortress, and his right
 on the high ground above Val de Mula. Lord
 Wellington had directed that officer to avoid
 any engagement with the enemy, and on their
 approach to fall back across the Coa. General
 Crawford, however, determined to await the
 arrival of the French columns, and not to retire
 till pressed by superior numbers. On the morn-
 ing of the twenty-fourth the piquets were driven
 in by the French skirmishers, which covered the
 advance of their columns. A vigorous attack
 was then made on Crawford's position, in which
 the whole corps of Ney was engaged. The
 British were compelled by superior numbers to
 give ground, and retreated down the hill to the

Jul. 24.

Coa. From the rains the river was unfordable, CHAP. X.
 and some confusion took place in crossing the
 bridge. The rear-guard had to sustain a violent
 1810. attack, and the French endeavoured to push a
 July. body of cavalry across the stream; but the op-
 posite bank of the Coa being precipitate, and
 occupied both by infantry and artillery, the at-
 tempt, though repeatedly made, was unattend-
 ed by success. Nor were the enemy's endea-
 vours to gain possession of the bridge more for-
 tunate in result. The British, who were posted
 behind walls which formed a kind of natural
 retrenchment for its defence, kept up so warm
 a fire on the assailants, that they were uniform-
 ly repulsed, notwithstanding their great numeri-
 cal superiority; and General Crawford having
 maintained his new position till evening, fell
 back under cover of the night. The loss of
 the light division in this honourable engage-
 ment amounted to thirty killed, and two hun-
 dred and seventy wounded. That of the enemy
 was much more considerable.

The French had already commenced that
 shameful system of cruelty and plunder, which
 disgraced the army of Massena throughout the
 whole of its operations in Portugal. Even in

CHAP. X. the villages which submitted without resistance, the most infamous excesses were committed.

1810. The confidence manifested by the unfortunate inhabitants in the promises of Massena was repaid by conflagration, murder, robbery, and violation. A proclamation, therefore, was issued by Lord Wellington, commanding all individuals to remove their effects out of reach of the enemy. "The Portuguese," said this document, "must now perceive that no other means remain to avoid the evils with which they are threatened, but a determined and vigorous resistance, and a firm resolution to obstruct, as much as possible, the advance of the enemy into the interior of the kingdom, by removing out of his reach every thing that may contribute to his subsistence, or facilitate his progress. The army under my command will protect as large a portion of the country as is possible; but it is obvious that the people alone can deliver themselves by a vigorous resistance, and preserve their goods by removing them beyond the reach of the enemy. The duties, therefore, that bind me to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to the Portuguese nation, oblige me to make use of the power and authority

CHAP. X. with which I am intrusted, to compel the careless and indolent to make the necessary efforts to preserve themselves from the dangers which threaten them, and to save their country. I therefore make known and declare, that all magistrates, and persons in authority, who shall remain in the villages and towns, after having received orders from the military officers to remove from them; and all persons of whatever class they may be, who shall maintain the least communication with, or aid and assist the enemy in any manner, shall be considered as traitors to the state, and tried and punished as an offence so heinous requires."

Almeida being a place of greater strength than Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wellington was entitled to expect that its defence would have been at least equally protracted, and that the advance of Massena would have been retarded till the commencement of the rainy season, when his difficulties would have been greatly increased. Lest he should determine, however, on pushing forward without waiting for its surrender, Lord Wellington drew back his divisions from Pinhel and Trancoso, and posted them along the Valley of the Mondego, in rear of Celori-

CHAP. X. co. By this arrangement his army was placed
 1810. several marches in start of the enemy, and
 August. time afforded for a leisurely retreat, whenever
 that measure should become necessary.

Massena, however, had determined to besiege Almeida; but his operations were delayed by the difficulties of the ground, and fire was not opened on the place till the twenty-third of August.

Aug. 27. On the twenty-seventh, however, the town unexpectedly surrendered. The cause of this unfortunate event was the explosion of a magazine, containing nearly all the ammunition of the place, which destroyed a large portion of the town, and buried the inhabitants in its ruins. The greater number of the guns were dismounted; huge masses of stone were thrown into the trenches, by which twenty French soldiers were killed; all the troops employed in guarding the ramparts were swept away by the violence of the shock; the citadel was overthrown; and the walls were rent in many places. Under these circumstances, the governor, General Cox, endeavoured to capitulate, on the condition of being suffered to retire with his garrison. This proposal was rejected, and the French again opened fire on the place. On the following day, how-

Guingret
Campagnes
de l'Armée
de Portugal.

ever, a capitulation was agreed upon, which CHAP. X.
 stipulated, that the regular troops should be considered prisoners of war, but that the militia should be suffered to return to their homes, on condition of not resuming arms during the contest.

1810.
August.

These terms were perfidiously broken by the enemy. A body of twelve hundred militia was forced to serve as pioneers; and every inducement was held out, through the agency of the Marques de Alorna and other Portuguese renegades, to prevail on the troops of the line to enter the French service, and assist in the subjugation of their country. As the alternative, in case of refusal, was a French prison, it was not difficult to obtain their assent. Massena, however, did not profit by his dishonesty. Nearly all the men found means to escape, and in a few days rejoined the standard of their country; and Lord Wellington, indignant at a breach of faith so dishonourable, did not hesitate to re-incorporate them with his army.

The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, in the immediate vicinity of the English army, was made, as might be expected, the subject of unmeasured boasting in the French bul-

CHAP. X. letins. These first successes were hailed as
 1810. the certain forerunners of approaching triumph,
 September. and held up to the world as new and unanswerable proof of the folly of attempting to obstruct the French armies in their career of conquest. The siege of the important fortresses in question, it was said, had been carried on under the very eyes of Lord Wellington and his army. Yet he had not dared to advance to their rescue. He had sacrificed his allies, to his fear of French valour, and of that army which was speedily, by one decisive victory, to drive him from the Peninsula.

In England the apprehensions of all classes had been strongly excited; and the army, ignorant of the vast preparations which had been made for the defence of Lisbon, regarded retreat but as the prelude of embarkation. Even the British Government was hesitating and fearful. No precise course was pointed out to Lord Wellington to pursue; but his instructions were couched in terms which showed the Ministry to be averse from any measures of boldness and hazard. He was directed to avoid all operations by which the safety of the army might be compromised, and was informed, that his Majesty

would be better pleased that the troops should
 be immediately withdrawn, than that their safe
 embarkation should be risked by unnecessary
 delay.

In such circumstances, Lord Wellington, with the firmness and confidence that became him, did not hesitate to assume the whole of that responsibility, from which it was evident, in case of disaster, the Government would be solicitous to escape. In no word or action of this great leader was vacillation discernible. He stood firm and collected, resolute in purpose, when all around him were wavering in hope; and, in the unfettered exercise of his energies at such a moment, exhibiting a degree of moral intrepidity which it is impossible to contemplate without admiration.

The Portuguese, aghast at the approaching peril, watched with fearful anxiety the gathering of the cloud which was about to burst in thunder on their devoted country. The Government, aware of their own utter helplessness if deserted by England, adopted the only policy by which their country could eventually be saved, and entered with manly earnestness into the views of Lord Wellington. The nobility

CHAP. X. and higher classes, submissive to misfortunes
 1810. which they could not avert, were generally
 September. faithful in their adherence to the cause of their
 country. The lower orders were animated
 by a detestation of their treacherous enemy, so
 powerful and unchangeable, that every confi-
 dence might be placed in their devotion and at-
 tachment, even in circumstances the most ad-
 verse.

Sep. 16. The fall of Almeida left no further obstacle
 to the enemy's advance, and on the sixteenth of
 September, having been joined by the corps
 of General Regnier, Massena commenced his
 march into Portugal. His army was formed
 into three columns. Junot's corps advanced by
 Pinhel and Trancoso; Ney's by Alverca; and
 the third, under Regnier, by Guarda and Ce-
 lorico. At Vizeu, however, the whole army
 was concentrated; and from that point, in one
 immense body, pursued their march along the
 road on the right bank of the Mondego. Each
 French soldier carried provisions for seventeen
 days; a period which, at a moderate calculation,
 was considered sufficient to enable the army to
 reach Lisbon.

Of the country now to be traversed by the

hostile armies it may here be expedient to CHAP. X.
 say something. The road selected by Massena 1810.
 for his advance was of the worst description; September.
 full of natural impediments; and by all the
 officers, by whom it had been surveyed, consid-
 ered almost impracticable. The direct, and in
 every respect preferable, road to Coimbra and
 Lisbon runs along the left bank of the Monde-
 go. By this Lord Wellington retreated, in a
 line nearly parallel with that followed by his op-
 ponent. Had Massena determined on advancing
 by the road on the south of the Mondego,
 he must have previously encountered the Bri-
 tish army in the strong passes of the Es-
 trella, a high mountain chain, extending from
 the Tagus to the Mondego. This, however, did
 not comport with his project of the campaign;
 and, notwithstanding its numerous disadvan-
 tages, he directed his march along the road to
 the northward of the river. After passing Vizeu,
 the road declines from the ridge into a lower and
 more level country, and is subsequently cross-
 ed by the Serra de Busaco, which terminates
 abruptly on the Mondego. On the southern
 bank of that river there is another range
 called the Serra de Marcella, which forms

CHAP. X. an obstacle of equal magnitude to the advance in that quarter. To penetrate by any tolerable road from Vizeu into Estremadura, it is necessary to cross one or other of these mountainous chains. Lord Wellington having ascertained the direction of the enemy's march, accordingly crossed the Mondego, and occupied the Busaco range with his whole force, and in that strong position awaited the approach of the French army.

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The corps of General Hill had hitherto been stationed on the line of the Tagus, in order to protect that route, while the intentions of the enemy remained dubious; and General Leith, with the reserve, remained at Thomar, ready to support either Hill or Wellington, as occasion might demand. Both of these divisions, by a rapid and well-regulated march, joined the army on the twentieth, and took post on the ridge of Busaco.

The position thus occupied consisted of one lofty ridge, extending from the Mondego northward, for a distance of about eight miles. It attains an elevation of two hundred and fifty feet above the ground immediately in front, and is covered by gorges and defiles of extreme dif-

iculty. Its principal disadvantage as a position lay in its extent, which was manifestly too great to admit of its being occupied at all points by an army not above sixty thousand strong.

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Some skirmishing had occurred on the twenty-third, between the light division and the advanced guard of the French. The former destroyed the bridge across the Criz, on the road to Coimbra; but, on the following day, the river was passed by the leading divisions of the enemy, and on the twenty-sixth, the whole French army was concentrated in front of the British position.

Sep. 23.

Sep. 26.

Even at this period, Massena seems to have formed no just appreciation of the skill and activity of his opponent. He had calculated on deranging his schemes, by the rapidity of his march, and imagined it impossible that the army should have been joined by the corps of General Hill. On reconnoitring the position, therefore, he considered its extent too great to admit of successful defence, and is said to have observed to one of the unworthy Portuguese by whom he was surrounded, "I cannot persuade myself that Lord Wellington will risk the loss of his re-

CHAP. X. putation by giving battle; but if he does, I have
 1810. him! To-morrow we shall effect the conquest
 September. of Portugal,—and in a few days I shall drown the
 Leopard!"

The head-quarters of Lord Wellington were fixed in the Convent of La Trappe, which crowns the Serra. From that elevated position, indeed from the whole summit of the height, the French army were distinctly visible. No sight could be more beautiful and striking. The eye rested on a vast multitude of men, clad in the imposing panoply of war,—their arms glittering in the sun,—standards waving in the air, while the distant sound of the trumpet or bugle loaded the breeze.

Sep. 26. On the evening of the twenty-sixth, the line of battle was formed. The division of General Hill, with those of Leith and Picton on his left, occupied the right of the position. The first division, under Sir Brent Spencer, was in the centre, General Cole's on the left. The light division was advanced somewhat in front of the left and centre. The main body of the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, formed in the plains in front of Mealhada, and across the Oporto road; and the brigade of General Fane remain-

ed on the left bank of the Mondego, to repel CHAP. X.
 any reconnoissance which the enemy might at-
 tempt in that direction. 1810.

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Such was the distribution of the allied army. Daydawn on the twenty-seventh, shewed the enemy drawn up for immediate attack. The corps of Ney was formed in close column opposite to the Convent of Busaco. That of Regnier appeared in front of Picton's division, prepared to advance by the road crossing the height St. Antonio de Cantara. Junot's corps was in reserve, with the greater part of the cavalry, and was posted on some rising ground about a mile in rear of Marshal Ney.

Sep. 27.

In this order, covered by his light troops, the enemy's columns moved on to the attack. The abruptness and inequalities of the ascent contributed to cover their advance, and they reached the summit of the ridge without more serious opposition, than the occasional fire of guns posted on the flanking points. It was with the corps of Regnier that the first hostile collision took place. The regiments, in the part of the line to which he penetrated, had not reached the position assigned to them, and for a moment the height was in possession

CHAP. X. of the enemy. Their leading battalions were in
1810. the act of deploying into line, when General Pic-
September. ton, at the head of a few companies hastily col-
lected, came up, and with these and the light
troops, he kept the enemy in play, until joined
by the eighth Portuguese regiment commanded
by Major Birmingham, when charging the ene-
my's column in flank, he drove them in great
confusion down the hill and across the ravine.

About a mile on the right, the enemy made
streuous efforts to gain possession of the pass of
St. Antonio. These, however, were defeated by
the seventy-fourth regiment, and a brigade of
Portuguese directed by Colonel Mackinnon,
who, without assistance, was enabled to main-
tain his post in spite of every effort to dislodge
him. Notwithstanding the complete discom-
fiture of his first attack by General Picton, on
the left of the pass, the enemy's column still
continued to press forward, and again reached
the summit of the height. From this the
eighty-eighth regiment, under Colonel Wallace,
and four companies of the forty-fifth, dislodged
them by a gallant charge; and a brigade
of General Leith's division, coming up at the
same moment, the enemy were borne down

the hill with irresistible impetuosity, and desist- CHAP. X.
ed from all further attempt on this part of the 1810.
position. September.

The attack of Ney was even less successful;
with a division of his corps formed in column of
mass, he advanced against the height occupied
by the light division. During his advance he
experienced little opposition, and without dif-
ficulty gained possession of a village situated
on the brow of the ascent; but no sooner did he
crown the height, than he found the whole divi-
sion of General Crawford, and General Pack's
brigade of Portuguese, drawn up to receive
him, and his column became exposed to a most
destructive fire, both of musquetry and artillery.
This, however, was but of short duration,—yet,
so long, that the leading regiments of the assail-
ants were almost totally annihilated. A charge of
bayonets followed; the whole column was routed,
and driven down the hill with prodigious slaugh-
ter. The expression of a French soldier, who
was engaged in this attack, and subsequently
made prisoner, "*Qu'il se laisse rouler du haut* Early Cam-
en bas de la montagne sans savoir comment il paigns of the
échappa," is sufficiently explanatory of the mode Duke of
Wellington.

CHAP. X. in which the remnant of this division effected
its escape.

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About eight o'clock in the morning, a fog came on, which, for a time, partially obscured the positions of the two armies; when the day cleared, however, it was discovered that the French had placed large bodies of light troops in the woods, which skirted the bottom of the Serra. In consequence, a continued skirmishing took place during the day. It was probably the intention of Massena, by this manœuvre, to draw Lord Wellington into an engagement of some consequence, in a situation where the advantage of position should be less decidedly in his favour. But Lord Wellington was immovable. He advanced the brigade of Colonel Pakenham to the support of the light troops, but directed them to retire when pressed, leaving his position again open to the enemy, should he think proper to attack it.

Massena, however, was but little inclined to avail himself of the facility thus afforded. The day passed without further attack on the British position; and on the approach of night, the French retired from the ground they had occu-

pied during the day, and the village, from which
the light troops had been driven in the morn-
ing, was again taken possession of by General
Crawford.

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The loss of the French army in this engagement amounted to between five and six thousand men, including four General officers, one of whom (Graindorge) was killed; another (Simon) wounded and made prisoner. The British and Portuguese loss did not amount to twelve hundred men. About three hundred of the enemy were made prisoners.

Though the victory of Busaco exerted little influence on the operations of the campaign, its moral consequences were in the highest degree important. The Portuguese troops, which had hitherto been the object of contempt to some, and of mistrust to all, on that occasion established their character both for courage and discipline, and proved that, though exposed for centuries to the action of debasing influences, there existed in the unbroken spirit of the people, a germ of high qualities, which, by proper management, might be made to fructify into a glorious harvest. The contemned and vilified Portuguese had now fought side by side with

CHAP. X. British soldiers, and had borne themselves with honourable courage. Lord Wellington declared he had never witnessed a more gallant charge than that made on the column of General Regnier, in which the eighth Portuguese regiment bore part; and the confidence which he was now enabled to repose in their steadiness and energy, was worth more than a victory, even greater and more splendid in its consequences than that which he had achieved.

It was from the meritorious exertions of Marshal Beresford that this result had proceeded. The task allotted him of organizing and habituating the raw levies of the country to a steady and rigid system of discipline, was one for which his powers peculiarly fitted him; and he performed it well. No man could be more profoundly versed in the minute technicalities of his profession, or more laboriously attentive to the dry mechanical details of military discipline. The extent and value of his services were made known by the battle of Busaco, and, in consequence, he was shortly afterwards rewarded by the knighthood of the Bath.

Sep. 28. On the morning of the twenty-eighth, the armies still maintained their respective positions,

and the light infantry were again partially engaged on the left of the line. Towards mid-day, Massena having ascertained, from some Portuguese peasants, the existence of a practicable road across the Serra de Caramula, leading by Boialvo to Sardao, and the great road from Coimbra to Oporto, he determined to put his army in motion by that route, and thus, by a flank manœuvre, to turn the position of the British. In order to conceal his intention, the second corps continued to make demonstrations on the position of the allies, till the baggage and artillery had defiled; but the position of Busaco commands an extensive prospect, and towards evening a large body of the French army was observed to be in motion from the left of the centre to the rear, and from thence their cavalry were seen in march along the road leading from Mortagoa across the Serra, in the direction of Oporto. Lord Wellington was at once aware of their purpose, but it was too late to counteract or impede its execution.

In truth, the probability of the enemy's attempting to turn the position by this route was not unanticipated; and Colonel Trant, with a body of Portuguese militia, had been

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CHAP. X. directed to take possession of the strong mountain passes in the neighbourhood of Sardao and Avelina. Unfortunately, however, Trant was sent round by Oporto by General Silveira, in consequence of a small force of the enemy having occupied St. Pedro de Sul; and notwithstanding every effort, he found it impossible to reach Sardao before the night of the twenty-eighth, when the enemy were already in possession of the ground. By this untoward failure, the French army were suffered to continue their progress unopposed through a series of defiles, which they could not otherwise have passed without severe loss.

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On ascertaining the movement of the French army, Lord Wellington gave instant orders to quit the position of Busaco, and continue the retreat. With the main body of the army he moved on Coimbra, while the corps of General Hill retired on Santarem by Espinhel and Thomar. Colonel Trant was ordered to take post with his corps along the northern bank of the Vouga; and a body of militia was directed to enter Vizeu, in order to cut off the enemy's communication with Spain.

The banks of the Mondego are generally high

and rugged, presenting many favourable positions in which the passage of the French army might have been successfully opposed. But such was not the policy of the British General. With a more advantageous position in prospect, he resisted every temptation to fight a second battle on the Mondego; and, crossing the river on the thirtieth, he continued his retreat to Leiria, where he arrived on the second of October. During the whole march, the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, covered the rear of the army, and were engaged in several affairs with the enemy's advance.

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The army halted in Leiria till the morning of the fifth, when Lord Wellington, having ascertained that the enemy were coming on in force, gave orders that the retreat should be resumed. Massena had entered Coimbra on the first, where he hoped, by the rapidity of his marches, to have come up with the rear of the British army. Deceived in this, he immediately pushed forward to Condeixa. There the exhaustion of his troops, and the want of provisions, compelled him to halt till the third. With a degree of imprudence, utterly unaccountable, the large stores of Coimbra, instead of being reserved for

Oct. 5.

CHAP. X. the regular supply of the army, were suffered
 1810. to become the subject of pillage to the soldiery.
 October. But the immediate wants of the troops having
 been thus satisfied, the pursuit was continued;
 and the wounded, whose transport had hitherto
 been a serious impediment to the army in its
 rapid advance, were left in hospital at Coimbra.

Oct. 9. In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington and General Hill continued their retreat by leisurely marches; and on the ninth the former reached Sobral and Torres Vedras; the latter Alhandra on the Tagus. The proclamations which had been issued requiring the inhabitants to fall back on the approach of the enemy, and the fearful memory they entertained of the former barbarous atrocities perpetrated by the French troops, induced the whole population of the country traversed by the armies to fly from their dwellings, bearing with them all the property for which conveyance could be procured.

The British army, during its retreat, was accompanied by crowds of miserable and despairing creatures, driven forth as outcasts; and, though escaping with life, yet destitute of all means by which life could be supported. They quitted their homes—the scenes of all their

CHAP. X. hopes, their memories, and their affections, in
 the conviction that they were never again to
 behold them. Mothers with infants at their
 1810. breasts; children happy in their ignorance, and
 October. smiling amid the scene of desolation which surrounded them; palsied grandsires smiling too in the second infancy of dotage; men robust and vigorous, with features wrenched by strong agony of the spirit;—the blind, the maimed, the cripple, the diseased, all animated by the common and overpowering motive of escaping from the savage cruelties of the invaders, were seen crowding the roads, and flying for protection to the capital.

The multitude of sufferers increased as the army approached Lisbon. The wayside became strewed with articles of furniture which the wretched fugitives were unable to carry farther. Those who, in the weariness of exhausted nature, had cast themselves on the ground, started up with unnatural and convulsive energy to renew their journey, on learning that the enemy's columns were approaching.—But it is useless to enlarge on a spectacle of suffering of which the pen can give no adequate description. By no one who bore part in that memorable re-

CHAP. X. treat, can it ever be forgotten. Other scenes may
 1810. fade in the changes of succeeding years, or pe-
 October. rish utterly from the memory,—the impression
 of this can be effaced only by death.

Oct. 10. On the tenth the British army moved into its
 position in the lines prepared for its reception,
 and on the day following was joined by the
 Marques de la Romana, with about six thousand
 Spaniards from the Alentejo.

When Lord Wellington commenced his re-
 treat from the frontier, it had been the im-
 pression of all ranks, that his intention was
 to embark, and finally relinquish a contest
 too unequal to be maintained with any pros-
 pect of success; but the measured, leisurely,
 and imposing manner in which the retreat was
 conducted; the knowledge that not an article
 of baggage had been sacrificed; that during the
 whole movement the infantry had never seen the
 enemy, but to defeat him on the heights of
 Busaco; and that, in the engagements of caval-
 ry, the balance of success had uniformly been
 in favour of the allies,—contributed in some de-
 gree to restore confidence, and gave rise to a
 vague yet powerful hope that a retreat, in all re-
 spects so admirable, was not destined to termin-

ate in embarkation. It was not, however, till CHAP. X.
 the army reached the lines of Torres Vedras, 1810.
 that the full tribute of admiration was paid to
 the skill and prescience of its leader. There the
 troops at once found themselves placed in a
 strongly fortified position, in which they might
 securely bid defiance to the utmost efforts of the
 enemy.

Oct. 10. On the tenth, Massena advanced to Sobral,
 and drove out the force by which it was occupied.
 Then it was that he first became aware of the
 formidable position in which the allied army
 awaited his approach. He instantly halted; and
 as soon as it was dark a retrogressive movement
 was made, and three days elapsed before he
 again ventured to advance. From this circum-
 stance it was easy to infer his dismay at the un-
 expected strength of Lord Wellington's position.
 For several days he was engaged in recon-
 noitring the ground; and though the chief fea-
 tures of its strength remained concealed, what
 he saw was, to an eye so experienced, enough to
 convince him of the extent and character of the
 obstacles opposed to his progress.

From the first, therefore, he appears to have
 given up all intention of attack, and placed two

CHAP. X. corps of his army in bivouac, on a range of
 1810. heights extending from Villa Franca on the Ta-
 October. gus, in an arc, almost concentric with that occu-
 pied by the allies. Part of Ney's corps was sta-
 tioned at Otta and Villa Nova, and the re-
 mainder occupied the villages along the banks
 of the river. At this period, several partial af-
 fairs alone brought the armies into collision. On
 Oct. 14. the morning of the fourteenth, a sharp skirmish
 took place with the piquets near Zibreira, on the
 main road to Lisbon; and on the same day an
 attack was made on a redoubt at the foot of the
 mountain behind Sobral, which formed part of
 the British position. The garrison consisted of
 the seventy-first regiment, under the Honourable
 Lieutenant-Colonel Cadogan. The enemy ad-
 vanced to the assault, and were bravely repulsed;
 but not satisfied with this success, the seventy-
 first advanced, in turn, and driving the French
 from a redoubt they had erected near that of
 the British, triumphantly maintained it.

This gallant exploit was performed in sight
 of both armies. Massena desisted from further
 efforts, and no event of any consequence occurred
 for several weeks. Of this period of inaction
 we shall take advantage, to offer a brief and

general description of the celebrated position CHAP. X.
 occupied by the allies.

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Lisbon stands at the extremity of a peninsula,
 the neck of which is crossed by several rugged and
 mountainous chains, stretching from the Tagus
 in a semicircular direction towards the sea,—a
 distance of about thirty miles. Along these,
 considerably below the point where the river
 ceases to be fordable, two lines of defence had
 been selected,—one considerably in advance of
 the other,—both of the greatest natural strength.
 To add to their security the whole resources
 of military science had been lavished. Moun-
 tains were scarped perpendicularly; insignificant
 streams were dammed into inundations; forts of
 the most formidable description were erected on
 the heights; all roads by which the enemy
 could advance were broken up and obstruct-
 ed, and at every part enfiladed with cannon;
 new ones were formed to facilitate the com-
 munications of the defensive army; the weak-
 er points of the position were strengthened by
 the construction of works and retrenchments;
 batteries were planted on posts inaccessible;
 and every measure had been adopted by which
 the position could be rendered favourable for

CHAP. X. offensive operations, whenever such should be
1810. assumed.

The right of the first line rested on the village of Alhandra on the Tagus, and was flanked by a flotilla of gun-boats, which occasioned great annoyance to the enemy. The road leading to the town, which forms the principal approach to Lisbon, was completely broken up, and rendered impassable, by every obstruction which ingenuity could devise. This most important part of the position was occupied by the division of General Hill, with that of General Crawford on its left. General Spencer's division was in the centre; and General Picton's and General Cole's continued the line of defence from Torres Vedras to the sea.

Considerably in rear of the former, was a second line of defence, of features nearly similar, and possessing advantages of equal magnitude and importance. At different places a series of works had been erected, covering the communication between them; and thus, even had the first position been carried by the enemy, he would still have found his approach to the capital obstructed by a barrier of immense strength.

On the southern bank of the Tagus, the heights

commanding the city and anchorage of Lisbon, CHAP. X.
were fortified; and a corps, consisting chiefly
of marines from the fleet, allotted to defend
them. Strong retrenchments were likewise
thrown up around Fort St. Julian at the en-
trance of the Tagus, in order to secure the em-
barkation of the army, should the enemy suc-
ceed in forcing the lines of Torres Vedras.

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The whole extent of the position was strong in the most emphatic sense of that term. To call it impregnable would be idle, because no accessible position is so; but it certainly presented no avenue of approach, by which the enemy could elude encountering the full strength of the defensive army, or avoid being met by obstacles, which an immense numerical superiority could alone afford the prospect of combating with success.

Independently, however, of the circumstances to which we have alluded, another prominent advantage of the position yet remains to be noticed. To the westward of Sobral, a huge ridge called the Monte Junto takes its rise, and stretches in a long unbroken chain to the northward, for a distance of about fifteen miles. There were no roads by which this mountain could be

CHAP. X. traversed; and it unquestionably added greatly to the strength of the position occupied by the allies. In case of attack, the forces on the different sides of the Monte Junto could lend no support to each other, since, in order to communicate, it was necessary to make the *detour* of its northern extremity—a march of nearly two days. The communications of Lord Wellington, on the contrary, between every branch of his position, were secure and easy; and, in the course of a few hours, the great mass of his forces could be brought to the defence of any point the safety of which might be endangered.

1810.

Let us now cast a passing retrospect over the operations of the campaign. From the first, it was evidently the intention of Massena to break in, by the rapidity of his movements, on the defences of his opponent; to afford him no rest or breathing-time, but to force him at once to battle, or drive him headlong to his ships. So long as Regnier's corps remained in Estremadura, it was considered possible by Lord Wellington that Massena might push forward the main body of his army by Castello Branco and Abrantes. But, by that route, it would

have been necessary to force the strong position of Sarzedas, and the defences of the Zezere. Had he followed the road along the northern bank of the Mondego, he would have been met in the passes of the Estrella mountains, and at the Serra de Marcella. But the main object of Massena being to reach Lisbon, and by one decisive battle to terminate the campaign, he took the only route by which it was possible to advance, in rapid and uninterrupted march on the capital. True, he fought at Busaco; but his doing so, was a blunder of the first magnitude, and convinced of this error, he instantly resumed the prosecution of his project, by turning the left of the position, and continuing his advance. During his march he left no garrisons behind him; he occupied no posts even to secure his communication with Spain; but sacrificing every thing to the maintenance of his numerical superiority, in the anticipated battle, he pushed resolutely forward in pursuit of the allied army.

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As he advanced, his difficulties increased. His communications with Spain were speedily cut off; the country through which he passed was deserted; the villages were tenantless; and

CHAP. X. for provisioning his army, he relied only on
1810. the supplies which Coimbra might afford.

The road by which Lord Wellington retired from Celorico to the Ponte de Marcella was greatly superior to that followed by the French. To prevent hurry and confusion in his movements, he had thrown his army across a difficult country, several stages in advance, and thus ensured the advantage of being able to intercept the enemy's advance. To afford still greater leisure for his movements, the bridges over the Dao and the Criz were destroyed by the light division; and the army, crossing the Mondego, halted in the position of Busaco. There his left flank was liable to be turned, and Lord Wellington knew it; but he knew also, should this manœuvre be adopted, that time would still be afforded for a leisurely retreat; and he wished to give confidence to his Portuguese troops, by braving the enemy's army, in a favourable position. Great moral advantages resulted from this victory. The retreat from Busaco to Torres Vedras was felt by all to be the march of a victorious army falling back on its resources. There was nothing fugitive in the

heart or spirit of the troops. The movement, CHAP. X.
though retrogressive, was attended by all the
exhilaration of an advance. To the enemy it was
an advance, but accompanied by all the depres-
sion of a previous defeat,—of increasing diffi-
culties, and accumulating privations.

With Lord Wellington's arrival at Torres Vedras, the hour of triumph came. It was a triumph of which the greatest General, of whom history bears record, might have been proud. It was the triumph of consummate skill, prudence, and foresight, and the more glorious, because to the victors it was bloodless. In all the other victories which Wellington has given to our annals, the courage, steadiness, and discipline of British troops, claim—and rightly claim—a large share of the awarded honour. Here it was all his own. The wreath of Waterloo may be divided; but the brows of Wellington alone can be encircled by that of Torres Vedras.

Massena had scarcely gone into position when he received intelligence that Coimbra, containing all his wounded, had been captured by a corps of Portuguese militia under Colonel Trant. Trant had marched to Mealhada with the view of joining the corps under General Miller, but not

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October. meeting him, and hoping to take the enemy by surprise, he resolved to advance alone against Coimbra. Near Fornos, he fell in with a French detachment, which he succeeded in cutting off and overpowering. The cavalry were then sent forward to occupy the road to Lisbon, while the infantry advanced against the town. The resistance of the garrison was trifling; and the place surrendered at discretion, on a promise that the French soldiers should be protected from the violence and insults of the peasantry. The number of prisoners amounted nearly to five thousand. Three thousand five hundred musquets were taken and distributed to the Ordenenza of the country. The greater part of the prisoners were conveyed by Trant to Oporto, and the corps of General Miller and Colonel Wilson remained at Coimbra. These continued to scour the country; and, in a few days, nearly four hundred of the enemy—chiefly stragglers from the foraging parties—were made prisoners. To this number, each succeeding day brought new additions, and the difficulty of Massena in provisioning his army daily increased. The several Portuguese corps at Ourem, Peniche, Obidos, Abrantes, and on the

frontiers of Beira, formed a complete and connected cord on every side, and intercepted the whole of his communications.

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In truth, the French army possessed nothing of the country but the ground on which it stood. Had the orders of the government for the destruction of all stores which could not be removed, been duly executed, it would have been impossible for the enemy to have remained above a week in his position. But in many cases, the grain, instead of being destroyed, had been concealed in pits, which were discovered either by the treachery of servants or the sagacity of French soldiers; and frequently the work of destruction had been delayed till the approach of the enemy rendered it impossible. It was from such sources that the supplies of the invading army were principally drawn.

Massena remained above a month in his position in front of Torres Vedras. The piquets of the armies were close to each other, but by tacit agreement no acts of hostility took place. About the beginning of November, the sick of his army increased so rapidly from exposure to the weather, and deficiency of provisions, that Massena detached the division of Delaborde to

CHAP. X. occupy Santarem, with the view of forming an hospital, as well as to assist the foraging parties in that quarter. He likewise threatened Abrantes, and occupied Villa Velha, with the intention of crossing the Tagus. In order to prevent this, General Fane, with a brigade of cavalry, was detached to the southward of the river, with directions to advance along the margin of the river, and destroy all boats, built or in process of building, within the reach of his guns.

Nov. 14. At length, on the night of the fourteenth November, the French army broke up from its encampment, and retired to a line of cantonments extending from Santarem to Thomar. The line which had now been assumed by the enemy was strong. The left flank was secure, being bounded by the Tagus; and the cavalry was chiefly posted on the right, which was without natural support. An advanced corps was strongly entrenched on the heights of Santarem, behind the Rio Mayor; and a post was established at Punhete, in the rear, with a bridge across the Zezere. The head-quarters of Massena were established at Torres Novas.

On the retreat of the enemy Lord Wellington

immediately put his troops in motion to follow him. But as the intentions of Massena were uncertain, the division of General Picton, as a measure of precaution, remained in its position at Torres Vedras, and the remainder of the army was brought opposite to Santarem. A report from General Fane, that the baggage was retiring towards Thomar, at first induced Lord Wellington to believe that Massena was retreating to the frontier. Under this impression some movements of attack were made by the light division and the brigade of General Pack; but the enemy remaining firm, and displaying a considerable force, the columns were withdrawn, and no further demonstration was attempted.

The allied army then went into cantonments at Alcoentre, Rio Mayor, Azembuja, Alenquer, and Villa Franca, and head-quarters were established at Cartaxo. The corps of General Hill was thrown across the Tagus, and occupied the villages of Barcos, Chamusca, and Caregiro. Should the enemy, in consequence of reinforcements, think proper to advance, Lord Wellington was thus prepared to fall back on the lines, and equally so to seize, by a prompt movement,

CHAP. X on any advantage which circumstances might
1810. place within his grasp.

November. The state of Lisbon during the period marked by the events we have just narrated, merits record. When the army commenced its retrogressive movement from the frontier, the inhabitants of the capital were filled with apprehension and dismay. The richer classes thought only of securing their wealth; commerce was at a stand, and a gloomy foreboding of approaching misfortune, overcame that lightness and buoyancy of spirit, for which the inhabitants of more southern and genial climates are generally remarkable. The entrenchments which had been formed round Fort St. Julian gave rise to the belief that the object of the retreat was embarkation; but no sooner had Lord Wellington assumed his position at Torres Vedras, than confidence was immediately restored, and the business and the pleasures of life went on in their ordinary routine. The measures dictated by humanity for supplying the wants of the multitude which had been driven in on the capital from the surrounding country, were speedily adopted. Hospitals and public buildings were allotted for their accommodation, and a general

feeling of security pervaded the city, at a moment when the enemy were within a march of its walls. This was a singular state of things, and differing greatly from what Massena had expected. He calculated on the occurrence of tumult and insurrection, and that the people, goaded by famine, would welcome the approach of the French army, less as conquerors, than as liberators of the capital from a state of unendurable privation.

These hopes were belied by the event. In Lisbon provisions were dear, but there existed neither danger nor apprehension of famine. The provinces of Alentejo and Algarve, the great granaries of the kingdom, were free from the enemy, and yielded considerable supplies; ships from America and England were daily arriving, and maize was easily imported from the coast of Barbary.

During the remainder of the year, both armies remained quiet in their cantonments, and few occurrences of any importance took place. The country to the east of Santarem is fertile and abundant; and, being removed from the line of advance followed by the French army, the orders issued by the Regency had been

CHAP. X.
1810.
November.

CHAP. X.
1810.
December. generally evaded. The inhabitants, deeming themselves secure, took no measures for the destruction or removal of the stores, on which their own subsistence and that of their families depended, nor was it till enveloped by the French cavalry, that they were undeceived. The consequence was, that but a small proportion of the corn had been carried off, and the enemy for some time enjoyed abundant supplies.

Soon after his arrival in front of Torres Vedras, Massena had despatched General Foy to Paris, to explain his situation to the Emperor,* and urge the necessity of large reinforcements.

* Massena, in his report to the Emperor, transmitted by General Foy, represented the battle of Busaco as a false attack made to facilitate his object of turning the position, and converted only by the ardour of his troops into a serious engagement. The capture of Coimbra by the Portuguese, he stated to have been the result of a *mistake*, and that his intention was to have garrisoned the town, &c. "Ce rapport," says Colonel Guingret, in his Narrative of the Campaign, "montre que les généraux memes deguisent parfois la verité aux Princes, dont ils ont toute la confiance." As we presume this generalization of a particular delinquency is intended only to apply to his own countrymen, we have no inclination either to narrow its latitude, or dispute its justice. But what would be said in England, of an officer in command of an army, who should attempt to deceive his Sovereign, by the assertion of a deliberate falsehood!

As the arrival of these, however, could not be speedily expected, General Gardanne, commanding on the Agueda, was directed to forward a supply of ammunition for the immediate necessities of the army. That officer, with a corps of three thousand men, accordingly attempted to perform the required service, and advancing by Castello Branco, had nearly reached the French posts on the Zezere, when, alarmed by a report that Massena was retreating, he precipitately retraced his steps, abandoning the convoy, and harassed in his retreat by the Portuguese militia.

General Drouet, who had recently moved forward to the Coa, then determined, with a corps of ten thousand men, to open a communication with Massena. He advanced for that purpose, by the road on the left of the Mondego, and encountered little opposition on his march. Towards the end of December the junction was effected without difficulty, and the troops of General Drouet were placed in cantonments round Leiria to strengthen the right flank of the army.

In order to disperse the militia, a corps of eight thousand men, under General Claparede,

CHAP. X. was posted in the neighbourhood of Guarda.
 1810. The irregulars, under General Silveira, impru-
 December. dently suffered themselves to be drawn into an
 engagement which terminated in their defeat.
 They were pursued across the Douro with considerable loss, when Claparede, whose chief object was to keep open the communication between Almeida and Santarem, judged it prudent to retrace his steps. The consequences of this check, however, were only temporary. The militia, commanded by officers of skill and activity, were gradually acquiring confidence, and occasioned on all sides the greatest annoyance to the enemy.

END OF VOLUME II.

EDINBURGH: PRINTED BY J. JOHNSTONE,
 18, ST. JAMES'S SQUARE.

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
IN page 15 of the present Volume it is stated, that the officers of Sir John Moore's personal staff did not attempt to conceal their dissatisfaction at the resolution of retreat adopted by their leader. This assertion, though made on what certainly did appear satisfactory authority, we now find to be erroneous. By a communication with which we have been favoured by Colonel George Napier, we learn that the officers on the personal staff of Sir John Moore, so far from expressing dissatisfaction with any measure he thought proper to adopt, entertained on every occasion the most perfect reliance on the wisdom of his judgment. On the authority of this distinguished officer, therefore, we have great pleasure in correcting an error, unpleasant to the feelings of those immediately concerned, and which, by passing uncontradicted in contemporary narratives, must in some degree have contributed to corrupt the future sources of history.




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ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS:

FROM
MDCCCVIII TO MDCCCXIV.

BY THE AUTHOR OF CYRIL THORNTON.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, EDINBURGH: AND
T. CADELL, STRAND, LONDON.
MDCCCXXIX.

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ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.

" NUNC IGITUR, NUNC CÆLO ITERUM VICTRICIA SIGNA
(RES EGRET HIS ARMIS ET BELLATORIBUS ISTIS)
ELEVA, ET ACCELERA PUGILES ARMARE BRITANNOS."

BAPTISTA MANTUANUS.

ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTER I.

ANDALUSIA—ARRAGON—CATALONIA.

THOSE disposed to attribute to the imbecility of the government, the successive disasters which had befallen the Spanish armies, naturally looked forward with anxiety to the Convention of the Cortes. By decree of the Supreme Junta, before quitting Seville, that representative body was directed to assemble in the Isla de Leon, and a code of instructions was promulgated, directing the mode and principles of election. All cities which had

CHAP. I.
1810.

CHAP. I. sent representatives to the last assembly were to
 1810. retain their privilege. The provincial Juntas were each empowered to elect a member, and the population of the provinces was to be represented by delegates, in the proportion of one to every fifty thousand inhabitants. Besides these, sixty-eight supplementary deputies were to be chosen in the different provinces as a representative *corps de reserve*, from which all vacancies by death or otherwise were to be filled up. Nobles, plebeians, and secular priests, were declared equally within the pale of election; and the only qualifications demanded were, that the person chosen should have attained the age of twenty-five years, and should hold no pension or office of emolument under government.

A temporary arrangement was made with regard to the representation of the American Colonies. It was agreed that twenty-six members should be added for that portion of the monarchy, including the Columbian and Philippine islands; and, in order to obviate delay, it was arranged that these should, in the first instance, be chosen from the natives of those dependencies then resident in Spain. It was the intention of the Supreme Junta to have balanced

the influence of this popular assembly, by another CHAP. I.
 composed of the grandees, and dignitaries of the church, but this part of the project was not carried into effect. 1810.

Many difficulties occurred in the election of members; nor was it till the twenty-fourth Sep. 24. September that the meeting, so anxiously expected, took place. At nine in the morning of that day the deputies assembled at the Constitutional Hall in Cadiz, and walked in solemn procession to the Cathedral, where high mass was performed by the Cardinal Archbishop de Bourbon. The oath was then administered; and, after a discourse from the Bishop of Orense, the assembly at once entered on its high functions.

One of the first acts of the Cortes was a decree declaratory of their own character and privileges, and of the indefeasible rights of Ferdinand to the throne of Spain. They pronounced the invalidity of any cession of the crown in favour of the French Emperor, and ordained that no member of the Cortes should accept of pension, honour, or reward from the Executive.

In the proceedings of this assembly, a disposition was speedily evinced to engage in matters of abstract and speculative legislation, little ap-

CHAP. I.
1810. plicable to the circumstances of the crisis. On the motion of the eloquent and patriotic Arguelles, the state of the press in Spain became the subject of discussion, and a decree emanated from the assembly, removing many of the restrictions under which it had laboured. A committee was appointed to inquire into the best means of accelerating the despatch of causes before the tribunals. It was ordained, that all prisoners accused of crimes should be brought to trial, without the intervention of any unnecessary delay. The judicial authorities were directed frequently to visit the prisons within their jurisdiction, and every two months to transmit, through the Regency to the Cortes, an accurate account of the causes pending in the courts of law, and of prisoners charged with criminal offences.

Such matters of legislative enactment are unquestionably, in every civil community, of the first importance; but the moment when the armies of the enemy extended from Cadiz to the Pyrenees, was scarcely the most proper for their calm and deliberate consideration. At such a crisis, to animate the courage of the people, to organize the irregular levies of the provinces, to consolidate their strength and direct their efforts,

should have been the paramount, if not the exclusive objects of the Spanish Government.

In the preceding year, the Duke of Orleans then resident at Palermo, made offer of his services to the Central Junta. This had been declined; but the Regency soon after their installation invited him to assume the command in the provinces on the northern frontier, imagining that the presence of a Bourbon Prince, of acknowledged talent, courage, and activity, would contribute to animate the population, and occasion considerable embarrassment to the French government.

The Duke of Orleans immediately prepared to take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded. He sailed for Malta, and from thence to Tarragona, where he issued a proclamation, inviting all true Frenchmen as well as Spaniards, to rally round the standard raised by a Bourbon for the subversion of that tyrannical usurpation by which both nations were oppressed. The Duke then proceeded to Cadiz, and was received with all the honours due to his rank, but the Cortes refused to sanction the appointment of the Regency, and he shortly afterwards returned to Palermo.

CHAP. I.
1810.

August.

October.

CHAP. I. Towards the end of October a change took
1810. place in the council of Regency. The Cortes displaced them, alleging as a cause, the repeated solicitations they had made to be relieved from office. Their successors were Blake, at that time commanding in Murcia; Don Pedro Agar, a naval officer; and Don Gabriel Cisgar, governor of Carthagena. Neither Blake nor Cisgar were then present; and the Marques del Palacio and Don Joseph Maria Puig were selected, *ad interim*, for the vicarious exercise of their functions. At the ceremony of installation, Palacio ventured to express some scruples with regard to the inaugural oath, which he deemed inconsistent with the perfect allegiance due to Ferdinand and the Seventh. The Cortes then declared him to have forfeited the confidence of the nation, and appointed the Marques de Castellar to fill his place in the Regency.

Till the close of the year, few discussions of importance took place. A project for regulating the representation of the colonies was passed into a law. It was unanimously voted that a public monument should be erected to the British monarch, as a testimony of the national gratitude; and it was proclaimed that the Span-

ish people would never lay down their arms CHAP. I.
while a Frenchman remained within the Py-
renees, nor till they had secured the indepen-
dence and absolute integrity of the monarchy in
both hemispheres. 1810.

While such occurrences were passing within the walls of Cadiz, the city was still leaguered by the French army. Early in October, Marshal Soult received intelligence that an expedition was preparing to alarm the coast near Malaga; and orders were sent to Sebastiani directing him to be in readiness to repulse the meditated attack. On the twelfth, a corps of Oct. 12. nearly four thousand British and Spanish troops, under Major-General Lord Blayney, sailed from Cadiz, and on the fourteenth landed to the westward of Frangirola, about four leagues from Malaga. The object of this expedition was to gain possession of the fort, which was occupied only by a small detachment. Had Lord Blayney succeeded in this object, he was then to have garrisoned the fort, and have re-embarked the remainder of his troops, in order to induce Sebastiani to attempt its re-capture. The expedition was subsequently to have been joined by a re-

CHAP. I.

 1810.

 enforcement from Gibraltar, with the view of carrying Malaga by a *coup-de-main*.

This project, in many respects faulty, experienced a complete failure. Had Lord Blayney succeeded in gaining possession of the fort, the distance from Malaga to Frangirola was too small to have enabled him to accomplish the main object of the expedition. As it was, the troops were disembarked about three leagues to the westward of Frangirola, and were delayed many hours on their march by the badness of the roads. The Governor of the fort perceiving that the assailants were unprovided with the means of taking it by storm, declined all parley, and Lord Blayney did not deem it advisable to attempt an escalade. During the night some guns from the ships were placed in battery, but there was no time for a siege. On the following morning, Sebastiani, at the head of a superior force, came up, and at the moment of his appearance the garrison made a sortie. The result was, that Lord Blayney, and a great part of his force, were made prisoners, and the remainder with difficulty effected a retreat to their ships. The wonder is, that Lord Blayney, having failed in his object of carrying the castle,

Oct. 15.

should, instead of re-embarking his troops in the night of the fourteenth, have thought it advisable to await the arrival of Sebastiani.

In Murcia, and on the frontiers of Granada, several partial encounters took place between the French army and that of Blake. While the Spaniards were content to engage the enemy in a warfare of partisans, their efforts were frequently successful; but whenever they attempted to assume a fixed position, defeat followed their imprudence. In the centre and north of Spain the system of Guerilla warfare was steadily pursued. The Empecinado in Castille, and Mina in Arragon and Navarre, were indefatigable in seizing every opening for successful attack, and occasioned continual annoyance to the enemy. The hostility thus waged, was, on both sides, marked by features of the most barbarous atrocity. No quarter was given or expected by either party; and the waste of human life in the constant succession of desultory conflicts, was perhaps greater than would have resulted from the systematic operations of regular armies.

Porlier was busy in the Asturias and Galicia. An expedition of five British frigates, and about

CHAP. I. five hundred Spaniards under that leader, sailed
 1810. from Corunna, with the view of attacking the
 French defences on the coast, and was completely successful. Nearly the whole of the
 Jul. 9. enemy's batteries, from St. Sebastian to St. Andero, mounting upwards of an hundred pieces of heavy cannon, were taken and destroyed without loss on the part of the assailants; and the port of Santana was completely dismantled.

A subsequent expedition, however, was less
 October. fortunate in result. A squadron of three British frigates, accompanied by one Spanish frigate, several brigs and gun-boats, and above thirty sail of transports, with a considerable body of Spanish troops, under the distinguished partisan Renovales, sailed from Corunna, to occupy and fortify the town of Santana. The squadron had reached its destination when a storm came on, which drove the vessels from their anchorage in the roadstead, and, increasing in fury, the Spanish frigate, an English brig, and five Spanish gun-boats, were wrecked on the coast. Many of the transports were driven ashore; others were compelled to seek refuge in ports occupied by the enemy; and upwards of one thousand men were thus lost. The English frigates suc-

ceeded with difficulty in weathering the tempest. CHAP. I.
 —The operations in Catalonia were generally 1810.
 unconnected with those in the other provinces of the Peninsula. In a mountainous country, containing fortresses of great strength, which it was necessary to garrison and maintain, amid a fierce and hostile population, the establishment of large magazines was indispensable to the success of the invaders. The British flag was seen everywhere on the coast, and supplies could only be procured by means of land convoys, at best slow, precarious, and insufficient. Thus was the French army in Catalonia narrowed, cramped, and hampered in all its movements; and its operations were necessarily confined within a narrow circle, which the activity of the native troops was contributing still further to circumscribe.

The first object of Macdonald was to provision Barcelona, which, from the commencement of the war, had been in a state of blockade, more or less rigorous. No stronger illustration can be afforded of the fragile and precarious tenure by which the French army maintained its hold in Catalonia, than the fact, that it was found necessary to array their whole force for the es-

CHAP. I. cort of a convoy. While Macdonald was en-
 1810. grossed by this service, O'Donnel was not inactive. He attacked the French force on its march near Granollers, and succeeded in gaining an advantage which would have been more decisive had the Somatenes, who received orders to attack the enemy in rear during the heat of the engagement, obeyed their instructions. As it was, the convoy succeeded in reaching Barcelona.

July.

The system at first pursued by Marshal Macdonald was worthy of his reputation. Sparing of the blood of his soldiers, he avoided engagements which, though almost certain to be crowned with immediate success, could exercise no influence on the ultimate result of the war. His first object was to strengthen and provision the fortified places occupied by his army, and he endeavoured, like St. Cyr, to conciliate the good-will of the inhabitants. In this respect, he formed an honourable contrast to his immediate predecessor. After the fall of Gerona, Augerau imagined that measures of the greatest severity were necessary to intimidate the people. Acting under this detestable delusion, all peasants, taken with arms in their hands, were executed,

and a system of ferocious intimidation was adopted throughout the principality. CHAP. I.

1810.

Macdonald at first acted on a sounder and better policy. He endeavoured to allay, by conciliatory proclamations, the fierce passions of the people, and substituted a system of mercy and mildness for one of bloodthirsty vengeance. The formation of magazines did much to prevent the necessity of pillage, and all abuses of authority were severely repressed. Yet even a policy so wise and generous failed of success. It is not at the moment when the wind abates, that the waves become still. The memory of past cruelties cannot suddenly be obliterated; and the ardent, haughty, and suffering Catalans, were rather disposed to attribute to fear, than to more generous motives, any increase of lenity discernible in the measures of the invaders.

Having relieved Barcelona, Macdonald took up a position near Cervera, as a central point, which would enable him at once to cover the siege of Tortosa, and menace the line of the Llobregat. O'Donnel was no indifferent spectator of this movement. On the sixth of September he quitted Tarragona, at the head of a

September.

CHAP. I. strong division, and marched on Mataro. The
 1810. artillery went by sea, under convoy of the Cam-
 Sep. 14. brian frigate, and a small Spanish squadron. On
 the tenth he reached Mataro, and on the four-
 teenth, succeeded, by a skilful manœuvre, in sur-
 prising the brigade of General Schwartz, which
 occupied Bisbal and the neighbouring villages.
 The French, thus taken at unawares, and sur-
 rounded by a force greatly superior in number,
 made a gallant though vain resistance. All who
 escaped the sword were made prisoners, and
 Schwartz himself was in the number of the latter.
 They were immediately embarked for Tarragona.

This was the last achievement of O'Donnell
 in Catalonia. He received a wound in the en-
 gagement, which made it necessary he should
 resign the command, and the Marques de Cam-
 poverde was appointed his successor. The suc-
 cess of Bisbal diffused energy and spirit through-
 out the whole population of the province.
 Those who had hitherto been restrained by fear,
 now gave full vent to their sentiments of hatred
 and revenge. The war, on both sides, became
 one of bloodthirsty vengeance; and the French
 leader, departing from the system of lenity and
 forbearance which he had hitherto followed, en-

deavoured to allay the general excitement by CHAP. I.
 violent reprisals. 1810.

In the meanwhile, the situation of Upper
 Catalonia rendered it necessary that Macdonald
 should quit his position at Cervera. A convoy
 had assembled at Gerona, which required the
 presence of the whole French army for its
 protection. After much difficulty, the convoy
 reached Barcelona in safety; and Macdonald, Nov. 25.
 having received large reinforcements, returned
 to afford protection to the third corps in the siege
 of Tortosa.

The chief object, however, both of Suchet
 and Macdonald, was the reduction of Tortosa.
 Early in June, the former received orders to
 undertake the siege, and was informed that
 the Catalonian army would simultaneously com-
 mence operations against Tarragona. In pur-
 suance of these instructions, Suchet began his
 preparations for this important siege. The com-
 mand in Arragon was confided to General July.
 Musnier; and the brigade of General Buget
 was posted at Huesca to maintain tranquillity
 on the left of the Ebro. The brigade of Gen-
 eral Verges occupied Doroca, Teruel, and Cala-
 tayud. A series of fortified posts was estab-

CHAP. I. lished on the different lines of communication ;
 1810. and thus guarded, a division was pushed forward to blockade the *tête-de-pont* of Tortosa, on the right bank of the Ebro.

The mild and judicious administration of Suchet had brought the inhabitants of Arragon to a state of comparative tranquillity. Many had resumed their ordinary occupations, and the fields again bore marks of cultivation. Those whom terror alone had induced to take arms, returned with the hope of safety to their homes; and the resistance to French power, though kept alive by the bold spirit of the Guerillas, had become less ferocious and pervading. This state of things, which a system of terror, however rigorously enforced, never could have produced, contributed to give greater security to the more distant operations in which the army was about to engage.

Many circumstances, however, combined to impede the progress of the besieging army. Near its confluence with the sea, the Ebro flows through a mountainous and barren country, affording no road practicable for artillery. By the droughts of summer the river had become too shallow for navigation; and these obstacles,

which labour and perseverance could alone sur- CHAP. I.
 mount, occasioned much delay. It was neces- 1810.
 sary too to establish a secure depot for the am- September.
 munition and provisions of the besieging army. With this view, *têtes-de-pont* were constructed at Mora and Xerta, and intrenchments thrown up, by which these towns would be protected from any sudden attack.

During the progress of these events, the blockading force was annoyed by sorties from the garrison; and a body of Valencians, under General O'Donaju, advanced against the fort of Morella. A brigade was accordingly detached to convey provisions and ammunition to the garrison; in which operation, after a smart engagement, it was completely successful.

The situation of Suchet, however, was one of considerable difficulty. He had advanced to Tortosa, under the idea that the army of Catalonia would already have commenced the investment of Tarragona, as the despatches of the Major-General (Berthier) had authorized him to expect. This, however, was not the case, and Suchet found himself open to the attacks of the Catalan army, which, acting in concert with the Valencian forces and the garrison of Tortosa, might be ex-

CHAP. I. 1810. pected to make a strong effort for the relief of the city. Under all its disadvantages, however, Suchet determined to maintain his position, in the conviction that any danger was preferable to the unfortunate consequences which must have resulted from retreat.

While the army thus waited the approach of Macdonald, in order to commence the siege, partial engagements almost daily took place. A more serious attempt, however, was made by the Valencian army, under Bassecourt, to relieve the town, but it was completely defeated by General Musnier, near Vineros, with the loss of two thousand five hundred of its number. Several encounters likewise took place with Villa Campa, who hovered on the frontiers of Arragon; but even an unbroken series of successful engagements did not relieve the French army from its state of almost perpetual annoyance.

Dec. 13. At length, on the thirteenth of December, Macdonald, with fifteen thousand men, arrived at Mora, on the Ebro, to cover the besieging army. On the fifteenth Tortosa was invested on both sides of the river, and General Suchet fixed his head-quarters at Xerta. On the eighteenth Macdonald moved to Perello, to keep

the enemy in check on the side of Tarragona. CHAP. I. 1810. —The operations of the siege were pushed on with vigour. On the eighteenth all the outposts were driven in, and the besiegers took possession of the heights in front of Fort Orleans; and on the following night, the first parallel was opened, on the ground between that fort and the river. At the same time a trench was opened on the right bank of the river, and batteries were erected to flank the principal attack. The covered way was crowned on the seventh night of the siege, before the completion of the batteries. Repeated sorties were made from the town, but without beneficial result. Alarmed by the rapidity of the enemy's approaches, the garrison determined, by a desperate attack, to attempt arresting his progress. At four o'clock on the twenty-seventh, a body of about three thousand Spaniards sallied from the Puerta del Rastro, and attacked the right of the French works on the height in front of Fort Orleans, while strong parties from the fort attempted to carry the trenches in the centre, and destroy the guns, then in the act of being conveyed into the batteries. One column succeeded in penetrating to the works in the plain, overpowered the

CHAP. I. guard in the trenches, burned the gabions in a
 1810. lodgement in the covered-way, and filled in a
 December. portion of the sap; but a strong body of the
 enemy coming up, they were driven back with
 considerable loss, and without effecting their ob-
 ject of spiking the guns.

The attack on the parallel opposite to the
 fort, was still less successful. In attempting to
 take them in reverse, they were attacked in
 flank by the brigade of General Habert, and
 compelled to retreat. In this affair the garrison
 lost nearly four hundred of their number, in
 killed and wounded.

The enemy's batteries on both sides of the
 river were now completed, and at daydawn on
 Dec. 29. the twenty-ninth, forty-five pieces of cannon
 from ten batteries opened a fire, which in the
 course of two hours silenced every thing oppos-
 ed to them. On the following day the bridge
 was almost demolished; and in the course of the
 night the Spaniards abandoned the *tête-de-pont*.
 1811. The fire continued from the batteries, with little
 Jan. 1. return from the town; and on the first of Jan-
 uary the counterscarp having been blown in, and
 two breaches effected in the walls, the Governor,
 Count de Alacha, sent a flag of truce to propose,

a suspension of arms for fifteen days; at the ex- CHAP. I.
 1811. piration of which period he offered to deliver up
 the town, if not relieved, under stipulation that
 January. the garrison, with arms, baggage, and four pieces
 of cannon, should be conducted to Tarragona.

These terms were instantly rejected, and an
 officer was sent into the town to state that no-
 thing but immediate and unconditional surrender
 could preserve the inhabitants from the impend-
 ing horrors of assault. The Governor was irre-
 solute, and no answer was returned. On
 the following morning the batteries renew- Jan. 2.
 ed their fire, by which the breaches were
 enlarged, and soon rendered practicable. The
 columns of assault were in the act of form-
 ing, when three white flags were displayed
 from the ramparts. The fire of the besiegers,
 however, was not suspended, and two officers
 were despatched to the Governor, to demand, as
 a preliminary condition of any arrangement, the
 instant admission of a French garrison, into one
 of the forts, as a security against treachery. To
 this demand the Governor replied, that he could
 no longer reckon on the obedience of the troops,
 and that the military council had not consented
 to the proposed terms.

CHAP. I. Under these circumstances, Suchet determined on a bold measure. Accompanied by the generals and officers of his staff, with no larger escort than that of a company of grenadiers, he approached the walls and demanded to be conducted to the Governor. The latter was a weak man, and overpowered by the difficulties of his situation. A bold and well-timed address from the French leader determined him to surrender. He directed the garrison to lay down their arms, and a brief capitulation was signed on the spot.

Thus was Tortosa, after a siege of seventeen days, surrendered to the enemy. The garrison, amounting to about seven thousand five hundred men, were marched as prisoners of war to Zaragoza. One hundred and eighty pieces of ordnance, a large quantity of ammunition, and provisions of all kinds, were found in the place. The capture of Tortosa cost the French army not more than four hundred men.

Under a commander of greater talent and vigour than the Count de Alacha, the city would have made a better defence; for the garrison were animated by the best spirit, and in all their sorties displayed gallantry and resolution. That

the place was not adequately defended, is evident from the fact that the enemy were suffered to complete the covered way without a shot being fired from the batteries,—a circumstance which could only have arisen from the ignorance or pusillanimity of the Governor. The Spaniards were naturally indignant at this tame surrender of so important a stronghold. The Count de Alacha was sentenced to death by a court-martial assembled at Tarragona, for having traitorously given up the fortress committed to his charge, and he was beheaded in effigy in the market-place. On the part of the enemy the conduct of the siege was marked by an union of skill and boldness, highly honourable to the Baron de Rogniat, who commanded the engineer department of the army.

While Suchet carried on the operations against Tortosa, the Catalan forces were kept in check by Macdonald. No great effort was made to relieve the place, and the projects formed for this purpose were defeated by its premature surrender. Tortosa was the principal point of communication with the neighbouring provinces, and its fall carried with it the preclusion of all exterior co-operation except by sea. To com-

CHAP. I.
1811.

CHAP. I. plete the insulation of Catalonia, preparations
 1811. were immediately made for the investment of
 January. Tarragona, the only stronghold of importance
 which remained to the Spaniards.

About this period the cause of liberty sustained other misfortunes of minor importance. The Coll de Balaguer, a small fort on the coast, was surprised by a detachment of the French army, which succeeded in overpowering the garrison.

1810. In the bay of Palamos the boats of the British squadron attacked a convoy of eleven vessels, laden with provisions for Barcelona, anchored under protection of the batteries on shore. A party of seamen were landed under Captain Fane of the Cambrian, who dislodged a French battalion, and succeeded in bringing out two of the vessels, and burning the remainder. Having defeated their enemy, however, order was at an end. Unaccustomed to the artifices of land warfare, both men and officers entered the town, when the French, returning, charged through the streets, and thus taken at a disadvantage, one hundred and twenty-two of the seamen were killed and wounded, and eighty-six made prisoners. The boats of the squadron succeeded with difficulty in bringing off the remainder.

CHAPTER II.

PORTUGAL.—RETREAT OF MASSENA.

IN Portugal the patriotic cause sustained a severe loss in the death of the Marques de la Romana. He died at Curtaxo on the twenty-third of January. Lord Wellington thus speaks of this distinguished patriot :—

“ I am concerned to have to report to your Lordship, that the Marques de la Romana died in this town, on the twenty-third instant, after a short illness. His talents, his virtues, and his patriotism, were well known to his Majesty's Government. In him the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country its most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always ac-

CHAP. II. knowledge with gratitude the assistance I have
1811. received from him, as well by his operations as
by his counsel, since he had been joined with this
army." What pen shall presume to add aught
to such an epitaph?

In Andalusia no effort was made for the expulsion of the invaders, and the inhabitants of Cadiz, satisfied with the security for which they were indebted to their situation, gave little demonstration of activity or zeal. Under these circumstances, Soult found himself in condition to detach a portion of his army to invade the Alentejo, and open a communication across the Tagus with Massena.

About the end of December, Soult and Mortier accordingly quitted Seville, with a force about fifteen thousand strong, and advanced into Estramadura. At Llerena, a division under General Girard, was met by Mendizabel and Ballasteros and compelled to retire; but having effected a junction with the remainder of Mortier's corps, Mendizabel in turn retreated on Almandrelejo and Badajos, without attempting to defend the passage of the Guadiana. On Mortier's approach, the division of Ballasteros fell

back to the neighbourhood of Olivença, and subsequently to Salvatierra. CHAP. II.

Before attempting to penetrate to the Tagus, Soult deemed it necessary to secure his communication with the south by the reduction of Badajos and Olivença. The latter place was defended by a garrison of three thousand men; and Girard's division, with the artillery of the advanced guard, was directed to reduce it. The trenches were opened on the twelfth of January; and after a feeble and inadequate resistance, the place surrendered on the twenty-second. The fall of Olivença was immediately followed by the investment of Badajos.

Intelligence of Soult's movements no sooner reached the British head-quarters, than Romana despatched the troops under his orders to the assistance of Mendizabel. They joined that leader at Elvas, on the sixth of February; and on the same day, the enemy's cavalry were driven beyond the Gebora; and a communication was established with Badajos through Fort St. Christoval, on the right bank of the Guadiana. Mendizabel then took up a position on the heights of St. Christoval; but a few shells thrown by the enemy from the opposite side of the river,

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January.

Feb. 6.

CHAP. II. unfortunately induced him to move his whole
 1811. force to its left, beyond the protection of the
 February. fort. Of this circumstance the besieging army
 immediately prepared to take advantage.

The overflowing of the Guadiana and the Gebora, secured Mendizabel from attack for several days, but the operations of the siege were prosecuted with vigour. On the night of the
 Feb. 11. eleventh the fort Pardaleras was carried by assault; and the waters having subsided on the eighteenth, the French forded the rivers during the night, and prepared to attack the Spanish army in its position.

Feb. 19. On the morning of the nineteenth, the cavalry crossed the Gebora, by a ford previously discovered, and advanced by the road leading from Badajos to Campo Mayor against the left flank of the enemy. The leading squadrons came suddenly in contact with the Spanish advance, and immediately dispersed it. The alarm of this attack spread through the army, and the troops flew to arms to engage an enemy of whose approach they had been ignorant. Day had already dawned, but a dense mist concealed the movements of the French army in the plain. Mortier took advantage of this, and by eight

o'clock his whole force was drawn up in order of battle. Shortly afterwards the sun broke forth, CHAP. II.
 1811. and the dense volume of vapour rolling upward
 February. like a curtain, both armies were seen drawn up in order of battle.

The engagement commenced with a brisk cannonade; and three columns were seen simultaneously advancing against the Spanish line. Girard, with three battalions, was directed to turn the right flank of the Spaniards, by the height near Fort St. Christoval. Mortier in person led the column of attack on the centre, consisting of six battalions. Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry, manœuvred on the Spanish left, which he succeeded in turning. All these movements were executed with rapidity and precision; and Mendizabel, alarmed at beholding his army pressed and surrounded on all sides, hastily directed the formation of two large squares, which, for a time, received and repulsed the repeated attacks of the enemy with gallantry and firmness. The cavalry, however, at length came up, and by an impetuous charge succeeded in breaking the squares, and the victory was decided in a moment. The carnage was great. The army of Mendizabel was in

CHAP. II. fact annihilated. A few escaped into Badajos, —others, more fortunate, succeeded in reaching Elvas; but the brigade of Portuguese cavalry, under General Madden, was the only portion of the army which quitted the field in a state at all approaching to organization. Nearly nine hundred of the Spaniards were left dead on the field; the prisoners are said to have amounted to nearly eight thousand. The French loss in this decisive victory did not exceed five hundred in killed and wounded.

The conduct of Mendizabel throughout these operations proves him to have been a person utterly destitute of military talent. From the moment of his arrival before Fort St. Christoval, he indulged in dreams of security from which the presence of the enemy alone awoke him. He courted battle, and yet was unprepared for it; and, in such circumstances, nothing can extenuate the disgrace of being surprised in a position commanding the whole country in his front, by an enemy who had to cross two rivers of very considerable breadth in their approach.

Perhaps the true policy of Mendizabel was to have left a sufficient garrison in Badajos, and with the remainder of his corps to have acted on

the enemy's rear, and cut off his communication with Seville. This would have forced Soult to divide his army, and detach a strong force to hold him in check. The operations against Badajos would thus necessarily have been retarded, and Soult might even have been forced to relinquish the enterprise.

During the progress of these events, Massena and Lord Wellington remained inactive in their positions. The circumstances of the two great armies, however, were very different. Lord Wellington had the capital behind him, with its noble port accessible to all the vessels which the power and wealth of England could freight, and his troops had to encounter no privations of any sort. The army of Massena, on the other hand, subsisted solely on the plunder of the surrounding country; and as the resources of the nearer districts became exhausted, its supplies became necessarily more inadequate and precarious. The convoys, coming from a distance, were continually liable to be intercepted and cut off. Every where in rear, the militia were in full activity, and the nature of the country was peculiarly favourable for a warfare of this irregular description. On the first of February, a small body

CHAP. II.
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February.

Feb. 1.

CHAP. II. under Colonel Grant, made a spirited attack on
 1811. the detachment of General Foy, about three
 February. thousand strong. Taking post on a ridge commanding the road along which the enemy were proceeding, he assailed them with so warm and well-directed a fire, that, in the space of four leagues, above two hundred of their number were found dead, and but for the approach of night, the loss would have been greater. During the months of January and February, small parties from Abrantes succeeded in cutting off upwards of three hundred of the enemy. A single peasant alone, in the neighbourhood of Thomar, killed above thirty Frenchmen with his own hand, and took about fifty horses and mules.

While this incessant warfare was carrying on, not only on the rear of the French, but almost in their very position, disease also was at work. Every day the number in the hospitals was increased; the supplies of provisions were constantly diminishing, and forage could no longer be provided. The reinforcements received were barely sufficient to replace the severe losses occasioned by famine and the sword.

"In this state of things," says the French

official report of the retreat, "the Prince of
 Essling had three measures only presented to his
 choice. The first was to attack the English in
 their lines before Lisbon; but the principles of
 military tactics forbade, inasmuch as his heavy
 artillery could not be brought up. The second
 was to pass the Tagus, and form a junction
 with the army of Andalusia, and thus open
 a communication with Badajos, Seville, and
 Madrid, and subsequently change the plan of
 the campaign and the line of operation. The
 third measure was to repass the Mondego, bearing upon Guarda, and thence to Ciudad Rodrigo, where the necessities of the army would be supplied. The last measure was that which the Prince of Essling decided on adopting."

In truth, it had become evident to Massena that the time for offensive operations had passed away. He saw that by retreat alone could his army be preserved; and so great was the pressure of his immediate wants, that he found it impossible to await the result of the operations undertaken by Soult for his relief. Massena, likewise, knew that considerable reinforcements were daily expected by Lord Wellington, and

CHAP. II. that their arrival would place him, with an
 1811. army sickly and dispirited, in immediate danger
 March. of attack.

Preparations, therefore, were made for the retreat of his army with great secrecy and skill. The sick and wounded were moved gradually to the rear, followed by the baggage and a part of the artillery; and, at the beginning of March, exclusive of a few heavy guns, for which means of transport could not be procured, there remained in the French cantonments, only the men and horses fit for duty, and the munitions necessary for their use.

Mar. 5. On the night of the fifth of March, Massena broke up from his position, and put his army in motion for the frontier, by three routes. The right column moved by Thomar and Espinhel; the centre, by Anciao; and the third and largest, by the great road to Coimbra. As all of these routes, however, converged towards one common centre, it was apparently the intention of Massena to concentrate his army and offer battle.

Mar. 6. On the fourth, the long-expected reinforcement, of seven thousand men, arrived in the Tagus; and, on the morning of the sixth, the retreat of the enemy became known at British

head-quarters, and immediate measures were CHAP. II.
 adopted for pursuit. General Houghton's brigade was directed to cross the Tagus, and, with the fourth, sixth, and part of the first divisions, under Marshal Beresford, to advance on Thomar, still occupied by the corps of Regnier. The light division, supported by the main body of the army, pushed forward by Leyria and Pombal.

On the approach of Beresford, the French retreated from Thomar, along the foot of the Serra de Estrella, to Espinhel; but the remainder of their army, having concentrated at Pombal, seemed determined to maintain its ground. Lord Wellington, accordingly, made preparations for a general attack on the following morning. After a short but smart skirmish, the enemy's advanced posts were driven in, and about two hundred prisoners secured by the light division. During the night, however, the French, having previously set fire to the town, fell back on Redinha, where a strong rear corps was found posted, on the following day, along a ridge of easy heights at the extremity of a defile. It was immediately attacked by the leading divisions as they

1811.
 March.

Mar. 11.

Mar. 12.

CHAP. II. came up, and, after an obstinate resistance, compelled to retreat for support on the main body.

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March.

The enemy's object, however, was gained,—the march of the British was delayed for several hours; and the baggage and artillery, which had been retarded by the difficulties of the road, were enabled to cross the Soure in safety.

The French army halted at Condeixa, where Massena again made demonstration of maintaining his ground. The position, thus occupied, consisted of a range of wooded heights of great strength, by which the road was completely commanded. An attack in front would have involved a great sacrifice of life; and Lord Wellington determined to dislodge the enemy

Mar. 13. by a flank movement. Picton's division was accordingly directed by a considerable circuit to the eastward, to approach the only road open for his retreat. This manœuvre had the desired effect. Picton's movement was no sooner discovered, than the enemy broke up from his position, and fell back to Casal Nova.

On the day previous, Massena had detached a force of cavalry, under General Montbrun, with a few light guns, to summon Coimbra. That

place was occupied only by a small body of militia; but the bold reply of the Governor to the message of Montbrun, led Massena to believe that the force in the city was considerable. Fearful, therefore, of committing his army, by waiting the reduction of the place, and pressed by the movement of Lord Wellington on his left, he gave up his intention of crossing the Mondego, and continued his retreat on the frontier by the road leading to the Ponte de Marcella. By the skilful manœuvres of Lord Wellington, therefore, the French were prevented from entering the strong and unexhausted country beyond the Mondego, and the communication of the allies with the northern provinces was opened.

The enemy now continued their retreat through a country presenting a succession of admirable positions, which continually afforded the means of retarding the pursuit. Of this circumstance they reaped the full advantage. At Casal Nova, the rear corps, under Marshal Ney, halted in a strong position, and on the following morning, their outposts were driven in by the light division. In order to dislodge them, Lord Wellington directed movements on their

CHAP. II.

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March.

Mar. 14.

CHAP. II. flanks; and Ney withdrew his force to a ridge nearly parallel, where he again stood firm, till compelled by a similar manœuvre to retreat. The French retired in fine order, on Miranda de Corvo, maintaining a continued action throughout the day.

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At this point, the corps of Regnier, which had marched by Espinhel, connected its movements with those of the main body of the army. The manœuvres of Lord Wellington again forced the enemy to retreat. The division of General Cole had, on the day preceding, been detached to Panella, in order to secure the passage of the Esa. Near that place, it was joined by Nightingale's division which had followed Regnier; and Massena, on observing the approach of this column on his flank, abandoned his strong position at Miranda de Corvo, having previously destroyed a considerable quantity of ammunition and baggage, for which means of transport could no longer be found.

Mar. 15. On the following morning a thick fog retarded the march of the allies for several hours. About nine the day cleared up; and the troops, renewing the pursuit, passed through the smoking ruins of Miranda de Corvo. The French

army were found in a strong position on the Ceira, a tributary of the Mondego, with one corps at Foz de Aronse, on the left of the river. Lord Wellington immediately directed movements on the flanks of this corps, and attacked it briskly in front. By these measures it was driven rapidly back on the bridge in great confusion. The loss of the enemy was very considerable. Many of their number were trampled down, and many drowned; and the darkness which came on contributed to increase the disorder. It has even been asserted that the bridge was blown up by the enemy, while crowded by their own soldiers; and two divisions, misled by their fears, opened fire on each other. A considerable quantity of baggage, and some ammunition carriages, were taken by the allies.

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During the night Massena continued his retreat, leaving the rear-guard to watch the ford. On the seventeenth the allies crossed the Ceira, having been compelled to halt a day to wait the coming up of supplies. The French army took post in a strong position behind the Alva, occupying the Ponte de Marcella, and the heights along the right bank of the river. Massena,

Mar. 17.

CHAP. II. deeming himself secure for several days, in
 1811. this formidable position, sent out detachments to
 March. collect provisions from the neighbouring country. Lord Wellington, however, directed two divisions to ford the Alva near Pombeira, in order to take the enemy in flank, and threaten his communication with Celorico; and having afforded sufficient time for their advance, made a front movement on the Ponte de Marcella.

Mar. 18. These manœuvres were successful. Massena fell rapidly back upon Mouta, without waiting to collect his foragers, many of whom were made prisoners; and the greater part of the allied army crossed the river at Pombeira on the same evening.

Lord Wellington was at length compelled, by the want of provisions, to relax in the active pursuit he had hitherto maintained. The Portuguese troops, whose commissariat depended altogether on the supplies which could be purchased in the country through which they passed, were in a state approaching to famine; and to enable them to move on, it had been found necessary to share with them the supplies intended for the British. A halt, therefore, was found necessary to give time for the arrival of forage

and provisions from the rear, while Lord Wel- CHAP. II.
 lington followed the enemy with the cavalry 1811.
 and light troops, supported by two divisions. March.
 Owing to this circumstance the enemy were enabled to reach Celorico with little further molestation.

Mar. 21.

In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington had determined on detaching a strong corps for the relief of Badajos. The division of General Hill, with the exception of General Houghton's brigade, was already on the south of the Tagus; and the fourth division, and General de Grey's brigade of heavy cavalry, and General Hamilton's division of Portuguese, were directed to join it. General Hill having recently returned to England, the command, *ad interim*, of this considerable force was bestowed on Marshal Beresford. Of its operations we shall speedily have occasion to speak.

Massena, on reaching Celorico, instead of falling back on Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, determined to take up a position in the neighbourhood of Guarda, with the view of connecting his operations with those of Soult on the Alentejo frontier.* After a few days halt the British

Mar. 23.

* Marshal Ney, at this period, quitted the army. In his

CHAP. II. army resumed the pursuit, and on the twenty-eighth reached Celorico. On the following day it moved forward in five columns, supported by a division in the valley of the Mondego; the militia, under Trant and Wilson, covering the movement at Alverca, against any attempt which might be made on that side.

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The position occupied by the enemy, was one of the most formidable strength. The town of Guarda is situated on the summit of a steep and isolated mountain, which forms part of the Estrella range, and commands the whole country by which it is surrounded. Massena availed himself of these natural advantages, and by their means expected to maintain his army within the frontier of Portugal. His officers, little apprehensive of attack in a position so secure, relaxed in their accustomed vigilance, and at length con-

opinion it should have moved on Almeida, and with his characteristic impetuosity he urged the necessity of this measure in the strongest manner. Massena was irresolute. Orders and counter-orders were issued during the whole of the twenty-second. At length he decided against the opinion of Ney, and that officer immediately resigned his command in disgust. Massena dreaded the responsibility of entering Spain without orders from the Emperor, and was anxious to maintain at least some portion of the Portuguese territory.

gratulated themselves on the termination of the pursuit.

So accurate were the calculations by which the movements of the attacking columns were regulated, that they almost simultaneously appeared on the different sides of the mountain, and succeeded in nearly reaching the summit before they were discovered by the enemy. The latter precipitately retreated without firing a shot, and the whole French army was driven across the Coa. A brigade of infantry, under General Maucune, posted considerably in front of Guarda, with difficulty escaped being cut off.

Driven from Guarda, Massena determined on a final effort to maintain himself within the frontier, by posting his army in a strong position along the banks of the Coa. The right flank extended to Ruivina, guarding the ford of Raponla de Coa, with a detachment at the bridge of Ferrereas. The left was at Subugal, and the eighth corps at Alfayates. The right of the allied army was opposite Subugal, the left at the bridge of Ferrereas; and Trant and Wilson crossed the Coa below Almeida, to threaten the communication of that place with Ciudad Rodrigo and the French army.

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March.

Mar. 29.

CHAP. II. The enemy was posted so strongly that his position was only approachable by the left flank; and on the morning of the third of April, the light division was directed to cross the Coa, at a ford several miles above Subugal, in rear of the corps of Regnier, while the third and fifth divisions should attack him in front; the latter crossing the river at the bridge of Subugal, the former at a ford a short distance above it. The sixth division remained opposite to Ruivina, and a battalion of the seventh observed their detachment at the bridge of Ferrereas.

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Apr. 3. The day was dark and cloudy, and a deep mist occasionally overspread the horizon, accompanied by storms of rain, which narrowed the scope of vision to the distance of a yard or two. A part of the light division had already crossed the river, when one of these impervious fogs came on. The enemy's piquets were driven in, and the troops advancing in pursuit, came at unawares on the left of the main body of Regnier's corps, which it was intended they should turn.

The consequence was that the advance was driven back on the forty-third regiment; and Regnier, by a partial dissipation of the mist, having ascertained the smallness of the force

opposed to him, directed on it a strong column of infantry, supported by artillery and horse. This attack encountered a spirited repulse; and Colonel Beckwith's brigade advanced in turn against the enemy's position, where they were attacked by a fresh column of infantry on the left, and by a regiment of cavalry on the right. Under these circumstances the leading battalion would probably have been sacrificed, had not Colonel Beckwith, with great promptitude, retreated behind some stone enclosures, which enabled him to maintain his ground. The combat was then waged with vigour and pertinacity on both sides. Colonel Beckwith's brigade made another charge, drove back the enemy, and had gained possession of a howitzer, when the French cavalry advancing on their flank, again forced them to retire to their post. There they were joined by the other brigade of the light division, and Colonel Beckwith again advanced with his own brigade and the first battalion of the fifty-second. They were once more charged in flank by a fresh column of infantry supported by cavalry, and Colonel Beckwith took post in an enclosure on the top of the height, which enabled him to pro-

CHAP. II.
1811.
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CHAP. II. tect the howitzer, in the capture of which so much gallantry had been displayed.

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In this state of things, when Regnier was disposing his troops for another attack, the head of Picton's division came up and immediately opened fire. At the same moment, the fifth division, under General Dunlop, having forced the bridge, was seen ascending the heights to the enemy's right, and the cavalry appeared on the high ground in rear of the left. Regnier then observing himself to be nearly surrounded, retreated with great precipitation to Alfayates, leaving the howitzer and above three hundred men dead on the field. About an equal number were made prisoners. The loss of the allies in killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to one hundred and sixty one.

Considering the great numerical disparity of the parties in this well-fought engagement, the conduct of the light division was admirable. Under circumstances of disadvantage impossible to be foreseen, they maintained a contest of the most unequal description, and executed their manœuvres in presence of a superior enemy, with the most imposing steadiness and precision. "Although the operations of this day,"

says Lord Wellington, "were by unavoidable accidents not performed in the manner I intended they should have been, I consider the action that was fought by the light division—by Colonel Beckwith's brigade principally—to be one of the most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in." Had the retreat of Regnier not been favoured by the fog, the results of the engagement would have been yet more brilliant and decisive.

The cavalry continued the pursuit as far as Alfayates, at which place the whole French army crossed the frontier and entered Spain. Massena hastened to concentrate behind the Agueda; and on the eighth, not a Frenchman remained in Portugal, except the garrison of Almeida, for the blockade of which Lord Wellington made immediate preparations. On the seventh, Sir William Erskine, who had been despatched with six squadrons of cavalry and two troops of horse-artillery, to reconnoitre Almeida, and drive in the enemy's posts, fell, unexpectedly, on a brigade of French infantry at Junça. Nothing could exceed the coolness and courage with which this body received the attacks of the assailants. The French commander formed his troops into a square, on which the cavalry

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CHAP. II. could make no impression, though supported by
 1811. the guns, which occasioned great havoc in the
 April. ranks. In this manner did the brigade continue its retreat, till it reached Duas Casas, carrying off the commanding officer, who was severely wounded, and affording a fine example of discipline and courage. The cavalry, however, succeeded in securing many prisoners, and, altogether, the loss of this gallant body was considerable.

The allied army then took up a position on the Duas Casas, with its advanced posts on Gallegos and the Agueda. The militia under Trant and Wilson were at Cinca Villas and Malpartida; and the communication of Almeida, both with Ciudad Rodrigo and with the French army, was cut off.

Thus terminated the invasion of Portugal;—that invasion by which it was boastingly predicted that the British would be driven into the sea, and the conquest of Portugal be decisively achieved. From the moment of its advance from Almeida, the French army of Portugal had encountered a long, unbroken series of disaster and defeat. Massena had been baffled in all his plans by the skill of his opponent. In every

engagement he had been worsted; and at length, CHAP. II.
 with the loss of nearly half his numbers, had 1811.
 been driven headlong from the kingdom, without the achievement of a single exploit which could serve to mitigate his discomfiture. By the aid of a British army, one of the weakest and most insignificant kingdoms of Europe, had successfully bidden defiance to the arms of France, and vindicated her claims to liberty by the sword. To the people of Portugal, is the honour due of having first given to Europe the spectacle of a mighty armament, led by one of the great captains of Napoleon, retreating, baffled, dispirited, and defeated, from the territory of the kingdom it had vainly attempted to subdue.

It is true, that a success so signal was not, and could not have been effected by the single and unaided efforts of the Portuguese nation. The age of miracles has passed—never to return. The Portuguese did all that a people so situated, so animated, and so suffering, could be expected to achieve. But it is to the zealous, ardent, and honest co-operation of England; to the consummate military talent of a British

CHAP. II. general; and to the gallantry and discipline of
1811. British soldiers, that a large share of the honour must be awarded.

The government of France had hitherto treated the efforts of Britain for the liberation of the Peninsula, with scorn and derision. England, they said, invincible on her native element, is insignificant on shore. Her generals are without boldness—without skill—without experience. The career of Wellington, they declared, had been one unvaried series of pertinacious blunder and fortunate escape. He was “*un homme borné*”—a dull and plodding follower of vicious precedent, incapable of conducting war on an extended scale, or of improving the advantages offered by the blunders of his opponents “*en grand general*.” British soldiers, it was said, though tolerable dischargers of firearms in a stationary position, were laggards in manœuvre, and only formidable from the stupidity which kept them ignorant of their danger, or the intoxication which emboldened them to brave it. Yet it was by these very men, and by the raw Portuguese levies which they disciplined and commanded,—by that very general whose talents

they denied, that Massena, in spite of all his CHAP. II.
boasting, had been driven triumphantly from 1811.
Torres Vedras into Spain.

A spectacle was thus exhibited to the nations of the Peninsula which could not fail to exhilarate their hopes, and animate their exertions. Nay, more, Europe was at length taught that proud lesson which led eventually to the overthrow of the most gigantic system of usurpation of which modern history bears record. There was not a province of his mighty empire in which the moral tenure of the tyrant was not weakened. The yoke was loosened from the shoulders of his vassal sovereigns, and they waited but for the occurrence of a favourable moment when they might cast it from them, and assert their claim to independence.

It would be unjust to deny that, as a military movement, the compulsory retreat of Massena was conducted with consummate skill. The French army retreated *en masse*, their rear covered by a strong body under command of Marshal Ney. It was impossible to exceed the skill and boldness with which that officer, taking advantage of every favourable position, foiled and delayed the pursuit of a force ten times more

CHAP. II. numerous than that which he commanded. Resistance was uniformly made till the very last moment, when it could be continued with safety. All his movements were marked by a promptitude and precision highly admirable; by a fearless confidence, ever bold, yet never degenerating into rashness.

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From the moment, however, when Ney quitted the army, a decrease of vigour and energy was discernible. Worn by privation and fatigue, and looking back on a campaign which presented few features calculated to lighten and redeem the gloom by which it was overspread, the French soldiers no longer felt confidence in their leader. All that was gallant and daring in the retreat, was attributed to Ney; while the timid policy of Massena was made responsible for the misfortunes of the campaign. The knowledge that a difference of opinion existed between these celebrated tacticians, tended still further to excite dissatisfaction. The departure of Ney was regarded as a misfortune by the whole army; and the lingering hope that the campaign might yet terminate in some honourable and distinguished achievement, gave place to forebodings of misfortune. These anticipations were not belied by

the event. Massena, by the want of due vigilance, was driven disgracefully from his position at Guarda; and he at length entered Spain with an army whose moral confidence was gone.

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During the retreat, the loss of the French army may be calculated at about five thousand men; while that of the allies amounted to little more than six hundred.

From the moment they crossed the frontier of Portugal, the invaders commenced a course of barbarous devastation, which continued unbroken till they were driven forth from its territory. The necessities of an army, forced to subsist on such produce as the surrounding country could afford, rendered pillage, to a certain degree, inevitable; and, in such circumstances, it was scarcely to be expected that acts of violence should not occasionally occur. But the gratuitous and wanton cruelty with which those inhabitants were treated, who, trusting to the promises of Massena, remained peaceably in their dwellings, must cast enduring infamy on all, by whom such a course of inhuman outrage was perpetrated or abetted.

"The conduct of the French army," says Lord Wellington, "throughout this retreat, has

CHAP. II. been marked by a barbarity seldom equalled,
1811. and never surpassed. Even in the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, in which the head-quarters of some of the corps had been for some months, and in which the inhabitants were induced by promises of good treatment to remain, they were plundered, and many of their houses destroyed on the night the enemy withdrew from their position; and they have since burned every town and village through which they passed."

The track of the French army to the frontier was marked by desolation. The town of Leyria, with the Bishop's palace, was burned. The Convent of Alcobaca, one of the most ancient and magnificent structures in the kingdom, shared a similar fate. Batalha, a religious edifice of equal beauty and antiquity, was likewise destroyed. In the hearts of these degraded barbarians, all human sympathies seem to have been dried up. The claims of age or sex afforded no protection from their murderous outrage. The bodies of murdered Portuguese were seen lying unburied, by the road, many of them—especially those of priests—mutilated in a manner disgusting to huma-

nity. "This is the mode," says Lord Wellington, in a tone of honourable indignation, "This is the mode in which the promises have been performed, which were held out in the proclamation of the French commander-in-chief, in which the inhabitants of Portugal were assured, that he was not come to make war on them, but, with a powerful army of one hundred and ten thousand men, to drive the English into the sea. It is to be hoped that the example of what has occurred in this country, will teach the people of this and other nations what reliance is to be placed on such promises and assurances; and that there is no security for life, or for any thing that renders life valuable, except in decided resistance to the enemy."

But the extent of the demoralization of the French army can be conceived only by those who saw the state of the cantonments in which they had been stationary for several months. There was something revolting, and even degrading, to human nature, in the spectacle of extreme uncleanness which they exhibited. In the houses inhabited by the soldiers, all the instinctive decencies, by which man, even in his mere animal nature, is raised above the brutes,

CHAP. II. had been habitually disregarded.—But on such
 1811. a subject it is unpleasant to enlarge. Let it
 suffice that history can produce no instance of
 civilized and Christian man, reduced to a state
 of debasement more abject and humiliating, than
 that of the French army, in this war of unprin-
 cipated spoliation.

CHAPTER III.

SIEGE OF BADAJOS—BATTLE OF BAROSSA.

IN England, the precipitate abandonment of
 Portugal by the enemy, contributed to revive
 the hopes of the people, and consolidate the
 power of the government. Convinced that
 there was now a fair, though distant, pros-
 pect of ultimate success, both Parliament and
 the country gave their cordial support to the
 policy of prosecuting the war with a vigour,
 firmness, and energy, worthy of England, and
 of the glorious cause of which she stood forth
 the chief champion. This was the general sense
 of the nation; and, supported by its voice, the
 ministry of Mr. Perceval were enabled to over-
 come all the difficulties by which they were sur-
 rounded. These indeed were of no trifling
 magnitude. The illness of the King occasioned

CHAP. III. the appointment of a regency, which threatened
 1811. an entire change in the members of the government. In both houses of Parliament the decided preponderance of talent was on the side of the Whigs, and the opposition which government had to encounter was powerful and systematic. With a blindness scarcely reconcilable with their acknowledged astuteness of intellect, or with an unfairness, which the ordinary prejudices of party can but partially excuse, the great Whig leaders endeavoured, by fallacy and misrepresentation, to raise the fears and depress the hopes of the people, at a crisis of difficulty and danger, when the destinies of England hung trembling in the balance. They knew that the honour of their country was, at length, irretrievably committed in the cause of the Peninsula. They knew it to be impossible to withdraw the British army, not only without danger to the national safety, (for the danger might have been braved,) but without disgrace. Yet, knowing this, they did not hesitate to advocate a policy which must have cast a deep tarnish on the honour of their country. They vehemently urged ministers to retire from a contest at once hopeless and absurd. Portugal, they declared,

could not be defended. The retreat to Torres
 Vedras was designated as a hopeless abandon-
 ment of the whole kingdom to the enemy. When
 Massena was triumphantly driven beyond the
 frontier, the country was gravely told that his
 movement was a mere change of position from
 the Zezere to the Agueda—a manœuvre to lead
 the allies to a distance from their resources,
 while the enemy would enjoy the advantage of
 removing from a ravaged and desolate country,
 to one comparatively fertile and unexhausted.
 The honour of Napoleon, they said, was pledged
 to effect the subjugation of the Peninsula; and,
 unfortunately, his power was commensurate with
 his ambition. Under these circumstances, it
 was worse than folly to expect that a British
 army could prevent the consummation of his
 projects. The resistance of England should be
 confined to that element on which her power
 was undisputed and irresistible.

Such was the language of the Opposition; fortunately, it was not in unison either with the judgment or the feelings of the nation at large. It contributed to lessen the popularity of the Whigs, and to weaken the influence which the leaders of that party had maintained over the

CHAP. III. public mind. The Prince Regent, from respect
 1811. to his father, expressed his determination to make no immediate change in the servants of the crown. The prime minister, Mr. Perceval, displayed a talent and aptitude for business of the highest order; and the precarious tenure by which the ministry held office, occasioned no diminution of the vigour of their measures. A grant of one hundred thousand pounds was voted by Parliament, for the relief of the suffering Portuguese; and large subscriptions for a similar purpose were made throughout the kingdom. By this generous aid, the lives of thousands, who must otherwise have perished, were preserved; many of them to fight the battles of their country, and contribute to the downfall of that despotism from which they had suffered.

One of the first measures of Lord Wellington, after the territory of Portugal had been freed from its invaders, was to issue a proclamation warning the people to prepare against future efforts of the enemy. He recommended that every man in the kingdom, capable of bearing arms, should become familiarized with their use. That, in each district, places of safety should be prepared, to which the inefficient part

of the population might retire in case of need; CHAP. III.
 1811. that every one should bury his more valuable effects, keeping the place of deposit secret from all not interested in the concealment; and that such stores of provision, as were not capable of removal or secretion, should be destroyed. If such measures of precaution were adopted, Lord Wellington assured the Portuguese, that the subjection of their kingdom could not be effected by any invading force, however numerous and formidable. The issue of such attempts, he declared, was certain. They would terminate in the independence of Portugal, in the happiness of its inhabitants, and in the eternal honour of those by whose unshrinking firmness and patriotism the freedom of their country had been achieved.

Lord Wellington, having issued this proclamation, and made arrangements for the blockade of Almeida, distributed the remainder of his army in cantonments, and set out for the Alentejo, where operations of immediate moment appeared to demand his presence.

On the defeat of Mendizabel, Soult completed the investment of Badajoz, and pushed forward the siege with increased vigour. Parallels were thrown out to the right and left of the Pardale-

CHAP. III. ras, and enfilading batteries thrown up for their

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protection. Unfortunately, the Governor, General Menacho, who had hitherto conducted the defence with great spirit, was killed by a cannon-shot, when standing on the ramparts to observe the effect of a sortie. His successor, General Imaz, was a man of less energy; and, from the moment he assumed the command, the vigour of the resistance was evidently decreased. Soult, on the other hand, having received intelligence of the retreat of Massena, was unremitting in his efforts for the reduction of the place. They were successful. On the ninth of March, the breaching battery opened,

Mar. 10.

and, on the day following, the place was given up, though the Governor was made aware, by a telegraphic despatch, that a strong force was advancing to his relief. On the eleventh, the garrison, nearly eight thousand strong, marched out by the gate of the Trinity, deposited their arms on the glacis, and were made prisoners of war. It was conceded by Mortier that the grenadiers should enjoy the privilege of marching out by the breach; but, to effect this purpose, several hours' labour was found necessary: a sufficient proof of the pusillanimous conduct of the

Governor in surrendering the city. The indignant comment of Lord Wellington, on the unworthy dereliction of their duty by the Spanish

leaders, is worthy of record. "Thus," he says, "were Olivença and Badajos given up without any sufficient cause: while Marshal Soult, with a corps which was never supposed to exceed twenty thousand men, besides capturing these two places, made prisoners and destroyed above twenty-two thousand Spanish troops."

On the fall of Badajos, Mortier advanced against Campo Mayor. The town was of little strength, and the works in bad order, and partly dismantled. It was garrisoned by a small detachment of militia, and only five guns were mounted on the ramparts. Under all these disadvantages, however, it held out for eleven days, and did not surrender till a practicable breach had been effected.

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Mar. 23.

A detachment, under Latour Maubourg, was also sent against Albuquerque. The place—which was formerly one of great strength, and still capable of resistance—surrendered without firing a shot. The French thus gained possession of seventeen brass guns, of large calibre, which were immediately sent off to Badajos.

CHAP. III. The satisfaction of Marshal Soult at the successful course of the campaign in Estramadura, must have been considerably diminished by a reverse experienced about the same time by the corps of Victor before Cadiz. In the month of January, the Spanish government, in concert with General Graham, had determined on making a combined attack on the rear of the French entrenchments. In order to remove all feeling of jealousy on the part of the Spaniards, General Graham consented that the chief command should be assumed by General La Pena. The enterprise seemed to promise success, since the corps remaining before Cadiz did not exceed twelve thousand men,—and the allies would be enabled to attack them with a force numerically superior.

It was accordingly concerted that the expedition should be conveyed by sea to Tariffa; and on being joined by the Spanish force at St. Roque, the combined army should advance against Victor; and, driving him from his lines, destroy the extensive works which had been erected from the bay of Cadiz to the mouth of the Santi Petri. An attempt was likewise to be made by the troops remaining in the Isla de Leon, under

1811.
February.

General Zayas, to open a communication with the allied force, and bear part in the operations.

On the twenty-first of February the expedition sailed; but the wind becoming violent it was found impossible to land at Tariffa, or any port in the neighbourhood. It was decided, therefore, to proceed to Algesiras, though from that point there was no road practicable for artillery. By the indefatigable exertions of the sailors, however, the guns were conveyed in boats to Tariffa, in spite of the formidable impediments of wind and current.

On the evening of the twenty-seventh, the whole combined force was assembled at Tariffa; and on the following day continued its advance on Casas Viejas, and Veger, in hope of surprising the detachments by which they were occupied. The enemy retreated with some loss from these places. In the meantime General Zayas had succeeded in throwing a bridge across the Santi Petri, and forming a *tête de pont* for its protection. On the nights of the third and fourth, the post was attacked by the enemy, but on both occasions they encountered a repulse. On the fifth, the allied army having been joined by the troops from St. Roque, after a long and

CHAP. III.
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February.

Feb. 27.

Mar. 5.

CHAP. III. fatiguing march, arrived on the low ridge of

1811.

March.

Barossa, when General Lardizabel, with his division, was directed to advance against the French entrenchments near the mouth of the Santi Petri.

In the execution of this mission, the Spaniards conducted themselves in a manner worthy of applause. They attacked the enemy with gallantry and success, and forced him, after some resistance, to withdraw. La Pena having thus opened a communication with the Isla de Leon, moved forward, with the main body of the Spaniards, to the heights of Bermeja, to secure the advantage thus acquired, and directed General Graham to advance with the British to his support.

This order, notwithstanding the fatigue of the troops, was promptly obeyed; and General Graham had already commenced his advance, when two divisions of the enemy were suddenly discovered, one of which directed its march on the heights of Barossa, still occupied by the rear-guard, while the other bore directly down on his flank.

The scene of approaching encounter was a rugged and extensive plain, nearly circled by a

pine-forest, which sweeps from the Santi Petri CHAP. III.

round its northern extremity to the sea. The plain is intersected by several ridges of rough and sandy eminences, which stretch directly inland from the shore. The ridge of Barossa is about a league distant from the mouth of the Santi Petri; and the Bermeja height, in a direct line, is nearly equidistant from both of these points. At its termination, near to the sea, stands a ruinous tower.

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On discovering the approach of the enemy, General Graham immediately directed his force to counter-march, with the determination of assuming the offensive, at once perceiving that to retreat under such circumstances could not but endanger the safety of the whole army. General Graham, accordingly, formed his troops into two divisions. Of these, the right, commanded by General Dilkes, advanced towards the Barossa heights. The left, under Colonel Wheatley, hastened to clear a wood which intervened on the left and attack the enemy's column in that direction. The latter came first into action. Unchecked by the fire of the British guns, which being judiciously posted, and admirably served, did great execution, the

CHAP. III. enemy's right wing under General Laval press-

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ed on gallantly to meet the attack which the British were preparing. A warm fire of musquetry was for some time maintained by both parties, the brigade of Colonel Wheatley continuing its advance. At length a decisive charge, led by the eighty-seventh regiment, and three companies of the Coldstream Guards, drove the enemy back in confusion, with the loss of a howitzer and an eagle, which remained in possession of Major Gough of the eighty-seventh. The pursuit was continued across a narrow valley; and a reserve formed beyond it was routed with facility, all attempts to re-form being prevented by the destructive action of the British guns.

The right wing was not less successful. The enemy had gained the heights of Barossa with little difficulty; the rear-guard and Spanish battalions, by which it was occupied, retiring after some shew of resistance. General Ruffin, by whom this division of the enemy was commanded, confident in his numbers and in the advantage of position, advanced to meet the assailants on the brow of the ascent. A warm engagement ensued. The fire of musquetry and artillery from the heights, occasioned great loss to

the British; but after a severe and sanguinary contest, the enemy were driven from the heights in complete disorder.

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Thus defeated at all points, Marshal Victor thought only of retreat. The exhausted state of the troops rendered pursuit impossible, and General Graham halted for several hours on the eastern side of the heights which had been the theatre of struggle. The results of this victory were the capture of an eagle and six pieces of artillery, with nearly five hundred prisoners, including two generals, (Ruffin and Rousseau,) who both died of their wounds. The enemy lost nearly a third of his number, upwards of three thousand being killed, wounded, or made prisoners. The victors also suffered severely, considering the smallness of the force engaged. Their loss amounted to about twelve hundred.

During the whole of this brilliant engagement, General Graham received no support from the Spaniards under La Pena. Two battalions, indeed, which were attached to his division, and had remained with the rear-guard on the height till ordered to retire, made every effort to rejoin him, but did not come up till the enemy were in

CHAP. III. full retreat. With a force greatly superior in number to that of Villatte, who, with four thousand men, was posted on the Santi Petri, for the protection of the lines, had La Pena thrown himself between that body and the centre, and pushed forward on Chiclana, the most important consequences must have resulted. The manœuvre would of necessity have been decisive. Victor could only have saved himself by instant and precipitate retreat ; and Villatte must either have at once abandoned the whole of the posts on the Santi Petri, or his retreat would have been cut off. This golden opportunity of achieving the entire object of the expedition, either through ignorance or cowardice, was lost by La Pena. During the whole engagement he remained inactive at Bermeja, satisfied with maintaining a position which the enemy were in no condition seriously to attack.

General Graham was naturally indignant at the disgraceful conduct of the Spanish general. After such a lesson, it was impossible that in any future operations he could place any reliance on the support of such a man. He, therefore, withdrew from his command ; and early on the next morning crossed the Santi Petri. La Pena

for several days remained at Bermeja, anxious, as he declared, to follow up the victory which British blood and British courage had alone achieved. Yet, with a force under his own immediate command, of fifteen thousand men, he refused to advance against the enemy, without the aid and presence of those troops, which in the moment of peril he had betrayed.

During this period several landings were effected by marines and sailors of the squadron, at different points of the harbour, who succeeded in dismantling all the sea defences of the enemy, from Rota to Sta. Maria, with the exception of Catalina. Victor, alarmed at his situation, hastened to Seville to demand reinforcements, concentrating nearly his whole force at Xeres, a small guard only being left for the protection of the principal works before Cadiz. Even under circumstances so favourable, however, La Pena remained pertinaciously inactive. At length the French, who at first were panic-stricken by the defeat they had encountered, emboldened by the timidity of their opponents, made an offensive movement. This operated as the signal of retreat. La Pena immediately withdrew his troops into the Isla de Leon, and

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CHAP. III. destroyed the communication across the Santi
1811. Petri.

Such was the lame and impotent conclusion of an expedition, which in all its operations had been crowned with greater success than could reasonably have been anticipated from the circumstances under which it was undertaken. We say this, because from the very moment when preparations commenced, the enemy must have been aware of the object for which they were intended. They commanded a view of the whole harbour; they saw in fact the whole progress of embarkation; the fleet steering for the Straits was clearly discernible from the coast; and opportunity was thus given to Marshal Victor of calculating the movements and counteracting the object of the expedition.

In truth, however, Victor had long been aware of the measure which the Spanish government was busied in arranging. He accordingly wrote to Sebastiani at Seville, entreating him to unite his army with that before Cadiz, or at least to embarrass the allied force by manœuvring on its flank and rear. Had Sebastiani acceded to the desire of Victor, the situation of Graham and La Pena would have been one of the greatest

danger, since it would have been impossible for CHAP. III.
an army, so discordant in materials as that which
they commanded, to oppose the combined forces
of their opponents, with any prospect of success.

That such a junction did not take place was owing solely to the jealousy of the French commanders. Sebastiani, intrusted with a sphere of independent command, did not choose to place himself under the orders of Victor; and the opportunity afforded of overwhelming the allied army was thus suffered to escape. But such expectations could form no part of the calculations on which the enterprise was undertaken. The allied leaders were not entitled to calculate on the occurrence of such a contingency, when they knew the enemy had full notice of the intended attack.

In this view we conceive the project, acted on by the allies, to have been radically faulty. In other respects it seems to have been concerted with skill and prudence; and had the element of secrecy been added to its other features, we should hold it to have been altogether unexceptionable.

The indignation excited by the conduct of La Pena, was not confined to the British army and

CHAP. III. people. His own countrymen joined in censuring the apathy or ignorance, by which all the beneficial consequences that might have resulted from the expedition had been sacrificed. The Cortes addressed the Regency, and demanded a complete investigation of the circumstances to which a failure so disgraceful was to be attributed. A Court of Inquiry was accordingly appointed, which exonerated La Pena from the charge of cowardice, but not from the stigma of incapacity and want of enterprise.

March.

In the Alentejo a considerable corps of the allies, commanded by Marshal Beresford, was advancing to check the French in their career of conquest. He was directed to invest Badajos, if possible, before the garrison should have time to repair the defences, and make the necessary preparations for standing a siege. The nature of the intelligence from Cadiz had induced Soult to return to Seville; and Mortier, who succeeded to the command, fell back on the approach of Beresford, leaving a small force under Latour Maubourg, at Campo Mayor, to watch the movements of the allies. Shortly afterwards he was recalled to France.

Mar. 17. On the seventeenth of March, the troops from

the north of the Tagus crossed the river at Tan- CHAP. III. cos; and after a halt of a few days near Portalegre, to recruit their strength, exhausted by a long succession of heavy marches, Beresford continued his advance on Campo Mayor. He reached that place on the twenty-fifth; and from a height about a mile distant, the enemy were seen running from the town, and hastily forming in order of march, while a convoy of artillery, ammunition, and provisions, was observed to be in motion towards Badajos.

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Mar. 25.

The enemy's force consisted of three battalions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and some horse artillery. Brigadier-General Long was directed to attack them on the right flank, and a charge made by the thirteenth light dragoons, under Colonel Head, supported by some squadrons of the seventh Portuguese cavalry, drove back the enemy's horse in confusion on their infantry, which halted, formed square, and in turn forced the assailants to retire.

The road from Campo Mayor to Badajos lies over a wide unbroken plain, which afforded to both parties ample scope for the display of military skill. The charges of the light cavalry were uniformly successful, yet productive of no

CHAP. III. important result. At one period a considerable

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part of the convoy was in possession of the thirteenth, but being unsupported, Colonel Head found it impossible to reap the benefit of his achievement. The convoy again moved on, and succeeded in effecting its retreat to Badajos, with no greater loss than that of a howitzer.

On the part of the allies the chief loss was sustained by the thirteenth light dragoons, which pursued the enemy to the very walls of Badajos, and were fired on by the guns of the place. Had Beresford employed his heavy cavalry to support the charges of the thirteenth, there can be little doubt that the whole convoy would have been taken; but alarmed at the boldness of Colonel Head's attack, he refused to allow the heavy cavalry to charge, observing that "the loss of one regiment of cavalry was enough for the day." The amount of casualties on the part of the allies was ninety-four killed and wounded, and seventy-seven missing. That of the enemy was considerably greater.

Mar. 26.

On the day following, Beresford moved forward to Elvas, where he halted for several days, while preparations were in progress for crossing the Guadiana. The task was one of difficulty.

The current of the river was rapid; and Beresford CHAP. III.

had brought with him no materials for the construction of a bridge. He depended, therefore, on such supplies as the country could afford; and so inadequate were these, that on the very morning of its completion, a sudden increase of the river entirely demolished the structure which had been laboriously erected. Rafts were then constructed; and on the sixth of April the passage of the troops was effected near Juramenha.

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April 6.

Head-quarters were then established at a small village on the left of the Guadiana, in the neighbourhood of which the army halted for several days. During this period of inaction, the enemy were on the alert. An out-piquet, consisting of a squadron of the thirteenth light dragoons, was surprised by a party of the enemy's cavalry in the night; and, with the exception of twenty men, the whole were made prisoners. The French, after this success, pushed forward to the village, from which Marshal Beresford with difficulty effected his escape. The alarm was at length given, but the party succeeded in reaching Olivença, bearing with them the men and horses they had captured, as trophies of success.

CHAP. III. During the progress of these events, the garrison of Badajos was busied in collecting provisions and repairing the works of the place. Mortier, whose force was too small to oppose that of Beresford, fell back to Llerena, leaving a detachment of four hundred men to garrison Olivença. As this body might occasion some annoyance during the progress of the operations against Badajos, Marshal Beresford determined on the immediate reduction of the place. Intrusting, therefore, the conduct of the siege to General Cole, he placed the remainder of his army in a line of cantonments, extending from Merida to Zafra, in order to cut off the communications of Badajos, and prevent further supplies being thrown into the town. At Los Santos an affair of cavalry took place, in which one hundred and sixty of the enemy were made prisoners.

The siege of Olivença did not long occasion a separation of the army. On the eleventh, General Cole sat down before the place, and on the fifteenth, when the breaching battery had been established, he sent a flag of truce into the town, offering terms to the Governor, in case of immediate surrender. To this communication no answer was returned, and the batteries open-

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ed fire. A breach was soon effected, when the Governor, apprehensive of assault, made an unconditional surrender of the town; and the garrison, consisting of three hundred and seventy men, were marched out prisoners of war.

A few days after this event, Lord Wellington arrived. He immediately reconnoitred Badajos, and gave orders for the immediate commencement of active operations. The loss of this important stronghold had been the only blow of the campaign. His anxiety to protect it had induced him to weaken his army to a degree which rendered the successes achieved over Massena less decisive than they would otherwise have been. He now considered its recapture essential to his future operations, since its possession enabled the French to protect their positions in the southern provinces, and placed the most fertile portion of Portugal within their grasp. It was impossible, too, that he could enter Spain with safety, while the enemy held so formidable a post on his flank.

While the preparatory arrangements were yet in progress, Lord Wellington was recalled to the north, by the movements of Massena. The want of a bridge across the Gua-

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CHAP. III. diana, for the transmission of artillery and stores, had, hitherto, kept the army inactive. Two had been constructed and swept away by the torrents caused by a succession of heavy rains; by great exertions, however, a third was established, and Beresford at length found himself in condition to commence operations against Badajos.

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May. The place was completely invested on the eighth of May, by Major-General Lumley, on the right of the river, and by Major-General William Stewart, on the left. Ground was immediately broken against Fort St. Christoval, and a breaching battery established on the eleventh, notwithstanding a vigorous sortie of the garrison, which, though at first partially successful, was, eventually, repulsed with considerable slaughter. The breaching battery, however, produced little effect. The guns sent from Lisbon being of brass, were soon injured by the frequent firing. The Portuguese gunners were raw and inexperienced, while the fire of the fort was vigorous and well-directed. The consequence was, that, in the course of a few hours, the whole guns in the battery were rendered unserviceable.

Fresh guns were then ordered to be brought

up; and, on the night of the twelfth, ground was broken against the castle; when Beresford, hearing that Soult, at the head of a considerable army, was advancing from Seville, relinquished the further prosecution of the siege, and advanced to meet him.

On the fourteenth, the army was put in motion on Valverde; and the stores and artillery were removed under escort of General Cole's division. As the rear-guard commenced its march, the enemy made a sortie from the town in force, and a battalion of Portuguese suffered very severely.

On receiving intelligence of the successful operations in Portugal, the Regent Blake had left Cadiz in hope of profiting by a conjuncture so favourable. He effected a junction with Castanos, who had been appointed to the command in Estramadura; and on the fourteenth these leaders had an interview with Marshal Beresford at Valverde. It was then agreed to offer battle to the enemy, and on the day following the British army took post on the heights of Albuera.

Before Beresford commenced operations against Badajos, it was deemed of importance to

CHAP. III. push the enemy as far as possible from the scene of action; and a combined movement of Colonel Colburne, Ballasteros, and the Conde de Villermur, commanding the Estramaduran cavalry, induced Latour Maubourg to fall back to Constantino. Soult, however, having by large drafts from the corps of Victor and Sebastiani collected a considerable force at Seville, joined Latour Maubourg, and, with this united army, was advancing to the relief of Badajos.

May 15. To oppose the progress of this formidable force, Beresford, on the fifteenth, took post on the heights of Albuera. During the night he was joined by the Spaniards under Blake and Castanos, who, with a liberality and self-denial unusual in the Spanish character, insisted that the chief command in the approaching engagement should be vested in Marshal Beresford.

The ground occupied by the allies was a chain of eminences, along the front of which flowed the river Albuera, a narrow stream, and fordable in many places above the position. Towards the left, the great road from Seville leads over it by a bridge, and subsequently divaricates to Badajos and Olivença. On the left of this road, and a short distance from the bridge, stands the vil-

lage of Albuera, containing a church and about an hundred houses, which had been deserted by their inhabitants. Below the bridge the Albuera was unfordable. The western bank occupied by the allies was of considerable altitude, and completely commanded all the ground to the eastward. A little above the bridge, a brook called the Ferdia joins the Albuera, and the banks of those streams, and the ground between them, is thickly covered with wood. The right of the position had no *point d'appui*, the range of heights being prolonged in that direction to an extent it was impossible to occupy.

On the the fifteenth, the cavalry were driven back from Santa Martha; and in the evening the leading divisions of the French army took post on some wooded ground about a mile distant, which stretched in a simicircular sweep downward to the river. The remainder came up during the night; and Soult, with a force of eighteen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and forty pieces of cannon, found himself in presence of his enemy.

The allied army was somewhat superior in numbers. It consisted of a corps of twelve

CHAP. III. thousand Spaniards, which joined during the night; of thirteen thousand British and Portuguese infantry, two thousand cavalry, and thirty-two guns.

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Beresford occupied his position in the following manner:—The Spaniards were posted on the right in two lines, their left terminating on the Valverde road, where it joined the right of General Stewart's division which occupied the centre. General Hamilton's Portuguese division was on the left, supported by a brigade of German light infantry, which held the village of Albuera. General Cole's division—which only came up as the action commenced—and one brigade of General Hamilton's division, formed a second line in rear of the left and centre. A strong body of artillery was posted for the protection of the bridge, and the cavalry, under General Lumley, lent support to the Spaniards on the right.

May 16. About eight o'clock on the morning of the sixteenth, the French army were observed to be in motion; and shortly afterwards a strong force of cavalry, supported by two columns of infantry and several guns, issued from the wooded

ground between the Ferdia and the Albuera, CHAP. III. and directed its march towards the bridge. The artillery immediately opened fire, and a heavy cannonade was kept up on both sides, with great effect on the part of the British, from their advantages of ground. In the meanwhile, Soult, crossing the Albuera, under cover of the wood, above the position, advanced with the main body of his army, and without opposition took possession of the heights on the right flank of the Spaniards. The combat then commenced. The Spanish troops, after a short resistance, were driven from their ground, and Soult then formed his army in a line, extending to the Valverde road, and raking that of the allies.

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It became instantly essential to the safety of the army, that the enemy should be driven from the commanding station he had thus assumed. Beresford directed a new alignment: General Cole's division was placed in an oblique line with its right flank thrown back, and an endeavour was made to bring up the Spanish troops to the charge. This failed. A heavy fire was kept up by the French artillery, and a charge

CHAP. III. of cavalry again forced them to retire in confusion. General Stewart's division, therefore, was brought up, and passing, through the Spaniards, advanced to gain possession of the heights. At this period a storm of rain came on, which completely darkened the atmosphere, and rendered it impossible to discern the movements of the enemy at any distance. The right brigade, under Colonel Colburne, consisting of the Buffs, the sixty-sixth, the second battalion forty-eighth, and the thirty-first, was in the act of deploying,—the two leading battalions alone, having completed the manœuvre,—when a regiment of Polish lancers, which under shelter of the mist had circled their flank, made a furious charge from the rear. The result was, that the whole brigade, with the exception of the thirty-first, which still remained in column, were driven forward into the enemy's line, and made prisoners.

General Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry, then took post beyond the right of the allies, waiting for the first indication of retreat, to execute a grand and decisive charge, and throw confusion into the movement. Their mo-

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tions were watched by the heavy brigade, under General Lumley, and the horse artillery did considerable execution in their ranks.

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It was under such circumstances that the brigade of General Houghton was advanced to retrieve, if possible, the fortunes of the day. A contest of the most bloody and pertinacious character ensued. The leading regiment, the twenty-ninth, no sooner reached the summit of the heights, than it was assailed by a fire of musquetry and artillery which spread havoc through the ranks,—and in leading this regiment to the charge, General Houghton fell pierced with wounds. Unfortunately, the intervention of a steep but narrow gulley, rendered it impossible to reach the enemy with the bayonet, and the twenty-ninth was directed to halt and open fire. The fifty-seventh and forty-eighth then came up, and assuming their position in line, the struggle was maintained on both sides with desperate courage.

In this state of things, General Cole directed the Fusileer brigade to advance on the enemy's left, and ascend the disputed heights from the valley. In the execution of this movement, General Cole, and almost every individual at-

CHAP. III. tached to his staff, were wounded. The Fusileer brigade, on crowning the ascent, was received with a fire so tremendous, that it at first recoiled, but instantly recovering its ground, displayed, throughout the remainder of this desperate conflict, a degree of steadiness and intrepidity impossible to be surpassed. Colonel Sir William Myers, commanding the brigade, was killed early in the action, and his country was thus deprived of the services of a most gallant and accomplished officer.

In the meanwhile, General Houghton's brigade had maintained its ground in spite of all the enemy's efforts to dislodge it. Above two-thirds of its number had fallen, yet the remainder continued unbroken, and not one inch of ground had been yielded. At length, the entire exhaustion of ammunition made it necessary to retire, and the retrogressive movement was made by the small number of survivors with the most perfect regularity. A brigade of guns was then advanced to the front, and immediately opened fire. They were charged in flank by the Polish lancers, and for a moment taken; but the Fusileer brigade coming up, the cavalry were driven back, and the guns withdrawn.

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At length the French were forced from their position with immense slaughter, and retired across the Albuera. Marshal Beresford, from his great inferiority in cavalry, did not judge it prudent to continue the pursuit; and Soult, alarmed at the extent of his loss, made no effort to regain the post, the pertinacious maintenance of which had involved a sacrifice so prodigious.

While these events were passing on the right, several attempts were made to gain possession of the bridge and village on the left. Though a great proportion of the troops had been withdrawn from this point, General Alten's light infantry brigade, and General Hamilton's Portuguese division, succeeded in repelling every attack.

About three o'clock, the firing had entirely ceased, and both armies took post on the ground they had occupied in the morning. Thus terminated, perhaps, the most fierce and murderous contest which took place during the war. Out of seven thousand five hundred British, four thousand one hundred and fifty-eight were killed, wounded, or missing. The total loss of the allies in the engagement, a-

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CHAP. III. mounted to nearly seven thousand men. Soult, in his official despatch, rated the French loss at only two thousand eight hundred; but it was ascertained, by an intercepted letter from General Gazan, that upwards of four thousand wounded, were under charge of that officer. Taking this fact in conjunction with the number of killed and wounded left on the field, the loss of the French army cannot be reasonably calculated at less than nine thousand men,—an amount of slaughter on both sides, which, in proportion to the numbers engaged, is altogether enormous.

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During the following day, both armies remained in peaceful occupation of their respective positions. On the morning of the eighteenth, it was ascertained that Marshal Soult had withdrawn from his position, and was retiring on Seville. The cavalry, under General Lumley, were instantly detached to follow this movement; and at Usagre, a very gallant affair took place, which, without loss to the British, cost the enemy about an hundred and fifty of their number.

Honourable as the battle of Albuera unquestionably was to the prowess of British troops, it

did by no means succeed in adding a reputation for military talent, to the other accomplishments of Marshal Beresford. The manœuvres of Soult, before and during the battle, were bold and masterly. He seized at once on the vulnerable point of the position, and refused to relax his grasp while it was possible to retain it. Had he been opposed by other than British troops, in all probability Albuera would have witnessed a repetition of the scene of Ocana. Never, in truth, was an army in more imminent peril than that of the allies. Soult at one period had not only gained the key of the position, but had captured a whole brigade of artillery, above one thousand prisoners, and six stand of colours. So decided indeed was his success, that Beresford even talked of retreat, when retreat could have involved nothing short of the entire ruin of his army. From the execution of this purpose he was fortunately dissuaded by the earnest remonstrances of General Stewart; and by the sacrifice of more than half of his British force, he was enabled to regain that ground which ought never to have been lost.

In allotting the defence of the most important

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CHAP. III. part of the position to the Spaniards, Beresford was guilty of an error of the first magnitude. He evidently expected that the chief efforts of the enemy would be directed against the bridge, but the right was the truly vulnerable point—the point, indeed, so obviously vulnerable, that its selection by Soult, as the chief object of attack, might have been anticipated by any General of ordinary accomplishment in his profession. Had such useful prescience been possessed by Marshal Beresford, he would scarcely have intrusted the key of his position to that portion of his force on which least dependence could be placed; and, by a different disposition of his troops, he would, in all probability, have escaped the peril to which the army was subsequently exposed.

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In one respect, at least, Marshal Beresford and the army he commanded were fortunate. General Cole and General Stewart were officers of the highest merit, and exerted themselves throughout the day with a talent, promptitude, and energy, impossible to be surpassed. General Stewart seemed everywhere in the field, animating and directing wherever danger seemed to

lower most darkly; and we believe it was solely from the dictates of his own judgment that General Cole made that decisive movement in advance by which the victory was decided.

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On the whole, the victory of Albuera was utterly barren and unproductive. In raising the siege of Badajos, Beresford at once allowed Soult to gain the great object of his movement; in fact, the only object, which, on the part of the allies, it was worth hazarding a battle to prevent. The armies fought; and Soult returned to Seville, baffled indeed in the field, yet successful in achieving the important purpose for which he had advanced. Beresford, on the other hand, after a successful battle, gained nothing but the boast of victory, earned at a most ruinous price.

CHAPTER IV.

BATTLE OF FUENTES—CAPTURE OF ALMEIDA.

CHAP. IV. ON the twenty-eighth of April, Lord Wellington returned from the Alentejo, and again established his head-quarters at Villa Formosa. Nothing of importance had occurred during his absence. Massena had been employed in re-organizing his army, which the retreat from Portugal had reduced to a miserable condition ; and, having received a reinforcement of fifteen hundred cavalry of the Imperial Guard, he concentrated his divisions in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. His chief object was to introduce supplies into Almeida ; and, on the second of May, the whole French army, consisting of the second, sixth, eighth, and ninth corps, with all the cavalry that could be collected in the provinces of Castile and Leon, crossed the Agueda

and the Azava. Lord Wellington's inferiority in cavalry did not permit him to oppose their march in a country peculiarly favourable for the exercise of that arm, and the cavalry and light division fell back on their approach to Fuentes d'Honore.

The numerical strength of the enemy was considerably greater than that of the allies ; it amounted to forty thousand infantry, and five thousand cavalry, while Lord Wellington could only muster an effective force of thirty-six thousand men, of which not more than two thousand were cavalry. Notwithstanding this disparity, he determined to oppose Massena in his attempt to relieve Almeida ; and accordingly concentrated his army to give battle.

Almeida stands on the right of the Coa, a river of considerable magnitude, which, from the steepness of its banks, affords few points at which it can be crossed by an army. The bridge immediately in rear of Almeida is within range of the guns of the fortress, and at the period in question was so dilapidated as to be nearly impassable. There is another at Castello Bom, about two leagues above Almeida ; but this also was a most difficult communication. A little

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CHAP. IV. higher up there is a ford, but between that point and Sabugal the river cannot be crossed. At the latter place the road from Ciudad Rodrigo leads across a stone bridge, affording the only safe and convenient communication in case of retreat.

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Lord Wellington, therefore, was naturally anxious to adopt a position which should enable him at once to protect the approach to Almeida, and cover this important line of communication. He was fully aware, however, that the great extension of front thus rendered necessary, was highly disadvantageous; and, from the first, he contemplated the probability of being forced by circumstances to relinquish the communication by Sabugal, and concentrate his army in a more confined position, for the protection of Almeida alone.

Between the Duas Casas and the Tournon rivers, both of which run nearly parallel to the Coa, is a range of easy heights, along which Lord Wellington formed the centre of his army. In front of these is the village of Fuentes d'Honore, which, though not strictly speaking embraced in the position, was held as an advanced post, and contributed materially to its strength. General

Houston, with the seventh division, was posted on the extreme right of the line; and a body of Spanish cavalry, under Don Julian Sanchez, was placed in the village of Nava d'Aver, about two miles beyond it, to add to the security which that flank derived from the extreme difficulty of the ground in its rear. The first and third divisions were stationed on the height in rear of Fuentes d'Honore, their light infantry occupying the village. The sixth and light divisions were posted in rear of Almada, where the Duas Casas is crossed by a bridge. The fifth division formed the extreme left of the line, and guarded the great road to Almeida, with its flank resting on Fort Conception. The Portuguese brigade of General Pack, supported by a British battalion, was employed in blockading Almeida.

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On the third of May the enemy appeared in front of the position, and took post on a ridge which overhangs the village of Fuentes d'Honore, nearly parallel to that occupied by the allies. A brisk skirmish took place between the light troops, followed by a heavy cannonade, and a desperate attack on the village. Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, with the light-infantry battalions of the first and third divisions, maintained this post

May 3.

CHAP. IV. with great gallantry and resolution ; but fresh numbers of the enemy pouring on to the attack, it was found necessary to support him successively with the seventy-first, the seventy-ninth, and the twenty-fourth regiments. The contest was continued on both sides with great obstinacy and perseverance, till the approach of night, when the assailants, repulsed in all their efforts, took advantage of the darkness to retire.

May 4. On the fourth no engagement took place. Massena employed himself in reconnoitring the position of the allies ; and Lord Wellington, anticipating that he would endeavour to turn his right, by crossing the Duas Casas at Poço Velho, moved the division of General Houston towards that point, with directions to defend the passage of the river.

May 5. The expectations of Lord Wellington were realized. On the morning of the fifth, the French army were observed to have made a general movement ; and the corps of Junot, with all the cavalry, appeared in two columns on the opposite side of the valley of the Duas Casas, in front of Poço Velho. Lord Wellington, in consequence, sent the light division and the cavalry to the support of General Houston, and the

first and third divisions also made a movement to their right.

About seven o'clock the enemy drove in the advanced guard of the British, and took possession of the village of Poço Velho. The cavalry, under General Montbrun, having driven Don Julian Sanchez from Nava d'Aver, now executed a general charge, supported by infantry and guns, and forced the British cavalry to retire in some confusion beyond the infantry, which, opening fire, succeeded in checking the assailants.

Though this attack was repulsed, the numerous cavalry of the enemy were observed to be collecting on the right flank, while large masses of infantry were forming in front. Under these circumstances, Lord Wellington decided on withdrawing his army to a more concentrated position, and giving up the communication by Sabugal. The seventh and light divisions, therefore, supported by the cavalry, were directed to retire, and a new alignment was taken up, extending from the Duas Casas to the Turon, nearly at right angles with that in which the army had hitherto been formed. The seventh division was posted on a height beyond

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CHAP. IV. the Turon, which commanded the whole plain
 1811. to Frenada; and the cavalry and light division
 May. were directed to form in reserve in rear of the
 left of the first division.

This retrogressive movement was executed with the most perfect regularity, though pressed by the enemy's cavalry, which, strongly supported by artillery, made repeated charges on the retiring divisions. Their superiority in this arm was too decided to admit of contest; but, occasionally, a few squadrons charged through the intervals of the squares, and succeeded in checking for a moment the progress of the assailants. During this movement the chasseurs Britanniques, in particular, distinguished themselves. They repulsed a furious charge; and, by a well-directed flanking fire, compelled the French cavalry to retire with considerable loss. The conduct of the horse-artillery, commanded by Captain Bull, was also admirable. Nothing could exceed the skill and boldness with which it was manœuvred; and, thus supported, the infantry accomplished its retrogression in unbroken order, and with a loss far inferior to that of the enemy.

When the divisions reached their ground, the

cavalry, in passing through the intervals of the new alignment, occasioned some confusion; and taking instant advantage of this circumstance, General Montbrun ordered his whole cavalry to charge. In order to protect the retiring divisions, the line of march had been flanked by two brigades of guns, which instantly opened fire on the approach of the enemy. The infantry likewise poured in several volleys; and, thus severely handled, the French cavalry retreated in confusion, and Montbrun desisted from further effort.

In the meanwhile, the sixth corps, which, during these events remained opposite to Fuentes d'Honore, had made strenuous efforts to gain possession of that important post. About nine in the morning, several brigades of artillery were brought opposite to the village, and pointed in readiness to fire. At length, on a given signal, the whole of their guns opened fire on the village, and several columns of infantry moved forward to the attack. A struggle of the fiercest and most obstinate character ensued. The seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and twenty-fourth regiments defended the village with the greatest gallantry,

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CHAP. IV. disputing every inch of ground. In this state of things, Colonel Cameron of the seventy-ninth, commanding the brigade, was killed, and the enemy continuing to pour in fresh columns, at length succeeded in overpowering the defenders. No sooner, however, did the assailants attempt to form beyond the houses, than the eighty-eighth, seventy-fourth, and eighty-third regiments, advancing to the charge, drove them back into the village with the bayonet, where the contest recommenced, and continued to be kept up on both sides with great vigour and obstinacy, till the streets may be said literally to have been covered with dead.* To-

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* Nothing could exceed the gallantry and devotion of the French troops in this part of the engagement. The forty-fifth French regiment in particular, distinguishable by their long red feathers, attracted the admiration of all who witnessed the contest. They came on to the sound of music in all the regularity of a field-day, and subsequently maintained their ground in spite of every effort made by the seventy-first and seventy-ninth to dislodge them. The eagle of the regiment was then planted on the outward wall of the village nearest to the British position, and maintained there while a sharp engagement was carried on with the eighty-third, which, animated by the hope of gaining so splendid a prize, fought with the greatest courage. The forty-fifth were at length forced to retire, and an incessant fire having been kept up on the eagle, nearly an hundred of their number were found dead within grasp of the pole.

wards evening the fire on both sides gradually slackened, and the village, as if by mutual consent, was divided by the combatants, the upper part being occupied by the British, the lower by the enemy.

The result of these repeated efforts convinced Massena that he had nothing to hope from continuing the contest. During the whole of the sixth an unbroken tranquillity reigned in both armies, and on the morning of the seventh he withdrew his troops from the front of the allied position. In order to repair as much as possible the reverse he had experienced, orders were secretly transmitted to the Governor of Almeida, directing him to blow up the works, and escape across the Agueda with his garrison, at Barba del Puerco or San Felices. On the seventh, Marshal Marmont arrived from Paris, with authority to assume the command of the army.

With this event, the military career of Massena may be said to have closed for ever. The short period of his service in the Peninsula had considerably impaired his reputation, and the charm of his name, as a watch-word to victory, had been tried in vain. Though

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May 7.

CHAP. IV. his faculties were entire, it was evident that
 1811. age had considerably impaired their activity.
 May. He was no longer what he had been, when celebrated as the hero of Zurich, the defender of Genoa, and the unconquered opponent of Souvaroff. At Busaco, at Guarda, at Sabugal, and at Fuentes, he had not only been out-fought but out-manceuvred; and he returned to France, shrunk from the gigantic dimensions with which men's opinion had invested him, to the stature of a common man. At Fuentes d'Honore, during the whole of the third, his efforts were confined to the single object of gaining possession of the village,—a sort of nibbling hostility, which was unsuccessful, and deserved to be so. His operations on the morning of the fifth gave hope of better things. By directing his efforts against the right of the allied position, he took advantage of the most vulnerable point; and in driving a British army from ground which they attempted seriously to defend, he achieved a temporary success, to which no parallel can be afforded in the whole war.

His subsequent manœuvres are not equally

entitled to praise. The charges of his cavalry— CHAP. IV.
 in which arm his superiority was overpowering
 1811. —were not supported by his infantry, and were
 May. therefore productive of little benefit. By some unaccountable timidity he appeared unwilling to commit the fate of his army to the chances of a battle, and no sooner did he perceive that Lord Wellington again fronted him in position, than he drew off his forces. He thus remained inactive at the very moment when having achieved an advantage, his troops felt something of that exhilaration, which the spectacle of a retiring enemy is certain to inspire. The position of the allies presented no feature of imposing strength. It was in many places unavoidably exposed, and open to the attack both of cavalry and artillery. The thick woods in front offered secure cover for the formation of his attacking columns; and thus favoured, he might have poured the full mass and volume of his force on any point of the position.

It is nothing to say that in such a powerful and concentrated effort he might have encountered repulse. If Massena was not prepared to fight for the relief of Almeida, why did he advance? If he was so prepared, was it possible

CHAP. IV. that he could have engaged his enemy under circumstances more favourable than those in which he gave up the contest?

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But the *gravamen* of the charge against Massena, is not that he did not attack his enemy's position, but that *he did nothing*. By throwing his cavalry across the Coa, a movement which, having lost Sabugal, it was no longer in the power of Lord Wellington to prevent; he might have penetrated to the rear of the allies, and compelled them to regain their communications, by crossing the Coa at points of great difficulty. Such a manœuvre must have utterly deranged the plans of the allies, and it was probably in reference to its adoption that Lord Wellington was currently believed to have declared, "That had Massena not been blind, he must have beaten him at Fuentes."

Of the manœuvres of Lord Wellington, little need be said. In the disposition and arrangement of his army, he displayed in an eminent degree that skill, sagacity, and confidence which marked him as a tactician of the highest order. His original position was too extended for his numbers, and Lord Wellington knew it to be so; but the communication with Sabugal was of

too much consequence to be lightly given up, CHAP. IV. and he therefore determined to maintain it, so long as he might find it compatible with the more important object of covering Almeida. When the enemy's movements, however, made it prudent that he should concentrate his army for the protection of Almeida, he at once boldly relinquished the preferable line of communication, relying on his own skill and the valour of his troops to prevent the necessity of retreat.

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The loss of the allied army, in the actions of the third and fifth, amounted to about seventeen hundred men. That of the enemy, from their acting throughout as assailants, must have been considerably greater. In the village of Fuentes, the lanes, the church, the court-yards, and the gardens, were found literally piled with the dying and the dead. A considerable number of prisoners were likewise made by the allies.

The French had no sooner retired, than Lord Wellington, having received information that General Brennier intended to sally out with the garrison, made instant arrangements for a more vigorous blockade. General Campbell's division was accordingly ordered to invest the

CHAP. IV. place, a battalion was posted at Barba del Puerco, and a brigade on the high road to Rodrigo. These precautions, however, were insufficient. About midnight, on the eleventh, a tremendous explosion took place in the fortress, which blew down the *revetement* of two fronts, and General Brennier marched out with his garrison, taking the road to Barba del Puerco. He surprised and bayoneted a piquet; and, passing through the posts of the brigade on the Rodrigo road, was enabled to continue his march without serious molestation, and followed only by General Pack, who, with a few troops hastily collected, hung upon his rear, indicating, by the flashes of his musquetry, the direction taken by the enemy.

The object of Brennier was to reach Barba del Puerco; but mistaking his way, he followed a circuitous route which led him to some distance from the point of his destination. In the meanwhile the officer commanding the battalion at Barba del Puerco, imagining from the sound of the firing that the enemy were receding from his post, moved his corps to a ford higher up, in the hope of intercepting them. By this error, General Brennier, on reaching Barba del

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Puerco found the town unoccupied; but the CHAP. IV. detour he had made, having enabled several regiments to close on his rear, a heavy fire was opened as his troops were in the act of crossing the bridge, and about two hundred, including ten officers, were made prisoners. A considerable number also were killed or wounded. With the rest of his force, Brennier succeeded in joining the French army, having performed an exploit remarkable at once for its boldness and its success.

The intelligence of this unfortunate event was accompanied by a general feeling of mortification and disappointment throughout the army. At his particular request the conduct of the siege had been committed to General Campbell; and it is difficult to acquit that officer either of negligence, or unsound judgment in the discharge of his trust. Had proper precautions been adopted in the disposition of the blockading force, the fruits of the victory of Fuentes would not thus have been sacrificed, nor would the character of a British army have been lowered in the eyes of their opponents.

Marmont, on assuming the command, placed his army in cantonments in the neighbourhood

1811.
May.

CHAP. IV. of Salamanca; and Lord Wellington directed the works of Almeida to be repaired. It afforded a favourable point for the establishment of a general dépôt of stores, whether he might still intend to remain on the defensive, or whether circumstances might enable him to penetrate into Spain. The information communicated by Marshal Beresford, determined him to detach two divisions to reinforce the southern army; and setting out instantly in person, May 19. he reached Elvas on the nineteenth, where he received intelligence of the battle of Albuera. He also learned that the investment of Badajoz had been renewed on the same day, and that Soult was in full retreat towards Seville, followed by the allied cavalry.

Lord Wellington immediately assumed the personal direction of the operations on the Guadiana. In a few days the divisions detached from the northern army came up; and on the May 27. twenty-seventh the place was completely invested, on the right of the river by General Houston's division, on the left by those of Picton and Hamilton. Trenches were opened on the night of the twenty-ninth; and on the fifth June 5. of June, the breach made in Fort St. Christoval

was considered practicable. On the night following it was assaulted. Owing to a blunder of the engineers, the attack failed. It had not been judged necessary to secure the ditch; and from the moment it became dark, the garrison had been employed in removing the earth and rubbish from the bottom of the breach, so that seven feet of the wall remained clear. An obstacle was thus unexpectedly presented, which the assailants were in no condition to surmount. Their ladders were too short; and though the gallantry of the men led them to attempt climbing the wall, their efforts proved unsuccessful. The enemy, from the parapet, hurled down on the assailants a shower of shells, grenades, stones, and other missiles, which occasioned great havoc; and the party were compelled at length to retire, with the loss of half their number.

During the two following days the fire against the fort was continued, and on the ninth the breach was again judged practicable. At night a storming party of two hundred men, preceded by a forlorn-hope of twenty-five men, under Lieutenant Hunt of the engineers, advanced against the breach. The enemy, however, were better prepared for their reception than on the

CHAP. IV.
1811
June.

Jun. 9.

CHAP. IV. former occasion. Reinforcements had been

1811.

June.

thrown into the fort, and unfortunately Lieutenant Hunt was killed on the glacis when leading on his party. The troops thus left without a leader, continued to press on with their accustomed gallantry. But the breach was again found impracticable, from the same cause which had occasioned the failure of the former assault. After many ineffectual efforts, the party was at length withdrawn, with the loss of one hundred and forty-five men in killed and wounded.

Jun. 10.

On the tenth, by an intercepted letter from Soult to Marmont, Lord Wellington received intelligence that these leaders were about to unite their forces, and advance against him. He, therefore, promptly determined on converting the siege of Badajos into a blockade; and on the night of the twelfth, the last of the guns and stores were withdrawn to Elvas, without molestation from the garrison.

By other channels Lord Wellington had learned that Drouet, with a corps of eight thousand men, had marched from Toledo to join Soult, and reached Cordova on the seventh. He was aware, also, that Marmont had put his army in motion towards the south, and that Soult was

advancing to Merida to meet him. Lord Wellington, therefore, advanced to Albuera, and took post with his army in order to fight Soult, should he venture to advance alone to the relief of Badajos. Soult, however, having drawn all the disposable troops from the various towns possessed by the French in Andalusia, and being joined by Drouet, marched on the twelfth from Llerena, and on the eighteenth established a communication with Marmont at Merida. From thence Soult and Marmont directed their march on Badajos, when Lord Wellington crossed the Guadiana, and took up a line on the river Caya, covered on the left by Campo Mayor, and on the right by Elvas.

The combined force of the armies of Portugal and the south, amounted to about seventy thousand men, whereof ten thousand were cavalry. That of Lord Wellington, including the corps of General Spencer, which had made a parallel movement with the enemy in its front, did not exceed fifty-six thousand, including four thousand cavalry. The smallness of this force may be accounted for by the unhealthiness of the army, upwards of twelve thousand British being in hospital. The Portuguese troops, ill

1811.

June.

Jun. 12.

CHAP. IV. paid and ill supplied, were by no means in the same state of discipline and efficiency which had marked them at an earlier period. The regularity with which the British soldiers were paid and supplied, could not but tend to excite comparisons productive of discontent, and it was judged necessary that Marshal Beresford should resign his command, in order to restore discipline, and silence complaint.

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June.

Under these circumstances, without dreading a battle, Lord Wellington determined not to court one. He resolved to limit his object to the defence of Portugal; and, with this view, he formed an encampment in the woods along the Caya, a small tributary of the Guadiana. This, forming the right of the army, was commanded by Sir Rowland Hill, who had recently returned from England. The left, under General Picton, occupied the heights in rear of Campo Mayor, which flanked the front of the position. The reserve, under Sir Brent Spencer, remained at Portalegre, ready, in case of need, to support the other divisions, or to cross the Tagus, should the movements of the enemy threaten danger in that quarter.

While the army was thus posted, Lord Wel-

lington induced General Blake, with a corps of about nine thousand Spaniards, to move into the Conde de Niebla, and thus at once to threaten Seville and the rear of the French army. Accordingly that leader set out on the eighteenth from Juramenba, and on the twenty-second reached Mertola. There he remained for two days to refresh his troops, then crossed the Guadiana; but, instead of pushing for Seville, he advanced against Niebla, an old and ruinous town, with a castle of considerable strength. Blake attempted to carry the latter by escalade, and, as might be expected, failed; and having fruitlessly spent three days before it, on receiving intelligence of the approach of a detachment sent in pursuit of him by Soult, he made for Ayamonte, where he embarked with all his artillery for Cadiz. From that city he soon after sailed to join the Spanish army, under General Freyre, in Granada.

1811.
June.

Jun. 22.

In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington knew it to be impossible that the enemy could long sub- sist their forces when in a state of concentra- tion, and he patiently waited the moment when they should find it necessary to break up from the frontier of the Alentejo. This took place

CHAP. IV. about the middle of July, when Soult returned to Seville; and Marmont, re-crossing the Tagus at Almaraz, marched on Salamanca. Lord Wellington, accordingly, leaving Sir Rowland Hill, with the second British division, and the Portuguese division of General Hamilton, and two brigades of cavalry to guard the Alentejo, crossed the Tagus with the remainder of his army, and fixed his head-quarters at Fuente Guinaldo. The troops went into cantonments in the villages of Aldea de Bispo, Albergaria, Almadilla, and El Bodon. In these quarters the army remained upwards of a month, without disturbance from the enemy.

1811.

June.

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES.

DURING the summer of eighteen hundred and eleven, the country was quiescent and submissive to the intrusive government, in a degree unprecedented since the commencement of the struggle, and no advantage was taken of the powerful diversion by which the army of Massena was for so long a period withdrawn from the Spanish territory. Joseph remained at Madrid, endeavouring to organize a system of equitable government, by which the aversion of the people to their new sovereign might be gradually overcome. In this he did not succeed. The necessity of raising money, to meet the exigencies of the state, gave rise to numerous confiscations of property; and the cruelties and oppressive exactions of the French commanders, over whom

CHAP. V.

1811.

CHAP. V. he possessed little control, counteracted all his
1811. views. The Spaniards held Joseph responsible for every act of atrocity, or oppression, committed by the supporters of his cause; and the flame of insurrection, though less violent, was not extinguished.

The Cortes, holding their sittings in a distant corner of the kingdom, and cut off from all intercourse with the interior, possessed little influence with the nation at large. It was owing, perhaps, to a consciousness of this circumstance, that their attention was chiefly devoted to matters of speculative legislation, while subjects of immediate and pressing importance were entirely overlooked. It may be well, however, at the present moment, to cast a cursory glance over the different provinces of the kingdom.

Biscay and the Asturias were occupied by the French; but in the latter, Porlier with his Guerillas was in activity. On one occasion, by a sudden movement having appeared before St. Andero, he succeeded in capturing the garrison.

In Navarre, Espoz y Mina, allowed no opportunity to escape of harassing the French army,

and cutting off its communications. The rich valleys of Roncal and Roncevalles, were still held by the natives. Galicia was free from the enemy; but its army, under General Abadia, was in a wretched state of equipment; and General Dorsenne, who had succeeded Bessieres in the north, was preparing to enter it.

In Arragon, Suchet had succeeded in allaying the storm of resistance which he had encountered in that kingdom. But numerous Guerilla parties were a-foot in the mountainous districts, and there was a small force of about four thousand regulars under Villa Campa.

In the two Castiles and Leon, the principal places were all held by the enemy. But in the province of Guadalaxara, the Empecinado allowed no opportunity to escape of inflicting punishment on the invaders. On one occasion, he succeeded in surrounding and cutting off a strong detachment of the enemy, employed in escorting eleven thousand Spanish prisoners. There were likewise bands of Guerillas in La Mancha, and in the province of Salamanca.

Murcia was in possession of the Spaniards. Their army, commanded by Blake, was nearly

CHAP. V. twenty thousand strong, but miserably wanting
1811. in equipment and munitions.

Granada was occupied by the French, who had garrisons in the sea-ports of Almeria, Malaga, and Marbella.

In Andalusia, the Guerillas were numerous and active; but the chief towns were held by the enemy, with the exception of Cadiz, Ayamonte, and Algesiras. The army before Cadiz remained under the command of Victor.

Estramadura, while the French held Badajos, might be considered in their power.

Of Catalonia and Valencia we shall now speak.

The courage and enterprise of the Catalans had not been tamed by misfortune. The Supreme Junta were dissatisfied with the inactivity of O'Donnel during the siege of Tortosa, and displaced him from the command. His successor was the Marquis de Campoverde, whose conduct on previous occasions had raised him to distinction. In the meanwhile, General Sarsfield had taken post, with about six thousand men, at Vals, from which station Macdonald detached his Italian division, under General Eu-

Jan. 16.

gene, and a brigade of cavalry, to dislodge him. CHAP. V.
Sarsfield then fell back, and took up another 1811.
position on the heights of Pla and Fruencaldas, January.
where he waited the approach of the enemy. Eugene, with greater gallantry than prudence, determined on immediate attack. His troops were received by a fire so destructive as instantly to arrest their progress. The Spaniards then charged with the bayonet, and drove back the assailants with great slaughter. Eugene was himself mortally wounded in the engagement; and the whole of his division would probably have been cut off, but for the timely support of a brigade of infantry and some cavalry, detached by Macdonald to his assistance. On the arrival of this force, the action was renewed with alternations of success on both sides, but without decisive advantage on either.

For several days after this check, Macdonald remained inactive, though the Spaniards still kept their position. At length, on the night of the sixteenth, taking every precaution to conceal his march from the enemy, he withdrew to Lerida, where he placed his troops in cantonments.

Jan. 16.

Of the defeat sustained at Vals, no notice was taken by the French journals. It was part of

CHAP. V. Napoleon's policy to praise the Italian troops,
 1811. and to infuse a taste for military glory into the
 March. people. He feared that a reverse so signal as
 that of Vals might create disgust at the con-
 scription, and aversion to bear part in a war of
 extermination, such as that waged in Catalonia.
 A severe censure on the conduct of Macdonald,
 was transmitted by the secretary of war; and, to
 mark the Emperor's displeasure, he directed
 that the army about to besiege Tarragona,
 should be commanded by Suchet.

About the end of March, Macdonald quitted
 Lerida for Barcelona. His route lay through a
 dangerous and difficult country, and Sarsfield
 was again on the alert. When Macdonald ap-
 proached Manresa, an Italian brigade, which
 formed his advanced-guard, was assailed by a
 warm fire from a part of Sarsfield's corps, placed
 in ambush to receive it. It was immediately
 thrown into confusion, and driven back on the
 main body; and the Italians, enraged at these re-
 peated disasters, during the night set fire to the
 town of Manresa, in which the Marshal had es-
 tablished his head-quarters. The town was con-
 sumed to ashes, and many officers who were
 quartered there, were able with difficulty to

rescue their baggage and horses from the flames. CHAP. V.
 —At Montserrat, where Sarsfield had taken
 1811. post, the conflagration was distinctly visible.
 March. The spectacle filled his soldiers with rage, and
 being joined by all the inhabitants of the sur-
 rounding country, Sarsfield, on the following day,
 encountered the French columns in the defiles of
 the Col d'Avic, with every advantage of posi-
 tion. The French, with great gallantry, dis-
 lodged the Spaniards from every rock and accliv-
 ity on which they took post; but the latter, re-
 treating from height to height, kept up a most
 galling and destructive fire. No quarter was
 given by the enraged Catalans; and so much
 did the necessity of carrying off the wounded
 impede the march of the French, that they were
 six hours in reaching the summit of the mountain.

In the meanwhile, Campoverde, having es-
 tablished his troops in a strong camp in front of
 Tarragona, made an unsuccessful effort to gain
 1811. possession of Mont Jouy at Barcelona. He had
 March. endeavoured to prevail on some of the leading
 officers to betray the place; but his project be-
 coming known to the governor, the garrison were
 prepared, and no sooner did his leading batta-
 lion enter the ditch, than it was almost annihi-

CHAP. V. lated by a tremendous fire from the garrison.

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April.

The remainder of his force instantly retreated; but their march was intercepted by detachments of the enemy, which occasioned great loss.

Another and more fortunate effort was made for the recovery of Figueras. A colonel of Miquelets, named Rovira, who to his military title joined that of doctor of theology, being a person of active and enterprising mind, had long amused himself in devising projects for regaining some of the important fortresses held by the invaders. These had been proposed to the successive commanders in the province, but rejected by all as visionary and impracticable. Campoverde, however, was at length induced to lend a favourable ear to the scheme of Rovira, and appointed General Martinez as his colleague in command.

Apr. 10. Having collected about one thousand volunteers, these leaders approached Figueras with great secrecy, halting in the woods by day, and marching by night. On the tenth they arrived at Palau Surroco, a short distance from the fortress. Preparations were then made for the execution of the perilous enterprise in which they had embarked. The officers commanding

each division were acquainted with the works of CHAP. V. the fort, and received the most minute instructions in regard to their duty. Intelligence had previously been established with three soldiers of the garrison, in the interest of Rovira. By these men, on the following night, the Spaniards were admitted into the castle; and the first sentinel they encountered was killed before he could give the alarm. The party then separated into detached bodies; and with such skill and accuracy had the duties of each been defined, that while the governor and garrison were yet sleeping in their quarters, the castle of Figueras was in the hands of the Spaniards. The whole of the garrison, amounting to about one thousand men, were made prisoners. The guns of the castle were then turned against the town, which also surrendered. The Baron d'Eroles, who was ordered to reinforce the victors, succeeded, in his march from Martorel, in capturing the forts at Castellfullit and Olot, by which upwards of five hundred of the enemy were made prisoners.

So badly, however, was Figueras supplied with provisions, that towards the end of April it became necessary to throw an additional sup-

1811.
April.

CHAP. V. ply into the place. With this view Campoverde
 1811. left his camp near Tarragona, to escort a convoy
 May. for its relief. In the meanwhile, General Bara-
 guay d'Hilliers, who commanded in Upper Cata-
 lonia, blockaded the town with the whole force
 May 3. at his disposal. In attempting to approach the
 town, Campoverde was attacked in flank and
 rear, and forced to retreat in great confusion,
 leaving the convoy and fifteen hundred prisoners
 in the hands of the enemy. His loss in killed
 and wounded amounted to about nine hundred.

During the progress of these events, Suchet,
 who had long been making preparations for the
 siege of Tarragona, took advantage of the ab-
 sence of Campoverde, and advanced against the
 May 4. city. On the fourth of May, he drove in the
 Spanish posts established in front of Fort Oliva,
 and his artillery and stores were put in motion
 from Tortosa and Lerida. The communication
 with the former place was protected by Fort
 Balaguer, and an entrenched post at Perillo;
 and, to secure that with Lerida, he fortified the
 convent which commanded the town of Mont
 Blanch.

Tarragona stands on the side and summit of
 a steep and isolated height, situated between the

points where the rivers Gaya and Francoli dis- CHAP. V.
 embogue into the sea. On the northern, west-
 ern, and southern sides, the rock is scarped and
 precipitate; but, on the east and south-east, the
 ground slopes down by a gentle descent to the
 harbour and the Francoli river. The upper town
 is encircled by an old wall which crowns the sum-
 mit of the rock; and the western side, on which is
 the approach from Barcelona, is besides protected
 by five *Lunettes*, which form a line reaching to
 the sea. There are likewise two large *Lunettes*
 on the northern face. Both present to the besieg-
 ers a front of naked rock, which renders any ap-
 proach on these sides peculiarly difficult.

The lower town stands at the bottom of the
 height near the harbour, and is protected to the
 landward by a small bastioned square, called the
 Fort Royal, about three hundred toises distant
 from the *enceinte* of the upper town, and two
 hundred from the sea. Both this fort and the
 lower town are covered by a second wall, ex-
 tending from the upper town to the sea, and
 protected by three regular bastions, and several
 other works.

The Spaniards, having always contemplated
 the probability of a siege, had repaired the

1811.
 May.

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1811.

May.

works, which were in condition for an obstinate defence. The garrison were in number nearly equal to the besieging army, and a squadron of British men-of-war were anchored in the bay, thus securing the admission of reinforcements and supplies.

Strong as Tarragona unquestionably was, the chief feature of its strength was the Fort Oliva, situated on a plateau of equal elevation with the upper town, from which it was about four hundred toises distant. It was armed with sixty pieces of cannon, and surrounded by a ditch twenty feet deep, which had been cut in the solid rock.

It was judged necessary by Suchet that this fort should be carried; and approaches were accordingly made against it, and pushed on with great vigour. In order to check the fire of the men-of-war, which was found exceedingly annoying, and force them to draw off to a greater distance, a large redoubt was erected on the shore, which being found insufficient, three other batteries were erected nearer to the Francoli.

We shall not enter on the numerous and complicated details of this interesting siege. Suffice it, that in its progress the French engineers gave

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proof of the highest accomplishment in their profession. The siege was pushed with a degree of vigour and skill, which the garrison, brave, but unpractised, were unequal to withstand. Fort Oliva was carried on the night of the twenty-ninth. It chanced that a column of twelve hundred men was in the act of entering the fort to relieve the garrison, when the signal of assault was given by the enemy. The rear of this body was attacked, and many of the assailants entered the gate, *pele mele* with the Spaniards. This distracted the defenders, the French columns continued to press on, and the fort was at length carried. Fifteen hundred of the garrison perished in this assault; about a thousand were made prisoners.*

May 29.

Memoires
de Marechal
Suchet.

The loss of Fort Oliva could not but depress the hopes of the garrison of Tarragona. On the following morning a column of three thousand men attempted to regain it, but without success. The enemy then pushed forward his advances

* Marshal Suchet, in his official report, makes the number of prisoners amount only to one hundred and sixty. In his memoirs he rates them at one thousand. We are inclined to believe the latter statement as most creditable to the French army and its commander.

CHAP. V. against the works of the upper town; and the
 1811. breaching batteries were nearly complete when
 June. Colonel Skerret, with two thousand men, arrived in the bay from Cadiz. Colonel Skerret was prevented from throwing his troops into the town, by the assurances of the Governor that Tarragona was already amply garrisoned; and that the force he commanded would render far greater and more important service by uniting with Campoverde in an attack on the rear of the besieging army. The Governor likewise stated, that when the enemy should commence battering in breach, it was his intention to abandon the place, considering the lives of his soldiers to be of higher value than the ruins of Tarragona.

Colonel Skerret, therefore, sailed in a man-of-war to join Campoverde, who had taken post with his army at Vendrels, about twenty-five miles to the eastward. Time was thus lost, and before any combined operation could be carried into effect, Tarragona had fallen.

Unfortunately, Contreras, instead of keeping secret his intention of abandoning the town, made it publicly known. The inhabitants, thus aware they were about to be forsaken by their

defenders, became stupified with fear; and Suchet, having gained intelligence of the design, was enabled to defeat it.

No time was afforded for the proposed retreat. The French batteries opened at daylight on the twenty-eight, and by ten o'clock a practicable breach had been formed. In a few hours the assault was given. The defence was trifling; for the views of the garrison had been directed to retreat, and panic reigned throughout the city. A scene of terrible slaughter ensued. All within the city were put indiscriminately to the bayonet; and a continued fire from the batteries swept away crowds of trembling fugitives, who fled to the shore in hope of rescue by the boats of the squadron. To many this hope was not broken. The British sailors, animated by compassion for the sufferers, persevered, amid the enemy's fire, in conveying the fugitives to the ships moored in the offing.

We have the assurance of Marshal Suchet, that the officers of his army made strenuous exertions to put a stop to the carnage. But the soldiers, with hands already steeped in blood, would not be restrained. Within and without the town the slaughter continued with unabated ferocity. The

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 June.

Jun. 28.

CHAP. V. claims of age and sex were disregarded. Those
 1811. who sought refuge in the churches, were massa-
 June. cred even at the altar. Beauty, innocence, and
 helplessness, did not save life, though they en-
 sured violation. More than six thousand unre-
 sisting persons were butchered. "And thus,"
 said Marshal Suchet, in his official report, after
 detailing the circumstances of the massacre, "has
 the terrible example which I predicted taken
 place, and it will long be remembered by the
 Spaniards."*

* In allusion to this dreadful scene of slaughter, and atrocities even worse than slaughter, Colonel Jones, in his able and excellent history of the war, makes the following observations:—"There is something so exceedingly revolting in the picture of these severities, that the mind cannot divest itself of feelings of abhorrence towards the individual who directed them; or, otherwise, were the subject coolly and dispassionately considered, the censure would be equally divided between the aggressors, and the commander of the suffering party. It is the paramount duty of every general to use every means in his power to bring his operations to a successful termination, and to preserve the lives of his own men; and there seems no other such effectual mode of preventing similarly obstinate defences to those of Gerona and Zaragoza, as for the assailants to avail themselves of every power of retaliation which victory furnishes. It is no more than the custom of war justifies, and self-preservation demands. In a battle, if a division stand the charge, the successful party make no scruple to bayonet all those whom they overtake, and no reason can be assigned why troops, fighting behind a wall, should be differently treated, and have the privilege of destroying their opponents till the last moment, and when they can no longer do

No sooner was Suchet master of Tarragona CHAP. V.
 than he proceeded to Montserrat, where the Ba-
 1811.

July.

so with impunity, be greeted with friendship. Till a certain point of the attack, it is perfectly safe to continue the defence; if the garrison persevere longer they do it at their own risk,—it is optional with them. It was so at Tarragona; and the principle of putting to the sword, after the assault of a breach, all those found with arms in their hands, seems so fully justified by right and policy, that General Suchet, on the abstract consideration of the subject, cannot be censured for having done so. The peculiar nature of the contest, however, ought to have made him hesitate in its application to the Spaniards, a people merely defending their homes against unprincipled aggression. The idea of so severely punishing an act of pure self-defence should have revolted his own feelings and those of his officers. Such not having been the case, and the ferocious acts of which they were guilty towards the unarmed inhabitants, equally with the garrison, having been publicly avowed, give rise to many reflections on the abasement of the moral character under military despotism. In what country, enjoying a sufficient share of freedom for impartial discussion, would a man, after such deeds, be received in society? or what government, having the voice of a free and enlightened people to control their acts, dare to confer rewards upon him?"

In these ingenious remarks of Colonel Jones there is much truth, and we think some little inconsistency. On the general principles of military ethics, he asserts that a general is authorized in directing the massacre of the garrison of a town carried by assault. In this we cannot coincide. It is unquestionably true, that, when two hostile parties are contending against each other, the laws of reason and necessity authorize the exercise of every means in the power of either, to ensure its own safety by destroying its opponent, or reducing him to a condition in which he can inflict no further injury. But the law of self-preservation, which alone can sanction the destruction of an enemy, places like-

CHAP. V. ron d'Eroles had established large magazines,
1811. and from whence he made incursions into the
July.

wise a limit to that right. Wherever security can be obtained by means less revolting than that of actual slaughter, the infliction of death becomes an act of mere wanton barbarity, irreconcilable with moral principle, and adverse to that eternal code imprinted in the heart of man. In no case, therefore, can death be justifiably inflicted on men who lay down their arms, and who, by the privation of their liberty, can be prevented from endangering the future safety of the conquerors. In the case of a town carried by assault, it must frequently happen that rude, ignorant, and unprincipled men, who compose the mass of all armies, and whose passions have been excited to the highest pitch, will burst the shackles by which at other times they are bound, and give full sway to a sentiment of ferocious revenge. But such an event must be considered as an unavoidable misfortune, not as the voluntary and justifiable infliction of an authorized retribution. It is a great and terrible evil, which every exertion should be made to modify or avert, and which no general is warranted, not merely in openly sanctioning, but in passively permitting.

But Colonel Jones, admitting that the massacre of Tarragona was fully sanctioned by the abstract principles of war, denies the application of these principles to the case of a people struggling in defence of their rights against unprincipled aggression. Thus, the Spaniards, in Colonel Jones's opinion, fighting in the cause of liberty, would have been justified in the slaughter of a French garrison under circumstances similar to those of Tarragona, and the reciprocity only of this privilege of massacre is denied. Now, the fallacy of Colonel Jones's reasoning consists in this: He confounds the motive or *cause* of war, which may be just or unjust, with the *laws* of war, which exclusively regard the conduct of its details. In a monarchical government, it is the king exclusively who declares war; who decides when the national safety is so much endangered as to require an appeal to arms. To him the justice or injustice of a war is

neighbouring country. On the twenty-fourth CHAP. V.
of July, Suchet was joined by a detachment from 1811.
the garrison of Barcelona, commanded by Gen-
eral Maurice Mathieu. July.

Montserrat is a mountain of very singular cha-

a matter of conscience,—a question, the right solution of which involves a high degree of moral responsibility; but it is one on which the soldiers who fight his battles are not called on to decide. The war, whether just or unjust, when once undertaken, must be conducted on certain fixed principles; and it is for the fair application of these that the commander of an army is alone responsible.

The question, therefore, of Marshal Suchet's culpability in the present case, may be reduced to this: If, for the sake of striking terror, by a terrible example, he voluntarily permitted the slaughter in Tarragona to exceed the limits necessary for the immediate security of his army, there is no degree of indignation too great for his offence; if, on the other hand, the massacre proceeded solely from the untameable excitement of the soldiery, which every practicable measure was adopted to check and allay, then the evil was inevitable, and Suchet stands absolved from that charge of moral turpitude which must otherwise affix a deep stigma on his name.

On these principles, we fear it is impossible that Suchet can be altogether justified. We may admit that the exertions of the officers were ineffectual to prevent the perpetration of atrocities in the town; but what can be said of the slaughter of the helpless and unresisting crowds who were swept away by grape-shot, and sabred by the cavalry on the shore, and on the road to Barcelona? It is but fair, however, to state, that the Governor Contreras, in his official report, not only declares that he himself, wounded and made prisoner, was treated with the greatest humanity, but that every effort was made by the French officers to check the excesses of their troops.

CHAP. V. racter. Situated at a short distance from Barcelona, Igualada, and Manresa, it commands the principal roads, and the numerous heights by which it is surrounded. It consists of a congregation of vast pyramidal heights, rising from insulated rocks, from which singular peculiarity it derived its name of Monte Serrado, or the Sawed Mountain. On the summit stands the celebrated convent, so difficult of access and so commanding in situation as to form a post of very extraordinary strength. The Spaniards had increased the difficulties of attack, by obstructing the road leading to the convent, and by constructing redoubts on very steep rocks, to the summits of which artillery had with great difficulty been conveyed.

1811.
July.

Suchet, aware that the force of d'Eroles was insufficient to defend the place, if attacked at numerous points, directed an attack on three redoubts at the foot of the mountain, whilst several columns of voltigeurs climbed the rocks wherever they were found accessible. The peasants, stationed on the summits of the heights, received the assailants with a brisk fire, and rolled down stones and masses of rocks on the advancing columns. This, however, did not

check their progress—the whole position was carried by the bayonet, and d'Eroles himself was only enabled to escape by the darkness of the night, and his intimate knowledge of the passes.

After the capture of Montserrat, Maurice Mathieu returned to Barcelona, while Suchet repaired to Arragon to make preparations for invading the kingdom of Valencia.

After the failure of Campoverde's attempt to throw provisions into Figueras, the blockade of the place was continued without interruption by General Baraguay d'Hilliers. During a period of four months, the garrison held out in spite of the miserable condition to which they were reduced by the entire exhaustion of their provisions. At length General Martinez, encouraged by the success of the garrison of Almeida, determined to sally from the place, and force his way through the enemy's lines with the bayonet. By the treachery of a Spanish officer, Macdonald received intelligence of this project, and was prepared to frustrate its execution. Lines of contravallation had been formed, covered by a strong *abattis*. During the day the French posts were doubled, and at night the troops were placed in bivouac, in the direction towards which it was

CHAP. V.
1811.
July.

CHAP. V. considered probable the garrison would direct
1811. their flight.

August.

On the night of the sixteenth Martinez, at the head of three thousand men, sallied from the town, and succeeded in forcing their way to the *abattis*. Here, however, his progress was arrested. After eight gallant attacks, he was forced to return to the town, with the loss of four hundred men.

Martinez then felt that all hope was at an end. Every horse and domestic animal within the place had been consumed for food. He, therefore, determined to capitulate; but before doing so, he employed two days in destroying every thing within the place which could be useful to the enemy. Macdonald granted honourable terms, and on the nineteenth the place was given up; and the whole of the fortresses of Catalonia were in possession of the French.

Aug. 19.

The spirit of the Catalonians, however, was not broken by the misfortunes of the campaign. A new general was appointed to command the army, which, at that moment, existed rather in *posse* than in *esse*. Fortunately, General Lacy was a man of enterprise and spirit, suited to the times. He issued a proclamation, calling on the

people to return to the standard of their country. CHAP. V.
On the first of September, d'Eroles, whose ac-
1811. tivity was ever conspicuous, succeeded, with the
September. assistance of a British frigate, in recovering the islands of Las Medas, which had been lost in the preceding campaign. These being considered of importance were occupied by a considerable force, and measures were speedily adopted for strengthening the works.

Soon afterwards, when the French forces had concentrated at Tortosa, General Lacy determined to attack a series of fortified posts, which the enemy had formed from Barcelona to Leri-
da. He accordingly marched rapidly on Igua-
lada, where a convent had been strongly fortified by the French. The town was surprised, one hundred and fifty of the enemy were killed, and twenty-five made prisoners. The remainder escaped into the convent; and, at daylight, Lacy, learning that succours were approaching from Montserrat and Casa Masana, fell back on Manresa.

Oct. 4.

The enemy, little apprehensive of further attack, moved forward with a convoy, destined for the supply of the garrison of Igualada. Lacy formed his force into two divisions. The first,

CHAP. V. under d'Eroles, intercepted the advance of the
 1811. convoy; while Lacy, with the second, cut off
 October. its retreat. A column, with artillery, from Igualada, sallied out to the assistance of their countrymen; but the day went in favour of the Spaniards. The whole convoy was taken; upwards of two hundred of the French were killed and wounded; and the remainder with difficulty effected their escape into the convent.

After this achievement, Lacy, finding his presence necessary in the Junta, to forward the formation and organization of the army, left the command to d'Eroles. The enemy, weakened by their recent losses, soon after abandoned Igualada, Montserrat, and Casa Masana, and withdrew to Barcelona.*

D'Eroles then marched against Cervera. The French, on his approach, retired from the town into the university, which had been fortified;

* It is a remarkable fact, that, about the middle of eighteen hundred and eleven, when his armies in the east of Spain were in full career of success, Napoleon appears to have anticipated the necessity, to which he was afterwards reduced, of abandoning the Peninsula. Observing that the spirit of the gallant Catalans remained unbroken under every reverse, and aware that a war of extermination must eventually terminate in the defeat of his projects, he gave orders that preparations should be made to destroy the fortifications of Barcelona.

and a party of five hundred foot, and thirty horse, CHAP. V.
 which were approaching from Lerida, instantly retraced its steps. A detachment was sent in pursuit of this body; and d'Eroles, with one ten-pounder, proceeded to attack the buildings occupied by the enemy. The gun opened fire, and the French, not aware that it was the only one in possession of the assailants, agreed to capitulate. Upwards of six hundred men were thus made prisoners, at an expense to the Catalans of only ten in killed and wounded.

This success was followed by another of a similar kind. At Bilpuig, a body of the enemy were posted in the castle which commanded the town. Here the solitary gun, which had done good service at Cervera, was again brought into action. Though without engineers, three mines were formed, the explosion of which reduced the castle to ruins. Of the garrison, which consisted of four hundred men, one hundred and eighty were made prisoners,—the rest perished.

By these several successes, the whole country between Lerida and Barcelona was freed from the enemy. An attempt made by the French to intercept d'Eroles failed. By a bold and skilful

1811
 October.

Oct. 10.

CHAP. V. movement that leader entered France, where he levied heavy contributions on the inhabitants. It is highly honourable to d'Eroles, that, during the whole of this incursion, he succeeded in preventing any retaliation of those atrocities which had marked the progress of the French in Spain. Having collected a considerable quantity of corn and cattle, and a considerable sum in specie, this enterprising leader succeeded in regaining his native mountains.

Blake, on reaching Cadiz after his unsuccessful attempt on Niebla, prepared again to take the field; and, embarking with a corps of choice troops, landed at Almeria, and joined the Murcian army near Baeza. Soult immediately advanced with his whole disposable force to attack him; and, on the ninth of August, an engagement took place near Lorea. The Spaniards were driven with great loss from their position; and, being closely pursued, the retreat became a complete rout, and they fled to the mountains near Caravaca. The Spanish cavalry in this action behaved with great courage, and gave protection to the fugitives who had taken the road to Murcia; but, on the tenth, they were attacked by the whole of the French ca-

1811.
October.

Aug. 9.

Aug. 10.

valry, and about five hundred were killed, wounded, or made prisoners. The remainder, amounting to about fifteen hundred men, retired precipitately to Murcia.

In a few days, however, the army of Blake, the greater part of which had been dispersed, again collected in the neighbourhood of Lebrilla; and that leader being appointed to the chief command in Valencia, his force was increased by reinforcements to thirty thousand men, and included nearly all the veteran troops of Spain. Generals Zayas, Sardizabel, Carlos O'Donnel Mahy, and Juan Caro, most of whom had earned distinction in the service, held subordinate commands in the army; and Soult having returned to Seville, Blake found himself at liberty to employ his whole force for the defence of Valencia.

Shortly after the fall of Tarragona, Macdonald was removed from the command, and General Decaen appointed his successor. To ensure unity in the operations of both armies, this officer was made subordinate to Marshal Suchet, who, on the fifteenth September, advanced from Tortosa, with the whole disposable force from Arragon and Catalonia, to achieve the conquest

1811.
August.

September.

Sep. 15.

CHAP. V. of the rich province of Valencia. On the nine-
 1811. teenth he reached Oropesa, and found the castle,
 September. which commanded the direct road to Valencia,
 in possession of a Spanish garrison. Suchet, con-
 sidering celerity of movement to be essential to
 the complete success of his operations, deter-
 mined to proceed by a route impracticable for
 Sep. 27. artillery; and, on the twenty-seventh of Sep-
 tember, the army reached Murviedro, a town
 which stands on the site of the ancient Sagun-
 tum, about four leagues to the eastward of Va-
 lencia.

Blake, with thirteen thousand of the flower of
 his army, fell back to Valencia on the approach
 of the French. The town was immediately oc-
 Sep. 28. cupied; and, on the following day, an attempt
 was made to carry the fort by escalade, which
 terminated in the repulse of the assailants with
 considerable loss. From this event till the com-
 ming up of his artillery, Suchet directed his at-
 tention to the Spanish troops in the field. He
 detached General Robert to attack a division of
 Blake's army, under General Obispo, at Segorba.
 Obispo was defeated with great loss; and, being
 pursued vigorously by the cavalry, his force dis-
 persed and sought shelter among the mountains.

The next operation was to attack the corps of CHAP. V.
 O'Donnel, which was formed in position near 1811.
 Benaquazil. The Spaniards, after a trifling re-
 sistance, retreated across the Guadalaviar in
 some disorder, but with little loss.

After these successes, Suchet was enabled to
 continue his operations against Murviedro with-
 out interruption. On the tenth, the castle of Oct. 10.
 Oropesa surrendered, at the moment when the
 besiegers were about to assault the breach.
 The road to Murviedro was now open, and the
 heavy battering-train arrived before that place
 on the sixteenth. A breach was soon effect-
 ed; and, on the eighteenth, the French attempt-
 ed to storm it, but encountered a severe repulse.
 On the nineteenth, the assault was again given,
 Oct. 19. but without more favourable result. The gar-
 rison, under General Andrioni, were animated
 by the best spirit; and, confident in the hope
 that Blake would advance to the relief of the
 place, entertained no thought but of resistance.

In the meanwhile, Blake, at first unwilling to
 hazard all on the chances of a battle, determined
 to confine himself to movements on the flank
 and rear of the French army, and detached a
 force under Mahy, to surprise a detachment in

CHAP. V. Cuenca, and thus interrupt the communication of Suchet with Madrid. The attempt, however, proved ineffectual, and Mahy returned with his division to the main body of the army.

1811.
September.

Sep. 26. In Arragon, however, Duran and the Empecinado, with about four thousand men, attacked the town of Calatayud, garrisoned by three battalions of the enemy. Nearly the whole of these were slain and made prisoners. Nor was Mina less active or fortunate. He captured a detachment of eight hundred men in Ayerba, having previously surprised and defeated a party advancing to their relief. By these movements, the situation of Suchet had been rendered one of difficulty and danger. With the army of Blake in his front, he was compelled to detach a corps of four thousand men to protect Teruel, and escort a convoy expected from Zaragoza. Had a junction been effected by Mina, Duran, and the Empecinado, and had these leaders attacked the French posts, and cut off the communication with Zaragoza, it is in the highest degree improbable that Suchet, whose communication with Tortosa was already intercepted by the peasantry, would have ventured to maintain his ground in Valencia. But the Guerilla leaders, influenced by petty jea-

lousies, were little disposed to act in unison, and allowed the opportunity to escape.

CHAP. V.
1811.
October.

Unfortunately, too, Blake at length resolved to fight a battle for the relief of Murviedro. On the twenty-fourth of October, he took post on the heights of Pache, with his right towards the sea, supported by the fire of some English vessels, and his left resting on the village of Betara. On his approach, Suchet, leaving six battalions to continue the investment of Murviedro, advanced with his army, and took up a line, extending from the sea, in rear of Puzol, to the mountains beyond the village of Val de Jesus.

On the following morning, Blake put his army in motion for attack. The right wing was commanded by Zayas, the centre by Carlos O'Donnel, and the left, in which were the Valencians, by Villa Campa. Mahy, with the Murcian division, formed a second line in rear of the left; while Blake, with another body of reserve, remained on El Puig.

At eight in the morning, the French light troops were driven in. General Zayas then advanced in fine order, and, seizing posses-

Oct. 25.

CHAP. V. sion of the village of Puzol, changed his front
 1811. on the extremity of his left, while with his
 October. right he moved on to gain an isolated height
 which commanded all the ground in its front.
 At the same time, the left wing of the Spaniards, by a wide movement, attempted to turn the enemy's right flank, by which the centre was inconsiderately weakened. Suchet immediately took advantage of this error, and directed a powerful attack on the Spanish centre, in order to isolate the wings. In this quarter the Spaniards fought bravely, and though forced at first to retire, again rallied and drove back the enemy with signal courage. Don Juan Caro made a desperate charge with the cavalry under his command on the enemy's horse, which were supported by artillery, and posted behind a mud wall. The Spaniards, very gallantly, leaped the wall, charged the guns, and cut down the gunners at their posts. No advantage, however, was reaped from this exploit. A fresh column of the enemy came on, the Spanish cavalry were driven back with considerable loss, and Caro himself was made prisoner. The centre at length gave way; but Lardizabel, hav-

ing collected some horse, continued to show front
 to the enemy, and covered the retreat of the
 infantry.

On the right, the battle had been waged with the utmost gallantry, by the troops under Zayas. A severe struggle took place for the possession of the height, in which the Spaniards were at first successful, but subsequently compelled to retire. Though this wing was isolated by the retreat of the centre, it still continued the contest with pertinacity and vigour. The French cavalry, in all their charges, were driven back in confusion. Both parties made strenuous efforts to maintain the village of Puzol, and in this quarter the slaughter was very great. The Spaniards kept up a warm fire from the roofs and windows of the houses; but after repeated alternations of success on both sides, Puzol remained in possession of the French. Zayas then retreated to the heights, near Puig, where he was again attacked both in front and flank. When driven from this last position, he executed his retreat in good order, by the road leading to Valencia along the shore.

The left wing having also been repulsed, the whole army retreated, and Blake was unfortu-

CHAP. V.
 1811.
 October.

CHAP. V. nately induced to make a second stand, in the
 1811. strong ground behind the rivulet Betara. From
 October. this measure no benefit resulted. The retreat

was continued with greater rapidity and less order than before; and it was with great difficulty that he succeeded in throwing himself with the remains of his army across the Guadalaviar.

The loss of the French in this engagement was somewhat above seven hundred in killed and wounded; of the Spaniards, nearly four thousand seven hundred were made prisoners, and about one thousand killed and wounded. Twelve cannon, four standards, and upwards of four thousand musquets—nearly all English—were captured by the victors.

The garrison of Murviedro beheld from the summit of their walls, which commanded all the neighbouring country, the defeat of that army in the success of whose efforts were centred all their hopes of relief. The place surrendered on the following morning, and the garrison, two thousand five hundred in number, were made prisoners. Blake, after his defeat, took up a position on the right of the Guadalaviar, which he strengthened by entrenchments. His left flank rested on the villages of St. Onofie and

Manises, which had been strongly fortified. His right was covered by canals, and appuyed on the city of Valencia.

CHAP. V.
 1811.
 September.

Before engaging in further operations, Suchet determined to await the arrival of the reinforcements he had solicited from the governments of Paris and Madrid. In the meantime, he halted on the left of the river, with his left at the Grao or port, his right at Liria, and his centre in the suburb Serano. He strengthened the front of his position with strong redoubts, and for nearly two months no occurrence of importance took place.

CHAPTER VI.

OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES—
IN ANDALUSIA, AND VALENCIA.

CHAP. VI. ON the separation of Marmont and Soult, it
 1811. was agreed that Dorsenne, with the army of the
 September. North, should enter Galicia, by a rapid movement, seize Corunna by a *coup-de-main*, fortify Lugo, and thus once more obtain military possession of the province. In pursuance of this project, Dorsenne, abandoning the Asturias, moved towards Astorga, where the Gallician army under General Abadia had taken post. An attack was ordered, the Spaniards retreated after a feeble resistance, and Dorsenne continued his advance into the province. In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington, having collected his army on the Coa, blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont, alarmed for the safety of so important a fortress, recalled Dorsenne, with the view of

raising the blockade, and throwing copious supplies into the place. CHAP. VI.

By compelling the enemy to concentrate their forces, for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wellington gained two important objects. He relieved Galicia, and drew the corps of Souham from Navarre, where it had been sent for the purpose of keeping down the strong Guerilla parties, from which great loss and annoyance were experienced. It was with a view to such benefits, rather than any immediate hope of reducing the fortress, for the siege of which he was not yet prepared, that Lord Wellington had formed the blockade. On learning the approach of Marmont, he therefore prepared to abandon it, and occupy a defensive position, which would enable him to ascertain the force of the enemy, and regulate his future movements as circumstances might direct.

As a point of support, therefore, by which he might be enabled to keep out a strong advanced corps to the latest moment, he caused the heights in front of Guinaldo to be strengthened by field-works, and posted his troops in readiness to concentrate in the position, whenever such a measure should become necessary. The division of Gen-

CHAP. VI. eral Picton was placed in advance on the heights
 1811. of El Bodon, between Guinaldo and Pastores. The
 September. light division was on the right of the Agueda,
 near Martiago, its right resting on the mountains
 which divide Castile and Estramadura. The left
 of the army, under General Graham, who had
 succeeded Sir Brent Spencer as second in com-
 mand, was on the Lower Azava. Don Carlos
 d'Espana, and Don Julian Sanchez observed the
 lower Agueda; and Sir Stapleton Cotton, with
 the cavalry, was on the upper Azava, in the
 centre. General Foy, having collected a body
 of troops in upper Estramadura, the fifth division
 was posted in rear of the right, to observe the
 road leading from Perales, and the fourth divi-
 sion remained at Guinaldo.

On the twenty-second September, the armies
 of Marmont and Dorsenne effected a junction at
 Tamames, about three leagues distant from Ciu-
 dad Rodrigo. Their combined force amounted
 to sixty thousand men, of which six thousand
 were cavalry. That of the allies, including four
 thousand cavalry, did not exceed forty thousand
 Sept. 23. men. On the twenty-third, the enemy appeared
 in the plain near the city, but again retired. On
 the day following, they came on in great force,

and escorted a large convoy of waggons, cars, CHAP. VI.
 and loaded mules, into the town. 1811.

During these operations, the allied army re- September.
 mained passive in its positions; and the enemy,
 of course, were left in considerable uncertainty
 as to the intentions of Lord Wellington. These,
 however, Marmont took speedy measures to as-
 certain. On the morning of the twenty-fifth, a
 body of French cavalry, consisting of about thirty
 squadrons, supported by a division of infantry,
 and twelve pieces of artillery, was observed in
 motion, along the great road leading from Ciudad
 Rodrigo to Guinaldo, on the left of El Bodon.
 To delay the progress of this formidable column,
 and give time for the coming up of other troops,
 Lord Wellington moved the brigade of General
 Colville, consisting of the fifth, seventy-seventh,
 and ninety-fourth regiments, to a height at some
 distance on the left, commanding the road to
 Guinaldo. This brigade had scarcely taken its
 position, when the enemy's artillery came up,
 and a brisk cannonade was maintained on both
 sides. The cavalry made a furious attack on the
 Portuguese guns, and succeeded in driving the
 gunners from their posts. This, however, was
 but the success of a moment. The fifth regiment

CHAP. VI. was ordered forward, and maintaining a brisk
 1811. fire as they advanced, charged with the bayonet,
 September. when within a few yards of the enemy. By
 this singular manœuvre, the guns were regained.
 The fifth, maintaining their advantage, pursued
 the cavalry down the declivity of the height,
 and across the ravine.

Though repulsed in this attack, the French cavalry, led by General Montbrun, again executed a charge of the boldest character, on the part of the position occupied by the fifth and seventy-seventh. These regiments suffered them to approach within a few paces, when firing a volley with great effect, the French instantly retreated in great confusion. In another part of the field a few squadrons of British and German dragoons, shewed gallant front to the enemy, and, notwithstanding the overwhelming superiority of numbers by which they were opposed, continued to skirmish with great effect.

It was not, however, the plan of Lord Wellington to commit his army by any serious engagement. The divisions had previously received orders to dispute the ground, but to retire when pressed, on Guinaldo. But the necessity of a retrogressive movement became in-

stantly apparent, by the discovery that a column CHAP. VI.
 hitherto hid by the nature of the ground, was
 1811. in the act of turning the right of the position.
 September. The heights, therefore, were abandoned, and the
 troops, formed in square, were put in motion on
 Guinaldo.

Nothing to a military eye could be finer than the scene which ensued. The battalions were repeatedly charged on their march by the enemy's cavalry, whom they repulsed with a gallantry and steadiness impossible to be surpassed. At one time, the fifth and seventy-seventh were charged on three faces of the square at the same moment. For upwards of two miles these regiments, and the twenty-first Portuguese, under Colonel Bacellar, continued their retreat in all the regularity of a parade movement, though entirely enveloped by the French squadrons. The chief loss sustained was from the Horse-artillery, which came up, and, firing on solid masses of infantry, did considerable execution.

Lord Wellington, having gained the object for which the position of Guinaldo had been fortified, would have immediately retired, had not an unforeseen circumstance prevented it.

CHAP. VI. By some mistake, the light division did not receive orders to retreat till all support had been withdrawn; and General Crawford, apprehensive that in crossing the Agueda at Robleda he might be intercepted, and ignorant that Perales was occupied by a strong corps of the enemy, determined to retreat along the right bank of the river. Orders, therefore, were instantly sent to General Crawford, to retrace his steps, and cross by the ford of Robleda, and the divisions of Picton and Cole remained in Guinaldo to cover his junction.

1811.
September.

In the meantime, dispositions were made to receive the enemy, should he think proper to attack the position. Fuente Guinaldo stands on a high ridge, nearly three miles in length, stretching from the Agueda across an extensive plain, by which it is bounded on the left. To secure this flank, two divisions were stationed at Nava d'Aver. The heights were occupied by the third and fourth divisions, and the brigade of General Pack. A division was posted on the right of the Agueda to face Perales, and counteract any attempt of the enemy to pass the river in rear of the position.

Sep. 26. The morning of the twenty-sixth, which was

expected to bring battle, passed over quietly. CHAP. VI. Marmont contented himself with making an exhibition of his force,—causing it to execute a variety of manœuvres, the rapidity and precision of which attracted the admiration of all who witnessed them. During the time thus occupied, the light division joined the army; and Lord Wellington, at nightfall, unwilling to court battle in a position assumed for a mere temporary object, put his army in retreat towards Alfayates, and stationed his rear-guard at Aldea de Ponte.

1811.
September.

On the twenty-seventh this village was attacked by the enemy, who twice succeeded in gaining possession of it. Twice, also, they were driven back by the gallantry of the fourth division, who ultimately remained masters of the disputed post. At night, the army were again in motion, and fell back to a position on the heights behind Soito, where an inflexion of the Coa gave protection to both flanks.

Sep. 27.

In this position Lord Wellington determined to offer battle. The manœuvres of the enemy had hitherto been marked by the greatest confidence and boldness. They betrayed throughout an evident feeling of superiority, and something even of contemptuous disregard for an opponent

CHAP. VI. whose policy had hitherto been wholly defensive. It was clearly the intention of Marmont to drive the allies across the Coa; but the army had already reached the ground which Lord Wellington had selected to give a decisive check to his progress. The natural defences of this position were strong. The flanks being covered by the Coa could not be turned; but it presented no avenue of retreat. The success of the enemy at any one point of attack must have proved fatal to the army; and the selection of such ground at once proved to Marmont, notwithstanding his immense superiority, how little apprehension was entertained by Lord Wellington of the result of a battle.

It did not, however, accord with the views of Marmont to accept the challenge thus offered. He retired to Ciudad Rodrigo, where his army separated; part, under Dorsenne, returning to the north; and the remainder, still retaining its designation as the Army of Portugal, moved towards the pass of Banos and Placentia. The allied army then went into cantonments, and head-quarters were established at Frenada.

But perhaps the most splendid achievement of the campaign was performed by General Hill.

1811.
September.

Oct. 1.

CHAP. VI. That officer remained in the neighbourhood of Portalegre, covering the province of Alentejo against any incursion by the garrison of Badajoz, while Castanos was employed recruiting the Estramaduran army, which had been so miserably sacrificed by the imbecility of Mendizabel. On learning that Castanos had already embodied a considerable number of recruits, Marshal Soult directed Girard, with about four thousand foot, and a thousand horse, to march to Caceres, and scour the neighbourhood, in order to disperse these newly collected levies. The presence of this force was productive of much inconvenience. It narrowed the limits and resources of Castanos, whose troops (in the miserable state of the Spanish government and commissariat) depended solely for assistance on what the neighbouring country might afford. A movement, therefore, was concerted, by which a signal blow might be struck against Girard, and the province relieved from the burden under which it laboured.

The execution of this enterprise was intrusted to General Hill, who, on the twenty-second of October, with such force as was deemed sufficient for the service, set out from Portalegre to-

1811.
October.

Oct. 22.

CHAP. VI. ward the Spanish frontier. On the day following he reached Albuquerque, where he learned that the cavalry of Girard had fallen back from Aliseda to Arroyo del Puerco. On the twenty-

1811.
October.

Oct. 25. fifth, the Spaniards, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, drove the enemy from Arroyo del Puerco. The French cavalry then fell back to Malpartida, which Girard occupied as an advanced post, his main body still remaining at Caceres.

Oct. 26. On reaching Malpartida, at daybreak on the twenty-sixth, General Hill learned that the enemy had retired during the night, followed by a party of Spanish cavalry. It was soon after ascertained that Girard had quitted Caceres; but as the direction he had taken was uncertain, General Hill remained at Malpartida to watch his movements.

Oct. 27. Having ascertained that the enemy had marched on Torre Mocha, the allies were put in motion on the morning of the twenty-seventh, by Aldea de Cano, and Casa de St. Antonio. As this was a shorter route than the one followed by Girard, General Hill was not without hopes of being enabled to intercept and bring him to action. On the march, however, he learned that the enemy had quitted Torre Mocha in the

morning, and moved to Arroyo de Molinos, leaving a rear-guard at Albala. Satisfied, from this information, that Girard was ignorant of his movements, General Hill, on the same evening, made a forced march to Alcuesca, where he halted in bivouac, taking every precaution to avoid discovery by the enemy's patrols.

Oct. 28. About two in the morning the troops moved on from Alcuesca in one column towards Arroyo de Molinos, a village situated at the foot of a mountain crescent, generally inaccessible, which sweeps round it, and embraces a diameter of about two miles. There were three roads which it was necessary to occupy in order to cut off the enemy's retreat. That leading to Truxillo, which winds round the eastern horn of the crescent; that to Merida, which diverges at right angles from the route by which the allies were advancing, and that leading to Medellin.

Though the distance from Alcuesca was little more than a league, it was nearly seven o'clock before the troops had defiled from the mountains, and formed under cover of a low ridge about half a mile from Arroyo de Molinos. General Hill then divided his force into three columns. The left column, consisting of the seventy-first

CHAP. VI.
1811.
October.

CHAP. VI. and ninety-second regiments, supported by the
 1811. fiftieth, and three pieces of Portuguese artillery,
 October. under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart,
 was directed to carry the village at the point of
 the bayonet.

The right column, consisting of Colonel Wilson's brigade, and the Portuguese brigade of Colonel Ashworth, under Major-General Howard, was instructed to move to the right, to cut off the retreat of the enemy towards Medellin, and finally to attack their left and rear.

The cavalry, under Sir William Erskine, was placed between the two columns of infantry, ready to act in front, or move round either of them, as occasion might require. Unfortunately, the British cavalry, mistaking the road in the darkness, were delayed in their advance; and the Spanish horse, under Penne Villemur, enjoyed the honour of first encountering the enemy;—the Spanish infantry remained in reserve, and bore no part in the engagement.

The route of these columns lay through a plain thinly covered with cork wood and evergreen oak; and, as day dawned, a violent storm of rain and mist came on, under cover of which the troops continued their ad-

vance. On the left, Colonel Stewart moved CHAP. VI.
 rapidly on the village, which they succeeded in
 1811. gaining unperceived, though the enemy were in
 October. motion, and a brigade had marched an hour before for Medellin. The seventy-first and ninety-second then charged through the street, driving every thing before them at the point of the bayonet, and leaving the fiftieth regiment, by which they were closely followed, to secure the prisoners. The enemy's infantry, on escaping from the town, immediately formed into two squares, with the cavalry on the left, and opened fire on the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments. The former took post behind a wall and immediately opened fire; while the ninety-second formed line on the right flank of the French, supported by two Portuguese guns, which shortly after came up and did great execution. The ninety-second, which had hitherto been directed to reserve their fire, then received orders to charge; but the French, without waiting their approach, retreated rapidly, and in great confusion towards the mountain in their rear.

At this moment the column of General Howard approached, and the cavalry crossing the head of the retreating column, succeeded in separating

CHAP. VI. the French horse from the infantry, and, by re-

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peated charges, threw it into confusion. General Howard, finding it impossible to get between the enemy and the mountain, made a rapid movement round its base, and, ascending at a point opposite to that chosen by the enemy, encountered them on the shoulder of the hill.

No resource then remained to the enemy, but to disperse or surrender. All order was at an end; the soldiers, throwing away their arms, fled, panic-stricken, towards the steepest parts of the ridge. Of the fugitives many were made prisoners; and General Morillo, with the Spanish infantry, one British, and one Portuguese battalion, continued the pursuit for eight leagues. General Girard, with a few hundred men, mostly without arms, escaped in the direction of Serena.

In this brilliant affair fifteen hundred of the enemy, including General Brun and the Duke d'Aremberg, were made prisoners, and the whole of their artillery, baggage, stores, and ammunition were taken, at an expense, on the part of the British, of sixty-four killed and wounded, and of only seven on that of the Portuguese. The loss of the Spaniards was likewise very trifling.

General Hill returned to his cantonments at CHAP. VI. Portalegre, where he remained till the end of 1811. December. He then made a rapid movement on December.

Merida, in hope of surprising a detachment of the enemy, under General Dombrowsky, which occupied that town. About three leagues from Merida, however, he fell in with a foraging party, which, though briskly pursued, succeeded in effecting its retreat, and gave the alarm. The enemy, thus informed of his approach, immediately abandoned the town, leaving a considerable magazine of flour; and General Hill immediately directed his march against Drouet, who had taken post with part of his corps at Almandrelejo. On reaching that town, however, he found that Drouet had retired towards the south; and, having cleared this portion of the province from the enemy, General Hill placed his troops in cantonments in Merida, and its vicinity.

Dec. 29.

In Cadiz, and its vicinity, nothing of importance took place till the close of the year. The Cortes, occupied with matters of speculative policy, had done nothing to promote the interests, or acquire the confidence of the country. What Spain wanted, was a leader of skill, enterprise, and

CHAP. VI. genius, to give unity to her exertions, and consolidate those resources which had hitherto been wasted and misapplied. But this truth, obvious to all reasonable men, was not appreciated by the Cortes or the government. After the abandonment of Portugal by Massena, it was proposed that the frontier provinces should be placed under command of Lord Wellington. On a motion to this effect, a debate took place in the Cortes; and the proposition, being somewhat wounding to Spanish pride, was negatived by a large majority.

Ballasteros, who had been appointed to the command in Andalusia, remained in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar; and, adopting a desultory system of warfare, occasioned great annoyance to the enemy. Soult, who had already made several ineffectual efforts to crush so annoying an opponent, at length despatched General Godinot with a force of about eight thousand men to execute this service. Ballasteros, by a variety of skilful manœuvres, avoided engaging a force superior to his own, and when pressed by the enemy sought shelter beneath the guns of Gibraltar.

In the meanwhile, a detachment from Cadiz,

under Colonel Skerret, and a Spanish force under Copons, were sent to occupy Tariffa, as a diversion in favour of Ballasteros. Tariffa was important in other respects. It afforded a secure point from which the allies might annoy the rear of the corps before Cadiz, and cut off their supplies. Godinot, therefore, on receiving intelligence of its occupation, immediately advanced against it. On the eighteenth, his artillery, with a considerable escort, moved towards Tariffa by the pass of La Pena; but as the road lay along the shore, the British ships of war assailed the column with so heavy a fire as to force it to return.

Ballasteros now assumed the offensive; and, attacking the rear-guard of the enemy, drove it back in confusion, and succeeded in making many prisoners. A more important advantage soon followed. General Semele had taken post at Bornos, on the right bank of the Guadalete, with two thousand foot, some horse, and three pieces of artillery. Ballasteros, by a night-march, came unexpectedly on this force, and, putting them to the route, succeeded in capturing about one hundred prisoners, with the whole of the artillery and baggage. The unfortunate result of his opera-

CHAP. VI. tions so affected the mind of General Godinot,
 1811. that on reaching Seville, whither he had been
 December. recalled by Soult, he put a period to his existence.

The views of Soult were then directed towards Tariffa; and General Leval, with about ten thousand men and eighteen guns, was directed to reduce it. On the nineteenth of December that officer appeared before the place, and on the following night it was completely invested, though not without considerable opposition on the part of the garrison.

Tariffa was a place of little strength; its only defence being an uncovered wall, flanked imperfectly by small projections. It communicated, however, with an island, on which were two half-moon batteries and a martello tower; and a secure point of embarkation was thus afforded, should it be found necessary to abandon the town. The garrison consisted of twelve hundred British under Colonel Skerret, and about nine hundred Spaniards, commanded by Don Francisco Copons.

Dec. 24. On the night of the twenty-fourth, the besiegers broke ground within four hundred yards of the place, and continued to push on their ap-

proaches, though annoyed by the fire from the town, which did considerable execution. On the twenty-ninth, two batteries were completed; one of which opened fire on the gun-boats at anchor in the bay, the other on the town. On the thirtieth, General Leval sent a summons to the governor, which drew from Copons a bombastic reply. On the thirty-first, a practicable breach had been effected, and preparations on both sides were made for the assault. On the following morning a strong body of the enemy were seen advancing towards the breach. Colonel Gough, of the eighty-seventh, then drew his sword, and directed the band of his regiment to play the Irish air Garry Owen. The soldiers immediately cheered, and opened a very destructive fire on the advancing column. The forty-seventh, in particular, who lined a wall descending from the south-east tower, did great execution. The French halted for a moment, as if stunned,—then, rushing forward, gained the bottom of the breach. Unable to effect an entrance they hurried off under the wall to the right, and made an effort to gain the portcullis. Defeated in this, and finding themselves cut up by a flanking fire of artillery, and overwhelmed by

CHAP. VI.
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 December.

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 Jan. 1.

CHAP. VI. showers of musquetry and hand-grenades, they
 1812. hastily retreated, with the loss of five hundred
 January. of their number.

After this failure, no further attempt was made against the town; and Leval having buried his artillery, which the state of the roads rendered it impossible to remove, on the night of the fourth of January withdrew from the town by order of Marshal Soult, who, alarmed by the movements of General Hill, was concentrating his army at Seville.

The loss of the enemy was estimated to amount to two thousand five hundred men,—a number exceeding that of the garrison. This calculation, perhaps, exceeded the truth; but their loss was unquestionably very great; and the French, for the first time, learned what was to be expected from British soldiers when defending stone-walls. The siege lasted seventeen days; during seven of which the breach was open.

In Valencia, Suchet, having been joined by considerable reinforcements from the army in Catalonia, made preparations for the passage of the Guadalaviar. General Blake had strongly entrenched himself on the right bank of that river, with a force of twenty thousand

troops of the line, six thousand militia, and one hundred pieces of cannon. His infantry occupied a line extending from the sea to Manisses; his cavalry were placed on the left towards Ribaroja.

During the night of the twenty-fifth of December, two bridges were thrown across the Guadalaviar, in front of Ribaroja, where the country was no longer intersected by that labyrinth of canals which gave great strength to the other parts of the position. At Mislata, a third bridge was constructed for the cavalry and artillery.

Early on the twenty-sixth, three divisions of French infantry crossed the bridges in face of the Spanish cavalry, which was driven back in confusion on Torrente. The Murcian division at Manisses, observing the French columns on their left, became apprehensive of being surrounded, and, abandoning their posts, fled in great disorder towards Coterroja, on the road to Murcia. They were pursued by General Harispe, who made some prisoners, though unable to come up with the main-body.

At other points, the assailants were less successful. The division of Palombini, which pass-

CHAP. VI.
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 December.

Dec. 25.

Dec. 26.

CHAP. VI. ed at Mislata, were unable to penetrate the canals by which they were surrounded, and were driven back in confusion on the Guadalaviar. The troops, however, rallied; and General Habert coming up to their support, they were enabled to maintain their ground, till Blake, who beheld one division of his army already cut off, gave up the contest, and retired within the defences of the city.

Valencia stands on the southern bank of the Guadalaviar, and is surrounded by a wall flanked by towers, to which some works had been added requiring regular attack. It was, moreover, covered by a strong line of retrenchments, in which the suburbs were included; and no expense had been spared in accumulating an ample supply of arms, guns, and ammunition, for the defence of works so extensive.

1812. Suchet immediately prepared for the regular
Jan. 1. siege of Valencia. On the night of the first of January, trenches were opened against the eastern extremity of the line, near Mont Olivete; but the chief attack was directed against the salient part of the line, which covered the suburb of St. Vincente.

The works of the besiegers were pushed on

with great vigour; and, on the morning of the fifth, the garrison, dispirited by their recent misfortunes, abandoned the defence of their lines, and retired into Valencia. The French then bombarded the city; and on the eighth, Blake consented to capitulate. The garrison, amounting to upwards of eighteen thousand troops of the line, including twenty-three general officers, were made prisoners; three hundred and ninety-three pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of stores and ammunition, fell into possession of the victors.

Thus did Suchet conclude a campaign, illustrated by a series of successes more brilliant than any which were destined to grace the French arms in the Peninsula. In every point of view, the conquest of Valencia was of vast importance: it gave the richest province of Spain into the grasp of the French; it enabled the armies of Arragon and Catalonia to connect their operations with those of Soult; it gave strength and consolidation to the French power in the interior provinces; it gave a great though temporary downfall to the hopes of the Spanish nation, which beheld the annihilation of its last effective army. Napoleon, to

CHAP. VI.
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January.

Jan. 8.

CHAP. VI. mark his sense of the distinguished services of
1812.

Suchet, bestowed on him the title of Duke d'Albufera, and the rank of Marshal of France. This elevation was accompanied by a grant of the royal domain of Albufera, in the neighbourhood of Valencia, to be held as an unalienable fief of the empire.

The conduct of Blake, in the operations which led to the surrender of Valencia, has subjected his integrity to vehement though unreasonable suspicion. He cannot be held as having betrayed that cause which he had supported throughout the war with zeal and steadiness, if not with judgment. That he committed several flagrant errors, is unquestionable. He intrusted the defence of the river, from Manisses to Ribaroja, solely to his cavalry; he shut up his army in Valencia, instead of retiring into Murcia; and thus sacrificed the hopes of his country in a futile attempt to hold a town which was in no respect calculated for a protracted defence. Valencia might have furnished a national guard, which, with the addition of a few thousand regular troops, would have been sufficient to garrison the city. Had Blake then manœuvred in the rear of the besieging army, or boldly

thrown himself into Catalonia, it is probable CHAP. VI.
he would have arrested the tide of Marshal
Suchet's success, even in the fulness of its flood. 1812.

But Blake, with all his faults, must be admitted to have been a man of high courage and unshaken patriotism. His chief failing was one he held in common with the great mass of his countrymen—a presumptuous self-confidence; and to this the long train of disaster, which unfortunately marked his career, may be attributed.

CHAPTER VII.

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

CHAP. VII. WHILE the army remained in cantonments, the ever active mind of Lord Wellington was engaged in devising measures by which the supply of his army might be improved. It had been found by experience, that the transport of the country, even in conjunction with the numerous commissariat mules attached to each division, was inadequate to the requisite conveyance of stores and provisions. The waggons of the natives were of the rudest mechanism, and in many instances of little use. Lord Wellington, therefore, gave orders for the construction of a certain number, on a more improved model, to be attached to the army, under the denomination of the Commissariat Waggon Train.

Upwards of six hundred of these vehicles, each

capable of conveying a load of eight hundred weight, were constructed during the winter at Lisbon, Oporto, and Almeida, and were formed into divisions and sub-divisions, with conductors, artificers, and other subordinate persons attached to each. By this judicious arrangement, the army became possessed of a wheel transport of its own, and the necessary requisitions on the inhabitants were rendered less burdensome and vexatious.

But this was not all. By the exertions of the engineer officers, the Douro was rendered navigable to the confluence of the Agueda, a point about forty miles higher than boats had ever previously been able to proceed. A great distance of land carriage was thus saved, at a moment when the whole means of transport, at command, were required for the conveyance of the battering-train to be employed in the approaching siege.

In the meanwhile, Marmont, satisfied from the facility with which he had succeeded in re-victualling Ciudad Rodrigo, that it was in no immediate danger of attack from Lord Wellington, remained tranquil in his cantonments on the Tagus. The activity of General Hill, in the

CHAP.VII. south of Estramadura, tended perhaps still further to increase his security, by inducing the belief that Lord Wellington had detached a large portion of his army to the Alentejo. Under this impression, he not only quartered his army in very extensive cantonments, but even ventured to detach General Montbrun, with three divisions, to assist Suchet in his operations in Valencia. The division of General Bonnet had likewise been detached, by Dorsenne, to occupy the Asturias; and another, under General Dubreton, was scouring the province of Las Montanas.

Lord Wellington, accurately informed of these details, determined instantly to commence the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Accordingly, on the sixth of January, head-quarters were transferred from Frenada to Gallegos; but the ground being covered with snow, and the weather inclement, the army did not move till the eighth. The light division alone crossed the Agueda, and formed the investment; but the other divisions took part in all the duties of the siege, and were prepared, if necessary, to move to the support of the investing force.

Jan. 8. Shortly after dark, on the same evening, par-

ties from the third, fourth, and light divisions broke ground before the fortress, under a heavy fire; and a redoubt, situated on the great Tesson, was gallantly stormed by a party of the light division, under Lieutenant-Colonel Colburne.—The immediate direction of the siege was entrusted to Sir Thomas Graham, who had succeeded Sir Brent Spencer as second in command.

By the capture of the redoubt, a powerful preliminary obstacle to the operations of the besiegers was removed. On the night following, the first parallel was established, and the batteries traced out. On the night of the thirteenth, a fortified Convent, situated on the right of the captured redoubt, was attacked and carried by a detachment of light infantry companies, supported by Lord Blantyre's brigade. The assailants succeeded in approaching the Convent unobserved; and, effecting an entrance, took the garrison by surprise. As this post was of considerable importance, a lodgment was formed in it, and the sap was carried on to the line of the second parallel.

On the fourteenth, the garrison took advantage of a moment when the trenches were unguarded, to make a sortie. By a culpable neg-

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Jan. 13.

Jan. 14.

CHAP. VII. 1812. intelligence, the guard, quitting the trenches, were accustomed to depart on observing the approach of the relief. For a moment, therefore, the enemy were successful; the workmen, armed only with spade and mattock, hastily retired; but the alarm was instantly given, and the assailants were driven back, without effecting more injury than that of upsetting a few gabions into the sap.

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In the meanwhile, intelligence was received that Marmont, ignorant of the operations of the allies, was approaching, with the view of throwing supplies into the place. But as this ignorance could be but of short duration, Lord Wellington determined to push forward his advances with the utmost rapidity, in the hope of carrying the town, before Marmont and Dorsenne should be enabled to collect their forces for its relief. In case, however, he should be defeated in this object, preparations were made for encountering the combined army in the field. The divisions, in the more distant cantonments, were moved up to the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and General Hill was directed to throw two brigades across the Tagus, to move as occasion might require.

CHAP. VII. 1812. It was considered of importance to gain possession of the convent of St. Francisco, by which the approaches were enfiladed on the left. Batteries were accordingly erected against it, which speedily destroyed the defences; and, on the night of the fourteenth, it was carried by assault. The second parallel was then completed, and progress made by sap towards the crest of the glacis. Advances were likewise made from the left of the first parallel down the slope of the hill, and fresh batteries established, from which an incessant fire was kept up on the *fausse braie*, and body of the place.

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Jan. 14.

On the nineteenth, two practicable breaches were completed, one in the *fausse braie*, the other in the main wall, and preparations immediately made for storming them, though the sap had not been brought to the crest of the glacis, and the counterscarp of the ditch was still entire.

Jan. 19.

The attack of the main breach was committed to the division of General Picton, consisting of the brigades of Major-General Mackinnon, and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell. The column was to be preceded by a storming-party, consisting of the light companies of the division under Ma-

CHAP.VII. jor Manners of the seventy-fourth; and, to divert the attention of the garrison, a demonstration was to be made on the right by Lieutenant-Colonel O'Toole, with five companies of the ninety-fifth rifle corps, and the light companies of the eighty-third and ninety-fourth.

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The light division, consisting of the brigades of Major-General Vandeleur and Colonel Barnard, was directed to assault the smaller breach, headed by a storming party of three hundred men, led by Major Napier of the fifty-second regiment.

General Pack was instructed to make a false attack with his brigade on the outwork of St. Iago, and the convent of La Caridada, with instructions to convert it into a real one, should circumstances prove favourable.

Jan. 19. Soon after dark, on the nineteenth, the troops were under arms, and at seven o'clock advanced to the assault. In order to facilitate the advance of the main storming party, under General Mackinnon, and remove such impediments as the enemy might oppose to their ascent of the main breach, Colonel Campbell, with the ninety-fourth regiment, and second battalion of the fifth, which had been placed as near as possible to the

town, descended the counterscarp, by means of ropes, and moved silently to the breach, which they succeeded in reaching without discovery. Not meeting with any serious obstacle to retard their progress, and aware of the danger of delay at such a crisis, Colonel Campbell, on his own responsibility, formed the daring resolution of storming the town, though such an attempt was not warranted by his orders. At this moment he could only avail himself of the battalion of the fifth, and the right wing of the ninety-fourth, but placing himself at their head, he instantly commenced ascending the breach.

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The enemy were now on the alert; and Colonel Campbell had nearly reached the summit of the breach, when he distinctly heard the enemy's artillery men receive orders to fire. With great promptitude he instantly ordered the men to throw themselves flat on their faces. No sooner had this been done than a shower of shot and shells swept over them; and the troops, springing to their feet, again poured onward, and in a few moments the breach was cleared.

In endeavouring to reach the ramparts on the right, an unexpected obstacle occurred. The enemy had cut a wide ditch between the breach

CHAP.VII. and the ramparts; but here one of those fortunate incidents occurred, on which the most important events frequently depend. Across the ditch two planks had been placed by the enemy, and in the confusion of their retreat, they had removed one of them, but neglected the other. Along this temporary bridge the troops passed to the ramparts on the right, driving the artillery men from the guns, and carrying every thing before them.

New difficulties, however, soon presented themselves. The storming party, under General Mackinnon, had not yet appeared; and the garrison, recovering from their panic, made a powerful attack on their assailants. Under these circumstances Colonel Campbell ordered a volley, and then charging at the head of his detachment, the French immediately fled, throwing down their arms. Such had been the celerity of Colonel Campbell's movements, that when on the ramparts, his men were fired at by the light troops from without the town, who were ignorant of its having been already stormed.*

* That the fifth and ninety-fourth regiments had entered by the breach before General Mackinnon's brigade came up, is not gen-

CHAP.VII. It was at this period that the column of General Mackinnon commenced its attack. It was received by a shower of grape and musquetry, which did great execution; but the troops pressing onwards, succeeded in clearing the breach. Unfortunately an expense magazine, on the rampart, accidentally caught fire, and General Mackinnon and many of his followers were killed by the explosion. Notwithstanding this misfortune, and a destructive fire kept up by the garrison from behind an interior retrenchment, the assailants maintained their ground, till the troops which had already entered came to their assistance, when the enemy gave way.

In the meanwhile, General Vandeleur's brigade of the light division, which had formed behind the convent in the suburb, nearly opposite to the lesser breach, advanced at the appointed moment to the assault. General Crawford—than whom the service boasted no more zealous and accomplished officer—received his death wound on the glacis while leading on his division; and General Vandeleur, Colonel Col-

erally known. The fact is in perfect accordance with the account given in the despatch of Lord Wellington, though not with the minuter details of Lord Londonderry or Colonel Jones.

CHAP. VII. burne, and Major George Napier, who led
 1812. the storming party, were likewise wounded.
 January. The courage of the soldiers, however, was not
 daunted. Notwithstanding the tremendous fire
 by which they were assailed, the column continu-
 ed its advance. The breach was carried in spite
 of every obstacle; and the troops having hastily
 formed, swept round the ramparts to the larger
 breach.

The column of General Pack had likewise been
 successful in their escalade, and the town was
 carried at all points. The garrison fled in confu-
 sion, throwing away their arms, and the whole
 of the survivors were made prisoners.

This successful achievement was followed by
 the usual scenes of riot and excess. The men,
 no longer amenable to discipline, ransacked
 the houses in search of plunder. The cellars
 were broken open and emptied of their contents;
 many houses were wantonly set on fire; and the
 yells of brutal triumph uttered by the intoxicat-
 ed soldiers, were heard in wild dissonance with
 the screams of the wounded. Thus passed the
 night. In the morning, by the exertions of the
 officers, discipline was partially restored. The
 soldiers by degrees returned to their duty, and

the blind appetites of their brutal nature became
 again subjected to moral restraint. CHAP. VII.

The loss of the allies in the siege and storm-
 ing of Ciudad Rodrigo, was considerable, though
 not more than might have been anticipated in
 such an operation. It amounted to one thou-
 sand three hundred and ten men in killed and
 wounded. Of the garrison one thousand seven
 hundred were made prisoners, and their loss in
 killed and wounded was estimated at a thousand.
 In the town were found a battering train of
 forty-four pieces, an immense quantity of ammuni-
 tion, several thousand stand of arms, and con-
 siderable stores of provisions.

The reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, was un-
 questionably an operation of great brilliance.
 It was effected in the depth of winter, with a
 rapidity for which Marmont was altogether un-
 prepared. The following are extracts from his
 reports to Berthier:—"I had collected five di-
 visions for the purpose of throwing supplies in-
 to Ciudad Rodrigo; but this force is now in-
 adequate to the object. I am, therefore, under
 the necessity of recalling two divisions from the
 army of the north. I shall then have above
 sixty thousand men, with whom I shall march

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 January.

CHAP. VII. against the enemy. You may expect events as

1812. fortunate as glorious for the French army."

January.

Thus did Marshal Marmont write on the sixteenth of January. On the twentieth, he is forced to record the failure of his hopes. "On the sixteenth, the English batteries opened their fire at a great distance. On the nineteenth, the place was taken by storm, and fell into the power of the enemy. There is something so *incomprehensible* in this, that I allow myself no observation. I am not yet provided with the requisite information." The warmest admirer of Lord Wellington, need desire no more honourable testimony to his skill, activity, and boldness, than is afforded by these extracts.

The Spanish government and nation were not slow in expressing their gratitude for the signal service which had been rendered to their cause. *Te Deum* was sung in the churches of Cadiz; a vote of thanks to Lord Wellington passed by acclamation in the Cortes; and, as a permanent memorial of Spanish gratitude, they conferred on him the dignity of a grandee of the first class, with the title of Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Nor were his own government and country more backward in manifesting their deep sense

of so splendid an achievement. It raised the

confidence of the people in their army and its leader. Lord Wellington, with the approbation of all classes, was raised to the dignity of an Earl of the United Kingdom; and the Parliament, besides a vote of thanks to the army, annexed to the title an annuity of two thousand pounds a year, as a testimony of the national gratitude.

It might have been expected that the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo would have animated the Spanish people into measures of vigour and activity. It had not this effect. Throughout the whole provinces, with the exception of Catalonia, there was an utter absence of energy; no advantage was taken of the opportunities afforded of combined and efficacious exertion. In the north, Dorsenne had been compelled to evacuate the Asturias and part of Leon, to collect forces for the succour of Ciudad Rodrigo. The retreat was precipitate, yet the Spaniards took no advantage of it. Galicia had long been freed from the presence of an enemy, yet what had the inhabitants of that province done for the liberation of their country? Had a strong Gallician army been in the field, it would have become im-

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CHAP. VII. possible for Dorsenne to have joined Marmont, and the whole scheme of the enemy's operations might at once have been overthrown. But Galicia did nothing. Her liberation had not been the signal of energetic preparation, but of inaction; and the sole fruit of her patriotism had been the collection of a force of ten thousand men, perhaps worse disciplined and provided than any other force in the Peninsula.

In Catalonia, a better spirit prevailed under circumstances of disadvantage immeasurably greater. A long succession of misfortune had raised instead of depressing the energies of the people. If, by the atrocities of Tarragona, Suchet hoped to quell the gallant Catalans into submission, he was deceived. If the spirit of patriotism and revenge, which glowed within them, could have been quenched by the most profuse outpouring of blood, it would long have ceased to burn. But this was not so. The Catalans, in undiminished numbers, continued to flock to the standard of their country, ready to peril all for the vindication of their freedom; and in spite of the vindictive and disgraceful cruelty with which they had been persecuted, Catalonia was still in arms.

During the siege of Valencia, General Lacy, who had succeeded Campoverde in the command of the Catalan army, took advantage of the moment to make an attempt on Tarragona, assisted by a British squadron then cruising in that quarter.

Having drawn together a force of ten thousand Miquelets and regulars, Lacy accordingly advanced to blockade Tarragona. On receiving intelligence of this movement, General Decaen despatched a division under Maurice Mathieu, to raise the blockade, and bring Lacy to battle. Having been joined on his march by a detachment of three thousand men from Barcelona, the force of the two armies was nearly equal. On the twenty-second of January, the French arrived at Villa Franca, and in order to deceive Lacy with regard to the amount of his force, the troops were brought up, not in a body, but in successive detachments.

This stratagem was successful. Lacy, imagining he had only to deal with a brigade, raised the blockade to give battle. He was attacked on the twenty-fourth, on the heights of Altafulla, and after a severe contest, in which victory long wavered between the armies, was

CHAP. VII. compelled to retreat through the mountains towards Cervera, with the loss of his artillery.

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While Maurice Mathieu was thus employed in raising the siege of Tarragona, Decaen manoeuvred against the forces under Sarsfield and Rovira, in the direction of Vich and Manresa. A desultory and irregular warfare ensued, in which the native troops, from their activity and knowledge of the country, had generally the advantage.

Marshal Suchet was not slow in taking advantage of that brilliant train of success which had hitherto marked his progress, to push his conquests still further. He gained possession of Guardia, Denia, Alzira, and St. Felipe; and from the Pyrenees to the gates of Alicante Peniscola was the only fortified place in possession of the Spaniards.

Shortly after the fall of Valencia, General Montbrun, with three divisions of the army of Portugal, arrived at Almanza, and anxious to signalize his zeal, he marched to Alicante, in hope of intimidating the governor into a surrender of the city. This enterprise, which was undertaken in opposition to the opinion of Marshal Suchet, failed. The governor at once re-

jected the proposals of Montbrun; and that officer, having thrown a few shells into the town, found it necessary to retreat, and shortly afterwards rejoined the army of Marmont.

1812.
January.

Suchet then detached a division of his army under General Severoli, to commence operations against the fort of Peniscola. Peniscola is a place of great strength, built on an isolated rock, jutting out into the sea, and connected with the mainland by a narrow isthmus. The garrison was commanded by General Navarro, and consisted of a thousand men. On the twenty-eighth of January, the French batteries opened fire, and on the fourth of February, the governor disgracefully capitulated. So lost to shame was this man, that he even made a merit with Severoli of his cowardice. At the moment of surrender, he boasted of having means of resistance for two months, and of having refused to admit the English, who wished to lend aid to the garrison. In Peniscola, the enemy gained possession of sixty-six guns, and large stores of provision and ammunition.

Feb. 4.

In the south, some partial successes were achieved. On the sixteenth of February, Balasteros attacked the French General Maransin,

Feb. 16.

CHAP. VII. near Cartama, with a force of about three thousand men. The numbers on both sides were nearly equal, but the Spaniards had the advantage of ground; and Ballasteros, concentrating his choicest troops, made a furious attack on the left of Maransin, and drove back that part of the line. The conflict was extremely obstinate, and lasted for three hours. At length, the French fled in confusion, and were pursued as far as Malaga.

1812.

February.

CHAPTER VIII.

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF BADAJOS—ATTACK
ON ALMARAZ.

ON the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wellington took immediate measures to repair the works, and put the fortress in a defensible state. Having effected this, and supplied the place with the requisite stores of provisions, he placed it under command of a Spanish governor, and returned to Frenada.

CHAP. VIII

1812.

February.

He then determined on the bold project of throwing his army with suddenness and secrecy across the Tagus, and reducing Badajos before Soult and Marmont should be able to take effective measures for its relief. At this period there were none of the enemy's troops in Estramadura, except a part of the fifth corps at Villa Franca, and a division under General Darican at La Serena. But Marshal Soult could readily concentrate

CHAP. VIII. a force of forty thousand men, while that of

1812.
February.

Marmont was yet more considerable. Should these armies unite, it would be impossible to effect any thing, in face of numbers so utterly overwhelming.

The success of the enterprise, therefore, depended on secrecy and rapidity of movement, and every means were adopted by Lord Wellington to conceal his intentions from the enemy till the last moment. With this view, the artillery for the siege was embarked in large vessels at Lisbon, for a fictitious destination, and subsequently transhipped at sea into small craft, by which it was conveyed up the river Sadao to Alcacerdo Sal. From thence it was conveyed in carriages across the Alentejo to Badajos, by a route towards which it was not probable that the suspicions of the enemy would be directed.

In all the details of preparation the same prudent caution was observed; and at length the arrangements being completed, the army on the sixth of March broke up from its quarters, and moving rapidly to the south, reached Elvas on the eleventh. One division only, covered by a few cavalry posts, remained on the Agueda.

Mar. 16. On the sixteenth of March, the army crossed

the Guadiana, and Badajos was immediately CHAP. VIII.
invested by the third, fourth, and light divisions,

1812.
March.

under command of Marshal Beresford and General Picton. Sir Thomas Graham, with the first, sixth, and seventh divisions of infantry, and General Slade's and General Le Marchant's brigades of cavalry, advanced to Los Santos, Zafra, and Llerena; and Sir Rowland Hill, with the second division, and the Portuguese division of General Hamilton, and one brigade of cavalry, moved from his cantonments near Albuquerque to Almandrelejo and Merida.

General Dronet, part of whose corps was stationed at Villa Franca, finding himself thus threatened in front and flank, immediately fell back to Hornachos.

In the meantime the siege went on. On the seventeenth, the weather, which had hitherto been remarkably fine, became cold and tempestuous. During the afternoon, and throughout the night, the rain fell in torrents; and taking advantage of the obscurity, ground was broken within one hundred and sixty yards of Fort Picurina, undiscovered by the enemy.

During the eighteenth, in spite of the elements, the troops persevered in their labours in

Mar. 18.

CHAP. VIII the trenches. A heavy cannonade was kept up
1812. from the town, but with little effect.

March.

On the nineteenth, the rain continued with increased violence. The troops were without shelter of any kind, and the duties of the siege were uncommonly severe. In the evening, a spirited sortie was made by the garrison, in which Colonel Fletcher, the commanding engineer, was wounded. They were speedily charged back into the town by the brigade of General Bowes; after which, the troops resumed their labours, and continued to persevere in spite of every obstacle. The loss on this occasion, amounted to one hundred and twenty men in killed and wounded.

Mar. 21.

During the night of the twenty-first, the bridge across the Guadiana was carried away by a sudden swell of the river. Owing to this misfortune, great difficulties occurred in bringing up the supplies necessary for the troops. The only communication was by a flying bridge, which could only be worked with great difficulty, and the quantity of provisions thus procured, was found so utterly inadequate to the demand, that the most serious consequences were apprehended.

There were likewise other impediments to be CHAP. VIII
overcome. The trenches on the low ground
1812. were flooded, and the earth became saturated
March. with moisture. To palliate this evil, double working parties were employed in the trenches. Some with buckets baling out the water, while others pushed forward the works. By these extraordinary exertions, favoured by a change of weather, several batteries were completed on the twenty-fourth, and, on the following day, opened fire on Fort Picurina, which Lord Wellington determined to carry by immediate assault.

Mar. 24.

The attack was made by five hundred men of the third division, formed into three detachments. The right, under command of Major Shaw of the seventy-fourth; the centre, under the Honourable Captain Powis of the eighty-third; and the left, under Major Rudd of the seventy-seventh. Two of these columns advanced from the flanks of the parallel, and attacked the work in its gorge, while the third, consisting of one hundred men, under Captain Powis, escaladed the front, at a point where the palisades had been much injured by the fire of the batteries.

Mar. 25.

The latter soon succeeded in effecting an en-

CHAP. VIII trance, and a short but violent contest ensued.

1812.
March.

The assailants and defenders were mingled in a confused *melee*, and the issue was yet undecided, when the two columns, which had attacked the work by the gorge, having succeeded, though with great difficulty, in effecting an entrance, appeared to the assistance of their comrades. This at once decided the issue of the attack. Of the garrison, consisting of two hundred and fifty men, one officer and thirty-three men alone escaped. The commander, three officers, and eighty-six men were made prisoners, and the remainder were either killed in the fort, or drowned in attempting to cross the inundation of the Rivillas. All the leading officers of the attacking columns were killed or wounded, and the total loss on the part of the besiegers exceeded two hundred men.

While the contest was going on in the fort the alarm bell was rung in the town, fire balls were thrown up in all directions, and a random fire of cannon and musquetry, was opened from every part of the ramparts. At the same time, a battalion of the garrison made a sortie from the ravelin St. Roque, but they were instantly driven back, by the detachment stationed to pro-

tect the attack. Throughout the night, a heavy fire was kept up on the fort, which did little execution.

1812.
March.

By the capture of Picurina, the besiegers were enabled to establish their second parallel with little loss; and, on the night of the twenty-sixth, two breaching batteries opened fire, within three hundred yards of the body of the place. On the thirtieth, the fifth division under General Leith, which Lord Wellington had deemed it necessary to withdraw from Beira, arrived at Elvas, and joined the camp before Badajoz.

Mar. 26.

Mar. 30.

It was now known that Soult, with his whole disposable force, was advancing to the relief of the place; and that Generals Graham and Hill—the former of whom had pushed on to Llerena—were retreating on Albuera. In the north, Marmont having collected his forces, took advantage of the absence of the allied army to cross the frontier; and masking Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, marched by Sabugal upon Guarda and Castello Branco, plundering the country as far as Covilhao in the Sierra de Estrella. The allied cavalry, which had been left to observe his motions, retreated towards the Tagus; and

CHAP.VIII a considerable body of militia, under Generals

1812. Trant and Wilson, fell back on Celorico.

April.

Apr. 6.

Under these circumstances, the operations of the siege were pushed on, if possible, with increased rapidity; and, on the sixth of April, three extensive breaches having become practicable, orders were immediately issued for the assault. The plan of attack was as follows:—

General Picton, with the third division, was to make an attempt on the castle by escalade.

The fourth and light divisions, under Major-General Colville and Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard, were to storm the breaches in the bastions of La Trinidad and Santa Maria, and in the connecting curtain.

General Leith, with the fifth division, was to escalade the rampart near the western gate; and the left brigade, under Major-General Walker, was to make a false attack on Fort Pardaleras, which he was to turn into a real attack should circumstances prove favourable.

Brigadier-General Power, with his Portuguese brigade, was to threaten the *tête-du-pont*, and the other works on the right of the Guadiana.

At ten o'clock, on the night of the sixth, Gen-CHAP.VIII
eral Colville and Colonel Barnard moved out of
the trenches, and led on their divisions to the
assault. On reaching the glacis they were dis-
covered by the garrison; and instantly a tremen-
dous fire opened. Though the carnage in the
ranks was very great, the troops continued their
advance, and entered the covered way at the
points where the palisades had been destroyed
by the batteries. The ladders were then fixed
down the counterscarp, and the descent into the
ditch was quickly effected.

1812.
April.

Though the formation of the troops was necessarily broken in these operations, they immediately advanced against the breaches, and soon succeeded in gaining the ascent; but such were the obstacles prepared by the enemy, that it was found impossible to surmount them. Not only had the summits of the breaches been obstructed by chevaux-de-frize, but deep and wide trenches had been dug, in the bottom of which were planted iron spikes, and the whole of the surrounding buildings were casemated and occupied by light infantry. To overcome these obstacles, many gallant but unsuccessful attempts were made by the troops; but after persevering with

CHAP.VIII
1812.
April. a courage impossible to be surpassed, they were at length compelled to retire. The attack was again renewed, but without more favourable issue; and nearly all the superior officers being disabled, the troops were withdrawn to prepare for fresh efforts when the day should dawn.

In the meanwhile, the third division, led by General Kempt, and commanded by General Picton, advanced to escalade the castle; and on approaching the Rivillas, were received by a heavy fire from all the works to the eastward of the town. They speedily descended into the ditch, and planted their ladders. These, unfortunately, were found too short, and did not reach within four feet of the summit of the rampart. This obstacle, though not insuperable, materially diminished the rapidity of the ascent, and kept the troops longer exposed to a destructive fire than would otherwise have been necessary. Showers of grenades, stones, and rafters of wood, were likewise poured down on them by the enemy, and the slaughter was very great. General Picton and General Kempt were carried from the field severely wounded, and the command of the division devolved on Colonel Campbell of the ninety-fourth. Under this offi-

cer, the attack lost nothing of its energy. The CHAP.VIII
troops, anxious to escape from the dreadful fire to which they were exposed in the ditch, eagerly mounted the ladders, and as they reached the summit, formed on the rampart. A short struggle then ensued,—and in a few minutes the division were in possession of the castle.

1812.
April. Soon afterwards, the brigade of General Walker, after forcing the barrier on the road to Olivença, succeeded in entering the town by escalade. Before this was effected, several of the ladders broke, and General Walker was disabled by a severe wound. The troops, however, persevered in the assault with a spirit and gallantry which drew the applause of Lord Wellington, who witnessed their efforts from a small eminence near the trenches, from whence he directed the whole movements of attack. The brigade of General Walker then advancing by the ramparts, attacked in rear the troops posted for defence of the breaches, and immediately dispersed them.

No sooner did Lord Wellington receive intelligence of the success of the third and fifth divisions, than he directed the fourth and light divisions again to advance on the breaches; and

CHAP.VIII fresh troops being thrown into the town, all resistance ceased on the part of the garrison. 1812. General Philippon and his staff, with about four April. hundred men, escaped across the river to Fort St. Christoval, and shortly afterwards surrendered.

The whole of the garrison, amounting nearly to four thousand, were made prisoners. A considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, one hundred and seventy-two pieces of artillery, and more than eighty thousand shot, were found in the place. The expenditure of life, on the part of the allies, during this extraordinary siege, was very great: by the returns, the number of killed and wounded amounted to nearly five thousand.

Considering the boldness of the effort and the magnitude of the obstacles to be overcome, the capture of Badajos is one of those events in our annals, of which Englishmen may well feel proud. "Never, probably," says Colonel Jones, "since the discovery of gunpowder, were men more exposed to its action than those assembled in the ditch to assault the breaches. Many thousand shells and hand-grenades, numerous bags filled with powder, every kind of burning composition and destruc-

tive missile, had been prepared and placed along CHAP.VIII the parapet of the whole front; these, under an incessant roll of musquetry, were hurled into the ditch without intermission for upwards of two hours, giving to its surface an appearance of vomiting fire, and producing sudden flashes of light more vivid than the day. Description, however, conveys but a faint idea of the imposing nature of such a mode of defence. The doors of success were certainly thrown open; but they were so vigilantly guarded, the approach to them was so strewn with difficulties, and the scene altogether so appalling, that instead of its being a disparagement to the troops to have failed in forcing through them, is it not rather a subject for pride and exultation that they had firmness to persevere in the attempt till recalled?"

The fall of Badajos took the French generals even more by surprise than that of Ciudad Rodrigo. General Lery, engineer in chief to the army of the south, wrote to General Kellerman respecting it in the following terms: "The fall of Badajos cost me eight engineers. I am not yet acquainted with the details of that fatal event. Never was there a place in a better state, better

CHAP.VIII supplied, or better provided with the requisite
 1812. number of troops. There is in that event a
 April. marked fatality. I confess my inability to account for its inadequate defence. Very extensive works have been constructed. *All our calculations have been disappointed.* The army of Portugal withdrew to a greater distance from us when it should have drawn nearer; and thus Lord Wellington has taken the place as it were in presence of two armies, amounting together to about eighty thousand men. This is the consequence of the want of a supreme chief. In short, I think the capture of Badajos *a very extraordinary event*; and I should be much at a loss to account for it in any manner consistent with probability."

The truth is, that had Soult and Marmont profited by the lesson taught them at Rodrigo, and displayed that energy and activity which the crisis demanded, it seems more than probable that Lord Wellington would have been defeated in his object. Notwithstanding the

Relation des sieges et
 Defences de siege of Badajos were conducted, Soult was not
 Olivença et
 de Badajos. taken by surprise. The Governor, General Philippon, was too shrewd an observer, not to

read aright the signs of the time; and he no CHAP.VIII
 1812. sooner learned that the troops in Elvas were employed in the construction of fascines and gabions, than he apprised Soult that the allies were certainly on the eve of besieging Badajos. At all events, from the moment he became aware that Lord Wellington's army had crossed the Tagus, Soult had, and could have no doubt of the proximate and immediate object of this movement. In such a state of things, that he did not immediately concentrate his forces and march to the relief of Badajos, must be attributed to a gross blunder in calculation. On the seventeenth or eighteenth of March, he must have been aware of the arrival of Lord Wellington at Elvas. A week was sufficient to have enabled him to concentrate at Seville an army of forty thousand men; and at the head of this force he might have reached Albuera on the third or fourth of April.

Instead of this, Soult appears at this important juncture to have been unaccountably bereft of that energy and activity which eminently distinguished him. He was slow and dilatory in his movements; he did not conceive that Lord Wellington would have pushed the siege with

CHAP.VIII such unusual vigour and rapidity; and relying
1812. on the skill of the Governor, and the courage of the garrison, he calculated on a protracted defence. It was not till the eighth of April, that he reached Villa Franca, where he received the mortifying intelligence of the fall of that fortress, which, by greater rapidity of movement, he might have relieved. Nothing then remained, but to retrace his steps to Seville.

But if Soult be thus open to censure, what shall be said of Marmont? That leader had a high game before him. Had he with one half of his army laid siege to Ciudad Rodrigo, and with the other marched rapidly to Merida by Almaraz, and formed a junction with Soult, he might have repaired the past, and prevented the future disasters of the campaign. On the tenth of March, the allied army was in full march for the south, and in the course of a week from that period, Marmont might have been on the Agueda. He did not arrive there till the twenty-fifth, and was then satisfied with ravaging Lower Beira, and a few piddling advantages gained over the militia. It was impossible that any important consequence could result from his advance to Castello Branco. The movement excited no alarm in

Lord Wellington, who continued his operations CHAP.VIII
against Badajos, in the certain conviction, that, 1812. on its fall, Marmont must instantly retire before him.

The only plea by which Marmont can be acquitted of flagrant incapacity, is, that he was actuated by jealousy of Soult. That such was the case is far from improbable. The French leaders in Spain, were each intrusted with a separate and distinct sphere of independent command, and receiving their instructions from Paris, were jealous of interference on the part of those who solicited assistance which they were not specially directed to afford. This feeling was perhaps aided by a sentiment of rivalry, which occasioned a want of zeal and cordiality in their combined movements. At all events, had Soult been joined, as he might have been, by twenty thousand of the army of Portugal, on the second or third of April, it is not too much to assert, that the allied army would have been forced to relinquish the siege, and march with all speed to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo. In the movements of the French armies at this period, there is a laxity and tardiness in remarkable discordance with the necessity of the crisis. Lord Well-

CHAP.VIII ton, on the other hand, was ever watchful and
 1812. alert, and in deciding on the bold and brilliant
 April. enterprises which marked this campaign, he may
 be supposed to have been influenced less by the
 abstract chances of success, than by those chances
 taken in conjunction with his observations on the
 qualities of his opponents. That these calcula-
 tions were sound, the event proved.

Soult, on receiving intelligence of the fall of
 Badajos, immediately retraced his steps to Se-
 ville, followed by the cavalry under Sir Staple-
 Apr. 11. ton Cotton. On the evening of the eleventh,
 the brigades of Generals Anson and Le Mar-
 chant; succeeded in coming up with his rear-guard
 at Villa Garcia. General Le Marchant immedi-
 ately charged in gallant style, and drove the ene-
 my in the utmost confusion to Llerena. In this
 engagement, upwards of one hundred and thirty
 of the enemy were made prisoners. On the
 same day, Soult continued his retreat to Seville,
 and General Drouet likewise falling back to
 Fuente Ovejuna, the province of Estramadura
 was thus entirely freed from the presence of
 the enemy.

In the meantime, the Conde de Penne Villemur,
 with some thousand men, left the county of

CHAP.VIII Niebla, and approached Seville on the fifth of
 April. He had several skirmishes with the gar-
 rison, and forced them to retire within their
 works; but the smallness of his force prevent-
 ed him from undertaking any thing of impor-
 tance.

Unfortunately, there existed no unity of ac-
 tion or purpose between the Spanish leaders and
 their allies. Had Ballasteros joined Villemur in
 attacking Seville, it is probable the inhabitants, in-
 fluenced by the appearance of such a force, would
 have risen on the garrison, composed chiefly of
 invalids, and the city would have been taken.
 Such a blow must have been most disastrous to
 the French army. Even had the place been
 abandoned on the approach of Soult, time would
 still have been afforded to remove or destroy
 the immense magazines which the enemy had
 collected in the city.

In the north, the Guerilla warfare was waged
 with increased vigour. Merino, a bold enter-
 Apr. 16. prising chief, suddenly attacked a considerable
 body of the enemy near Aranda, and made up-
 wards of five hundred prisoners. This success
 enabled him to make a just, though severe re-
 taliation for the execution of three members of

CHAP.VIII the Junta of Burgos, and of some of Merino's
 1812. soldiers who had fallen into his hands. The
 April. prisoners immediately suffered in the proportion
 of twenty for each member of the Junta, and
 of ten for each soldier. This act of retribution
 was accompanied by a declaration, that similiar
 measures would be resorted to, on every re-
 newal of the enemy's atrocities.

The Empecinado, Mina, and Sanchez, were
 likewise in full activity, and continued to occa-
 sion great losses to the enemy. General Abadia,
 with the Gallician army, advanced into Leon,
 but retreated on the approach of the enemy.
 The Asturias was occupied by General Bonnet,
 with his head-quarters at Oviedo.

After the fall of Badajos the allied army
 was put in motion for the north; and the corps
 of General Hill alone remained on the south of
 the Tagus, taking post in the neighbourhood of
 Merida. Marmont, who, during the siege of
 Badajos, had pushed on to Sabugal and Castello
 Branco, was no sooner informed of Lord Wel-
 lington's approach than he retired hastily to Ci-
 dad Rodrigo, and, raising the blockade of that
 place, fell back on Salamanca. Head-quarters
 were then established at Fuente Guinaldo, and

the army went into cantonments between the CHAP.VIII
 Agueda and the Coa.

Lord Wellington then prepared to prosecute
 the ulterior objects of the campaign. He deter-
 mined to transfer the seat of war from the fron-
 tier to the interior provinces of Spain; but, in
 order to prevent the junction of the French
 armies, he deemed it necessary, as a preliminary
 measure, to gain possession of Almaraz, where
 the enemy had a bridge of boats across the Ta-
 gus. As all the permanent bridges had been
 destroyed, Almaraz was, in truth, the only line
 of communication below Toledo, between the
 armies on the north and south of the Tagus;
 and the enemy, aware of the importance of this
 bridge, had thrown up works on each side of
 the river for its protection, while the castle and
 redoubt of Mirabete, about a league distant, con-
 tributed to its security. Upon the southern bank
 of the river, the bridge was defended by a *tête-
 du-pont*, and a strong field-work, called Fort
 Napoleon, on a commanding height. On the
 opposite side was another called Fort Ragusa,
 of very considerable strength. These works
 were garrisoned by about one thousand men,
 with eighteen guns.

CHAP.VIII Lord Wellington directed Sir Rowland Hill
 1812. to move forward with his corps, and gain pos-
 May. session of this important post. Accordingly, on
 the twelfth of May, Sir Rowland Hill broke up
 from Almandrelejo, with his little army, and on
 May 16. the sixteenth reached Xaraicejo. At night he
 continued his advance, having formed his troops
 into three columns.

Great obstruction, however, was experienced
 from the badness of the roads, and it was found
 impossible for the troops to arrive at their several
 May 17. points of destination before daybreak. Sir
 Rowland Hill, therefore, perceiving there was
 no longer a chance of taking the enemy by sur-
 prise, gave orders to halt in a mountain range
 about five miles distant from Almaraz, and the
 attack was delayed till the morning of the nine-
 teenth.

In the meanwhile, the enemy were discovered
 to have raised so formidable a barrier, on the only
 road by which artillery could be brought from the
 south, against the works of the bridge, that Sir
 Rowland Hill determined to leave his guns, and
 proceed by a mountain track leading through the
 village of Romangordo. Accordingly, about ten
 May 18. o'clock on the night of the eighteenth, General

Howard's brigade, and the sixth Portuguese regi- CHAP.VIII
 ment of the line, descended into the plain by a
 1812. most difficult and narrow path, which, in many
 May. places, did not admit the passage of more than
 one file at a time. By daybreak the head of this
 May 19. column had arrived within a few hundred yards
 of Fort Napoleon; but such had been the mag-
 nitude of the obstacles encountered, that several
 hours elapsed before the rear came up. The or-
 der for attack was then given, and the troops,
 advancing from a ravine by which they had
 hitherto been concealed, rushed on to the as-
 sult. General Howard had formed his detach-
 ment into three columns: one, consisting chiefly
 of Portuguese, remained in reserve; another,
 composed of the fiftieth and one wing of the
 seventy-first regiment, directed their efforts a-
 gainst Fort Napoleon. The ninety-second and
 the other wing of the seventy-first, formed the
 third, which was ordered to storm the *tête-du-*
pont and Fort Ragusa, at the same time that the
 attack was made on Fort Napoleon.

The column, destined for the attack of the
 fort, was no sooner discerned than the garri-
 son, aware of the vicinity of an enemy, from a
 feint which had been made early in the morning

CHAP.VIII on the works of Mirabete, poured in a vehement and destructive fire, which did not succeed in checking the progress of the assailants. The ladders were soon planted; the troops gained the parapet, and in less than ten minutes the fort was carried.

1812.
May.

Thus driven from the fort, the garrison endeavoured to cross the river, pursued by the British, who entered the *tête-du-pont pêle mêle* with the fugitives. There all hope of escape was unexpectedly cut off. The officer commanding in Fort Ragusa, alarmed at the approaching danger, had cut the bridge, and the whole of the garrison on the southern bank were under the necessity of submitting as prisoners of war.

Intimidated by this success, Fort Ragusa was abandoned without even an effort at resistance, and the whole of the enemy's stores, which were very considerable, fell into possession of the victors. The loss sustained by the allies in these operations amounted only to one hundred and seventy-seven in killed and wounded. Of the enemy two hundred and fifty-nine were made prisoners. The works, the bridge, the cannon, and all the stores which could not be conveni-

ently removed, were immediately destroyed; and on the day following Sir Rowland Hill set out on his return.

1812.
May.

Marmont no sooner received intelligence of the march of General Hill than he broke up from Salamanca, and put his army in motion towards the Tagus. Drouet, also, made some movements which indicated an intention of intercepting his retreat; but on learning that General Hill had reached Truxillo on the twenty-first, he retired into Cordova.

In regarding the operations of the present period of the war, nothing is more remarkable than the glaring miscalculations of the French generals, in regard to the activity and enterprise of their enemy. They continually put their armies in motion to relieve fortresses which had already fallen. The English, they had brought themselves to believe, were slow, cautious, and prudent, most clumsy and elaborate in their operations; and their leader, though not without his tact and talent, was incapable of snatching success by a brilliant infringement of the rules of art. The reverses they had incurred at Oporto, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajos, were considered as isolated and unaccountable misfortunes,

CHAP.VIII arising from temporary contingencies, and in no
1812. degree attributable to the skill and boldness of
their opponent.

Accordingly, Soult and Marmont were never ready at the right moment. There was great bustle and preparation out of season. Marches were followed by countermarches; advances by retreats. Their anticipations of events had almost uniformly been erroneous. They suffered themselves to be robbed piecemeal of advantages which they were in full condition to have retained. Their calculations had been falsified; their hopes baffled. They had not been defeated in any general engagement, but they had been, what was even more mortifying, *out-generated*.

CHAPTER IX.

OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIED ARMY—BATTLE
OF SALAMANCA.

DURING the progress of the events which we
have imperfectly attempted to detail, the seeds
of war, which had been plentifully sown through-
out Europe, were already bursting into blossom.
Implacable in his hostility to England, Napoleon
determined on the gigantic attempt of excluding
her commerce from the whole continent of Eu-
rope. By the treaty of Tilsit, the Emperor
Alexander had acceded to this system of exclu-
sion, which he speedily found to be subversive
of the interests of his empire, and incapable of
being rigidly enforced. Napoleon, however, was
little disposed to modify his policy by the cir-
cumstances or necessities of other nations. He
insisted on a rigorous adherence to that prohibi-
tory system, by which he trusted that the wealth

CHAP. IX.
1812.

CHAP. IX. and resources of England would eventually be
1812. exhausted.

In few undertakings could Napoleon, with the mighty means at his command, be expected to fail. But a war on trade, is, in truth, nothing less than a war on all the habits and propensities of mankind. It is a war unattended by the pride, the pomp, and circumstance of glorious achievement, but one whose sufferings come home with peculiar force to the business and bosoms of all men. It is a war against enjoyment,—against the comforts and luxuries of civilized life, and affecting the interests of every individual, from the monarch to the peasant. The very attempt to enforce such a system as that demanded by Napoleon, was absurd, and followed by a signal failure. In spite of his decrees, British produce circulated by a thousand secret channels into all the markets of Europe.

In Russia, great relaxation took place in the observance of "the continental system." Napoleon, not unwilling, perhaps, to take advantage of a plausible pretext for war with that power, made forcible seizure of the Duchy of Oldenburgh. For a time, it was the policy of Alexander to be quiescent under this injury;

but vigorous preparations were made on both sides, and war at length followed. On the
CHAP. IX.
1812.
May. ninth of May, Napoleon set out from Paris, to place himself at the head of that immense army, by whose approaching victories, Russia was to be humbled to the dust, and his supreme authority established throughout the civilized world.

Hitherto the undivided energies of France had been directed towards the conquest of Spain. That had now sunk into a secondary object, and the contest was about to assume a new character. Henceforth, it was scarcely possible that reinforcements should be poured into Spain, with the extraordinary profusion, which, in time past, had enabled the French leaders, amid multiplied disasters, to maintain their hold on the Peninsula. The prodigal expenditure of life to which they were subjected, could now be less easily repaired; and the hopes of many brave hearts, which, amid the darkness lowering on the cause of freedom, had hitherto but faintly glimmered, now rose into brighter flame.

At this critical juncture, however, the amount of the French forces in the Peninsula was very great. The army of the south, commanded by

CHAP. IX. Marshal Soult, was fifty-eight thousand strong.

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That of Portugal, under Marmont, fifty-five thousand. The army of the north, under command of General Souham, mustered about ten thousand. There were forty thousand commanded by Suchet, in the eastern provinces; and there were about fifteen thousand of the army of the centre, to maintain the security of the capital; forming, in all, the large aggregate of one hundred and seventy thousand men, chiefly veterans, experienced in the nature of the war in which they were engaged.

The army of Lord Wellington had received, since the commencement of the year, considerable reinforcements, and had become more formidable, both in numbers and discipline, than at any former period of the war. The corps of General Hill, who, by the successful attack on Almaraz, had established a communication with all the allied forces throughout the whole province of Spanish Estramadura, consisted of about ten thousand infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry. The force which Lord Wellington could muster for offensive operations on the north of the Tagus, amounted to about forty thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry.

With such a force, Lord Wellington, though fully equal to cope singly with either of the great French armies, could effect nothing in case they should succeed in forming a junction. Before advancing against Marmont, therefore, he took every precaution to prevent the occurrence of an event which could not fail to occasion the necessity of instant retreat. General Hill held Almaraz, and Soult was thus cut off from his only direct communication with the north. To keep Marshal Suchet in check, and fix the attention of the French commanders on Granada and Valencia, a considerable body of troops, from the Sicilian army, were to land at Alicante or some other favourable point on the eastern coast. Soult and Drouet, it was hoped, would then find it necessary to withdraw from the western provinces; and the allies might at length expect to secure the full fruits of their victories.

Assured that the Sicilian troops had sailed, Lord Wellington, having completed the formation of magazines at Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and upon the Douro, at length put his army in motion, and advanced on Salamanca. Marmont fell back on his approach, leaving a garrison of about eight hundred men in some neighbouring

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Jun. 13.

CHAP. IX. forts which commanded the bridge across the Tormes.

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The allied army crossed the Tormes on the seventeenth of June, by the fords above and below Salamanca ; and preparations were immediately made for the reduction of the forts. These works had been constructed on the ruins of different convents, and formed collectively a post of considerable strength, which could only be reduced by regular attack. The siege was conducted by the sixth division, under Major-General Clinton ; while the remainder of the army remained in readiness to oppose the army of Marmont, who still endeavoured to keep up a communication with the forts.

Jun. 19. Ground was broken on the night of the seventeenth, and on the nineteenth the guns opened fire. Unfortunately, the ammunition became exhausted before the breach was rendered practicable, and Lord Wellington determined on an attempt by escalade. In this unfortunate attack, Major-General Bowes and one hundred and twenty men fell. The conduct of this gallant officer had been, on all occasions, conspicuous. In leading on the storming party he received a wound, which was no sooner dressed than he returned

to the post of honour, and died gloriously in the service of his country. The monument of a soldier can bear no prouder epitaph than the record of such facts.

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Jun. 20. On the twentieth, Marmont arrived in front of the position of St. Christoval, and made a strong demonstration with his cavalry in the plain. A pretty warm skirmish was the consequence. They were gallantly charged by the twelfth light dragoons, commanded by Colonel Ponsonby ; and Captain Bull's troop of Horse-artillery was ably manœuvred. The enemy at length retired, leaving twelve horses on the field.

Jun. 21. On the twenty-first, the French shewed themselves in force in the plain in front of St. Christoval. On this occasion, they displayed a force of not less than fifteen thousand men, as if to tempt the British General to descend from his vantage ground, and try the fortune of a battle. This Lord Wellington declined. During the night, however, the enemy established a post on the right flank of the position, from which General Graham was directed to dislodge him. He accordingly advanced with the seventh division,

CHAP. IX. and the enemy were immediately driven from the ground, with considerable loss.

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On the morning of the twenty-third, it was discovered that Marmont had withdrawn his army during the night, and taken a position with his right at Cabeça Velosa, his centre at Aldea Rubea, and his left on the Tormes near Huerta, where he made demonstration of passing a large force across the river. As it was evidently the object of Marmont, in this manœuvre, to communicate with the forts, Lord Wellington, directing a brigade of cavalry to cross the Tormes, changed the front of his army, placing the right at the ford of Santa Martha, and the advanced posts at Aldea Lengua. During the night, Marmont crossed the Tormes with the greater part of his army; but observing that Sir Thomas Graham had likewise passed the river with two divisions, he re-crossed at Huerta, and again took up his former position.

In the meantime, supplies of ammunition having been brought up, on the twenty-sixth the fire on the forts was recommenced. On the twenty-seventh, the buildings in the largest fort, St. Vincente, were in flames; and another fort

being breached, the commander of St. Vincente expressed a desire to capitulate at the expiration of three hours. Lord Wellington, however,

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perceiving that the object of this proposal was to gain time, ordered an immediate assault. The party employed in this service, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Davies of the thirty-sixth regiment, performed it in the most gallant manner. The smaller forts were carried; and the attack on St. Vincente had already commenced, when the Governor sent out a flag, to notify his acceptance of the terms offered by Lord Wellington; and the whole garrisons, in number about seven hundred men, were made prisoners of war.

Jun. 27.

The forts thus captured, were found to be of great strength, the enemy having been engaged for nearly three years in their construction. They were armed with thirty pieces of artillery; and in St. Vincente was found a large quantity of clothing and military stores, which was given to the Spaniards. The whole of the works were immediately destroyed.

The forts had no sooner fallen than Marmont broke up from his position, and retired towards the Douro. During this movement he was closely

CHAP. IX. followed by the allies ; and on the second of July, the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, succeeded in coming up with the rear-guard of the enemy, which they instantly attacked and drove in confusion across the Douro. On the night following, both armies halted in position on opposite sides of the river. That of Marmont occupied a range of high ground, stretching from Pollos to Simancas on the Pisuerga, with the centre posted at Tordesillas, to defend the passage of the Douro. The British took up a line, extending from La Seca to Pollos, and head-quarters were established at Rueda.

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Both Toro and Zamora had been strongly fortified by the French ; and the few other points at which the river could be crossed had likewise been put in a state of defence. Lord Wellington, therefore, considered the enemy's position on the Douro too strong for attack, and both armies remained inactive for about a fortnight, during which period Marmont was joined by General Bonnet, from the Asturias, with a division of eight thousand men.

The march of that General had not been unopposed. The Spanish Generals, Mahy, Barcena, and Porlier, had drawn together a force of from

fifteen to twenty thousand men, with which it was determined to attack him on the march. To avoid this, Bonnet threw himself into the mountains, and by roads of great difficulty, succeeded in reaching Reynosa without encounter, and, afterwards, in joining Marmont on the Douro.

We shall here take leave to offer a few cursory observations on the manœuvres of the hostile armies. The object of Marmont in his advance to the neighbourhood of the position of St. Christoval, was to relieve the forts, which he was well aware could not hold out much longer without assistance, and to take the chances of Lord Wellington's retiring, in case he should think it prudent to decline a general engagement. There can be little doubt that this movement was made under a false notion of the strength of his opponent, for at the period in question, it was in no respect the policy of Marmont to fight a battle. He was in daily expectation of being joined by the division of General Bonnet, and the possession of the northern bank of the Douro, and of all the bridges on that river, gave him a decided advantage over his opponent.

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CHAP. IX. But in proportion as a battle was against the
 1812. interest of Marmont, was it desirable to the
 July. British General. By tacticians of no mean order, therefore, Lord Wellington has been held guilty of an error, in not attacking his opponent on the twenty-third or twenty-fourth of June, when it was certainly in his power to have done so. That the forts of Salamanca had not yet been reduced, cannot be gravely urged as an objection to the measure. A garrison of eight hundred men could be held in check by a battalion; and the whole army were thus disposable for battle. That Lord Wellington could expect a more favourable opportunity of striking a decisive blow, can scarcely be established by any general reasoning on the subject; yet in a few days we find him marching to the Douro, in search of that very adversary who had already been within his grasp on the Tormes.

Once, on the Douro, the advantages of Marmont were very great. He had everywhere formidable positions at command, and the whole bridges and fords were in his possession, and guarded by strong defences. The river, bending in its course, encircled the flanks of the allied army, and it was impossible for Lord Wellington

to anticipate the quarter from which the enemy CHAP. IX.
 might direct his attack. He might be deluded 1812.
 by a false demonstration at one point, while the July.
 real danger was approaching from another. By a single injudicious movement, he was continually liable to be cut off from Salamanca, by the French army being suddenly thrown across the Douro, at some of the numerous salient points formed by the windings of the river on either flank. On the other hand, Marmont, when pressed by the allies, had always a secure retreat open to him by crossing the Douro.

Had Marmont remained in his strong line on the Douro, in all probability the campaign would have terminated without any important result. But Lord Wellington knew it to be impossible that so large an army could long procure subsistence in any one position; and aware that in his rear the Guerilla parties were in constant activity, he waited the moment when the increasing necessities of his army should compel him to a decisive movement.

Marmont, however, having received the expected reinforcements, was little disposed to remain inactive. The army he commanded was

CHAP. IX. composed of veterans, inured to the warfare of the country, and full of confidence in their own discipline and prowess. In manœuvre the French had uniformly proved themselves superior to the troops of every other nation; while the English were proverbially deficient in that alacrity of movement, on which the success of a contest of tactic must generally depend. Marmont, therefore, calculated with confidence on the numerous advantages he enjoyed; and relied on his own skill, and the activity of his troops, to compel Lord Wellington to retreat on Ciudad Rodrigo, or fight a battle under circumstances of disadvantage.

Both armies remained quiet in their positions till the sixteenth of July, when Marmont moved his army to St. Roman, and passed two divisions across the Douro at Toro. Lord Wellington was not deceived by this manœuvre. Making a feint of moving on Toro with part of his army, he took up a strong position on the Guarena, occupying Villaescusa, Fuente la Pena, and Castrejon.

On the night of the sixteenth, the French recrossed the river at Toro, and having blown up

the bridge, marched about ten leagues higher up to Tordesillas. Here, in the course of the day, Marmont passed the Douro with his whole army, and made a forced march on Rueda, Nava del Rey, and Castrejon, of which places he took possession on the morning of the eighteenth, the allies falling back on his approach. During this movement, the right of the army, consisting of General Cole's, and the light division, were for some time in very imminent peril. The enemy attempted to cut off their communication with the centre and left, and it was only by a resolute and successful charge of cavalry, that they were at length extricated from their difficulties.

By a brilliant manœuvre, therefore, Marmont succeeded in establishing his communication with the army of the centre, which was then advancing from Madrid to his support. The position of the allies now extended along the banks of the Guarena, a stream tributary to the Douro, which, near Canizal, separates into four branches, and again unites its waters about a league below it. By thus posting his army, Lord Wellington kept his communications un-

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CHAP. IX. broken; and in case of attack, the advantages of ground were decidedly in his favour. Marmont likewise halted his army in position on the opposite bank of the Guarena.

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Shortly afterwards he pushed a considerable column across the river below the junction of the streams, which attempted to turn the left of the allies, and gain possession of the valley of Canizal, by which it would have been enabled to command the Salamanca road. This attempt was repulsed by the cavalry and General Cole's division. The twenty-seventh and fortieth regiments, supported by a brigade of Portuguese, advanced to the charge with bayonets; and the enemy retreated in confusion, leaving two hundred and forty prisoners in the hands of the victors. In this affair about four hundred of the enemy were killed and wounded. The loss of the allies was more considerable, amounting in all to five hundred and fifty men.

Jul. 18.

On the day following, Marmont withdrew his right, and moved his left forward, making demonstrations against the right of his opponent. Lord Wellington made an instant counter movement. He crossed the upper Guarena at Vallesa and El Olmo, with his whole army, and

every preparation was made for the engagement CHAP. IX. on the following morning.

On the twentieth, however, the enemy were observed still moving to their left along the heights of the Guarena, which they crossed without opposition, and halted for the night with their left at Babilafuente, and their right at Villamula. Lord Wellington, who, during the day, had closely followed the enemy in all his motions, encamped his army at Cabeça Velosa, placing a corps of observation at Aldea Lengua on the Tormes.

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Nothing could be finer or more striking than the spectacle of the hostile armies during the greater part of the march on the twentieth. They moved in parallel lines within half cannon-shot of each other, in the most imposing order and regularity. As the diversities of ground gave either party a temporary advantage, the artillery opened fire; but though both armies were prepared in a moment to form line of battle, no collision took place.

Jul. 20.

On the morning of the twenty-first, the two armies again moved forward in lines nearly parallel towards Huerta, between which place and Alba de Tormes the French army crossed

Jul. 21.

CHAP. IX. the river, leaving only a small body in occupation of the heights of Babilafuente. Marmont then directed his march to the left, threatening the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington immediately moved his army on the bridge of Salamanca, by which it crossed the Tormes in the evening, with the exception of the third division, and the Portuguese cavalry, under General D'Urban, which were left to observe the motions of the body of the enemy still remaining at Babilafuente.

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Jul. 22. Before daylight on the morning of the twenty-second, both armies moved into position. That of the allies extended from the Tormes to two steep and rugged heights, which, from their similarity, the natives generally distinguished by the name of the sister Arapiles. The position of the French was covered by a thick wood, and embraced the heights of La Pena, and the hamlets of Calvarasso de Ariba, and Calvarasso de Abaxo. In the morning a good deal of skirmishing took place. Detachments from both armies endeavoured to seize the Arapiles heights, and the French succeeded in gaining possession of the external and more distant one.

The occupation of one of the Arapiles by the

enemy, occasioned some changes in the position of the allied army. The right was extended *en potence* to the heights behind the village of Arapiles, which was occupied by light infantry; and General Pakenham, with the third division, and Portuguese cavalry, was directed to cross the Tormes, and take post at Aldea Tejada, to lend still farther support to the right flank.

The morning passed in a series of manœuvres on the part of Marmont, from which no conclusion could be drawn with regard to his ultimate intentions. Lord Wellington, therefore, contented himself with keeping an accurate observation on all the movements of his adversary, ready at any moment to assume the offensive, and equally so, should sound policy require it, to retreat.

There can be no doubt that Lord Wellington considered the latter alternative as by far the more probable; and every preparation had been made to carry it into effect. It was unquestionably in Marmont's power, by turning the right of the allied army, to have rendered its position untenable. The baggage and commissariat, therefore, had already quitted Sa-

CHAP. IX. lamanca; and even some of the divisions had commenced a retrogressive movement.

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About two o'clock, however, a sudden and decisive change took place in the character of the enemy's demonstrations. Under cover of a heavy cannonade, and a skirmish along the whole front of his line, Marmont advanced his centre, making at the same time a movement to his left, as if intending to encircle the position of the allied army, and cut them off from the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. His line, thus unduly extended, was necessarily weakened, and the favourable opportunity of attack, thus presented, was immediately seized by Lord Wellington. The following was the disposition of the army at the moment of attack. The first and light divisions were on the left of the Arapiles, and formed the extreme left of the line. The fourth and fifth divisions were posted in a double line, in rear of the village of Arapiles, with the sixth and seventh divisions, and the division of Don Carlos d'Espana in reserve. On the left of the fourth division was the Portuguese brigade of General Pack; on the right of the fifth was that of General Bradford. The third division, with the main body of the cavalry, formed the

extreme right. While these arrangements were in progress, the enemy made repeated attempts to gain possession of the village of Arapiles, occupied by a detachment of the Guards; but no important change took place in their general dispositions. The third division was then ordered to advance obliquely to its right, to turn the left of the position, while General Cole's and General Leith's divisions should attack it in front.

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The arrangements being completed, the third division, led by General Pakenham, moved on to the attack. The division advanced in column of battalions, and was in the act of ascending the ridge occupied by the enemy, when the skirmishers were driven in by a large body of cavalry, who in a moment came sweeping along the brow of the ascent, on the right flank of the division. Fortunately the retreat of the light troops had given intelligence of their approach; and Colonel Campbell of the ninety-fourth, who commanded the brigade, had time to throw back the fifth regiment *en potence*, which, by a well-directed volley, caused them to retreat in disorder.

General Pakenham no sooner crowned the heights on the extreme left of the French, than

CHAP. IX. he formed line across their flank, and supported

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by General D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, and some squadrons of the fourteenth, advanced towards the centre, carrying every thing before him. On every favourable point where they attempted to make a stand, they were charged with the bayonet; and with such vigour did General Pakenham follow up his success, that even the colours of the British regiments were often seen waving over battalions of the enemy. Sir Stapleton Cotton with the cavalry charged the enemy in front, and cut to pieces a brigade of French infantry, though not without sustaining a severe loss in General Le Marchant, who was killed at the head of his brigade. The whole left wing of the enemy was now retreating in confusion, and above three thousand prisoners had been made by the allies.

While the events just narrated were passing on the right of the army, the tide of success had not flowed with equal rapidity in the centre. The repeated attempts of General Pack to gain possession of the Arapiles height occupied by the enemy, were unsuccessful. On the retreat of the Portuguese, a body advanced from the height,

and made a gallant and very vehement attack CHAP. IX.

on the flank of the fourth division, while warmly engaged with the enemy in its front. General Cole had been already wounded, and his division, disconcerted by this sudden attack, was compelled to retire in some confusion. The misfortune, however, was immediately repaired by the advance of a brigade of the fifth division, which, by a change of front, took the enemy in flank, and subjecting them to a cross fire, forced them instantly to retreat. The fourth and fifth divisions then continued to advance, uninterrupted by any further reverse, and gained complete possession of the crest of the position.

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In the meanwhile the Arapiles was carried by General Clinton; and the third division had advanced from the left, along the centre of the French position, attacking and dispersing the enemy in every encounter. Marshal Marmont had been wounded, and the command of the army devolved on General Clausel, who, with great skill and promptitude, now endeavoured to rally his defeated troops in a new position, running nearly at right angles with the original front. The ground was admirably chosen. Either flank of the position was supported by masses of cavalry; and the artillery was so

CHAP. IX. posted as not only to sweep the whole face of the height, but to command all the ground in the vicinity.

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The assumption of so strong a position caused a pause in the movements of the allies. Lord Wellington having examined it, at length directed the fourth division to dislodge the enemy by a flank movement on the left, while General Clinton's division, supported by the third and fifth, should attack it in front. It was in this part of the action that the loss on the part of the allies was most severe. General Clinton's division, during the whole of its advance, was exposed to a most destructive fire of artillery and musquetry, which it sustained with the greatest steadiness, till reaching the summit of the height, it at once charged with the bayonet, and the fourth division coming up, the enemy abandoned the position in great confusion, and fled towards Alba, where he crossed the Tormes. The allied troops continued the pursuit with great vigour till the approach of night, when the darkness and extreme fatigue of the troops, rendered it necessary to halt.*

* But for an unforeseen circumstance, the victory of Salamanca must have been attended with even greater results.

The immediate results of this most splendid victory, were the capture of eleven pieces of artillery, two eagles, and of seven thousand prisoners. Three French Generals (Ferey, Thomieres, and Desgraviers) were killed; Marshal Marmont, Generals Bonnet, Clausel, and Menne, were wounded. The total loss of the enemy cannot be calculated at less than fourteen thousand men.

The number of killed and wounded on the part of the victors, was about five thousand two hundred, including six General officers, one of whom (Le Marchant) was killed, the others (Beresford, Leith, Cotton, Cole, and Alten) were wounded.

The enemy, taking advantage of the darkness, continued his flight during the night; and, at day-dawn, the pursuit was renewed on the part of the allies. The advanced-guard, consisting of Major-General Baron Bock's and General Anson's brigades of cavalry, which joined during the

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When the enemy took up his second position, the light division was directed to march to Huerta, and the first division to Alba de Tormes, to cut off their retreat. These orders, so far as concerned the first division, were *not* executed, and the Spaniards having abandoned the Castle of Alba on the approach of the French, the latter were enabled to effect their retreat across the Tormes without impediment.

CHAP. IX. night, succeeded in coming up with the enemy's rear division, strongly posted behind the village of La Serna. The two brigades instantly charged; and the French cavalry, panic-stricken by their recent defeat, fled in great confusion, leaving the infantry to their fate. The whole of the latter, consisting of three battalions, were made prisoners.

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After this disaster, Clausel continued his retreat, by forced marches and in great disorder, towards Valladolid. Being joined, however, by a considerable body of cavalry and horse artillery from the north, he succeeded in crossing the Douro, with little further annoyance from the allies, whose march was delayed by the difficulty of bringing up the supplies. Lord Wellington reached Valladolid on the thirtieth, but finding Clausel continued his retreat on Burgos in a state of great disorganization, on the day following he recrossed the Douro, and halted at Cuellar.

Lord Wellington then determined to march against the army of the centre, which, in order to favour the escape of the defeated force, had approached the flank of the allies. Preparations for this purpose were immediately set on foot,

August 7.

and on the seventh of August the army commenced its movement on Madrid, by the route of Segovia, leaving a force under General Paget on the Douro to observe the motions of the enemy.

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Joseph Bonaparte could muster, for the defence of the capital, about twenty thousand men,—a force altogether inadequate to offer any serious impediment to the march of the allies. In Madrid all was confusion. So decisive a movement on the part of Lord Wellington had been altogether unforeseen, and no arrangements had been made for the defence of the capital. Joseph had left Madrid on the twenty-first of July, and marched by the Escorial to join Marmont. In the neighbourhood of Arevalo he received intelligence of Marmont's defeat. He then marched by his right to Segovia, with the intention of drawing Lord Wellington's attention from the army of Clausel. No sooner, however, did he learn that Lord Wellington was advancing against him, than he fell back rapidly on Madrid.

In the meantime the allied army continued its progress. No attempt was made to defend the passage of the Guadarama mountains; but, on the tenth, an engagement took place with a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had been sent for-

CHAP. IX. ward to watch the motions of the allies. This
 1812. force was driven in in the morning by General
 August. D'Urban, who moved on to Majalahonda, where
 he took post with his brigade of Portuguese cavalry, Captain Macdonald's troop of horse artillery, and the cavalry and light infantry of the German legion.

The enemy's cavalry having again approached, General D'Urban ordered the Portuguese brigade to charge the leading squadrons of the enemy, which appeared too far in advance to be supported by the main body. The Portuguese cavalry advanced to the attack, but before they reached the enemy, turned about and fled. By this disgraceful conduct three guns were lost, which owing to the difficulties of the ground could not be removed. The Germans then charged, and succeeded in checking the progress of the enemy; and Colonel Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, and a brigade of the seventh division coming up shortly after, the French burned the carriages of the captured guns and retired.

Aug. 12. On the twelfth the allies entered Madrid; Joseph having abandoned it on the preceding night, and retired to the left of the Tagus, where he took post with his right at Aranjuez, and his

left in the direction of Toledo. A garrison of CHAP. IX.
 seventeen hundred men were left in the Retiro, 1812.
 in order to check the enthusiasm of the people, August.
 and preserve the convoys from plunder.

The appearance of the allied army was hailed with joy and triumph by all ranks in the capital. All business was suspended; and thousands of the inhabitants bearing branches of laurel, came forth to welcome their victorious liberators. On the day following the Retiro surrendered. Don Carlos d'Espana was appointed governor, and the Constitution was proclaimed amid the enthusiastic *vivas* of the populace.

While these brilliant operations were in progress, Marshal Soult had advanced against Sir Rowland Hill; but that officer retreating on his approach to the position of Albuera, which had been strengthened by entrenchments and redoubts, Soult did not venture to attack him. At Ulna, on the eleventh of June, an unfortunate affair took place between the heavy brigade of cavalry, under General Slade, and a party of the enemy, commanded by General Lallemande. General Slade charged with great spirit, and in a few minutes put the French to flight; but the pursuit being continued

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CHAP. IX. too far, the enemy were reinforced, and became the assailants in turn. After a sanguinary conflict, General Slade's brigade were driven back in great confusion, with the loss of nearly two hundred of their number in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Many other cavalry affairs took place, in one of which Lieutenant Streuwitz succeeded in surprising a party of the enemy, which he attacked and defeated, with the loss of twenty men and horses, besides a great number killed.

But the aspect of affairs in the whole Peninsula was at once changed by the victory of Salamanca. Soult relaxed his grasp of Andalusia, and determined to concentrate his army in Granada. On the twenty-fifth of August the siege of Cadiz was raised, and the Spaniards took immediate possession of Puerto Real and Chiclana. The enemy's rear-guard was attacked by a detachment sent from Cadiz, under Colonel Skerret and General Cruz Morgeon, which drove it from St. Lucar; and on the twenty-seventh Seville was carried by assault. The French, on the approach of the allied force, evacuated the suburb Triana, and retreated to the town. An attempt was then made to defend the bridge; but

the grenadiers of the Guards attacked them CHAP. IX. with the bayonet, when all resistance ceased, and the enemy fled, leaving the streets strewed with their dead. In this affair they lost above two hundred prisoners, besides a considerable quantity of baggage, horses, and money.

The enemy having withdrawn from Estramadura, the presence of General Hill on the Guadiana was no longer required, and that leader was directed to move to the Tagus, and connect his operations with the main body of the army. On the approach of General Hill's corps, Joseph abandoned Toledo, and fell back to Almanza, on the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia, from which point he could communicate both with Soult and Suchet.

With the exception of one battalion, the whole British troops were withdrawn from Cadiz; and every effort was made by Lord Wellington to excite the Spaniards to new and increased efforts at a crisis so important.

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CHAPTER X.

SIEGE OF BURGOS—RETREAT OF THE ALLIED ARMY.

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THE situation of Lord Wellington at Madrid, though brilliant, was full of peril. The defeated army of Marmont was still numerous, and had been largely reinforced; and a corps of observation, of ten thousand men, had been sent into Alava. The armies of the south and centre, by forming a junction with that of Suchet, might speedily advance against the capital, with a force at least treble in amount to that of the allies.

Little benefit had resulted from the tardy arrival of the Sicilian force under General Maitland. A few days before its appearance on the coast, General O'Donnell had been defeated at Castalla, and driven into Murcia, with the loss of three thousand of his army. The only Spanish army with which he could co-operate having

thus been beaten from the field, General Maitland remained cooped up in Alicante, and none of those benefits which had been anticipated from the arrival of this force were realized.

In the north, indeed, Santocildes, with the Galician army, besides other minor advantages gained over the enemy, succeeded in reducing Astorga; and the garrison, amounting to twelve hundred men, surrendered prisoners of war. A detachment of seven hundred men was captured by the Empecinado in Guadalaxara; and the Guerillas were every where active in their vocation. But in the neighbourhood of Madrid, no active exertions were made against the common enemy. There was no attempt to organize any military system, and it soon became evident to Lord Wellington that he could only calculate with security on his own army, to defeat the projects of the enemy.

To remain in Madrid, therefore, was impossible, and only three other courses presented themselves.

He might advance into the south against Soult; but, in that case, the other armies would immediately combine and act in his rear, and no advantage of any kind could be secured.

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CHAP. X. He might unite his whole force, enter Valencia, march directly on Alicante, establish his communications with General Maitland, threaten the armies of Arragon and the centre, and prevent their junction with Soult, leaving a corps of sufficient magnitude to guard the passage of the Douro.

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He might, in the third place, advance against the army of the north, which had again assumed a hostile attitude, and compelled General Paget to cross the Douro. This scheme was attended with the evident disadvantage, that it was in the power of Soult, Suchet, and Joseph, to combine their forces, and thus compel him to retreat.

Under more favourable circumstances, the second of these projects, was probably that which Lord Wellington would have followed. Had Ballasteros done his duty in the south, and thrown himself between Soult and the army of the centre—had O'Donnel's army been in condition to join him—and had the force of General Maitland, been of the magnitude which Lord Wellington had been taught to expect, the allied army, by entering the eastern provinces, might probably have secured a more brilliant termination to the campaign. But in all these

things Lord Wellington had been deceived. Ballasteros refused to combine his movements with those of the allies. General Maitland's corps barely amounted to six thousand men. The army of O'Donnel had been beaten from the field; and in the whole south and east of Spain there existed not a single force on the assistance of which he could rely.

There were also other reasons to induce Lord Wellington to transfer his operations to the north. The resources of Galicia had never been called forth since the French were driven out, about three years before, and Lord Wellington was assured, that a force of twenty-five thousand men were ready to act with him from thence, and able to oppose Clausel, if put in possession of Burgos. Considerable reinforcements were expected from England, and in the north only could these effect their junction, in time to influence the success of the campaign. By advancing against the army of Portugal, he would at all events create a strong diversion in favour of the southern provinces, the most wealthy, the most populous, and the most patriotic in the kingdom. He would secure the liberation of Andalusia, which Soult had unwill-

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CHAP. X. lingly been driven to abandon, and was again
1812. prepared to occupy on the first return of success.

September. Thus forced on a choice of difficulties, Lord Wellington, considering it possible to strike a blow against Clausel before the other armies could advance to his support, determined to march in person to the north, with four divisions of his army. Two divisions were left in garrison at Madrid. General Hill moved to Aranjuez, to observe the motions of the army of the south; and Ballasteros was requested to unite his force with the corps of that leader, in case Soult should direct his march on Madrid. In the event of Soult moving into Valencia, he was to take post at Alcazar, and defend the approach to the capital on that side.

Sep. 7. On the first of September, Lord Wellington quitted Madrid, and on the morning of the seventh, the army passed the Douro, and took possession of Valladolid. Clausel fell back on the approach of the allies, destroying the bridges on the Pisuerga. At Palencia, the Gallician army effected its junction, but, instead of an efficient force of twenty-five thousand men, it scarcely mustered above ten thousand undisciplined soldiers, utterly deficient in every thing of equip-

ment and organization, and officered by men CHAP. X.
ignorant of the first rudiments of their profes-
sion. 1812.

September.
Sep. 19.

On the nineteenth, the allied army entered Burgos; and the French, under General Souham, who, with a reinforcement of nine thousand men, had arrived on the day previous, to assume the command, fell back to Briviesca, leaving in the castle a garrison of two thousand men, under General Dubreton.

The castle of Burgos is situated on an eminence, and strongly defended by its outworks. The enemy had encircled the acclivity, by two lines of formidable field-works, armed at all points with cannon, and the base of the hill was surrounded by an uncovered scarpwall of very difficult access. Lord Wellington considered the reduction of this fortress to be essential to the success of his operations, for the French had collected in it large stores of ammunition and provisions, and the allied army required it as a point of support, in the insecure position which it was boldly intended to assume.

Lord Wellington, therefore, immediately directed the investment of the place, though the whole of his artillery consisted of three eighteen

CHAP. X. pounders, and five twenty-four pounder iron
 1812. howitzers, and the supply of ammunition was
 September. very deficient. The siege was allotted to the
 first and sixth divisions, under Generals Campbell and Clinton, while the main body of the army advanced to the neighbourhood of Quintanapala, to hold Souham in check.

Sep. 19. On the evening of the nineteenth, a formidable horn-work on the hill of St. Michael, which commanded several of the works of the castle, was carried by assault. The troops employed on this service, under command of General Pack, suffered very severely. The assault lasted above an hour; but a detachment, led by the Honourable Major Cocks, having at length effected an entrance by the gorge, the work was carried. The loss of the assailants, owing to the gallant resistance of the garrison, and the warm fire to which they were subjected from the place, was very great. It amounted to about four hundred in killed and wounded. In the work were found three guns. One captain and sixty-two men, the sole survivors of a strong battalion, were made prisoners.

On the day following, the guns were drawn up and planted in battery on the hill of St.

Michael; but the enemy kept up so strong a CHAP. X.
 fire from the castle, that two of the guns were, 1812.
 after a few days, dismounted. On the night of September.
 the twenty-second, an attempt on the exterior line of works unfortunately failed. The storming party succeeded in escalading the outer wall; but after many gallant efforts to maintain their ground, were driven back with great loss. Two of his guns being disabled, Lord Wellington abandoned the ordinary method of attack, and had recourse to the slower and more uncertain process of sapping.

On the twenty-ninth, a breach having been Sep. 29.
 effected in the outer wall by the explosion of a mine, a party of the first division attempted to storm it. The enemy, however, had placed such obstacles at the mouth of the breach as it was found impossible to surmount, and the attack failed, with considerable loss on the part of the assailants.

Another mine exploded on the evening of Oct. 4.
 the fourth October, and made a second breach. The exterior line of the enemy's works was at length carried, and the twenty-fourth regiment effected a lodgment on the space between the outer wall and the first line of field-works. The

CHAP. X. garrison, however, on the day following, made
 1812. a spirited sortie, and driving back the British
 October. troops at the point of the bayonet, gained possession of the lodgment, which was immediately destroyed. Fresh troops were then sent on to retrieve this disaster; and under a desperate and most destructive fire from the place, the works were again carried, and the enemy driven behind their interior defences.

The progress of the besiegers was slow, for at every step they were encountered by obstacles, which the deficiency of means at their disposal rendered almost insuperable. Before day-break on the eighth, the enemy made another sortie, and overpowering the guard in the trenches, succeeded in destroying all the work of the besiegers within the outer wall. In this affair, the Honourable Major Cocks, commanding the seventy-ninth regiment, was killed. The zeal and gallantry of this officer, had on all occasions been conspicuous.

The perseverance of the besiegers, however, was not to be overcome. They continued their labours, and established themselves within one hundred yards of the enemy's second line. On
 Oct. 11. the eleventh, a mine was successfully sprung,

and another breach being formed, the assault
 was given on the same evening, and the second
 line carried after a severe struggle. On the
 eighteenth, preparations for the assault of the
 castle being completed, the Guards and German
 Legion in the first division attempted to carry it
 by escalade, and succeeded in effecting an entrance; but the fire from the garrison was so heavy, that the assailants found it impossible to maintain their ground.

This was the last effort to gain possession of the fortress, the advance of the enemy rendering it necessary to desist from further operations. The failure is attributable to the deficiency of means, not to any deficiency of ardour or devotion in the troops. Never were the boldness and intrepidity of British soldiers more admirably displayed than in those unfortunate attacks, the unsuccessful termination of which was attributable to causes beyond their control. The loss of the allied army during the siege was very severe. It exceeded two thousand men, a number nearly equal to that of the brave garrison, whose efforts were at length crowned by merited success.

In the meantime, the army under Souham,

CHAP. X. having been joined by the whole disposable
1812. force in the north, advanced through Monas-
October. terio, with the apparent intention of fight-
ing a general action for the relief of Burgos.

Oct. 20. On the evening of the twentieth, the enemy
came on in force, and drove in the outposts
of the allied army; but Sir Edward Paget, who
was directed to move the first and fifth divisions
upon their right flank, promptly executed this
manœuvre, and the French immediately fell
back.

Sep. 15. While these events were passing in the north
of Spain, Marshal Soult, on the fifteenth of Sep-
tember, had commenced his march from Granada,
and having effected a junction with the army of
the centre, advanced along the line of the Xucar
towards Madrid. Ballasteros, influenced by petty
jealousy of Lord Wellington, on whom the Cortes
had wisely conferred the chief command of
the Spanish armies, offered no annoyance to the
enemy during this movement. He was in con-
sequence removed from all military command,
and imprisoned in the fortress of Ceuta on the
coast of Barbary. The small force of General
Maitland, cooped up in Alicante, without support
of any kind from the native armies, could effect

nothing; and a trifling detachment of about six
hundred men, with some artillery, which, under
General Donkin, had landed near Denia, were
defeated in their object of carrying that post,
and forced to re-embark.

The armies of Soult and Jourdan then ap-
proached Madrid, and arrived at Aranjuez on
the twenty-third of October. Sir Rowland Hill
immediately placed his forces in position, cov-
ering the capital, and preparations were made
for a general engagement. On the night of the
twenty-seventh, however, an express from Lord
Wellington arrived, directing Sir Rowland to
fall back on the Adejo, unless an opportunity
should occur of bringing the enemy to battle
under circumstances of great advantage.

The position chosen by General Hill was
highly favourable; but Soult, whose movements
were combined with those of Souham, avoided
a general engagement; and marching to Toledo,
crossed the Tagus, and thus threatened the rear
of the allies. Under these circumstances, inde-
pendently of the orders of Lord Wellington, im-
mediate retreat became necessary. Madrid was
in consequence evacuated,—the magazines in the
Retiro were blown up, the guns spiked, and,

CHAP. X. agreeably to his instructions, Sir Rowland Hill
 1812. put his corps in motion, and slowly retired to-
 October. wards Salamanca.

Nothing can be more admirable than the whole arrangements of Lord Wellington at this period of difficulty, nor more nicely balanced than his manœuvres.

Oct. 21. On the twenty-first of October, the siege of Burgos was raised. During the night, Lord Wellington filed his whole army under the walls of the castle, and across the bridge of the Arlanzon, closely enfiladed by the guns of the place. This bold measure was productive of little loss; and Lord Wellington thus succeeded in gaining a march on his opponent, who did not overtake him till the
 Oct. 23. twenty-third. On that day, the enemy's cavalry made a sharp attack on the rear-guard, which was gallantly repulsed by a light infantry battalion of the German legion.

On the twenty-fourth, the army was joined by a reinforcement from England, under Lord Dalhousie, consisting chiefly of the Guards, which had disembarked at Corunna, and Lord Wellington took up a position behind the Carrion, the left at Villa Muriel, the right at Duenas.

The retreat had been so sudden and rapid, CHAP. X.
 that the greatest difficulty was experienced in
 1812. the conveyance of the sick and wounded, a great
 October. portion of whom had not yet crossed the Douro. Lord Wellington, therefore, found it necessary to halt during the whole of the twenty-fifth; and in order to check the pursuit of the enemy, directed the bridges over the Carrion and Pisuer-ga to be destroyed on their approach.

In consequence the bridges at Villa Muriel and Duenas were blown up. At Palencia the enemy attacked the party posted to cover the operation, and gained possession of the bridges in a perfect state. At Tariejo, owing to the failure of a mine, the bridge was little injured; and the enemy, having pushed on a considerable body of cavalry, the covering party, under Captain Ferguson of the fifty-eighth, were made prisoners. The enemy then pushed a corps across the Pisuer-ga, in contact with the posts of the allied army. Lord Wellington determined to force them back; and on the approach of the columns, they hastily recrossed the river. On the left, a strong body was thrown across the river by a ford near Villa Muriel, and took possession of a village at some distance

CHAP. X. from the bank. The Spaniards were ordered to dislodge them, but failed in the attempt; and the French, pursuing their success, came in contact with the fifth division, and the engagement was for some time very serious. The Spanish General, Don Miguel Alava, observing the discomfiture of his troops, immediately galloped into the plain, and rallying them by dint of great exertion, led them back to the charge. The enemy being also repulsed by the fifth division, were then beaten back across the river with considerable loss.

Oct. 26. On the twenty-sixth, the army continued its retreat along miserable roads, and exposed to an incessant deluge of rain. The troops, dispirited, began to manifest symptoms of disorder. During the night, the soldiers quitted their bivouacs in search of wine, and were guilty of numerous excesses. A large proportion being intoxicated, were regardless of command; and the utmost exertions of the officers to restore discipline and regularity, were unavailing. General Souham made some attempts to gain possession of the bridge at Cabeçon, which were repulsed. He then marched down the Pisuerga towards the Douro, and endeavoured to pass the river at Siman-

cas, which was found impracticable from the complete destruction of the bridge. A battery was established on some heights near Valladolid, which commanded a part of the road on the left of the river, along which the allied army was retreating; and the hospital waggons and commissariat became occasionally exposed to its fire.

On the twenty-ninth, the army continued its retreat along the left of the Pisuerga, having destroyed the bridges at Cabeçon and Valladolid. The Douro being too high to be fordable at any point, the whole of the divisions crossed at Tudela and the Puente del Douro. The bridges at these places were likewise blown up. In the night, the enemy crossed a party by swimming, who dislodged a German regiment, posted to guard the ruins of the bridge of Tordesillas, and immediately proceeded to re-establish the communication. Lord Wellington in consequence took up a position in which he might give battle, and stationed his army along the banks of the Douro, on nearly the same ground which it occupied in July, before the battle of Salamanca.

On the sixth of November, the enemy having repaired the bridges at Toro and Tordesillas,

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Nov. 6.

CHAP. X. Lord Wellington recommenced his retreat, and
 1812. fell back to Torrecilla del Orden, the corps of
 November. Sir Rowland Hill having effected a junction on
 the third. On the eighth the divisions from Burgos occupied the heights of St. Christoval, in front of Salamanca; and General Hamilton's Portuguese division held the town of Alba de Tormes.

On reaching the Douro, General Souham desisted from the pursuit, till being joined by the armies of the south and centre, under Soult, their whole united force, amounting to seventy-five thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry, concentrated in position on the Tormes, on the
 Nov. 10. tenth of November. The army of Lord Wellington did not exceed forty-eight thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry; and with the disadvantage of so great a disparity of numbers, he felt it necessary to continue his retreat, unless a favourable opportunity should occur of bringing the enemy to action.

On the ninth, the French drove in the cavalry piquets in front of Alba; and in the course of the day approached the positions on the Tormes, and attempted to force the passage of the river. They attacked General Hamilton's division in Alba with twenty pieces of cannon; but finding

they made no impression, the greater part of the CHAP. X.
 troops were withdrawn during the night.

On the fourteenth the French crossed the river
 1812. in force, at three fords near Lucinas, and took
 November. post in a formidable position at Mozarbes. Lord Wellington then moved his army to the Arapiles, the scene of his former victory; but finding the enemy too strongly posted to render it prudent to assume the offensive, and perceiving that detachments of their cavalry were already in motion to intercept his communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, he withdrew the troops from Alba, and put his army in retreat towards the Agueda.

On the sixteenth the allied army encamped on
 Nov. 16. the Valmusa. Soult followed their steps with a strong advanced-guard, but made no attempt to achieve any great and signal success. On the seventeenth the enemy cannonaded the rear-guard on its passage of the Huerba, near Munoz; and, on the same day, Sir Edward Paget was unfortunately made prisoner, almost in the centre of the allied army. A detachment of French light troops were concealed in a wood on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Sir Edward observing an interval between the fifth and seventh divisions of infantry, rode alone to the

CHAP. X. rear to inquire into the cause by which the progress of the latter had been delayed. On his return he missed his way, and fell into the hands of the enemy. By this unlucky accident, his country, at a moment of peculiar need, was deprived of the services of one of the bravest and most distinguished of her leaders.

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During the whole of this retreat, though little annoyance was experienced from the enemy, the sufferings of the troops were very great. The weather was cold and inclement; the troops at night were without shelter of any sort, and the rain descended in torrents, which precluded the possibility of lighting fires. The wretched condition of the roads, in many places nearly impassable, occasioned great irregularities in the supply of provisions; and under the pressure of such sufferings, it was found impossible to maintain discipline.

Nov. 18. On the eighteenth the head-quarters of Lord Wellington were at Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the two following days the army crossed the Agueda. Shortly afterwards, on learning that the enemy had withdrawn from the Tormes, the divisions were distributed in extensive cantonments, the right being thrown forward to Banos

and Bejar to hold the passes, and the left retired on Lamego. The season of the year no longer admitted of military movements, and the troops were suffered to enjoy the repose necessary to prepare them for the toils of the succeeding campaign.*

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* On the arrival of the army in quarters, Lord Wellington addressed a letter to the commanding officers of battalions, censuring, in the severest manner, the misconduct of the troops during the retreat from Burgos.—“It must be obvious,” he said, “to every officer, that, from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred.

“Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches,—none in which they made such long and repeated halts,—and none in which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy. These evils,” continues Lord Wellington, “I have no hesitation in attributing to the habitual inattention of officers of regiments to their duty as prescribed by the regulations of the service, and the orders of this army.

“Unfortunately, the inexperience of officers of the army, has induced many to conceive, that the period during which an army is on active service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which, of all others, every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier; for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessities, and field-equipments, and his horse and horse-appointments; for the receipt, and issue, and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his

CHAP. X. The intelligence of the retreat from Burgos
 1812. was received in England with clamours of discontent and disappointment. The hopes which the early successes of the campaign had overweeningly excited, were unreasonably depressed by its termination. Within and without the walls of Parliament loud accusations were heard against the Ministry. Even Lord Wellington, who, by a course of splendid achievement, had won his way to a high place in the hearts and hopes of all Englishmen, now ceased to be "gracious in the people's eye." He was accused of compromising the safety of his army by a series of rash miscalculations. The Government were charged, by one class of politicians, with wasting the resources of the country in a hope-

food, and the forage for his horse, should be most strictly attended to by the officer of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army—a British army in particular—shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial."

Lord Wellington then proceeds to point out the most effectual means of remedying these evils, by means of greater vigilance and attention on the part of officers commanding regiments and brigades, and notices the superior regularity, in some particulars, of the French army. The letter, altogether, is of the most severe and unsparing character, and produced a powerful effect.

less struggle,—with lavishing the best blood of CHAP. X.
 England in defence of a people whose zeal and 1812. patriotism, if such ever existed, were long proved to have subsided into sluggish and imperturbable inertia. The events of the campaign were declared to have spread dejection throughout Spain, and renewed the confidence of her invaders. All hopes had been disappointed,—the allied army had been forced again to abandon the Spanish territory,—and the very name of Englishmen had become hateful to the people. The clever sophistry, it was said, by which the nation had been so long deluded into the belief that we were contending for the independence of Britain and Spain, amid the mountains of the Peninsula, was at length powerless. Thenceforth it must be manifest to all, that the war was solely continued because a powerful faction were benefited by the expenditure it occasioned.

By such base and contemptible clamour it was little probable that Lord Wellington would be moved. No man ever sacrificed less to the acquisition of mere temporary and vulgar popularity; none has ever done more to secure the lasting gratitude of his country. He knew that the campaign, which had thus exposed him to

CHAP. X. contumely and abuse, had shed fresh and unfading lustre on the British arms. It had been marked by three signal triumphs; the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, of Badajos, and by the victory of Salamanca. These had been achieved at a time when the military power of the Spanish was at the lowest ebb. With an army whose effective force did not certainly exceed sixty thousand men, he had traversed the interior of Spain—defeated a powerful army—occupied the capital—liberated the southern provinces,—and, by a series of nicely calculated manœuvres, baffled the pursuit of an enemy overpoweringly superior. At the very period when all this had been effected, the enemy had a force of two hundred thousand men in the Peninsula, commanded by leaders of high name and pretension, and whose fame had become familiar to all Europe.

That the consequences of the victory of Salamanca were less brilliant than might have been anticipated from its decisive character, is attributable to causes over which Lord Wellington could exercise no control. He was entitled, nay instructed, to calculate on the co-operation of a strong force in the eastern provinces. He was entitled to calculate on good service from

the armies of O'Donnel and Ballasteros. He was entitled likewise to expect, that the patriotism of the Spaniards would have taken advantage of the liberation of the capital to burst the cearments of its sepulchre, and come forth in renovated strength.

In all these—not vain but reasonable calculations, he was deceived. By the bungling of the Ministry, the force from Sicily was delayed till too late, and was most beggarly in amount. The army of O'Donnel was defeated a few days before its arrival. Ballasteros refused to co-operate with the allied army, and did nothing. In spite of the victory of Salamanca, and the expulsion of the intrusive monarch from the capital, the tree of Spanish patriotism put forth no blossom. What, then, was to be done? The course pursued by Lord Wellington, in the circumstances of difficulty by which he was surrounded, has been vehemently censured; yet there existed no other to which objections of equal magnitude did not apply. One great object—the liberation of the southern provinces—was at least secured by it. The failure before Burgos was unfortunate; but nothing could exceed the skill of the manœuvres by which it was followed, and never was a re-

CHAP. X. treat more imposing than that of Lord Wellington in face of the combined French armies. It may be fearlessly asserted, that no man of competent judgment can read the details of this most splendid campaign, without perceiving, that in tactic and combination Lord Wellington proved himself throughout superior to his opponents. While he repeatedly belied their calculations, in no one instance was he taken at a disadvantage, or involved in difficulties, which he was unprepared to encounter and surmount.

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A general of less nerve would probably have fought a battle to escape the clamour by which he must have known he would be assailed in consequence of the reverse at Burgos. But Lord Wellington was not thus to be moved. He knew that the cause of his country and her allies would more effectually be promoted by a different policy; and in spite of every personal motive, he avoided battle, and continued his retreat to the frontier of Portugal. In truth, if there is any one quality in Lord Wellington which demands our paramount admiration, it is the self-command with which, under every temptation, he kept the natural boldness of his character in strict subordination to the dictates of the coolest prudence.

CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE OF LORD WELLINGTON—BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

JUDGING from the past events of the war, it has been maintained by many, that had Napoleon remained at peace with the other nations of Europe, the complete subjugation of the Peninsula must at length have been effected. Such an inference we hold to be unfounded. The whole Peninsula had long been unable to support either the armies of its invaders or its defenders. Agriculture had almost wholly ceased, in provinces subjected to perpetual inroads, in which marauders continually destroyed the labours of the peasant. The cattle were driven into defiles amid the mountains, and a great portion of the population was converted into bodies of armed herdsmen, the more active and enterprising of which kept up a war of ex-

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CHAP. XI. termination on the enemy. They harassed his
1813. march, intercepted his foragers, and plundered his convoys. It was necessary, therefore, from the first, for the French to employ numerous armies in Spain; to maintain a strong yet extended line through the whole country; and, above all, to preserve unbroken the communication with Bayonne. While they were able to do so, the victories achieved by Lord Wellington appeared, from their want of subsequent advantages, as so much waste of blood. The warmest partisans of the cause became, in some degree, disheartened, by that continued alternation of victory and retreat which had marked the arms of the allies; and, to a superficial observer, it might have seemed that little progress had been made by the lavish expenditure of British blood and treasure, towards the attainment of the first great object of the war—the liberation of the Peninsula.

But the extreme diffusion of force thus necessary to the invaders, was pregnant with all the elements of defeat. Every additional province overrun by their arms, was in itself a cause of weakness. While they occupied the south, the north was still in arms: while pursuing their victories in the east, they were defeated in the west.

Present everywhere, they were nowhere strong CHAP. XI.
enough to put down resistance, and the greatest 1813. achievements of their arms were in general only followed by the farther extension of a vulnerable front.

But, independently of other causes, nothing could be more certain, than that the increasing deficiency of the means of sustenance, would ultimately of itself have compelled the French to diminish their forces, and narrow their schemes of conquest. The British army, secure of its supplies, though at an enormous expense, by the ports of Lisbon and Oporto, were better able than their opponents to support a war of deprivation. Lord Wellington, therefore, had only to maintain his footing in the Peninsula, to feel secure that the hour would at length come when the contest would be maintained on equal terms, and he might enter on a wider and more brilliant course of achievement.

The period thus warmly anticipated at length came. It was accelerated not created by the events in the north of Europe. These are well known. By the destruction of his army in the Russian campaign, the throne of Napoleon had been shaken to its base, and it became at length

CHAP. XI. apparent that the hour of deliverance for the
1813. nations of the Peninsula was at hand. At all

events an important change had been wrought in the relative position of the belligerents. Hitherto the losses of the French armies had been replaced by a large and almost constant influx of reinforcements. In this mighty power of restoration consisted the great and prominent advantage which the enemy till now had possessed over Lord Wellington. While the whole means of England were unequal to repair the loss which might have flowed from one disastrous battle, the French leaders acted throughout with the conviction that no misfortune was irreparable. In opposing the British, therefore, it was their policy to dare every thing, conscious that in every struggle where the loss of combatants was equal, the game was in their favour. But times were now changed. The necessities of Napoleon had compelled him to withdraw nearly twenty thousand men from the force in the Peninsula; and the movements of the enemy gave indication of an intention to abandon the whole south and centre of the kingdom.

During the long interval in which the allied army remained in Cantonments, no hostile

movement of importance took place. In No-
vember, Longa, the celebrated partisan, suc-
ceeded in surprising a body of the enemy under
General Fremant, who were posted in the town
and valley of Sedano, near Burgos. He defeat-
ed them with the loss of seven hundred killed
and wounded, five hundred prisoners, two guns,
and the whole of their baggage, plunder, and
provisions.

In the month of February, General Foy
advanced from Salamanca, with a considerable
force, in hope of surprising the town of Bejar.
The garrison, however, were prepared; and
when General Foy attempted to effect an en-
trance by the gates of the town, his troops en-
countered a spirited repulse.

In the meanwhile every effort was made to
repair the losses which the army had suffered
during the late active campaign, and to restore
the troops to that vigour and discipline which
the sufferings of the retreat from Burgos had
materially impaired. During the winter, large
reinforcements and supplies of every kind were
received from England. Several regiments of
cavalry arrived; others were remounted; and
every corps and department in the army was

CHAP. XI. brought into a state of complete efficiency for
1813. active service.

In the late campaigns the health of the troops had been found to suffer so severely from want of cover, that it was deemed advisable to remedy this evil by providing tents for the soldiers. A pontoon train was likewise fitted out, an adjunct of the highest utility and importance in a country so intersected by rivers as that which was about to become the theatre of operations.

While the army remained in cantonments, Lord Wellington, who had at length been appointed to the chief command of the Spanish forces, repaired to Cadiz and Lisbon, to concert measures with the authorities. In a conference with the Spanish Regency, it was arranged that a force of fifty thousand native troops should be placed at his disposal, and an order was issued, for a portion of the general staff to remain at head-quarters, to serve as a channel of communication with the Spanish leaders. Having completed these preliminaries on the eleventh of May, Lord Wellington returned to Frenada, and preparations were immediately made for the advance of the army.

It has been already stated, that the allied CHAP. XI.
forces were distributed in a very extensive line. 1813.
Sir Rowland Hill, with the second division, and a body of Spaniards under General Morillo, was in Estramadura, and the remainder of the British and Portuguese occupied cantonments, extending along the northern frontier of Portugal to Lamego. The Duke del Parque, commanded an army in La Mancha, and the force of General Elio, was stationed on the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia. The recent levies in Andalusia were intended to act as an army of reserve, and placed under the command of O'Donnel. The army of Galicia, was commanded by Castanos, and occupied the frontier of that province.

The Spanish armies were generally in a state of the most miserable equipment and discipline; but the chief obstacle to their efficiency, lay in the petty jealousies of the secondary leaders, who, considering the assumption of the chief command by a foreigner, as involving a national degradation, did much to paralyse the zeal and valour of their solders, and frustrate the skilful combinations of the campaign. Something, however, had been achieved. The government had at length adopted a wiser and more reasonable

CHAP. XI. policy, and Lord Wellington received assurances
1813. that a great and determined effort would be made throughout the whole Peninsula, in the approaching campaign.

Notwithstanding, Soult, with a considerable body of troops, had been called to Germany, there were still about one hundred and sixty thousand French in Spain; but of these, a large proportion was dispersed in garrisons; and the force under Suchet in the eastern provinces, may be calculated at thirty-five thousand. The armies of Portugal, the centre, and the south, under command of Joseph, amounting collectively to about seventy thousand men, were spread through Castile and Leon, with the general head-quarters at Madrid. The army of Portugal, under the immediate command of General Reille, had its head-quarters at Valladolid. That of the centre, under Drouet, was distributed around the capital; and the head-quarters of the southern army were in Toledo. Arragon and Biscay were also occupied by independent divisions, under command of Generals Clausel and Foy.

The position of the allies thus formed an extensive semicircle round that occupied by the enemy, and the latter perhaps conceived that by

the rapid movement of their concentrated forces, CHAP. XI.
they would be enabled for a time, at least, to
1813. baffle the manœuvres of an enemy acting on a line so extended. It was evident, however, from the preparatory arrangements of the enemy during the past winter, that his views were chiefly directed to the defence of the Douro. The ground on the northern bank of that river, naturally strong, had been fortified at every assailable point by works and retrenchments; and with such advantages of position, with a deep and rapid river covering its front, little doubt was entertained that an insuperable barrier would be opposed to the progress of the allied army.

Preparations being at length completed for
May. the commencement of operations, the army was put in motion on the sixteenth of May, in three bodies. Five divisions, with a large force of cavalry, under Sir Thomas Graham, who had resumed his station as second in command, crossed the Douro, by means of boats provided for that purpose at Lamego, at Torremoncorvo, and St. Joao de Pesqueira, with orders to move through the province of Tras Os Montes, on Braganza,

CHAP. XI. and Zamora, and effect a junction with the remainder of the army near Valladolid.

1813.
May.

Lord Wellington in person, with the light division, a brigade of cavalry, and a corps of Spaniards, moved forward on Salamanca by the direct route; and Sir Rowland Hill, on the right, with the troops from Estramadura, was directed to advance on the same point by Alba de Tormes. By this grand and comprehensive movement, the enemy's position on the Douro was turned, as well as that of their whole forces on the south of the river.

The movements of the right and centre were executed with such rapidity, that the officer commanding at Salamanca had barely time to abandon the town when it was entered by the British cavalry under General Fane, who pursued his rear-guard with great effect, and captured about two hundred prisoners, and some guns. Lord Wellington then placed the divisions of the right and centre in cantonments between the Tormes and the Douro, and, passing the river on the thirty-first, he joined the corps of General Graham.

May 31.

This portion of the army had encountered se-

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rious difficulties from the impracticable character of the country through which its march lay. The roads were miserable, intersected at numerous points by rivers and ravines, and leading over steep mountains, up which the horses were unable to drag the artillery. By great exertion, however, these obstacles were overcome; the corps reached its point of destination on the appointed day, and took up a position, with the left resting on Tabara, in communication with the Gallician army.

1813.
May.

The enemy were utterly unprepared for this movement of Lord Wellington. Their attention had hitherto been directed to the front of the position, and the possibility of the allied army effecting the passage of the Douro within the Portuguese frontier had never been contemplated. The corps of General Graham reached the Escla, therefore, without encountering an enemy, and a party posted to guard the fords of that river near Losilla, hastily retired on their approach.

On the thirtieth the fords were reconnoitred, but being found too deep, a bridge of pontoons was laid down for the passage of the troops; and, on the first of June, General Graham encamped in the neighbourhood of

May 30.

Jun. 1.

CHAP. XI. Zamora, the French falling back on his approach.

1813.

June.

On the day following, the enemy continued their retreat, having previously destroyed the bridges at Toro and Zamora. A brilliant affair took place with the cavalry. The hussar brigade coming up with the enemy's rear-guard near Morales, gallantly charged and overthrew it; and, continuing the pursuit for several miles, made two hundred prisoners. On the same evening, Don Julian Sanchez, with his Guerillas, surprised and captured a French cavalry piquet at Castronuno. On the third, the corps of General Hill having crossed at Toro, the whole army directed its march on Valladolid.

Jun. 2.

In the meanwhile, the rapid advance of the allies had placed the army at Madrid in a situation of immediate peril. By remaining there, it must have been cut off from the army in the north, and from its line of communication with France. Joseph, therefore, immediately abandoned the capital, and crossing at Puente de Douro, succeeded in effecting a junction with the army of Portugal. The French armies, thus united, continued their retreat. On the seventh, the allies crossed the Carrion at Palencia, and on

Jun. 7.

the following days occupied both banks of the CHAP. XI.
Pisnerga, the French retiring on Burgos, with-
out any effort to defend the passage of the 1813.
river. June.

The whole forces of the enemy were now concentrated at Burgos; and as this fortress formed the key of the north of Spain, and the last before reaching the Ebro, it was anticipated that here the decisive stand would have been made. Lord Wellington, therefore, to give time for the coming up of his rear, and to recruit the troops exhausted by the rapidity of the marches, made short movements during the eleventh, and on the twelfth remained stationary with his left. In order to ascertain the enemy's intentions, however, and force him to some decisive measure, he made a strong reconnoissance with the right, under Sir Rowland Hill, and, by a flank movement, dislodged a considerable force, under General Reille, from an advantageous position above the village of Hormaza. Though vigorously pressed by the cavalry, the enemy retired in the finest order, and succeeded in crossing the Urbal and Arlanzon with little loss. During the night, the whole French army abandoned Burgos, having destroyed, as far as pos-

Jan. 11.

CHAP. XI. sible, the defences of the castle, and retreated towards the Ebro by Briviesca.

1813.

June.

Thus far the campaign had been one of signal, though bloodless triumph. The next great object of Lord Wellington was to effect the passage of the Ebro, which the enemy had made every preparation to defend. They had garrisoned the strong fortress of Pancorvo; and the attempt to cross a river so considerable, in face of the combined forces of the enemy, must have led to an engagement under circumstances of the greatest disadvantage. Instead of continuing the pursuit, therefore, along the main road, Lord Wellington had again recourse to the manœuvre which had been so successful on the Douro. He moved the army to its left by the road to St. Andero, and then traversing a country of such difficulty as to have been hitherto deemed impracticable for carriages, crossed the Ebro, near its source, at San Martino and Puente de Arenas.

For such a measure the enemy was utterly unprepared, and no precaution had been taken to occupy the strong natural defences which that portion of the Ebro afforded. From Puente de Arenas, the road, for nearly three

miles, runs along the left bank of the river, and is flanked by a ridge of rugged and precipitous mountains, in many places inaccessible. In some parts the road has been hewn through the solid rock; and at one point in particular, the rock not only projects over the road, but juts out upon the Ebro. The whole country, on either bank of the Ebro, above Miranda is eminently defensible. Having passed the river, the march of the army often lay through passes and defiles, which a thousand men might have successfully maintained against twenty times their number.

Through such a country did the allied army pursue its march on Vittoria, without obstruction from the enemy. On the eighteenth the light division came in contact with two brigades of French infantry, on the march from Frias to Vittoria, which they attacked and defeated with the loss of three hundred men. At Osma a strong corps of the enemy, which had been assembled in great haste at Espejo, made a spirited attack on the first and fifth divisions under Sir Thomas Graham. Though superior in numbers the French were repulsed and pursued to Espejo. From thence they continued their retreat unmolested to Subijana on the Bayas.

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Jun. 18.

CHAP. XI. On the nineteenth the enemy's rear-guard
 1813. were found strongly posted on the left of the
 June. Bayas, their right covered by Subijana, their left
 by the heights in front of Pobes. Lord Wellington directed the light division to turn the left of the position, while Sir Lowry Cole attacked it in front; and the rear-guard was thus driven back on the main body of the army, then in full march on Vittoria.

The moment had at length come when the enemy, whose whole movements since the commencement of the campaign had been those of retreat, was compelled to make a final and decisive stand on the Spanish territory, or suffer himself ingloriously to be driven headlong on the Pyrenees. Joseph decided on the former;
 Jun. 19. and on the night of the nineteenth concentrated his forces in position in front of Vittoria, which the French had made their central depot in the frontier provinces. During the twentieth Lord Wellington collected his divisions, on the Bayas, which had been scattered in the hasty march across a rugged and difficult country; and having made a close reconnoissance of the position of the French army, determined on the following morning to attack it.

Vittoria, the chief town of Alava, one of the Biscayan provinces, stands behind the little river Zadorra, in a plain about two leagues in extent, bounded on one side by a part of the Pyrenean chain, and on the other by a range of bold heights of smaller altitude. The ground around Vittoria is marked by considerable inequalities of surface, of which the enemy did not fail to take advantage. At the period in question it was for the most part covered with ripening corn, which gave concealment to the light troops, and sometimes even to the movements of whole battalions during the engagement.

The French army was posted as follows. The right extended northward from Vittoria across the Zadorra, and rested on some heights above the villages of Abechuco and Gamarra Major, covered by formidable field-works. Between the centre and right was a thick wood, into which were thrown several battalions of infantry. The right of the centre occupied a strong height commanding the valley of the Zadorra. It was covered with infantry, flanked and otherwise defended by one hundred pieces of cannon. The advanced posts of the centre lined the banks of the Zadorra, the bridges over

CHAP. XI. which were fortified. The left and left centre
 1813. crowned the high ridge above the village of
 June. Subijana de Alava, with a reserve posted at the
 village of Gomecha, and a corps thrown out to
 occupy the bold mountains above Puebla, to
 protect the centre, which might otherwise have
 been turned by the main road where it crosses
 the Zadorra.

Thus posted, the French army covered each of
 the three great roads which concentrate at Vit-
 toria, in the great road to Bayonne. That of
 Logrono by its left, that of Madrid by its
 centre, and that of Bilboa by its right. It
 was commanded by Joseph in person, hav-
 ing Marshal Jourdan as Major-General. In
 point of numbers there existed little disparity
 on either side; it having been found necessary,
 before passing the Ebro, to detach General Foy
 with twelve thousand men towards Bilboa, to
 procure subsistence for the army, and keep in
 check the powerful Guerilla bands which haun-
 ted the neighbourhood; and General Clausel,
 with a corps of fifteen thousand, was at Logrono.
 Lord Wellington likewise had found it necessary
 to employ the sixth division, under General Pak-
 enham, in guarding the line of supply. The

amount of combatants on either side, therefore, CHAP. XI.
 may be fairly calculated at from seventy to 1813.
 seventy-five thousand men. June.

At daylight on the morning of the twenty-
 first June, Lord Wellington put his army in mo-
 tion, in three great divisions. That on the right
 under Sir Rowland Hill, consisting of the second
 British division, the Portuguese division of the
 Conde de Amarante, and Morillo's corps of
 Spaniards, was destined to commence the action,
 by attacking the enemy's left on the mountains
 behind Subijana. Jun. 21.

The left column, commanded by Sir Thomas
 Graham, composed of the first and fifth divisions,
 two brigades of cavalry, and the Spanish division
 of Longa, was directed by a wide movement to
 turn the enemy's right, and crossing the Zador-
 ra, to cut off his retreat by the road to Bayonne.

The centre corps, consisting of the third, fourth,
 seventh, and light divisions, in two columns, was
 ordered to wait till both or one of the flank co-
 lumns should have crossed the Zadorra, and then
 to make a powerful attack on the French centre.

The Spanish troops under General Morillo
 commenced the action by an attack on the ene-
 my's corps, posted above Puebla, supported by

CHAP. XI. the light companies of the second division and
 1813. the seventy-first regiment, under the Honourable
 June. Colonel Cadogan. After a severe struggle, in
 which that most promising and gallant officer
 was mortally wounded, the enemy were driven
 from the heights at the point of the bayonet.
 Strong reinforcements were then brought up by
 the enemy, and the contest was renewed, and
 continued for some time with great obstinacy on
 both sides. Sir Rowland Hill, however, having
 detached an additional force to support the troops
 already engaged, the French at length gave
 way, and yielded undisputed possession of the
 heights.

Thus far successful, Sir Rowland Hill cross-
 ed the Zadorra, and directed two brigades of
 the second division to attack the heights of
 Subijana de Alava. Here the contest was se-
 vere. The troops advanced under a heavy fire
 of artillery, and succeeded in dislodging the ene-
 my, and driving them back on their reserve.
 The heights thus gallantly carried, however,
 were too important to be resigned, while a
 chance of regaining them remained. Fresh
 columns of attack were formed, and repeated ef-
 forts were made by the enemy to recover their

ground, but without success. At length Joseph, CHAP. XI.
 alarmed at these repeated failures, and the threat-
 ening attitude assumed by Sir Rowland Hill,
 withdrew his advanced posts from the Zadorra,
 and directed the left to fall back for the defence
 of Vittoria.

In the meantime, General Cole, with the fourth
 and light divisions, had passed the Zadorra at
 the bridges of Nanclares and Tres Puentes;
 and the third and seventh divisions, crossing
 by the bridge on the Mendonza road, both
 columns advanced against the heights in the
 centre. At the same time, Sir Rowland Hill
 moved forward from Subijana de Alava, and
 vigorously followed up the left wing in its re-
 treating movement.

Though the enemy had been forced to with-
 draw his left, the centre still stood firm, and re-
 ceived the columns, advancing from the Zadorra,
 with a fire so destructive, as for a time to check
 their progress. Two brigades of horse-artillery
 were then moved forward to the front; and, thus
 supported, the centre columns continued their
 advance in fine order. Notwithstanding the
 difficulties of the ground, the division of Sir
 Thomas Picton first came in contact with a

CHAP. XI. strong body of the enemy, whom, by a spirited attack, he drove into immediate retreat, with the loss of twenty-eight pieces of artillery. On the approach of the fourth and light divisions, the whole heights were abandoned, and the French retired in admirable order on Vittoria, taking advantage of every favourable position to turn on their pursuers.

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In the meanwhile, Sir Thomas Graham, with the left column, which on the evening before had been moved to Margina, was advancing by the high road from Bilboa to Vittoria. About ten o'clock, he approached the enemy's right, posted on the heights commanding the village of Abechuco. From these he immediately dislodged them, by attacks both in front and flank.

Having gained possession of the heights, Sir Thomas Graham directed General Oswald's division to advance against the village of Gamarra Major, which the enemy occupied in great force, while, with the first division, he attacked the village of Abechuco. Gamarra Major was carried in the most gallant style by the brigade of General Robinson, which advanced in columns of battalion, under a heavy fire of artillery and musquetry, without firing a shot, and drove out

the enemy at the point of the bayonet, with great slaughter, and the loss of three guns.

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The attack on Abechuco was no less successful. Under cover of the fire of two brigades of horse-artillery, Colonel Halket's brigade of the German legion advanced to the attack, and drove the enemy from the village, with the loss of three guns and a howitzer, captured by the light battalion in a very gallant charge. The village of Gamarra Menor was likewise carried by the Spaniards under Longa, after a trifling resistance.

During the operations at Abechuco, the enemy made the greatest efforts to re-establish themselves in Gamarra Major. A strong body advanced to regain the village, but were driven back in confusion by General Hay's brigade. In spite of this failure, another attempt was subsequently made; but Sir Thomas Graham having caused the houses in front of the bridge to be loopholed, and placed his artillery in position to flank the approach, the enemy were again repulsed, and did not afterwards venture to renew the attack.

Notwithstanding these successes, it was found impossible to cross the bridges, the heights on the left of the Zadorra being occupied by a

CHAP. XI. strong reserve; and General Graham awaited the moment when the attacks on the enemy's left and centre should occasion the withdrawal of the corps in his front. This at length came. Towards evening, when the centre of the allies had penetrated beyond Vittoria, the right wing of the enemy, fearing to be cut off, retired hastily from its position. Sir Thomas Graham immediately pushed forward across the Zadora, and took possession of the road to Bayonne, which, for some distance, runs along the margin of the river. Great confusion ensued. The baggage, heavy artillery, military chest, and court equipages of Joseph, had already been put in motion by that road, and were now intercepted. The enemy's columns, which were also retreating on Bayonne, were forced back into the Pampluna road; and in a moment the French army became a vast mob, without organization of any sort, and divested of every attribute of a military body. Never had any victory achieved by the enemy over the rude and undisciplined Spanish levies been more complete; never was any army reduced to a more absolute and total wreck than that which now fled from the field of Vittoria.

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CHAP. XI. The allies pressed forward, allowing not a moment of respite in which order might be restored, and adding to the amount of their captures at almost every step. Unfortunately the country was too much intersected by ditches to admit of the action of cavalry; and it was impossible for infantry advancing in military order to come up with an enemy who trusted solely for safety to rapidity of flight. The amount of prisoners, therefore, was comparatively small, though the pursuit was kept up with unrelenting activity, till the approach of night, when the extraordinary fatigue of the troops occasioned it to be discontinued.

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Joseph—whom from this period it would be a mere mockery to designate as King—fled towards Pampluna, and owed his safety to the swiftness of his horse. The tenth hussars entered Vittoria at full gallop the moment after his carriage had left it. Captain Wyndham, with one squadron, pursued, and fired into the carriage; and Joseph had barely time to throw himself on his horse, and escape under the protection of an escort of dragoons.

The immediate results of the battle were the capture of one hundred and fifty-one guns, and

CHAP. XI. four hundred and fifteen caissons, with upwards of
 1813. fourteen thousand rounds of ammunition, nearly
 June. two millions of musquet cartridges, forty thousand pounds of gunpowder, the military chest, and the whole baggage of the army, including the baton of Marshal Jourdan. Several carriages with ladies, among whom was the Countess de Gazan, likewise remained as trophies in the power of the victors. Many other females of rank, whose husbands were attached to the Court at Madrid, sought safety by mingling in the confused *mêlée* of fugitives. Being utterly unprepared for such a disaster, their sufferings were extreme during the retreat to the Pyrenees; and many are stated to have crossed the frontier barefooted, and in a state of the most pitiable privation.

Though the defeat of the enemy was thus accompanied by every conceivable concomitant of disgrace, the loss of combatants on both sides was unusually small. The amount of killed and wounded, on the part of the allies, was under five thousand. That of the enemy is rated, by their own writers, so low as six thousand, but was unquestionably greater. The number of prisoners made by the allies, from the

causes already mentioned, did not exceed one thousand. Of the two guns which the enemy
 succeeded in carrying off, only one reached Pampluna, the other being taken on the following day.*

It is a coincidence worthy of remark, that the battle of Vittoria was fought nearly on the same spot with another, in which a victory obtained by the English restored a legitimate Sovereign to the throne of Spain. Within sight of the enemy's positions on the twenty-first of June, and only a few miles higher up the same stream, the Zadorra, stands the village of Navarrette, where, on the third of April, 1367, Edward the Black Prince, totally defeated Henry the Bastard, and, in consequence, seated Don Pedro on the Throne of Castile.

Froissart, who gives a lively description of this engagement, observes of Sir John Chandos, the most eminent among the English knights, that "he never thought during the day of making any prisoners; but was solely occupied in fighting and pushing forward." The most striking passage, however, in his account, is that in which he describes the approach of the two armies towards each other, when, a little before they met, the Prince of Wales, with eyes and hands uplifted towards Heaven, exclaimed—"God of Truth, the Father of Jesus Christ, who has made and fashioned me, grant through thy benign grace, that the success of this battle may be for me and my army; for thou knowest, that in truth I have been solely emboldened to undertake it, in the support of justice and reason, to reinstate this King upon his throne, who has been disinherited and driven from it, as well as from his country." This zealous prayer was immediately followed by the onset, the Prince crying aloud, "Advance, banners, in the name of God, and St. George." "At the commencement," says the old historian, "the French and Arragonese made a desperate resistance, and gave the good knights of England much trouble;" but at last, "when all the divisions of the Prince were formed into one large body," the enemy "could no longer

CHAP. XI. The whole of Lord Wellington's manoeuvres
 1813. from the commencement of this memorable campaign are entitled to the highest admiration. The annals of modern war contain record of nothing more brilliant and decisive. Every calculation of the French Generals had been set at nought. Disregarding all occasion of petty or ephemeral success, he had threatened their whole flank from St. Andero to Valencia; and every movement of the allied army may be regarded as an important, though bloodless triumph. In the short space of one month, the enemy had been driven from Madrid to Vittoria, and forced to abandon the strong lines of the Douro and the Ebro. It was impossible, however, that Joseph should tamely suffer himself to be expelled from the Spanish territory without a struggle. It was necessary, by a strong effort, to turn the tide

keep the ground, but began to fly in great disorder;" and Henry (the Usurper) "perceiving his army defeated without hope of recovery, called for his horse, mounted it, and galloped off among the crowd of runaways." The English pursued them through the town of Najura, where they gained considerable plunder. "For King Henry and his army had come thither with much splendour; and, after the defeat, they had not leisure to return to place in security what they had left behind them in the morning."

of war, which seemed about to burst the barrier of CHAP. XI.
 the Pyrenees and flow onward into France. In 1813.
 the plain of Vittoria, therefore, it was determined to give battle. The position chosen was a bad one; and it was badly occupied. Covering a space of two leagues, it was too extensive; and the only roads by which the army could retreat, lay at the extremity of the line. The wings were strongly posted; but the only strength of the centre lay in the river, and in a height within half gun-shot, which commanded the valley for a considerable distance. It was in the centre that Marshal Jourdan anticipated attack, and concentrated his chief strength to repel it. Under this impression, instead of posting a strong division on the heights of Puebla, he occupied them only with a few light troops; and every subsequent effort to repair this error proved abortive.

The loss of the battle flowed almost as a necessary sequence. Sir Rowland Hill having gained the heights of Subijana, continued to advance; and the centre, weakened for the support of the left, was penetrated with facility by the centre columns of the allies. The left and centre were thus thrown back on Vittoria;

CHAP. XI. and the right, being unsupported, retreated, leaving the road to Bayonne in possession of Sir Thomas Graham. No victory was ever more complete and decisive. The whole plunder of Spain was disgorged in a moment; and he who had passed the Pyrenees as a monarch, recrossed them as a fugitive.

On examining the position two modes of attack naturally presented themselves to Lord Wellington. One of these was to content himself with merely threatening the wings, and to direct his principal attack against the enemy's centre, by penetrating which, and moving rapidly on Vittoria, in all probability the left wing would have been cut off. The other was that actually adopted, viz. to turn the position on both flanks, and subsequently to direct a powerful attack against the centre, when, by the necessities of the contest on the right and left, it should have been considerably weakened.

Against the first of these projects there were many objections. The Zadorra in front of Vittoria is not fordable; and to have forced the bridges, in face of a powerful army advantageously posted for their defence, was an operation of the greatest hazard and difficulty, which

could not have been effected without incurring a much heavier loss than that which actually resulted from the whole battle.

The French writers, by whom in the mortification of wounded vanity the charge has been made, neither will, nor can understand the situation of Lord Wellington. They cannot understand that with a high career before him, in which a single failure must have placed an insuperable barrier to his progress, he could not afford to sacrifice even a life beyond what was necessary for the attainment of the great and paramount end of his operations. The loss of ten thousand British soldiers at Vittoria, would have been poorly compensated by the capture of an equal number of the enemy. The previous fame of Lord Wellington had left him no petty vanity to gratify. It was his object not to gain victory merely, but *cheap* victory, for such alone could be attended with those great and important results, which in his eyes gave victory its value. By his manœuvres at Vittoria, he deceived the calculations of the French generals; and having forced them by his flank attacks to weaken their centre, his columns passed the Zadorra with trifling opposition. Under these circumstances

CHAP. XI. it may fairly be doubted, whether, by any other
1813. scheme of attack, a victory of equal magnitude could have been attained, without incurring a loss infinitely greater.

We do not assert, and it is not necessary for the triumphant vindication of Lord Wellington that we should assert, that even greater results might not have been attained by a different system of tactic at Vittoria. That Napoleon, with the population of a vast empire at his command, and without responsibility of any kind, would have fought the battle differently we have no doubt. But the circumstances of Lord Wellington were utterly dissimilar. He was intrusted with the destinies of three nations; and to have rashly hazarded so mighty a stake, would, even if successful, have deprived him of half his fame.

In truth, as the character of Lord Wellington is viewed by his countrymen, it exhibits no quality more worthy of admiration, than that unswerving energy with which, in spite of all temptations, he persevered in the pursuit of great objects; daring much where daring was required, yet pausing even in the moment of victory, whenever these objects had been attained. It is this nice proportioning of the hazards to the

ends,—this unvarying refusal to sacrifice the
lives of his troops, for the sake of converting
certain into more brilliant results, which constitutes the brightest and most enduring claim of Lord Wellington to the gratitude of his country. To the soldiers trained in the school of Napoleon, who, as has been truly said, would have sacrificed a million of lives for a million of pounds of coffee, this may seem inexplicable. Yet so it is. The very points which they select for censure, are those which will be handed down to posterity, as having attracted, in a supreme degree, the gratitude of England, and the applause of those nations whom he rescued from the yoke.

After the battle of Vittoria, Sir Thomas Graham, with the left wing, was directed to advance on Bilboa, to intercept the retreat of General Foy, who then occupied that town. On receiving intelligence of the battle, however, General Foy, having collected all the detachments from the different military stations in Biscay, except Santona and St. Sebastian, immediately fell back on Bayonne, and endeavoured to impede pursuit by barricading the gates of Tolosa, and occupying the convents and large buildings in the vicinity.

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CHAP. XI. Towards evening Sir Thomas Graham directed a

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general attack. The French were rapidly driven from all their positions without the town, and a nine-pounder was brought up to burst open one of the gates. The allied troops then entered; but it was already dark, and in the difficulty of distinguishing the troops of the different nations engaged, the enemy effected their escape with smaller loss than they must otherwise have suffered.

Sir Thomas Graham continued to push the enemy along the road to Bayonne, dislodging them from every position in which they attempted to make a stand. They were driven across the Bidassoa, which forms the boundary in this direction between Spain and France, by a brigade of the Gallician army under Castanos.

On Jun. 30. the thirtieth, the garrison of Passages, a harbour of considerable importance, surrendered to the troops of Longa, and St. Sebastian was blockaded by a detachment of Spanish troops.

The enemy, in retiring from the Ebro, having left a garrison in the castle of Pancorvo, Lord Wellington directed the Conde de Bisbal, with the Spanish reserve, to reduce it. On the twenty-eighth, the town and lower fort were carried by assault; and, on the first of July, the castle

surrendered by capitulation. The garrison, consisting of six hundred and fifty men, were made prisoners.

Whilst these operations proceeded on the left, the remainder of the army was no less actively employed. On reaching Pampluna, Joseph withdrew his wings from the Spanish territory, leaving three divisions of the centre, under Gazan, in the valley of El Bustan. Lord Wellington, entertaining some suspicion that they intended to fortify a position in that fertile and defensible country, directed Sir Rowland Hill, with three brigades of the second division, and one brigade of Portuguese, to approach the enemy by the pass of Lanz; and Lord Dalhousie, with the seventh division, to menace their right by a movement on San Estevan. These manœuvres were completely successful. By a series of brilliant attacks, the enemy were successively driven from every post, and forced to seek safety in a rapid retreat across the Pyrenees.

In the meanwhile, the third, fourth, and light divisions, with two brigades of cavalry, marched in pursuit of General Clausel, who, ignorant of the battle, advanced to Vittoria on the day following. Finding it occupied by General Paken-

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July.

Jul. 7.

CHAP. XI. ham's division, he instantly retreated on Logrono, where he remained several days, and
 1813. Lord Wellington conceiving it possible to intercept his retreat, moved a large force towards Tudela, while another advanced on Logrono. Clausel, however, receiving intelligence of the approach of the allies, and discovering that the direct road to France was barred against him, fell back on Zaragoza by forced marches, pursued and harassed by a strong Guerilla body under Mina. Having reached that city, he continued his retreat on the pass of Jaca, where he entered France, with the loss of his artillery, and about three hundred prisoners, captured by the indefatigable Mina.

Jul. 1.

With the exception of the garrisons of Pampluna and St. Sebastian, the whole army of Joseph had now retreated into France; and preparations were immediately made for the reduction of these last strongholds of the enemy. As Pampluna was generally believed to be ill provided with provisions, it was placed under blockade by a corps of Spaniards, and encircled by a strong line of entrenchments to prevent the escape of the garrison. St. Sebastian was immediately invested; and Sir Thomas Graham, with

the first and fifth divisions, directed to prosecute the siege. CHAP. XI.

1813.

Intelligence of these events was received in England with unequalled joy and exultation. The Marquis Wellington was raised from the rank of Lieutenant-General to that of Field Marshal, and received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament. Illuminations and rejoicings took place in all the principal cities, and the measure of the national gratitude was filled to the brim.

Nor were the Government of Spain backward in testifying their deep sense of the eminent services of Lord Wellington. By a decree of the Cortes, he was created Duke of Vittoria; and a grant, in perpetuity, of the Lordship of Soto de Romano, in the kingdom of Granada, was annexed to the title.

CHAPTER XII.

OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES.

CHAP. XII. WHILE in the north-west of Spain the cause of liberty and justice had gone forward, prospering and to prosper, the eastern provinces had become the scene of events of a very different character. During the preceding winter, a considerable reinforcement, under Major-General Campbell, arrived at Alicante from Sicily, and a body of native troops had been organized in the Balearic islands, under British officers. No movement, however, took place till the beginning of April, when Sir John Murray having assumed the command, the Anglo-Sicilian army, amounting to about sixteen thousand men, advanced to Biar and Castalla. General Elio, who, with a corps of twelve thousand men, oc-

cupied the frontiers of Murcia, also advanced to Yecla and Villena. CHAP. XII.

On learning this combined movement, Suchet collected his whole disposable force; and on the morning of the eleventh, General Harispe succeeded in surprising the Spanish division in Yecla, about fifteen hundred of which were killed or made prisoners. On the day following he again attacked the Spaniards at Villena, from which the cavalry immediately retired, leaving in the castle a battalion, which, wanting means of subsistence and defence, capitulated next day.

Suchet then advanced by the road to Castalla, leading through the pass of Biar, which was occupied by the advance of Sir John Murray's army, under Colonel Adam. The orders of that officer were to fall back on Castalla, but to dispute the passage with the enemy. After a contest of several hours, Colonel Adam accordingly retired on the main body, with the loss of two mountain guns, which had been disabled in the action.

On the following day, Suchet found the allied army strongly posted, with its left on a range of heights in front of Castalla, and the right and

1813.
April.

Apr. 11.

Apr. 12.

Apr. 12.

CHAP. XII. centre covered by a ravine. He immediately

1813.

April.

directed a strong column to attack the left of the position, at the same time threatening the right with his cavalry. The enemy's column, covered by their light infantry, ascended the heights with great gallantry, opposed only by the Spanish brigade of General Whittingham, which, for nearly an hour, kept up a continued skirmish with the light troops. At length, when they had nearly reached the summit, the British troops opened fire with tremendous effect; and charging with the bayonet, drove back the assailants with great precipitation on their main body in the plain.

After this repulse, Suchet, unwilling to commit his army by a general engagement with the defile of Biar in rear, retreated on Fuente la Higuera; and Sir John Murray, on the day fol-

Apr. 13.

lowing, moved by the direct route on San Felipe, in hope of reaching that point before the defeated force. In this he was disappointed; and retracing his steps, again established himself in the position at Castalla. The loss of the allies in these engagements, amounted to one hundred and forty-five killed, and somewhat more than five hundred in wounded and missing.

That of the enemy is acknowledged by Marshal Suchet to have been very great. CHAP. XII.

1813.

May.

No consequences, however, flowed from the advantage gained at Castalla. The position of the enemy on the Xucar was too strong to admit of a direct attack on its front; and the armies remained inactive till the end of May. Sir John Murray then received instructions from Lord Wellington to embark his army for Catalonia, and, securing an establishment on the coast, to combine his operations with the Catalan leaders, and thus effect a diversion in favour of Valencia. Should Suchet, however, succeed in bringing up his troops in time to prevent the capture of a maritime fortress, his orders were instantly to re-embark and return to Valencia, to assist the Duke del Parque in driving the enemy from his line on the Xucar.

On the thirty-first of May, therefore, the army was embarked at Alicante on board of the English fleet on that station, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hallowell. Early on the third of June, the troops were landed near the point of Salon; and in the course of the day Tarragona was reconnoitred and invested.

May 31.

Jun. 3.

A brigade under Colonel Prevost had pre-

CHAP. XII. previously been despatched to attack the Fort
 1813. on the Col de Balaguer, which commands the
 June. only road practicable for artillery between Tortosa and Tarragona. This force was joined on the fifth by two Spanish battalions; and on the seventh the Fort capitulated. The garrison, consisting of eighty men, were made prisoners of war.

The strength of Tarragona had been materially diminished since the former siege. The French could not afford a garrison sufficient for the defence of works so extensive, and the outer line had been dismantled. In order to delay the progress of the besiegers, however, General Bertolletti, the governor, occupied the Fort Royal and the ruins of the Bastion San Carlos, which had been hastily repaired on the approach of the allied army.

Though General Murray was yet in no state to enter seriously on the siege, two batteries were opened on the morning of the sixth against the Fort Royal, and another on the seventh. On the morning of the eighth, it was reported by Major Thackray, the commanding engineer, to be practicably breached. It was the request, however, of that officer that the

Jun. 8.

fort should not be assaulted, as the immediate possession of it could be rendered available for no object, and to maintain it would necessarily be accompanied by considerable loss. General Murray, therefore, determined to delay the attack, and gave orders that the fire on the fort should continue only to prevent the restoration of its defences.

The stores, and the artillery, and engineer horses, were at length landed; and on the morning of the eleventh, fire was opened on the body of the place from two heavy batteries, at a distance of four hundred and fifty yards. But time had been already given for the approach of Marshal Suchet, who, leaving the command of the troops, on the Xucar, to General Harispe, moved rapidly with the remainder of his army on Tortosa, where, learning the fall of the Col de Balaguer, he left his artillery, and continued his march, with a single division, by paths through the mountains on his left towards Tarragona. In the meanwhile, orders had been sent to General Maurice Mathieu, to advance rapidly with his whole disposable force from Barcelona, to the relief of the place.

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Jun. 11.

CHAP. XII. On learning these movements, General Murray decided on raising the siege; and in the course of the twelfth of June, embarked his infantry, leaving nineteen pieces of artillery in the trenches, and a considerable quantity of stores. Against this sacrifice Admiral Hallowell vainly remonstrated, and urged his opinion that by delaying the embarkation till night the guns might be brought off. But Sir John Murray, strongly impressed with the conviction that the force under his command, even when joined with the Spanish army of Copons, in the immediate neighbourhood, was unequal to contend with the enemy, adhered to his resolution. The cavalry and field artillery were sent to the Coll de Balagner, as affording a more favourable place for their embarkation.

During the night of the twelfth, General Murray received an express from the Col de Balagner, informing him that a large body of the enemy had passed towards Tarragona, and he proceeded to that fort on the following day. On his arrival, he found that a skirmish had taken place between the out-piquets and the French cavalry, and that it was necessary to land infantry to protect the embarkation of the cavalry

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and artillery. During the following day, his whole force was disembarked, in the hope of being able to cut off a body of the enemy at Bandillos. This hope, however, proved vain; and on the seventeenth, Lord William Bentinck arrived to assume the command of the army, which he immediately re-embarked, and having destroyed the defences of the fort, returned to Alicante.

Such was the miserable conclusion of these operations. In the course of the following year, the conduct of Sir John Murray became the subject of investigation before a military tribunal. By the decision of the court, he was acquitted of all intentional disobedience to his instructions; but convicted of having "unnecessarily abandoned a considerable quantity of artillery and stores, which he might have embarked in safety, such conduct being detrimental to the service." As no evidence of unworthy motive was adduced, the court attributed his conduct to an "error in judgment;" and nothing followed upon the decision, as the case did not appear to the Prince Regent to call for the admonition pointed out by the court.

But the verdict of no tribunal could remove

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Jun. 17.

CHAP. XII. from Sir John Murray the imputation of gross incapacity. Entertaining the deliberate conviction that the force he commanded was utterly unequal to contend with that of Suchet, it might naturally be supposed that on learning the approach of that leader he would take instant measures for the security of his army. But Sir John Murray, influenced by some unknown and unintelligible motive, continued his operations against the town, at a time when he must have known that its reduction was impracticable. Instead of re-embarking the guns and stores already landed, we find him, during the whole of the tenth and eleventh, employed in landing more, and moving them to situations of greater danger and exposure.

On the twelfth, however, a change came over the spirit of his dream. He then determined instantly to re-embark his troops; the guns were left in the trenches without an effort to remove them, in spite of the arguments and entreaties of Admiral Hallowell, who stated his conviction, that, by the delay of a few hours, they might be brought off.

All this is very miserable; yet we do not blame Sir John Murray. That he acted to the

best of his judgment, we are bound to believe: CHAP. XII. But what shall be said of those who, amid the multitude of accomplished officers presented to their choice, selected such a man for the command of an army?

On reaching Alicante, Lord William Bentinck advanced to form a junction with the Duke del Parque, with the view of attacking the different French posts in Valencia. But intelligence of the battle of Vittoria no sooner reached Suchet than he determined on abandoning the province. On the fifth of July, he retired into Catalonia, leaving twelve thousand of his army to garrison the chief fortresses in his rear.

Lord William Bentinck, leaving the blockade of the other strongholds to the Spaniards, entered Catalonia, and crossing the Ebro below that city, immediately invested Tarragona by sea and land. On the third of August, the army was joined by the Duke del Parque; and on the eleventh, by the Catalan force, under General Sarsfield. It was then determined to land the ordnance and ammunition, and commence the works of the siege.

Suchet, however, who had retired on Barcelona, aware that Tarragona, if left to itself, must

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July.

Jul. 5.

Jul. 30.

Aug. 11.

CHAP. XII. soon fall, determined to make a strong effort for its relief. Having formed a junction with De-
 1813. caen, and collected all the troops which could
 August. be spared from Barcelona and the neighbouring garrisons, he advanced with a force of twenty-five thousand men. A strong column attempted to proceed by the road along the coast, but driven from this route by the fire of the British squadron, it struck into that leading by Brafín and the Col de St. Christina, while De-caen, crossing the Francoli, advanced from Valls. On the approach of Suchet, Lord William Bentinck took up a position in front of Tarragona, with the intention of giving battle; but subsequently judging from an affair of outposts, that the enemy were too strong, fell back during the night to Cambrils, and gave up Tarragona.

In the circumstances of the French army, however, Suchet did not think it prudent to retain possession of Tarragona, but destroying the works he withdrew the garrison, and fell back behind the Llobregat. In this position he maintained his communication with Lerida, and covered Barcelona and the road to France.

In the beginning of September, Lord William

Bentinck being informed that a considerable por- CHAP. XII.
 tion of the French forces in Catalonia had been 1813.
 withdrawn, moved forward to Villa Franca. An September. advanced corps, under Colonel Adam, consisting of a British, a Calabrian, and three Spanish battalions, with four mountain guns, was posted considerably in advance at Ordal, a position of great strength, which commanded the high road from Barcelona. Though Lord William Bentinck was aware that Suchet had already assembled a large force at Molino del Rey, he considered the advance at Ordal to be secure, and anticipated that the enemy would attempt to dislodge him from his position by a movement in flank. In this calculation he was deceived. At midnight of the twelfth, the piquets of the advanced corps were suddenly driven in, and the French came on in great force. The allies, though taken by surprise, and attacked by overwhelming numbers, made vigorous resistance, and twice repulsed their assailants. At length, however, the position was carried; and the French cavalry executing a charge on the retreating column, it was thrown into confusion, and forced to seek safety by dispersing amid the mountains. The guns, and a considerable number of prisoners,

Sep. 12.

CHAP. XII. were taken by the enemy; and the total loss of the allies amounted to nearly one thousand men.

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September.

On the following day Lord William Bentinck retreated from Villa Franca on the approach of Suchet and Decaen, the latter of whom was advancing on his left flank from Martorell. During the march an affair of cavalry took place, in which the Brunswick hussars behaved with great gallantry. Suchet then recrossed the Llobregat; and the allies, unmolested, continued their retreat on Tarragona by Altafulla. Shortly afterwards, Lord William Bentinck returned to Sicily, and was succeeded in command by Lieutenant-General Clinton.

CHAPTER XIII.

BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.

NAPOLÉON, while occupied with the great contest, which he was about to wage on the banks of the Elbe, had, in some degree, withdrawn his attention from the operations in the Peninsula. He had trusted that the army, in the strong line of the Douro or the Ebro, would be enabled to give a decisive check to the progress of the allies; and the more immediate pressure of the war in Germany had induced him to recall many of his ablest generals, and among others Soult, who had long held the chief command. But in one short month his hopes had been overthrown. By a series of splendid manœuvres, terminating in a victory no less splendid, his grand army had been swept out of Spain, and the tide of war had already rolled onward to the Pyrenees, where a

CHAP. XIII
1813.

CHAP.XIII mighty effort was demanded to arrest its progress.
1813.

Under these circumstances, Napoleon at once perceived that the contest on the southern frontier was one which could no longer be disregarded. He felt the urgency of the crisis; he saw that the most immediate and energetic measures could alone rescue France from invasion; and a portion of the vast levies then raising was directed to recruit the exhausted ranks of the army in the Pyrenees. Soult, whose talents alone seemed equal to so great an emergency, hastened from Germany to assume the command, with the rank of Lieutenant of the Emperor.

If any measure could have restored the confidence of the disheartened and fugitive legions of Joseph's army, this appointment would unquestionably have done so. The reputation of Soult stood almost pre-eminently high, and no other leader, during the whole war in the Peninsula, had enjoyed the confidence of the troops in an equal degree.

Soult having proclaimed his determination of repairing the errors of his predecessors, and of driving the allies across the Ebro, took instant measures for the re-organization of the

army. Supplies of all sorts were sent to replace CHAP.XIII
the losses sustained in the campaign, and reinforcements of cavalry and artillery gave considerable augmentation to his strength in these arms. His infantry, which by recent losses and desertions, had been reduced to eighty thousand, he divided into three corps, under command of Generals Reille, Drouet, and Clausel, with a body of reserve under Villatte. These arrangements being completed, he established a large dépôt at St. Jean Pied de Port; and prepared, by a strong effort, to relieve the fortresses, and roll back the tide of war from the frontier.

The situation of Lord Wellington, to whom the progress of the campaign had hitherto been little else than one continued march of triumph, was become one of considerable hazard. Having to cover the siege of two fortresses, with a wide interval between, he was under the necessity of extending his line in a dangerous degree. The positions occupied by his divisions were indeed strong; yet, by the impassable nature of the country, they were cut off from all direct communication with each other, and the enemy enjoyed the advantage of being able to direct the whole volume of his force

CHAP. XIII against a single corps, while the other divisions, separated by almost impenetrable barriers, could lend no assistance. A defensive army, therefore, was weak in the precise proportion of the number of the passes it was necessary to maintain; and by the success of the enemy at any one point, the safety of the whole was liable to be compromised.

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This circumstance gave Marshal Soult a great and prominent advantage over his opponent. By a strong and sudden attack, he might reasonably calculate on overpowering one of the corps covering the passes; and then, by pushing forward on the flank and rear of the remainder, he might force the whole army to a hasty retreat, and thus effect the relief of the blockaded fortresses.

A change, therefore, was about to take place in the character of the contest. The allied army was to defend a series of mountain defiles, in a country where cavalry could not act, and in positions to which artillery could not be conveyed. They were about to enter on a struggle for which they were unprepared by any former experience; while the system of mountain warfare was one for which the lightness and

activity of the French troops peculiarly fitted CHAP. XIII them, and in which they had hitherto been considered unrivalled. The high fame of the hostile commanders contributed also to invest this period of the war with an extrinsic interest. Unless at Oporto, Soult had never been brought into close and direct contact with Lord Wellington. The celebrated leaders by whom the latter had been successively opposed, when weighed in the balance had been found wanting; and Soult had been selected by the Emperor, as the man on whose skill and energy he relied, to repair the disasters of the campaign, and free the soil of France from the reproach of invasion.

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The principal passes of the Pyrenees were occupied by the allied army, which was distributed in the following manner:—

The right wing covered the direct approaches to Pampluna from St. Jean Pied de Port. The brigade of Major-General Byng, and the Spanish corps of General Morillo, occupying the advanced passes of Roncesvalles and Arbaicete, formed the extreme right, supported by the fourth division at Biscaret, and the third division in reserve at Olacque.

The right of the centre, under Sir Rowland

CHAP. XIII Hill, consisting of the second division, and the

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Portuguese division of the Conde de Amarante, guarded the passes near Maya, in the valley of Bustan, distant about twenty miles from the pass of Roncesvalles. On his left were the seventh and light divisions, the former posted in the pass of Echelar, the latter on the mountain Sta. Barbara, and in the town of Pera. The sixth division was placed in reserve at St. Estevan, to support the troops at Maya or Echelar, as occasion might require.

The left wing, commanded by Sir Thomas Graham, consisting of the first and fifth divisions, was engaged in the siege of St. Sebastian, protected in its operations by a force on the Bidassoa, composed of Lord Aylmer's brigade and the Spanish corps of General Freyre.

The army of the Conde de Bisbal, about ten thousand strong, was employed in the blockade of Pampluna; and the corps of Longa extended the line of communication from the Urumea to the Bidassoa, forming a chain between the left, and left of the centre.

Soult's first object was to relieve Pampluna. With this view, he collected the main body of his army in the neighbourhood of St. Jean Pied

de Port. Posting the reserve at Urogne to CHAP. XIII

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guard the line of the Bidassoa on his right, he formed his army into two powerful columns, with which he prepared to make a simultaneous attack on the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya. By the one he hoped to secure his immediate object, while the other was chiefly intended to deceive his opponent; and, by diverting his attention to a different point, to delay the transmission of reinforcements to the real scene of danger.

The column destined for the attack on the position of Maya, was about thirteen thousand strong, and commanded by Drouet. At ten o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fifth, this corps was perceived to be approaching the right of the position, by a mountain path, leading from Espallete, across the ridge to the village of Maya. At the same time demonstrations were made against the different passes, and under cover of these manœuvres having concentrated a strong force in front of Aretesque, about half-past eleven they filed in column from behind the mountain, and attacked the piquets of the second division on the heights of Maya.

Jul. 25.

The piquets, with the support of the light in-

CHAP. XXI fantry companies of the second brigade, for a

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time sustained the onset of the enemy, with the greatest steadiness, but were at length overpowered. The thirty-fourth and fiftieth regiments then came up, and charging with the bayonet, succeeded in driving back the assailants. The latter, however, again advanced in great force, and the two gallant battalions were on the point of being surrounded, when the right wing of the ninety-second came up to their support. The contest was then continued on both sides with the greatest obstinacy. While the thirty-fourth and fiftieth were re-forming, the wing of the ninety-second was opposed to a force of the enemy more than two thousand strong, and almost annihilated in the contest.

The troops which had hitherto waged so unequal a contest were at length ordered to withdraw; and fresh regiments were moved forward in their place. But the enemy, in spite of all opposition, continued to gain ground, and was already in possession of the pass. The second division, overmatched in numbers, retired slowly, defending every favourable point, till joined by a brigade of the seventh division, under General Barnes, when the lost ground was regained, and

the enemy driven back beyond the pass of Maya, CHAP. XIII
About nine at night, the contest ceased; and the troops, having formed line, were allowed an interval of repose.

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Throughout this severe engagement the British laboured under a decided disadvantage. Though the attack was made only at one point, it was impossible for General Stewart to denude the other passes of defence; and while the enemy acted in one compact and powerful body, they were opposed only by successive battalions, brought up as the pressure of circumstances demanded. It was owing to this, that the utmost gallantry of the troops was unequal to arrest the progress of the assailants; but in no instance were the qualities of British soldiers more finely displayed. The loss of the allies was very severe; it exceeded sixteen hundred men, and four guns were taken by the enemy.

During the night, Sir Rowland Hill retired from the heights which had been so gallantly defended, and took post on some very strong ground in rear of Elizonda. The enemy remained inactive in his position in front of Maya, during the whole of the twenty-sixth.

Jul. 26.

In the meanwhile, Soult, with a column of
VOL. III. P

CHAP.XIII thirty-five thousand men, had directed a more

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powerful attack on Roncesvalles. Making a demonstration on the front of General Byng's position, in advance of the Pass, he pushed the main body of his army along the ridge of Arola, on its left, occupied by General Cole's division. Though the enemy were greatly superior in numbers, General Cole defended his ground with great obstinacy, but was at length forced to retire with considerable loss. He then took up a strong position in rear, which the enemy did not venture to attack.

Soult then directed his efforts against the front of General Byng's brigade, and forcing it back gained possession of the road to Arbaicete, which enabled him to attack the Spanish corps of Morillo, on the right. The Spaniards, after some resistance, were forced to retire for support on the fourth division; and the position being thus turned, General Cole, as soon as it was dark, fell back to a strong ridge in front of Zubiri, where he halted for the night.

Jul. 26.

On the day following, General Picton moved up with the third division, and assumed the command; but the enemy coming on in great force, both divisions retired to some strong

ground in the rear, where they remained in order of battle till night. On the twenty-seventh, the retreat was continued to a position in front of the villages Huarte and Villalba, which covered the blockade of Pampluna.

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At the commencement of these operations, Lord Wellington was with the left of the army, probably anticipating that Soult's first effort would be directed towards the relief of St. Sebastian, as the fortress more immediately in danger. On the night of the twenty-fifth, he received intelligence that the enemy were in motion, and hastened to the scene of action, where he arrived at the moment when the divisions under Sir Thomas Picton were taking up their ground.

Lord Wellington determined to concentrate the main body of his army for the defence of Pampluna, and the sixth, seventh, and light divisions, were directed to pass the mountains of Lanz, and form on the left of the fourth division. Sir Rowland Hill was directed to retire behind the Lizasso, and keep in check the corps of Drouet, which might otherwise have advanced on Pampluna, by the lateral road from Irantsum and Berisplano; a body of the blockading force,

CHAP. XIII under the Conde de Bisbal, was ordered to move

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up and form a *corps de reservé*. At the same time, Sir Stapleton Cotton was ordered to bring up the cavalry, and take post on the right of the third division, the only ground which permitted the action of that arm.

General Picton's division formed the right, and was posted on a ridge, in front of the village Huarte, with its right extending to the hills beyond Olaz. The left, consisting of General Cole's division, General Byng's brigade, and General Campbell's brigade of Portuguese, occupied the heights in front of Villalba, between the rivers Arga and Lanz, with the left at a chapel behind Sauroren, on the high road from Maya.

The divisions had scarcely taken up their ground, when the enemy directed an attack on a hill, projecting from the line on the right of the fourth division, occupied by a Portuguese and a Spanish battalion. These troops maintained their ground, and drove back the enemy with the bayonet; but the possession of this post being considered of importance to the position, Lord Wellington directed the fortieth regiment to advance to their assistance. Thus reinforced

the enemy were defeated in every effort to gain possession of the hill. CHAP. XIII

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On the morning of the twenty-eighth, the French army were formed on a mountain ridge, fronting the position of the allies. Their left rested on some bold heights beyond the road of Roncesvalles, and their right extended to the village of Sauroren, which they occupied in force. Before any hostile movement had taken place, the sixth division, under Major-General Pack, came up, and were immediately formed, unobserved by the enemy, across the valley, in rear of the left of the fourth division, making face against the village of Sauroren.

The troops were scarcely posted, when the enemy pushed forward a very large force from Sauroren, in order to penetrate by the valley, and turn the left of the position. But this body being unexpectedly met by a strong fire, both in front and flank, was speedily forced to retire with great loss.

The next effort of Soult was directed against the centre. About one o'clock, a strong column advanced against the left of the fourth division, posted at a chapel on the road to Ortiz, and speedily dislodged a Portuguese battalion, by

CHAP.XIII which it was defended. The brigade of General

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Ross, however, coming up, the Portuguese were enabled to rally, and the enemy in their turn were forced to give way.

A powerful attempt was made to gain possession of the hill on the right, defended by the fortieth regiment, and two Spanish battalions. The French succeeded in gaining the summit of the height; but the fortieth, charging with the bayonet, drove them back with distinguished gallantry, and every effort of the enemy at this point proved abortive.

Soult then directed a general attack on the whole front of the heights occupied by the fourth division, and a contest of the most desperate character ensued. The French advanced, with cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" to penetrate the position with the bayonet. The fourth division waited their approach, reserving their fire till the enemy had approached within a few paces, then pouring in a volley, and charging almost at the same instant, drove them down the heights in the greatest confusion, and with prodigious loss.

In one instance alone was the attack successful. A Portuguese battalion, on the right of

General Ross's brigade, having given way, the CHAP.XIII assailants gained possession of the chapel near Sauoren; and General Ross being thus obliged to retire, the enemy succeeded for a moment in establishing his columns on the line of the allies.

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On perceiving this circumstance, Lord Wellington directed the twenty-seventh and forty-eighth regiments to charge; and nothing could exceed the gallantry or the success with which these orders were obeyed. The two regiments, and General Ross's brigade, made several most brilliant charges, and at the bayonet's point dislodged the enemy from the chapel. At the same time, General Pack's division having moved up the valley to support the left of General Cole, the attack on this part of the position ceased entirely; and Soult, at length convinced of the hopelessness of the contest, drew off his troops.

The brunt of this severe struggle was borne almost exclusively by the fourth division, which, though repeatedly attacked by the enemy in great superiority of numbers, maintained its ground throughout the day. "In the course of this contest," says Lord Wellington, "the gallant fourth division, which has been so frequently distinguished in this army, surpassed their

CHAP.XIII former good conduct. Every regiment charged with the bayonet, and the fortieth, the seventh, twentieth, and twenty-third, four different times. Their officers set them the example; and Major-General Ross had two horses shot under him. The Portuguese troops likewise behaved admirably; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the Spanish regiments del Principe and Pravia."

Jul. 29. During the whole of the twenty-ninth, both armies remained inactive. But the situation of the allies was materially improved by the arrival of the seventh division at Marcalain, between Sir Rowland Hill's position and the right, which secured the communication between the corps, and gave unity of action to the whole force. Soult then gave up all idea of penetrating the line of the allies, at the points towards which his efforts had hitherto been directed, and determined, by a lateral march, to effect a junction with the corps of Drouet. This would open to him the road from Pampluna to Tolosa, by which he might advance against the left of the allied army, and taking it in rear, effect the liberation of St. Sebastian.

In order to masque his intention, he still oc-

cupied, in considerable force, the strong position on the heights of Sauroren, which then became the *point d'appui* of the extreme left, and put the remainder of his force in motion by its right. At the same time, the wounded, the artillery, and a great part of the baggage, were sent off to the rear, in order that the army might, as much as possible, be untrammelled in its movements.

On the morning of the thirtieth, the enemy's troops were observed to be in motion towards the mountains on the south of Lanz; and Lord Wellington, instantly divining the object of the manœuvre, determined on dislodging the corps in his front from its position. Sir Thomas Picton, therefore, with his division, was directed to move by the valley of Arga, against the French left, while the seventh division, under Lord Dalhousie, should turn their right in the valley of Lanz. These manœuvres were completely successful. The brigade of General Inglis, with great gallantry, carried a height which supported their right; and General Pakenham, who, after General Pack was wounded, had assumed command of the sixth division, drove the enemy from the villages of Sauroren and Ortiz.

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General Cole, with the fourth division, then moved on to attack the front of the position, and the enemy, after trifling resistance, gave way on his approach. By these operations, the French were compelled to abandon a position which Lord Wellington declared to have been "one of the strongest and most difficult of access he had ever seen occupied by troops."

In the meanwhile, Sir Rowland Hill having occupied the post of La Zarza, which exceedingly cramped and impeded their movements, the right wing, under Drouet, was strongly reinforced, in order to dislodge him. About ten o'clock, the enemy filed about twenty thousand men to their right, to turn the left flank of the position. In consequence, Sir Rowland Hill moved General Pringle's brigade to the summit of the hill on the left of the road leading to La Zarza, which, as the enemy extended his right, was directed to make a corresponding movement on the ridge. General Walker's brigade was likewise moved to the left; and the heights on the right of the road were occupied by Portuguese.

While the left of the position was thus threatened, powerful and repeated attacks were made

CHAP. XIII

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July.

on its front, which uniformly encountered repulse. The ninety-second and thirty-fourth regiments, in particular, charged with the bayonet, and drove back the enemy with great slaughter. At length, Sir Rowland Hill observing that the enemy had already encircled his left, withdrew his troops to a strong and rugged ridge, about a mile in rear, where he maintained his ground in spite of every effort to dislodge him.

On the morning of the thirty-first, the French were discovered to be in full retreat; the column of Reille by the road to St. Jean Pied de Port, and that of Clausel by Echalar and Sarre, and that of Drouet by Maya. The allied army instantly moved forward in pursuit. About eleven o'clock, a strong rear corps was found posted in the pass of Donna Maria, from which Lord Wellington dislodged them, by moving the second and seventh divisions on their flanks. A smart engagement, however, took place, in which the brigade of General Barnes, of the seventh division, particularly distinguished itself. The pursuit was vigorously continued, many prisoners were made, and a large convoy with baggage was taken in the town of Elizonda.

Thus terminated these great conflicts. By a

Jul. 31.

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CHAP. XIII. skilful concentration of his strength, Soult had
 1813. actually succeeded in penetrating to within a league of Pampluna; yet, after one of the most desperate struggles in which troops ever were engaged, he had been compelled to return, leaving this important fortress to its fate. On the twenty-eighth, the garrison made a spirited sortie, and succeeded in gaining several batteries; but they were at length driven back by the Spanish division of Don Carlos d'Espana. The loss of the French army in these operations exceeded eight thousand men. That of the allies amounted to about six thousand.

By the retreat of the enemy, the allied army again became masters of the passes through the mountains. On the first of August, the different divisions were established nearly in the same positions which they had occupied previous to the attack of the twenty-fifth; and, in order to provide against future attack, these were strengthened by the construction of redoubts and entrenchments.

Aug. 1.

CHAPTER XIV.

CAPTURE OF ST. SEBASTIAN—SOULT DEFEATED AT ST. MARCIAL.

THE town of St. Sebastian stands on a pen-
 insula, formed by an inlet of the sea on its
 southern, and by the river Urumea on its
 northern side. The only approach is by a low,
 sandy, isthmus, which is crossed by a regular
 line of works, having a large hornwork in front.
 The water faces consist of a single high wall,
 with no flank defences but a few small towers.
 About six or seven hundred yards distant is a
 range of sand-hills, on the left of the Urumea,
 which flank the land defences of the town;
 and in front of these the Urumea is fordable on
 the efflux of the tide. Near the neck of the isthmus
 is a range of heights, on which stands the
 Convent of St. Bartholomeo, about eight or nine

CHAP. XIV.
 1813.

CHAP. XIV. hundred yards distant from the body of the
 1813. place, which the enemy had put into a state of
 July. defence.

Behind the town, at the extremity of the peninsula, is the castle. It stands on the summit of a high oval shaped hill, the sides of which are scarp'd and precipitous, and by a projection to the south, forming, by the aid of moles, a harbour for small craft.

The side selected for attack was that towards the Urumea; and as a preliminary operation, it was judged necessary to gain possession of the Convent St. Bartholemeo, against which two small batteries were constructed on the night of the thirteenth of July. At the sametime, working parties were employed on the sand-hills on the north of the river, in erecting batteries to open on the body of the place, as soon as the Convent should have fallen.

Jul. 14. The batteries having opened fire on the fourteenth, a false attack was directed on the day following, in order to ascertain whether the enemy's intention was to defend the place to extremity. This attack, however, by the ardour of the troops, was converted into a real one, and encountered a severe repulse.

On the seventeenth, one end of the Convent CHAP. XIV.
 being in ruins, the assault was again given, and 1813.
 it was carried without difficulty, by the ninth July.
 regiment, and a brigade of Portuguese.

The way being thus cleared, operations were pushed forward against the town. Batteries were erected on the sand-hills, both for breaching the river face, and for enfilading the front defences. On the nineteenth, approaches were commenced on the isthmus, both on the right and left of the village of St. Martin, which the enemy had burned. On the twentieth, all the batteries on both sides of the river opened fire on the town.

On the twenty-first, Sir Thomas Graham sent Jul. 21.
 a summons to the governor, who refused to admit the bearer into the town. In cutting the parallel across the isthmus, a sort of tunnel or sewer was discovered about four feet in height, which on examination proved to lead into the ditch opposite to the face of the right demi-bastion of the hornwork, where it was closed by a door. In this drain it was thought advisable to plant a mine, and a quantity of earth was deposited at its further extremity, in the hope that

CHAP. XIV. the explosion might fill up the ditch, and form a bridge for the assailants.

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July.

On the twenty-third, the breach being reported practicable, the fire of the batteries was directed to form a second breach on the left. Towards evening, a second smaller breach was considered practicable, and preparations were made for storming them on the following morning, when the tide should prove favourable. At daybreak the troops were under arms, but owing to a furious conflagration among the houses behind the breach, which bore the appearance of design, it was judged advisable to countermand the order for assault.

Jul. 25.

At daybreak on the morning of the twenty-fifth, the troops being in readiness, the explosion of the mine gave the signal of advance. The storming party, consisting of about two thousand men, with the advance, led by Lieutenant Campbell of the ninth, then pushed forward towards the larger breach; and the confusion caused in the town by the unexpected explosion, enabled them to reach it with little loss. The garrison, however, soon recovered from their alarm, and the assailants, in ascending the breach, were re-

ceived with a fire so destructive, both in front and flank, that after a gallant effort, they were driven back in confusion, with tremendous slaughter.

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A few hours after the repulse of this attack, the garrison, animated by their success, made a sortie, and entering the parallel by the left, succeeded in making prisoners of all the troops in the trenches, who sought refuge in some ruined houses in rear of the right of the parallel. These were exclusively Portuguese. The enemy then retired, carrying with him about two hundred prisoners into the town.

It was at this period that Soult advanced with the intention of driving back the allied army and relieving Pampluna. In consequence, Sir Thomas Graham embarked his guns at Passages, and till the issue of the operations in the Pyrenees became known, contented himself with keeping St. Sebastian in a state of rigorous blockade.

The retreat of Soult, however, was no sooner known than Sir Thomas Graham made preparations for the renewal of the siege. On the sixth of August the artillery was relanded, and on the eighteenth a fresh battering train, and a plentiful supply of stores, arrived from

Aug. 6.

CHAP. XIV. England. It was determined to renew the former attacks, both from the north of the Urumea and from the isthmus, with increased power of artillery; and new batteries were accordingly erected.

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August.

At midnight on the twenty-sixth, the garrison made a sortie on the advanced trenches, and succeeded in reaching the parallel. There, however, their progress was arrested by the guard in the trenches, and they were forced to retire into the town, carrying with them a few prisoners.

Aug. 28. The batteries opened fire on the morning of the twenty-eighth, against the towers which flanked the curtain on the eastern face, against the demi-bastion on the south eastern angle, and the termination of the curtain of the southern face. The fire continued throughout the whole day without intermission. During the night a party of two hundred men were landed from the fleet, under Sir George Collier, on the rocky island of Sta. Clara, and the small detachment posted for its defence were made prisoners. On the night following the garrison made another sortie, which, profiting by their former dear-bought ex-

Aug. 29.

perience, the besiegers succeeded in repulsing CHAP. XIV. without loss.

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During the following days the fire from the batteries was continued, and three mines were sprung on the morning of the thirty-first, which destroyed a large portion of the curtain. The column of attack was then formed. It consisted of Major-General Robinson's brigade, preceded by a storming party consisting of seven hundred and fifty volunteers from the different divisions of the army.*

Aug. 31.

As the column filed out of the trenches, it became exposed to a heavy fire of shells and grape-shot; and a mine was exploded in the left angle of the hornwork in the front line of works, which blew down the counterscarp, under which the troops were advancing, but did not check their progress towards the breach. "Nothing," says Sir Thomas Graham, "could be more fallacious than the external appearance of the breach.

* The storming party consisted of one hundred and fifty men of the light division, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hunt of the fifty-second regiment; two hundred of the brigade of guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke; two hundred of the German legion, under Major Robertson, and two hundred of the fourth division, under Major Rose of the twentieth foot.

CHAP. XIV. Notwithstanding its great extent, there was but one point where it was possible to enter, and there by single files. All the inside of the wall to the right of the curtain formed a perpendicular scarp of at least twenty feet to the level of the streets, so that the narrow ridge of the curtain itself, formed by the breaching of its end and front, was the only accessible point. During the suspension of the operations of the siege, the enemy had prepared every means of defence which art could devise, so that great numbers of men were covered by entrenchments and traverses in the hornwork, on the ramparts of the curtain and inside of the town opposite to the breach, ready to form a most destructive fire of musquetry on both flanks of the approach to the top of the narrow ridge of the curtain."

Every thing that the most determined courage could attempt was repeatedly tried in vain by the troops, as they were brought forward in succession from the trenches. "No man," says Sir Thomas Graham, "outlived the attempt to gain the ridge;" and it was found impossible, notwithstanding every exertion of the engineers and working parties, to effect a lodgment for

1813.

August.

the troops, exposed to the shells and grape of the batteries of the castle.

It was under such desperate circumstances that Sir Thomas Graham adopted the bold resolution of ordering the guns to be turned against the curtain. A heavy fire was then opened over the heads of the troops on the breach, which produced great effect; and two hours were thus employed, during which the troops, though partially covered from the fire of the place, suffered very severely. In the interval a battalion of the thirteenth Portuguese regiment, led by Major Snodgrass, with great gallantry forded the Urumea near its mouth, and succeeded in carrying the small breach on the river face.

It was then determined to renew the attack. The troops were ordered once more to ascend the breach, and to gain the high ridge at all hazards; and an attack was also ordered on the hornwork. Fortunately an explosion of some combustibles took place on the rampart of the curtain, and created considerable confusion at the moment when the assault commenced. The narrow pass was gained; and a detachment, which occupied the right of the breach, having succeeded

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CHAP. XIV. in forcing the barricades on the top of the line-wall, effected an entrance into the houses which joined it. The assailants then formed a lodgment on the summit of the breach, and the troops impetuously pushing forward, the enemy were driven from all their defences into the castle, with the loss of nearly seven hundred prisoners.

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The loss of the army in this attack was very severe, upwards of two thousand men and officers being killed or disabled. Among the latter were Generals Leith, Oswald, and Robinson; among the former Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Richard Fletcher, commanding engineer, who on all occasions had given the highest proofs of gallantry and professional talent.

The capture of St. Sebastian was followed by scenes of atrocity and outrage painful to record. The inhabitants, who were prepared to welcome the British as liberators, were treated by the drunken and infuriated soldiers with the greatest barbarity. Every house was ransacked and plundered; and notwithstanding the utmost exertion on the part of the officers, several days elapsed before it was found practicable to restore order. The lustre of the British arms was never

more deeply tarnished, nor the laws of honour and humanity more disgracefully outraged, than on this lamentable occasion. CHAP. XIV. 1813.

Preparations were made for the reduction of the castle, and an occasional fire of shot and shells was kept up from the batteries on the right. During the assault on the thirty-first several houses had caught fire, and the flames not being extinguished spread through the whole town, and the operations of the besiegers were thus considerably retarded. On the ninth of September, however, the whole of the ordnance, amounting to fifty-nine pieces, opened fire on the castle, with such terrific effect, that in a few hours the white flag was hoisted on the Mirador battery; and the garrison, amounting to about eighteen hundred effective men, and five hundred sick and wounded, surrendered prisoners of war.

Sep. 9.

Thus terminated the siege of St. Sebastian, after a loss of nearly four thousand men, and an expenditure of upwards of seventy thousand shot and shells, and above five hundred thousand pounds of gunpowder.

It has often been remarked that British soldiers, who have uniformly displayed in all their contests with the enemy in the field a de-

CHAP. XIV. cided superiority, have lost that superiority in
1813. every instance in which a fortified place was to be attacked, and either failed in their object, or purchased success at a great and disproportionate price. This cannot be attributed to any want of talent or zeal in the Engineer officers, who were in general men accomplished in their profession; and the testimony borne by Lord Wellington to their conduct on every occasion, is more than sufficient to exonerate them from censure. But the subordinate branch of the department was miserably defective. There was no corps of sappers and miners, nor any body of men peculiarly trained to carry on the intricate and complicated operations of a siege. The corps of Royal Artificers consisted of handicraftsmen of different sorts, unprepared by previous education for the novel duties they were called on to discharge. But the number even of these was small, and the chief labour of the trenches fell to be performed by the soldiers of the line, or in other words by a promiscuous mass of men, bred many of them to sedentary occupations, most of whom were utterly unskilled even in the use of the implements committed to their hands. In conducting a siege with such

clumsy and unmanageable workmen it was of
CHAP. XIV. course found impossible to push the approaches
1813. to the body of the place, and rash and dangerous expedients were in consequence resorted to. It was attempted, often vainly, to purchase with life, that which in other circumstances might have been gained by labour; and the reliance of the besiegers was placed not on the resources of art, but on the courage of the troops.

To assault a breach in the body of a place before a lodgment has been formed on the counterscarp, is evidently one of the most dangerous enterprises in which it is possible to embark. All authority is against such a mode of proceeding; it is a great and confessed violation of the just rules of attack, and has long been abandoned by the continental armies. Yet such was the system adopted by the British army in all its sieges in Spain. Both at Badajos and St. Sebastian it signally failed; and the journals of these sieges afford—if such were wanted—satisfactory evidence that accident alone can give to an assault, under such circumstances, a reasonable chance of success. There is no fire from the trenches to keep down that from the

CHAP.XIV. place. The assailants advance to the breach
1813. without cover of any sort, and are therefore exposed, during their whole progress, to a most destructive fire from the garrison. Order is necessarily broken in descending the counter-scarp, and cannot be restored in the ditch, under the shower of missiles poured down from the parapet. Thus the attack is made under every possible disadvantage, while the difficulty of surmounting the obstacles to the ascent of the breach contribute still further to augment the confusion. But if in addition the breach be well entrenched, and the governor has employed the precautions prescribed by every treatise on defence, by covering the approach to the breach, and preserving a powerful flank fire both direct and vertical, to play on the assailing columns, no conceivable superiority of courage over a skilful enemy can counterbalance such enormous advantages. The attack *must* fail, or at all events can only succeed by the occurrence of some of those fortuitous and unforeseen accidents, by which in war the issue of a contest must sometimes be decided.*

* Those who wish to see this subject elucidated with great clearness and sound judgment, we beg to refer to the "Journal

On the thirty-first of August, the very day CHAP.XIV.
on which the town of St. Sebastian was carried 1813.
by assault, Soult made another effort for its relief. Three divisions of Spaniards, under General Freyre, occupied the left bank of the Bidasoa, covering the high road from Bayonne. They were drawn up on the strong heights of St. Marcial, with their right extended in front of the Haya mountain, to observe the different fords by which the enemy might approach the position. On the left, they were supported by the first division and Lord Aylmer's brigade in rear of Irun, and General Longa's Spanish division was posted in rear of their right.

On the thirtieth, it was ascertained that the Aug. 30.
enemy were assembling a large force in the neighbourhood of Bera, and the brigade of Gen-

of the Sieges in Spain," by Colonel Jones. The work constitutes a record of great importance, and the author exposes the deficiencies of the particular branch of the service to which he belongs with an unsparing hand. The evils complained of, however, we are happy to state, are now in progress of amendment; and in any future siege in which a British force may be engaged, there is no reason to apprehend a repetition of such unfortunate results as those which it is our present duty to record. In the establishment under Colonel Paisley at Chatham, young officers of engineers, and the corps of sappers and miners, are not only instructed but practically exercised in all the duties of their profession.

CHAP. XIV. eral Inglis was in consequence ordered to the
 1813. bridge of Lezaca, and two brigades of the
 August. fourth division to take post on the left of the Haya
 mountain, to strengthen the right flank. A
 Portuguese brigade was likewise moved to the
 right of the mountain, to prevent the position
 being turned in that direction.

Aug. 31. On the morning of the thirty-first, the enemy
 crossed the Bidassoa in great force, by the fords
 in front of the position, and made a desperate
 attack on the Spanish left, on the heights of St.
 Marcial. The Spaniards, advantageously post-
 ed, received the attack with great firmness and
 gallantry. They charged the enemy with the
 bayonet, and drove them down the face of the
 heights, in the greatest confusion, to the river,
 in which many were drowned.

The course of the Bidassoa being immediately
 under the heights occupied by the enemy, on
 which he had thrown up several batteries, he
 was enabled to throw a bridge across the river.
 A general attack was then made on the heights
 of St. Marcial. While the French columns were
 ascending the heights, Lord Wellington appear-
 ed in front of the line. The Spanish troops ex-
 pressed their joy and confidence by loud and re-

peated acclamations; and again charging the CHAP. XIV.
 enemy with the bayonet, put them to the route,
 1813. and pursued them across the river. Nothing
 August. could be more triumphantly decisive than the
 success of the Spaniards, achieved without the
 smallest support from the British divisions
 posted in reserve. The French fled, panic-
 stricken and without order, and plunged head-
 long into the river at the different fords. The
 bridge gave way under the extraordinary pres-
 sure of the fugitives, and most of those passing
 at the moment were drowned. Soult, observing
 the extreme facility with which his most vehe-
 ment attacks had been repulsed, then gave up all
 hope of success, and took advantage of the
 darkness of a violent storm to withdraw his
 troops.

"The conduct of the Spanish troops," says
 Lord Wellington, in his official account of the
 action, "was equal to that of any troops I have
 ever seen engaged; and the attack having been
 frequently repeated, was, upon every occasion,
 defeated with the same gallantry and determin-
 ation."

During this ineffectual attempt to penetrate
 by the high road to St. Sebastian, strong columns

CHAP. XIV. of the enemy forded the Bidassoa in the neighbourhood of Bera and Salines, with the view of turning the right flank, and gaining possession of the road leading through Oyarzun. The Portuguese brigade, stationed on the right of the Haya mountains, was then attacked; and, though the brigade of General Inglis was immediately brought up to its support, it was found necessary to abandon the heights between Lezaca and the Bidassoa. General Inglis then withdrew to a strong ridge in front of the Convent of St. Antonio, where the remainder of the seventh division shortly after came up to his support.

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August.

The aspect of this formidable position, and the entire failure of the attacks on the heights of St. Marcial, at length induced the enemy to re-cross the Bidassoa. The river had become so swollen with the heavy rain which had fallen during the day, that the fords were found impassable before the rear of the column had been able to cross. In order, therefore, to gain the bridge of Bera, they attacked General Skerret's brigade of the light division, both from the pass of Bera and from the left of the river. By this measure, the remainder of their force succeeded

in effecting its passage by the bridge, though exposed to a heavy fire from the light division.

The loss of the enemy, during these engagements, was very great, and included two Generals of division; but the moral consequences of their defeat were far more important. In presence of both armies, the French columns had been repeatedly routed by the Spanish troops, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to regard with supreme contempt. The effect of this was twofold. It gave the Spaniards that collective confidence in themselves, which a long series of disasters had contributed to impair: it tended to depress the hopes and ardour of the French soldiers, in whose minds the results of the day must have been accompanied by a mortifying sentiment of inferiority.

1813.
August.

CHAPTER XV.

OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.
EVENTS IN SPAIN.

CHAP. XV. AFTER the fall of St. Sebastian, nearly a
1813. month elapsed unmarked by any hostile movement on the part of either army. During this interval, both were employed in strengthening their respective positions, by the construction of field-works, and in preparing for the further prosecution of the campaign. The weather was cold and inclement, and the sufferings of the part of the allied army employed in guarding the passes were very great. Compelled to pass a season of extreme rigour on the stormy summits of the Pyrenees, the troops gazed down with a feeling of envy and discontent on the fertile plains and rich valleys of France, outspread before them. Being liable at any moment to attack, it was necessary that the strictest vigi-

lance should be maintained, and the duties were CHAP. XV.
in consequence severe. Under these circum-
stances, a spirit of gloomy discontent became
1813.
diffused among the soldiers, and the prospect of
October. future glory was outweighed by present suffering. Desertions, in consequence, became numerous; and it was found necessary to check the increasing prevalence of this disgraceful crime by severe examples.

Until the fall of Pampluna it was impossible to act on the offensive on a great scale; but, in the meantime, Lord Wellington determined to push his left across the Bidassoa, and dislodge the enemy from a range of heights on the right of that river, extending from the high and steep mountain, La Rhune, to the sea. On the sixth of October, preparations were made for
Oct. 6. the approaching encounter; and at three o'clock, on the morning of the seventh, the troops were
Oct. 7. under arms.

The dispositions for attack were as follows:—
On the left, the first and fifth divisions, and General Wilson's brigade of Portuguese, were directed to ford the river in four columns, near its mouth, and attack the enemy's entrenchments in the neighbourhood of Andaye.

CHAP. XV. The Spanish corps of General Freyre, in three columns, was to cross at fords higher up the river, in front of Boraton, and attack the works on the Montagne Vert, and the height of Mandalle.

1813.
October.

The light division, under General Alten, and the Spaniards, under Longa, were to dislodge the enemy from the mountain of Commissari, and the pass of Bera.

The Andalusian troops, under General Giron, were to advance against the entrenched position on the mountain of La Rhune.

Every precaution was adopted to prevent discovery by the enemy. The troops moved on to the attack in deep silence. The night had been one of cloud and storm, and the approach of morning was accompanied by vivid flashes of lightning, which occasionally shed a glare upon the columns, brighter by contrast with the deep darkness by which they were preceded and followed. The storm, however, had rolled on to the French side of the river, and thus favoured, notwithstanding the noise of the artillery and pontoon train, the troops succeeded in gaining the different fords of the Bidassoa undiscovered by the enemy.

The fifth division enjoyed the honour of first planting their feet on the French soil. Under a brisk fire from the enemy's piquets, they continued their advance against the French line, which was hurriedly forming on the nearest range of hills. The first division came up soon after, and the enemy were driven from their works in gallant style, with the loss of six pieces of artillery. The brigade of General Hay, in particular, distinguished itself. It attacked the enemy in three successive positions, with the most perfect success.

1813.
October.

The attack of the light division on the position of Bera was peculiarly brilliant. The approach was narrow, and completely commanded by several strong redoubts on the acclivities and summits of the steep mountains above the village of Bera. But these obstacles did not retard the advance of the division. General Skerret's brigade, led by Colonel Colburne, attacked the right of the position, and drove the enemy from his entrenchments by a most gallant charge. The brigade of General Kempt attacked the pass of Bera, and carried it with little difficulty. The result of these operations was the capture

CHAP. XV. of upwards of four hundred prisoners, and of three pieces of cannon.

1813.
October.

General Giron likewise succeeded in carrying the lower slopes of La Rhune. But the summit was still maintained by the enemy, when the approach of darkness prevented the prosecution of further measures to dislodge them. In the morning, however, the post was surrendered after a feeble resistance; and General Giron pushing forward, the enemy were forced to abandon the whole of their intrenchments.

These important successes were achieved with a loss comparatively small on the part of the allies. It amounted, altogether, to little more than fifteen hundred men. The resistance of the enemy was certainly more trifling than was anticipated, owing partly, perhaps, to the secrecy and suddenness of the attack, and partly to the circumstance that the views of Soult were chiefly directed to the concentration of his army behind a strongly-fortified line on the Nivelle.

The allied army now occupied a range of commanding situations, from which it might at any moment continue its advance into the French

territory. The surrender of Pampluna at length removed the obstacle which had hitherto tramelled its operations, and forced it to linger inactive on the frontier. On the thirty-first of October, the garrison, four thousand in number, surrendered prisoners of war, and all the artillery and stores were given up. The only cause of delay being thus removed, Lord Wellington immediately determined to assume the offensive, and drive the French army from its position.

1813.
October.

Before transferring his operations to the French territory, Lord Wellington issued a proclamation to the army, prescribing the conduct to be observed on passing the frontier. Nothing can more honourably mark the wisdom and humanity of the British Commander, than the regulations which, at such a moment, were imperatively promulgated to the troops. As an example to future ages, and a contrast to the ferocious system of intimidation adopted by the enemy in Spain, the following clauses are worthy of historical commemoration:—

“ Officers and Soldiers must recollect, that their nations are at war with France, solely because the ruler of the French nation will not al-

CHAP. XV. low them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget, that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy, in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal, have been occasioned by the irregularities of his soldiers, and their cruelties, authorized and encouraged by their chiefs, toward the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country. To avenge this conduct on the peaceable inhabitants of France, would be unmanly and unworthy of the nations to which the Commander of the Forces now addresses himself."

1813.
October.

To enforce this order, however, was no easy task. In the British army, indeed, the system of discipline was too rigid, and the conduct prescribed too much in unison with the individual feelings of the officers, for any glaring breach of it to remain undetected or unpunished; but the Spaniards and Portuguese were filled with too powerful a remembrance of the atrocities perpetrated in the Peninsula by the French armies, not to feel desirous of retaliating on the French people the evils under which their own countries had so severely suffered. Cases of outrage, therefore, did at first occur; but the firmness of

Lord Wellington in bringing the offenders to CHAP. XV. punishment, speedily put a stop to such vindictive demonstrations, which the peaceful character of the inhabitants did nothing to provoke. During all the operations in the south of France the strictest discipline was maintained; and the forage and provisions necessary for the supply of the troops were paid for at the highest price. Thus secure from spoliation, and certain of a favourable market for their produce, the inhabitants of the country in a short time returned to their dwellings, and established a peaceful and lucrative traffic with the invading army.

1813.
October.

On the failure of his efforts in the Pyrenees, Soult had directed the formation of a strong line of defence, about twelve miles in extent, covering the town of St. Jean de Luz, and extending from the sea across the Nivelle to the heights behind Ainhoe. The whole front of this position was strongly fortified; and the right, in particular, was covered by several formidable redoubts, and by an interior line of very considerable strength. In the centre, the line extended along the left of the Nivelle, which, at that part, forms a considerable inflexion in rear of the mountain Petite La

CHAP. XV. Rhune, along a range of heights, covered on the left by the Sarre. The line then crossed the
 1813. Nivelles, and extended along a strong ridge in
 November. rear of Ainhoe, covered by a series of redoubts.

In addition to the reinforcements drawn from the general conscription throughout France, a decree had been issued, by which a force of thirty thousand conscripts was ordered to be levied in the provinces bordering on the Pyrenees; and the French army was thus daily receiving fresh accessions to its numbers. Unfortunately, the extreme inclemency of the weather, and the miserable condition of the roads, rendered nearly impassable by the heavy rains, contributed very considerably to retard the operations of Lord Wellington. This delay was most valuable to Marshal Soult, who thus gained time to discipline his new levies, and these military neophytes, being mingled in the ranks with the veterans of Spain, in a short time became instructed in their military duties.

Nov. 10. At length, on the tenth of November, the meditated attack took place. Soon after midnight, the troops having fallen under arms without the signal of trumpet or drum, began to descend the

Pyrenean mountains by moonlight, by the different passes, and advanced to the verge of the line of out-piquets, preparatory to the attack at day-dawn. This grand movement was made in the most profound silence. As the columns moved onward, the stillness was felt by all to be impressive. The village clocks striking the hours amid the darkness increased the general anxiety for break of day; and the first streaks of light which dappled the east were watched by many thousand eyes with strong and almost feverish impatience. On reaching their stations the troops were ordered to lie extended on the ground, and the columns were so posted that the intervening ground concealed them from the enemy.

It was the object of Lord Wellington, in the approaching attack, to occupy the attention of the enemy by false attacks on his right wing, where the position was too strong to be seriously assailed, while his chief efforts should be directed to penetrating the centre, and thus to separate the wings of the French army. This object attained, it was even possible, that by establishing his troops in rear of the enemy's right wing, its retreat on Bayonne might be cut off.

CHAP. XV. The left wing of the army was commanded
 1813. by Sir John Hope, who, on crossing the Bidas-
 November, soa, had succeeded Sir Thomas Graham as second in command.* It consisted of the first division, under Major-General Howard; the fifth division, under Major-General Hay; Lord Aylmer's independent brigade; and the Portuguese brigades of Generals Wilson and Bradford.

The centre was divided into two columns; the left of which consisted of the light division, under Charles Baron Alten, supported by Longa's corps of Spaniards. The right column of the centre was commanded by Marshal Beresford. It was composed of the third division, under the Honourable Sir Charles Colville, in the absence of General Picton; of the fourth division, under the Honourable Sir Lowry Cole; of the seventh division, under Mariscal del Campo de Cor, in the absence of Lord Dalhousie.

General Giron, with the Spanish army of reserve, was posted between the two columns of the centre, which were supported by a brigade of cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton.

* Sir Thomas Graham had been recalled, to assume the command of an expedition sent from England to assist in the liberation of Holland.

CHAP. XV. The right wing, under Sir Rowland Hill, consisted of the second division, under the Honour-
 1813. able Sir William Stewart; the sixth division,
 November, under Sir Henry Clinton; the Portuguese division of Sir John Hamilton; and the Spanish division of Morillo.

The attack began at daylight by a brisk cannonade, and a skirmish of the piquets along the whole line. The fourth division then advanced to attack a strong redoubt of the enemy in front of the village of Sarre, and carried it with little opposition. Sarre was then abandoned by the enemy without any attempt at resistance. At the same time, the light division, advancing with the greatest impetuosity, forced the lines on Petite La Rhune, and, having driven the enemy from the different redoubts, formed on the summit of the hill.

These preliminary attacks having proved successful, the centre columns continued their advance against the heights, in rear of Sarre, under a heavy fire from the various lines of retrenchment by which this point of the position had been secured. On the approach of the columns, however, these were successively aban-

CHAP. XV. done, with scarcely an effort at defence, and
 1813. the enemy fled in great disorder towards the
 November. bridges on the Nivelle. The garrison of one redoubt alone attempted to repulse the assailants.

While the light division were escalading the work, the column of Marshal Beresford succeeded in intercepting the retreat of the garrison, and an entire French battalion, nearly six hundred strong, was in consequence made prisoners.

In the meanwhile, Sir Rowland Hill made a powerful attack on the heights of Ainhoe. The troops moved on in echelons of divisions; and the sixth division, supported by that of Sir John Hamilton, having first crossed the Nivelle, came in contact with the enemy's right, posted behind the village, and at once carried the whole of his defences on that flank. The second division was equally successful in its attack on a redoubt on a parallel ridge in the rear; and both divisions then advanced to Espellate, when the enemy, afraid of being intercepted, abandoned their advanced line in front of Ainhoe, and retreated in some confusion towards Cambo.

During these operations, a detachment of fifteen hundred Spaniards of Mina's division moved along the heights of Maya, and attacked the ad-

vanced post of the enemy in that direction. CHAP. XV.
 Their onset was vigorous, and the French were
 1813. at first forced to retire; but, being reinforced,
 November. they again returned to the assault, and beat the Spaniards back nearly to the village of Maya.

The heights on both sides of the Nivelle being thus carried, the third and seventh divisions were directed to move by the left, and the sixth division by the right of the river, against a ridge of fortified heights near St. Pe, where the enemy was observed to be collecting in considerable force. These divisions came up, and, after a smart engagement with the enemy, drove them in confusion from the position. By this success the troops of the centre were established in rear of the enemy's right, which still remained in their works. But the extreme extent of the line of movement, and the great difficulty of part of the ground to be crossed, joined to the approach of night, prevented Lord Wellington from pushing farther the advantages he had acquired. Marshal Soult took advantage of the darkness to retire the force from his right, and resigned his whole line to the victorious army.

The result of these splendid operations was

CHAP. XV. the capture of fifty guns, fifteen hundred prisoners, and a considerable quantity of stores and ammunition. The loss of the victors little exceeded five hundred killed and two thousand wounded,—an amount of casualties almost incredibly small, when the strength of the position occupied by the enemy, and the amount of the forces engaged, are taken into calculation. The truth is, that the enemy, in defending his works on the Nivelle, did not display that courage and resolution, by which, aided by the talent of their leaders, the French army had earned trophies in every quarter of Europe. They were dispirited and disheartened by a continued series of defeats, and no longer met their opponents in the field with that confident anticipation of victory, which, like other prophetic aspirations, frequently contribute to their own fulfilment. Had it been otherwise, the loss of the allied army must have been very severe.

Though the whole of the allied army conducted itself in a manner impossible to be surpassed, no small portion of the success must be attributed to the artillery under Colonel Dickson. By the indefatigable exertions of that officer, artillery was brought to bear on the enemy's

works from situations which appeared utterly inaccessible to that arm. Mountain guns, harnessed on mules trained for the service, ascended the most difficult ridges, and showered down destruction on the entrenchments below. Even in the situations where the enemy considered themselves most secure, they found they had miscalculated, and suffered very severely from the action of the British guns.

The achievements of the tenth of November were followed by an interval of repose. The allied army went into cantonments between the Nivelle and the sea, while Marshal Soult withdrew his army within an entrenched camp in front of Bayonne. The shortness of the space which divided the armies, induced Lord Wellington to adopt the precautionary measure of establishing a defensive line of outposts, to protect the divisions from sudden attack. It extended from the sea along the front of the allied position to Cambo on the right.

During the whole of November the weather continued inclement; and the heavy and almost incessant rains, induced Lord Wellington to continue his troops in their cantonments. The

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November.

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November.

CHAP. XV. enemy, in the meanwhile, guarded the right bank of the Nive, and communicated, by strong patrols of cavalry, with a division, under General Paris, stationed at St. Jean Pied de Port. Thus the allies occupied only the confined space between the sea and the Nive, and were cut off from the whole country beyond that river, which afforded large supplies to the enemy. Lord Wellington, therefore, determined to cross the Nive, and drive back the advanced posts of the enemy, from the strong ground they occupied between the Nive and the Adour.

Dec. 9.

The ninth of December was the day fixed for the execution of these intentions. At ten o'clock on the evening of the eighth, the pontoon train passed through Arauntz as quietly as possible, and the troops were ordered to be under arms three hours before daylight. The left wing, under Sir John Hope, was directed to advance by the great road leading from St. Jean de Luz, and reconnoitre the enemy's entrenched camp near Bayonne. Sir Rowland Hill was to cross the Nive at Cambo, and the sixth division, under Sir Henry Clinton, at Ustaritz.

Accordingly, at day-dawn, Sir John Hope CHAP. XV. commenced his advance, and the enemy on his approach retreated, covered by his light troops, which skirmished with the advance of the allies. By one o'clock, the left wing had gained the heights on the right of the Bayonne road, and the enemy were driven into their intrenched camp.

Sir Rowland Hill with his corps passed the river by a deep ford above Cambo, and flanking the enemy's left at Urcuray, without resistance gained possession of the great road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Bayonne. The sixth division having crossed at Ustaritz, attacked a position to which the enemy had retired at Ville Franque, and speedily dislodged them. Darkness then came on, of which the enemy took advantage to withdraw all his posts within the lines of Bayonne; and Sir John Hope, with the left wing, returned to his former cantonments. On the morning of the tenth, Sir Rowland Hill established his corps with its right resting on the Adour, its left on the heights above the village of Ville Franque, and the centre in front of Vieux Monguerre, covering

CHAP. XV. the road to St. Jean Pied de Port. The sixth division re-crossed to the left of the Nive.

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Bayonne is situated at the point of confluence of the Nive and the Adour. The former which, during the greater part of its course, is a rapid mountain stream of little consequence, becomes unfordable for several miles above the city. The latter is a river of greater magnitude, and descending from the centre of the Pyrenees, in a course of fifty leagues, waters and enriches the plains of Gascony, and at Bayonne falls into the sea. The town is strongly fortified on three sides, and on the fourth is covered by the Adour, which divides it from the city or suburb of St. Esprit. The citadel or castle likewise stands on the right of the Adour, across which there is a bridge, and commands the whole city and the anchorage. It is the work of the celebrated Vauban, and of very considerable strength. In addition to the defences of the town, the enemy had formed an intrenched camp on the left of the Adour, covered in front by an impenetrable morass, and sufficiently spacious to contain an army.

There were only two roads practicable for artillery, by which Bayonne could be approach-

ed from the south—the one leading from St. Jean de Luz, the other from St. Jean Pied de Port. All the other approaches were of the most miserable description, and, in the depth of winter, wholly impassable for carriages of any sort.

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December.

While the armies were thus posted, Soult could direct an attack at pleasure on any portion of his adversary's line, the communications along which were of the worst and most difficult description. He likewise enjoyed this advantage, that, even if defeated, he had a secure retreat opened to him within the lines of Bayonne. Accordingly, on the morning of the tenth, Soult assumed the offensive, and directed a powerful attack on the left of the allied army covering St. Jean de Luz, the great *entrepot* for the supply of the allied army.

At daybreak, he moved out of Bayonne with the main body of his army, and advanced by the wood of St. Jean de Luz, to attack the left wing, under Sir John Hope. The road was defended by the fifth division, under Major-General Hay, stationed on the strong plateau of Barouillet, having the Portuguese brigade of General Campbell in its front. The light division was posted at Ar-

Dec. 10.

CHAP. XV. canques, about two miles on the right, between
1813.
December.

which and Barouillet there was a broad valley, which had not been occupied, in the belief that the enemy would not venture to advance in this direction, with posts of such strength on either flank.

A column of the enemy first came in contact with General Campbell's Portuguese brigade, which retired for support on the fifth division on the plateau of Barouillet. Another column attacked the light division, and drove their outposts within the village of Arcanques, which had been strongly intrenched. A strong body, however, pushed forward some distance beyond the left flank of the light division, and directed a powerful attack on the right of the fifth division, with the evident object of penetrating between the two allied corps, in the direction of Arbonne.

The fifth division, attacked in great force in front and flank, maintained its ground with the utmost gallantry, but its loss was very severe, and Major-General Robinson was wounded. In front of Barouillet, there is a thick coppice wood, and on the right there is a large field and an orchard. Through these the enemy

came on in great strength, and having driven CHAP. XV.
in General Campbell's Portuguese brigade, and
the brigade of General Robinson, which had
been sent forward to support it, at length suc-
ceeded in penetrating beyond the front of the
position. At this moment, a Portuguese batta-
lion, on the left flank, moved forward by the
road, and wheeling into the rear of the wood,
charged back on the French columns. The
ninth regiment, on the right, made a similar
movement; and the enemy, thus unexpectedly
attacked in rear, was compelled to retreat, with
a heavy loss in killed and prisoners.

The enemy, however, notwithstanding this check, renewed their attacks, and again attempted to dislodge the fifth division from their ground. But the brigade of Guards coming up to their support, the French columns were uniformly repulsed, till the approach of night put a close to the combat.

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In the meantime, the attacks on the light division at Arcanques had been scarcely less animated and persevering than those on the left. Repeated efforts were made by the enemy to drive the light division from their defences, which were always repulsed with great loss;

CHAP. XV. but, at the close of the day, the French troops
 1813. retained possession of the plateau of Bassussary,
 December. in the immediate front of Arcanques.

During the night, Soult retired the bulk of
 his force from its position in front of Sir John
 Hope, with the intention of attacking the light
 division in overwhelming numbers. At day-
 Dec. 11. break on the following morning, the enemy's
 piquets were driven in by the fifth division, and
 the sentries were again pushed forward to their
 former stations. Sir John Hope, suspecting the
 enemy's intention, moved part of his corps to
 their right to support the light division. This
 occasioned a change in the plans of Marshal
 Soult, who, conceiving that the force at Barou-
 illet had thus been materially weakened, again
 directed several columns against that point.

The morning had passed quietly, the troops on
 the left had received their rations, and parties
 had been sent out to cut wood, when the alarm
 was given that the enemy were approaching.
 The cry of "To arms!" was instantly echoed
 by a thousand voices, and the fatigue-parties
 ran hastily back to assume their stations in the
 ranks. On observing this, loud cheers were
 heard from the enemy, and with shouts of "*en*

avant! en avant!" their columns advanced to CHAP. XV.
 the attack. 1813.

In a few moments, however, the left wing was
 under arms, and formed to receive them. The
 efforts of the enemy were less vigorous than on
 the preceding day; and they were again repulsed
 with considerable loss. At the close of the day,
 both armies remained in the same positions
 which they had occupied on the preceding night.

On the morning of the twelfth, the French
 were still observed to be in great force in front
 of the left wing, and their movements gave indica-
 tion of an intention to renew the attack in that
 quarter. In the afternoon, the enemy push-
 ed forward a body of tirailleurs, and some se-
 vere skirmishing took place with the piquets, but
 no attempt was made to advance in force, and
 night again closed without any change having
 taken place in the positions of the hostile armies.

Marshal Soult had now resigned all hope of
 penetrating the left of the allied army, but con-
 ceiving that the pertinacity of his attacks on that
 part of the line must have induced Lord Wel-
 lington to withdraw a considerable portion of his
 troops from the right, he determined on an entire
 change in his plan of attack. During the night

CHAP. XV. of the twelfth, therefore, availing himself of the
1813. facilities afforded by his position, he withdrew
December. his whole force through Bayonne, with the intention of attacking the right of the army under Sir Rowland Hill.

But Soult was again deceived in his calculations. The probability of such a manœuvre on the part of the enemy had occurred to Lord Wellington, and measures had been taken to prevent its success. Orders were given to the fourth and sixth divisions to move to the support of the right, and the third division was held in readiness to cross the Nive, and afford still further support if required.

The force, under the immediate command of Sir Rowland Hill, consisted of about thirteen thousand men. It was distributed as follows :— On the left of his position a range of heights extends from the village of Ville Franque along the Nive, towards Bayonne. It is bounded by the river on one side, and by a deep valley, in the bottom of which are several large mill-dams, on the other. On this ridge was stationed General Pringle's brigade of the second division.

On the right, in front of the village Vieux Monguerre, there is also a long ridge of high

ground, which is bounded on the right by the CHAP. XV.
Adour, and on the left by several mill-dams. On
1813. this was stationed the brigade of General Byng.
December.

The centre extended along a ridge of heights opposite to the village of St. Pierre D'Irube, and in front of the heights of Petit Monguerre. It consisted of General Barnes's brigade, and the Portuguese brigade of General Ashworth. Two Portuguese brigades were posted in rear of Ville Franque, and formed a reserve.

At daylight on the morning of the thirteenth, Soult issued from his intrenched camp with a force of thirty thousand men, and directed the march of his columns against the centre of Sir Rowland Hill. This general was no sooner aware of the enemy's intention, than he moved the brigade of General Byng, with the exception of one battalion, to support the right of the centre ; and a Portuguese brigade was brought up from Ville Franque to strengthen it on the left. As the enemy's columns advanced up the long acclivities in front of the centre, they were subjected to a most destructive fire of artillery, and the havoc in their ranks was very great. The French, however, continued their advance, driving in the

Dec. 13.

CHAP. XV. piquets and the light troops which had been sent forward to their support. The engagement then became very warm. The enemy, in spite of the most determined resistance, succeeded, by superiority of numbers, in gaining possession of a height close to the position, and was continuing to gain ground when the brigades ordered to the support of the centre came up. The battle was then waged on more equal terms, and after a long and strenuous contest, the French were driven back. The whole of the regiments in General Barnes's brigade distinguished themselves by repeated charges on the enemy, and the conduct of the Portuguese troops was also marked by the greatest gallantry and firmness.

1813.
December.

The attack on General Pringle on the left was apparently intended to be merely auxiliary to the chief effort in the centre. During its continuance the enemy kept up a warm fire from his *tirailleurs*, but did not venture any earnest and decided attack on the position. The guns, however, being advantageously posted, did considerable execution.

In the meanwhile the enemy pushed forward a column on the right, in order to turn the flank of the position, to the village of Vieux

Monguerre. The Buffs, and some companies of light troops, which remained on that flank when the remainder of General Byng's brigade had been withdrawn, were at first forced to retire to some heights in rear of the village. Being ordered, however, by Sir Rowland Hill to recover the post, they attacked the enemy in the village, and drove him from it, with the loss of some prisoners.

1813.
December.

Thus had the utmost efforts of Marshal Soult been defeated by the corps of Sir Rowland Hill, without any assistance from the divisions which Lord Wellington had directed to move to his support. Nothing could exceed the skill and coolness which Sir Rowland Hill displayed in this unequal contest, or the precision with which every movement was executed by the troops. He was ably seconded by the Honourable Sir William Stewart, whose gallantry, promptitude, and judgment, were conspicuous throughout the day.

Soult drew off his troops and retired to some strong ground in front of the intrenched camp, where he remained in great force. In order to dislodge them, General Byng's brigade was directed to gain possession of a height on their

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CHAP. XV. left. This was done. General Byng led on the
 1813. troops to the attack, and ascending the hill un-
 December. der a heavy fire of musquetry and artillery, the
 enemy were driven down in some confusion,
 with the loss of two guns. An effort made to
 regain this post encountered a severe repulse,
 and the Portuguese brigade of General Buchan
 coming up, the enemy did not venture to renew
 the attack.

The result of the operations from the ninth to
 the thirteenth of December, during which the
 troops were exposed to the weather, at the most
 inclement season of the year, was honourable,
 in the highest degree, to the allied army. Though
 Soult, from his situation, possessed the advan-
 tage of being able to bear with his whole force
 on any point of an extended and vulnerable line,
 in none of his attacks, made in vast superiority
 of numbers, did he succeed in gaining any advan-
 tage. He could not, by all his efforts, recover a
 single yard of ground, from that adversary whom
 he had declared himself prepared to drive tri-
 umphantly beyond the Ebro. He had repeated-
 ly attacked with an army, and been repulsed by
 a division.

The loss of the allied army, during these con-

tests, was very severe. It amounted altogether CHAP. XV.
 to nearly five thousand men. That of the enemy, 1813.
 as given by the returns of the different corps, December.
 was about six thousand. On the eleventh, two
 battalions of Nassau troops, having received in-
 telligence of the liberation of their country, de-
 serted from the enemy, in hope of being thus
 enabled to join their restored sovereign.

The fierce and stormy contest which for five
 days had raged between the armies, was follow-
 ed by a calm of some duration. The extreme
 rigour of the season induced Lord Wellington
 to keep his troops in cantonments, and in this
 quarter no military events of any consequence
 took place before the close of the year.

The truth is, the proud and palmy days of the
 French army were gone. They were now be-
 come as familiar with defeat as they had formerly
 been with victory. The confidence of the troops
 had been broken by a continued series of disas-
 ters. Many of the veterans of Spain had been
 withdrawn, and the ranks were filled up with
 raw conscripts, forced into the service at a mo-
 ment when the French standard was sullied by
 defeat in every quarter of Europe. The ap-
 prentice was taken from his master, the student

CHAP. XV. from his college; and they came, not voluntarily
 1813. and animated by the high aspirings of youthful
 December. ardour, but chained together like felons, the enforced defenders of their invaded country, and the supporters of that tyranny under which they suffered.

It was with such unhopeful materials that Soult had to oppose the march of a victorious army, superior in numbers, in discipline, in confidence, and in powers of physical endurance. The difficulties of his situation were great and manifold, and the bold and skilful manner in which he struggled with these, neglecting no effort, and allowing no advantage to escape, retarding the progress of his enemy where he could not prevent it, and yielding no tenable position without a struggle, unquestionably mark him as a general of the highest order.

We must now turn for a moment to Catalonia. The necessities of the Emperor occasioned large drafts to be made from the French army in the east of Spain. All thought of conquest in that quarter had been resigned; and Napoleon, in the hope of being able to render the army of Suchet available for his necessities,
 Dec. 11. and to excite division among the allies, con-

cluded a secret treaty with Ferdinand, at Valen- CHAP. XV.
 çay, the object of which was to detach Spain 1813.
 from the coalition. By this treaty it was stipu- December.
 lated that the Spanish territory should be evacuated by the troops both of England and France, and that all who had taken office under Joseph, should be secured in all their titles, offices, and estates. The Duke de San Carlos was immediately despatched to Madrid with a copy of this document, bearing a letter from the King, in which the members of the existing government were directed instantly to ratify it in the customary forms.

But the concessions of Napoleon were too evidently wrung from him by the pressure of circumstances, to have any influence on the government of Madrid. They were unwilling to desist from hostilities, on the mere faith of a treaty without guarantee of any kind; and the situation of Ferdinand, as a prisoner, was such as to deprive his assent of all valid power in binding the nation. The reply of the Regency, therefore, conveyed expressions of joy at the approaching liberation of the country, and the restoration of its royal line; but was accompanied by a copy of the decree of the Cortes,

Dec. 18.

1814.
Jan. 8.

CHAP. XV. passed some years before, declaring that no public act of the King, while in a state of durance, could be recognised by the existing government of Spain.

1813.

December.

The arrival of the Duke of San Carlos at Madrid was followed by that of the celebrated Palafox, bearing another letter from Ferdinand, urging, in stronger terms, the immediate ratification of the treaty. But the Regency were immovable, and the Cardinal de Bourbon, in reply, informed his Majesty that an ambassador had been sent, in his name, to a congress of the belligerent powers, to treat for peace on an enlarged and secure basis.

In the meanwhile, Suchet was chiefly occupied in escorting convoys of provisions to Barcelona. And satisfied with retaining possession of the fortified places, he remained, prepared to shape his course as the current of events might direct.

With such events in the south of France and in Spain did the year close. It had witnessed the total and final discomfiture of one of the most profligate invasions in which cold and profligate ambition ever ventured to embark, and presented an example of vicissitude in human affairs, more extraordinary in its circumstances,

and memorable in its results, than any of which CHAP. XV. the pages of history bear record. Napoleon, for the first time, had been made to feel the full effects of his ambition, and of conquests extended too far to be either successfully maintained or honourably resigned. On every side his armies, hitherto so formidable, had encountered defeat. The monarchs whom he had humbled in the zenith of his prosperity, now declared against him; and after experiencing a succession of reverses, scarcely less decisive than those of the preceding campaign, he was driven across the Rhine, with the scanty and miserable relics of a vast army.

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Under these circumstances it was that Napoleon returned to Paris; and, announcing to his Council of State the desperate situation of the country, demanded new sacrifices. He addressed them in a strain of turbid and disconnected eloquence, which spoke the distraction of his own feelings, and could not be heard unmoved by men elevated by the remembrance of past grandeur, and influenced by the immediate terrors of hostile invasion.

Nov. 9.

"Wellington," he said, "is in the south; the Russians threaten the northern frontier; Aus-

CHAP. XV. tria, the south-eastern; yet, shame to speak it!

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the nation has not risen in mass to repel them.—

Every ally has abandoned me—the Bavarians have betrayed me!—Peace? No peace, till Munich is in flames!—I demand of you three hundred thousand men. I will form a camp at Bourdeaux of a hundred thousand—another at Lyons—a third at Metz. With the remnants of my former levies, I shall have a million of men under arms. But it is *men* whom I demand of you—full-grown men, in the prime of life; not these miserable conscript striplings, who choke my hospitals with sick, and my highways with their carcasses.—Give up Holland? rather resign it to the sea!—The word *peace* is ever in my ear, when all around should re-echo with the cry of *war*!”

It was in such language that Napoleon gave expression to the wild tumult by which his spirit was convulsed. Reckless alike of human blood or human misery in following the frantic schemes of his ambition, he demanded fresh victims; and his cry, like that of the sisters of the Horseleech, was “Give, give!” The Senate, awed and intimidated, acceded to his demands. They at once passed decrees, ordaining a levy of

three hundred thousand men, and doubling the

public contributions. But the execution of such edicts was becoming daily more difficult, in a country already drained of its male population, and of its wealth; and they were probably passed, rather with the view of supporting Napoleon in the negotiations then pending with the Allied Powers, than with any expectation that so vast an augmentation of men and revenue could be furnished by the nation.

In the meanwhile, though little obstacle intervened to the immediate invasion of France, the allies paused for a time in their career of success, and issued a public declaration, that their views were limited to the establishment of peace on equal and honourable terms, to which the ambition of Napoleon opposed the only obstacle. By this measure the hold which he possessed on public opinion was weakened; and the French nation, exhausted by the exertions of the baneful struggle, relinquishing all hope of conquest, thought only on peace.

Hitherto, however, Wellington alone had invaded the French territory, and he it was who first broke the charm of imaginary sanctity with which the long absence of foreign aggression had invested it in the minds of the people.

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CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLES OF ORTHEZ AND TOULOUSE.
CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.

CHAP. XVI. AT the commencement of 1814, the allied
1814. army occupied a line extending from Bidart on
January. the left to Arcanques and Ville Franque, with the
right thrown back *en potence* to Urcuray, on the
road to St. Jean Pied de Port. The head-quarters
of Lord Wellington were at St. Jean de Luz. In
order to guard against surprise, telegraphic sig-
nal stations were established in the cantonments
of the different divisions, to give notice of any
movement of the enemy.

The French army occupied a defensive posi-
tion, with its right, under Reille, in the in-
trenched camp; its centre, under Drouet, ex-
tending along the right of the Adour to Port de
Lanne, guarding the islands De Broc and De
Berens; and its left, under Clausel, along the

right of the Bidouse, from its confluence with CHAP. XVI.
the Adour to St. Palais; the flank being cover- 1814.
ed by the cavalry. General Harispe, a Basque January.
by birth, who had been recalled from Catalonia
in order to organize a system of Guerilla war-
fare among the mountaineers, was at St. Jean
Pied de Port, with a corps of irregulars, and a
weak division of troops of the line.*

For the support of this line on the right of
the Pau, Hastings had been strongly re-
trenched, and the bridges on the Bidouse at
Guiche, Bidache, and Come, were protected by
tetes-de-pont. A bridge, covered by strong
works, had been thrown across the Adour at
Port de Lanne, and a series of redoubts had been
erected along the line of the river. The works
of St. Jean Pied de Port were strengthened and

* The efforts of General Harispe failed of success. By dint
of great exertion, he succeeded in assembling a few bands of his
countrymen, for the purpose of desultory war on the flank and
rear of the allied army; but these were easily kept in check by
the Spanish Guerillas, under Mina. The inhabitants, in gene-
ral, were peaceable spectators of the contest waging in their
country, and few instances occurred of their attempting acts of
hostility. No motives of patriotism prevented their supplying
the allied army with provisions of all sorts, which were paid for
regularly; while Soult, who had neither the means nor the in-
clination to follow such a course, could only obtain by enforced
requisitions the means of subsisting his army.

CHAP.XVI. repaired; and the town of Dax was retrenched,
 1814. to serve as an *entrepot* for supplies and reinforcements
 January. drawn from the interior.

The impossibility of advancing through a country full of strong posts, and intersected by rapid streams, at a season when, by the heavy rains, the rivers had overflowed their banks, and the cross roads were impassable, prevented the movement of the allied army for a considerable period. Early in January, the Duc d'Angouleme arrived at St. Jean de Luz from England, accompanied by a small suite. Lord Wellington, while he received the Prince with all the respect due to his birth and his misfortunes, was unwilling to commit his country by a rash and premature adoption of the Bourbon cause; and requested him to appear only in the character of a simple volunteer, since, by the instructions of his government, he was not authorized to receive him in any higher character. Nevertheless, an address to the French nation, calling on them to renounce their allegiance to the existing dynasty, and restore their ancient line of Princes, was circulated, by many private channels, through the country, and produced in several of the provinces a powerful effect.

Till the middle of February no collision CHAP.XVI.
 took place between the armies, except a few cavalry skirmishes on the Joyeuse, and an affair
 1814. between Mina and General Harispe, in which
 February. the former was compelled to retreat into the valley of Bustan. The weather having then become more favourable, Lord Wellington prepared to take the field. His first object was to drive the enemy from his line on the Bidouse, and force him to abandon the whole country on the left of the Adour. With this view, the corps of Sir Rowland Hill broke up from its cantonments on the fourteenth, and moved on Hellete
 Feb. 14. to turn the enemy's left, and cut off his communication with St. Jean Pied de Port. By this movement General Harispe was forced to retire on St. Palais, leaving a garrison of fifteen hundred men in St. Jean Pied de Port; and, on the day following, he continued his retreat to Gar-
 Feb. 15. ris. The Spanish corps of Mina then returned, and blockaded St. Jean Pied de Port.

General Harispe, being joined by another body of troops near Garris, took post on the heights of La Montagne. The position was strong; but Lord Wellington conceiving it possible to cut him off from the bridge of St. Palais, deter-

CHAP.XVI. mined instantly to attack him, though the only
 1814. troops at his immediate disposal were the second
 February. division, under Sir William Stewart, and the
 Spanish corps of Morillo. The Spaniards, there-
 fore, were directed to march on St. Palais as rap-
 idly as possible, while the British advanced to
 attack the position in front.

The second division, with great gallantry, as-
 cended the heights, and drove down the enemy
 with the bayonet. The French made repeated
 efforts to recover their ground, but without suc-
 cess; and the march of Morillo on his rear, at
 length compelled General Harispe to put his
 force in retreat, after suffering considerable loss.
 The Spaniards having been unable to reach
 St. Palais in time to intercept his retreat, Gen-
 eral Harispe was enabled to cross the Bidouse
 without molestation. This contest was not
 more remarkable for the gallantry displayed by
 the troops on both sides, than for the circum-
 stance of its being chiefly waged in the dark,
 night having come on during the struggle.

On the day following, Sir Rowland Hill cross-
 ed the Bidouse, and continued the pursuit. On
 Feb. 17. the seventeenth, the enemy were found posted
 behind the Gave de Mauleon, having destroyed

the bridge at Arivarette. Under protection CHAP.XVI.
 of the artillery, however, the ninety-second re- 1814.
 giment crossed the stream by a ford, and attack- February.
 ed the French troops in Arivarette. The ene-
 my retired; and in the night passed the Gave*
 d'Oleron, and took up a position at Sauveterre.

By these successes, the enemy had been driv-
 en from a country of peculiar difficulty, which,
 from its frequent intersection by rivers, afford-
 ed great advantages for defence. The position
 occupied by the enemy at Sauveterre was very
 strong, and covered in front by a broad and
 rapid river. The greater part of Soult's force
 being concentrated] in that neighbourhood, Lord
 Wellington determined to distract the enemy's
 attention by a general movement of the whole
 army to its front, thus simultaneously threaten-
 ing him at different points, while Sir Rowland
 Hill should turn his left by crossing the Gave
 d'Oleron at Villenave. This manœuvre was at-
 tended by the most complete success. Marshal

* The torrents or rapids of the different rivers are known by
 the vernacular name of *gaves*, by the inhabitants of the coun-
 try. These *gaves* are distinguished among each other by the
 addition of the name of the principal town near which they
 flow; for example, the Gave de Mauleon, the Gave d'Oleron,
 &c.

CHAP. XVI. Beresford drove the French posts within the
 1814. *tete-de-pont* of Peyrehorade. Sir Rowland Hill
 February. effected the passage of the Gave on the twenty-fourth; and Soult hastened to concentrate his forces behind the Pau, leaving in Bayonne a garrison barely sufficient for the defence of the works.

We must now turn to the operations of the left wing in the immediate front of Bayonne.

Lord Wellington determined to pass the left wing across the Adour below the city, by a bridge of boats. Preparations had been in progress for this purpose for some time, but, from the breadth of the river, and the strength of the tides, it was necessary to employ vessels of from twenty to thirty tons burthen. These, however,
 Feb. 22. had been provided, and, on the twenty-second, waited only for a fair wind to sail from St. Jean de Luz to the mouth of the Adour.

Feb. 23.. On the morning of the twenty-third, Sir John Hope moved forward with the left wing; and driving in the enemy's outposts, formed a cordon round the town, terminating both above and below on the Adour. The heavy guns were with great labour and difficulty conveyed across the soft sandy ground to the banks of the Adour,

immediately below the intrenched camp where
 they were placed in battery. At the same time
 the fifth division obliged the French piquets, between the Nive and the Adour, to retire within the intrenched camp on that side.

The squadron, with the bridge-vessels, under Rear Admiral Penrose, having been detained by contrary winds, Sir John Hope determined to make an immediate effort to cross the river by means of pontoon rafts, guided by ropes; and having succeeded in stretching a hawser across the river, the project was put in immediate execution.

The enemy, trusting to the width and depth of the river, and the rapidity of the current, offered no opposition, their attention being apparently engrossed by the warm fire kept up by the British artillery on an armed corvette at anchor near the town. Owing to the strength of the tides, the rafts worked slowly, and in the evening only about six hundred of the Guards, and two companies of the sixtieth rifle corps, had been conveyed to the right bank.

The French at length discovered their error in neglecting to defend the passage of the river below the city, and a little before dark two bat-

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CHAP. XVI. talions were moved forward to attack the detachments which had already crossed. General Stopford made immediate preparations to receive the enemy. He posted his troops behind some low sandy ridges, with their right resting on the Adour, and their left on a morass, the ground in their front being flanked by the artillery on the opposite bank. A few rocketmen were hastily sent across the river and advantageously posted on the sand-hills.

In this position did the Guards await the approach of the French columns, but the fire of the guns and rockets was alone sufficient to check their progress; and, without venturing on closer encounter, the enemy retreated into the town.

During the night the allied troops continued to cross the river, and on the following evening the whole of the first division was established on the right bank.

Feb. 25. On the twenty-fifth, Admiral Penrose and the squadron appeared off the mouth of the river; and though the difficulties of effecting an entrance were very great from the swell on the bank, and the uncertainty of the channel, they were surmounted by the skill and energy of British seamen, who led the way in the ships'

launches, followed by the bridge-vessels. Of CHAP. XVI. the latter several were wrecked, but the remainder, protected by gun-boats, passed up the river, and by dint of incessant labour, a bridge had been laid down in the course of the twenty-sixth. Feb. 26.

The bridge thus constructed was sufficiently strong for the passage of artillery; and, till the conclusion of the war, served as the regular communication with the army from St. Jean de Luz and Spain, thus avoiding the inconveniences attending the route through the difficult country of the Gaves, in which all the bridges had been destroyed by the enemy.

The establishment of this communication across the Adour, opened to Lord Wellington the direct road to Bourdeaux, where he had long known that a strong party had been formed in favour of the Bourbons. But the district of country to be traversed by this route, besides being barren and uncultivated, was of a character unfavourable for military operations. Lord Wellington, therefore, when freed in his movements by the enemy's abandonment of the strong country in his front, directed his march on Orthez, where Soult had placed his army in a formidable position.

CHAP.XVI. Leaving the left wing under Sir John Hope to form the blockade of Bayonne, he moved the remainder of the army in three columns. The left, under Marshal Beresford, having driven the enemy from their intrenchments at Hastings and Oyergave, passed the gaves of Oleron and Pau, at their confluence above Peyrehorade, and advanced by the high road to Orthez. The cavalry and third division crossed the Pau by fords higher up the river near Berenx, and the corps of Sir Rowland Hill advanced directly on the bridge of Orthez, but finding it too strongly fortified to be carried by a *coup de main*, and being without artillery, no attempt was made to force a passage at that point. On the twenty-seventh, the sixth and light divisions crossed the river by a pontoon bridge; and Sir Rowland Hill, with the second division, remained on the left bank opposite to Orthez, on the road from Sauveterre.

Feb. 27.

Soult had placed his army in a strong position in the neighbourhood of Orthez, where he appeared determined to await the issue of a battle. It consisted of a range of tabular heights about a mile in length, stretching in the direction of Dax, the right of which terminating in a hill of pecu-

liar boldness, was covered in front by the village of St. Boes. The left rested on the town of Orthez, and commanded the passage of the river at that point, while the centre, sweeping back in the form of an arc, was protected by the protrusion of the wings. The divisions of Villatte and Harispe, and the brigade of General Paris, were formed in reserve.

Lord Wellington having reconnoitred the position, determined on immediate attack. He directed Marshal Beresford with the left wing, consisting of the fourth and seventh divisions, and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, to attack the enemy's right at St. Boes. The centre, consisting of the third and sixth divisions, and Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of cavalry, under Sir Thomas Picton, was directed to move by the road leading from Peyrehorade against the centre and left, while the light division moved up a ravine between the columns, ready to support either as occasion might require. Sir Rowland Hill was directed to cross the river at a ford about two miles above Orthez, in order to take the enemy in flank or rear, and cut off his retreat in the direction of Pau.

The action commenced about nine in the morn-

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CHAP.XVI. ing, when Sir Lowry Cole, with the fourth division, carried the village of St. Boes, after a strenuous resistance. Marshal Beresford then directed his efforts against two lines, posted on the heights above, the only approach to which lay along a narrow tongue of ground, flanked on either side by a deep ravine, and completely commanded by the enemy's guns. In this confined space it was impossible to deploy his masses; and so destructive was the action of the French artillery, that notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the fourth division, it was found impracticable to reach the heights. A Portuguese brigade at length fell into complete disorder, and its retreat was with difficulty covered by the remainder of the division and a brigade of the light division which moved to their support.

Thus far the tide of success had flowed in favour of the enemy. The crisis was urgent, and Lord Wellington with the greatest promptitude at once decided on changing the plan of attack. The column under Sir Thomas Picton received instant orders to advance; and the seventh division, under General Walker, which had hitherto remained in reserve, and Colonel Barnard's brigade of the light division, were ordered to

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support it, and attack the height occupied by the right of the enemy, at its point of junction with the centre.

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This powerful and desperate attack was successful. The fifty-second regiment, under Colonel Colburne, led the way in the most gallant style, supported on either flank by the troops of the third, fourth, and seventh divisions; and the artillery, having gained a promontory jutting out from the position, swept the whole line of the enemy's centre. The third division earned particular distinction in the attack. The whole eleven regiments composing it were desperately engaged, and drove the enemy from every height on which they ventured to make a stand. The conduct of General Inglis's brigade was also admirable. It executed a brilliant charge on the enemy's left, which was completely successful, and, if possible, increased the very high character which this brigade had previously acquired, by its steadiness and gallant demeanour on all occasions.

At length, having gained the crest of the main position, a severe struggle ensued, but the French were at length forced to give way, and fled rapidly over the level ground in the rear, covered

CHAP. XVI. by their cavalry, which endeavoured to check the pursuit by a very gallant charge on the sixth division. The infantry having reached some rising ground, rallied, and appeared determined to make a stand. They were charged, however, by Colonel Vivian, with the seventh hussars, who brought in some prisoners. The enemy then formed into squares, and continued their retreat in good order, though warmly pursued, and suffering heavily from the British guns.

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The centre being thus forced, Soult was compelled to withdraw his wings, which had suffered comparatively little, and gave the order for a general retreat. The movement was at first conducted with regularity; but the appearance of Sir Rowland Hill, who had passed the river above the town, and was observed to be marching on a line nearly parallel, to cut off the retreat on Sault de Navailles, occasioned great precipitation, and many quitting the road, fled over the fields towards the Adour. The allies pursued with all possible rapidity; and could the cavalry have sooner acted off the great road, the French army must have been almost annihilated. Wherever any obstacle occurred to impede their flight for a moment, they sustained great loss. Up-

wards of two thousand fugitives, exclusive of the wounded, were captured in the pursuit; and the number was considerably increased by a charge of Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of cavalry, near Sault de Navailles. Six pieces of artillery were likewise taken.

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Such was the victory of Orthez, in which the superiority of the allied army was maintained as conspicuously as in any former battle. It was marked by an incident, for the possible consequences of which, no success, however brilliant, could have made compensation. During the engagement, Lord Wellington was struck by a grape-shot, which drove the pommel of his sword against his side, with such violence as to occasion a severe contusion. He was in consequence unable to cross the intersected country in his front in time to direct the movements of the different divisions in pursuit. But for this misfortune, the results of Orthez would probably have been even more decisive. As it was, the loss of the enemy must have been very great; and such effect did its result produce on the minds of the French soldiers, that the desertion afterwards was immense. The loss of the allies amounted, altogether, to about two thousand three hundred men.

CHAP.XVI. Having crossed the Luy de Bearne, the
 1814. French army continued its retreat during the
 March. night to Hagetman, where it was joined by two
 battalions of conscripts, and by the garrison of
 Dax. On the day following, the main body re-
 treated on St. Sever, while another column di-
 rected its march on Aire, to protect a consider-
 able magazine which had been formed there.

A sudden rise of the Adour and its tributa-
 ries, occasioned by the heavy rains, delayed the
 allied army in their pursuit, till the bridges, de-
 stroyed by the enemy, should be re-established.
 Sir Rowland Hill, however, was directed to
 march on Aire, and dislodge the enemy from
 Mar. 2. that post. He found them in occupation of a
 strong ridge of heights, covering the road to the
 town, with their right on the Adour. Notwith-
 standing the strength of the position, Sir Row-
 land made instant dispositions for attack. The
 second division, under Sir William Stewart, ad-
 vanced by the road, while the Portuguese bri-
 gade of General Da Costa moved against the
 centre of the heights. The latter succeeded in
 gaining possession of the ridge, but were thrown
 into such confusion by the resistance they en-
 countered, as to be unable to re-form, while the
 enemy were advancing to attack them in this

disordered state. Fortunately, Sir William CHAP.XVI.
 Stewart, having previously dislodged the enemy 1814.
 in his front, detached the brigade of General March.
 Barnes to their assistance, which, by a gallant
 charge, drove back the approaching force in the
 greatest confusion.

The enemy made reiterated efforts to recover
 their lost ground, in which, though unsuccessful,
 they persevered till the brigade of General
 Byng came up, when they were driven from the
 whole position and from the town, with great
 loss. The greater part of their force made a
 disorderly retreat on the right of the Adour;
 but a part being cut off from the rest by the ra-
 pidity of the pursuit, fled in the greatest confu-
 sion towards Pau, throwing away their arms.

In this affair, above one hundred of the ene-
 my were made prisoners. The allies lost twen-
 ty killed and one hundred and thirty-five wound-
 ed. Among the former, was the Honourable
 Lieutenant-Colonel Hood, on the general staff
 of the army.

Marshal Soult, finding, neither at St. Severe
 nor Aire a tenable position, was compelled to
 continue his retreat. Three roads were open
 to him.

CHAP. XVI. The first leading through Mont de Marsan
to Bourdeaux.

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The second leading to Agen by Condom.

The third leading up the course of the Adour
to Tarbes.

By the first, it would be necessary to traverse the district of the Landes, a flat and barren country, without resources of any kind, and affording no military positions, while the rich departments of the Ger and the Garronne would be open to the allies.

By adopting the second, he would march indeed through a fruitful country, but Bourdeaux would be left open, and the war would be carried into the very heart of France.

By following the third, he was not without hopes of being able again to transfer the seat of war to the Pyrenees, where he might effect a junction with Suchet, and by withdrawing the allied army from the interior, neutralize the consequences of his defeat at Orthez. Bourdeaux indeed would, in this case also, be left exposed; but Soult imagined that Lord Wellington would not venture to advance on that city, leaving behind him the French army, and a place so formidable as Bayonne.

CHAP. XVI. The last, therefore, was the route which Soult determined to adopt; and there is no doubt that his decision was founded on true principles. But Lord Wellington deceived his calculations. Aware that a powerful party in favour of the Bourbons existed in Bourdeaux, he took immediate advantage of Soult's movement to the north, to detach Marshal Beresford, with three divisions, to expel the military, and give the inhabitants an opportunity of declaring their sentiments. In order to supply the place of these divisions, the Spanish reserve, under General Freyre, which had hitherto remained in the neighbourhood of Irun, was ordered to join the army, as well as every other disposable body.

On the eighth, Marshal Beresford put his corps in motion; and, accompanied by the Duke d'Angouleme, marched by Mont de Marsan on Bourdeaux. The Marquis de la Roche Jaquelin had previously been despatched to that city to make arrangements with the authorities for the reception of the Prince, and for making a public declaration in favour of the Bourbons. General L'Huillier, commandant of the garrison, satisfied that no support was to be expected from the people, quitted the city on the approach of the allied force.

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March.

Mar. 8.

CHAP.XVI. Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the
 1814. Bordelais. The whole population of the city
 March. came forth to welcome the descendant of their
 ancient monarchs. The white flag was displayed from the summits of the spires, the Bourbon emblem was adopted by all, and the air was rent by the long-forgotten cry of *Vive le Roi!* The Duke d'Angouleme entered the city amid the acclamations of the people, who crowded round him, in tumultuous disorder, eager to gaze on him, to touch him, to kiss the hem of his garments, or even the horse on which he rode. Blessings on their prince were faltered from the lips of age, lisped by those of childhood, and uttered in the full volume of sonorous intonation by thousands, who declared themselves prepared to peril life and fortune in the cause of their unfortunate and exiled Monarch.

The scene was one impossible to be contemplated without emotion. It seemed as if feelings which had long slumbered in the hearts of the people, and hopes long subdued but never utterly eradicated, had, by one sudden and spontaneous impulse, been awakened into life and vigour. Like the stream of a river long pent up, they had gathered strength from the very obstacles which opposed their demonstration, and,

at length, bursting the restraints of prudence, CHAP.XVI.
 flowed on with a force and an exuberance impossible to be controlled. The highly-wrought
 1814. sentiments of devotion with which the Bordelais welcomed their restored Prince, partook in nothing of the slavish and time-serving adulation of men veering cautiously with the current of events. The tribute of attachment which they offered was fraught with circumstances of the greatest danger. The treaty at Chatillon was yet in progress, and no important movement in favour of the Bourbons had been made in any of the provinces. The generous enthusiasm, indeed, which animated the Bordelais, placed them far above the dread of personal consequences. But deep apprehensions were entertained by the friends of freedom in other quarters, for those who, acting on the impulse of a precocious loyalty, had thus thrown off their allegiance to the existing government, which might yet be enabled to re-assert and establish its authority.

On the first of January the allied Sovereigns had crossed the Rhine, declaring their sole object to be the establishment of a general peace, which should leave France the whole territory she had possessed anterior to the Revolution, and

CHAP.XVI. disclaiming all intention of disintegrating any portion of her ancient possessions. This manifesto was attended by the most beneficial consequences. It proved that Napoleon, in continuing the war, was actuated only by projects of personal ambition, and contributed to generate an extensive alienation from his cause.

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In the meanwhile, the conduct of that great leader was regulated by no intelligible principle of prudence or expediency. He uniformly declined to make any appeal to the loyalty of the people. When solicited to declare publicly that the country was in danger, his reply was, "*Non, jamais ; je ne ferai ma cour à la nation.*" Even the legislative assembly, having ventured to state the unpalatable truth, that the security of personal rights, and the establishment of a representative government, could alone secure the national support at a crisis so important, were dismissed with an indignant and insulting reprimand. This impolitic display of rooted despotism lost Napoleon the support of all those who might hitherto have indulged a hope of something like constitutional liberty under his sovereignty, while his harsh, overbearing, and insolent demeanour, was offen-

sive to those who had immediate access to his person and councils.

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From Paris, Napoleon returned to assume the personal command of the remnant of those mighty armies which his ambition had sacrificed; and, by a series of able manœuvres, succeeded, in the months of January and February, in gaining several advantages over his antagonists, who, by movements ill combined, were hastily endeavouring to reach Paris. Thus, by extraordinary skill and rapidity of movement, and continuing, with a mere handful of men, to shew formidable front to the enemy, he obtained from the confederated Sovereigns the continued option of peace on fair and honourable terms.

But the ambition of Napoleon was too innate and insatiable to be eradicated even by misfortune. It was the ruling impulse of his nature, and would not be controlled. Though, in obedience to the public sentiment of the French nation, he had sent an ambassador to Chatillon, he instructed him to insist on the retention of various fortresses beyond the ancient limits of the kingdom, which could only be useful as the means of facilitating future schemes of aggression. Every artifice of diplomatic chicanery was employed to de-

CHAP.XVI. lay and embarrass the proceedings of the Con-

1814.

gress; and so complicated, varying, and evasive were the proposals and pretensions of the French Ruler, that it was impossible to calculate, with any approach to probability, in what result the negotiations would at length terminate.

Though the French people, exhausted by the conscriptions, the contributions, and the varied sufferings and privations to which they had been subjected, were little disposed to rally *en masse*, in support of Napoleon, or put forth the national energies in his behalf, it was still doubtful, however, how far they might be disposed to restore the Bourbon dynasty. The allies had hitherto taken no part in maintaining their pretensions; and the appearance of the Duke d'Angouleme at Bourdeaux, accompanied by a British force, was to be considered rather as an experiment to ascertain the feelings of the nation, than as any indication of an intention in the British government to interfere in the internal policy of France. The great source of the remaining strength of Napoleon was the army. The veterans, whom in his happier days he had led to battle and to victory, still remained faithful to his cause, and maintained it, with obstinate and unshrinking bravery, till

the moment of its final and irresistible subver- CHAP.XVI.

sion. The number of these, indeed, was comparatively small; but the people were passive, while the opinions of men who reason, bayonet in hand, are generally treated with respect.

At this period a proclamation, couched in that peculiar style of vituperative bombast to which the French Marshals were somewhat overweeningly partial, was put forth by Soult. In this document he not only loaded the British nation with abuse, but descended to the adoption of the coarsest invectives against his great and successful competitor. This was unworthy of Marshal Soult; and in affording such evidence of a wounded spirit, he only gave additional splendour to that reputation, which he felt with bitterness to have overshadowed his own.

Soult was no sooner aware of the movement of Marshal Beresford on Bayonne, than he boldly determined to assume the offensive. With that view he put his army in motion on the thirteenth of March, and advanced by Lambege to Conchez and Viella, on the right flank of the allies, and driving in the piquets of Sir Rowland Hill, made demonstration of attack. Sir Rowland then took up a position behind the Gros Lees, extending

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CHAP. XVI. from Aire to Garlin on the road to Pau. Lord

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Wellington, on learning this movement of the enemy, immediately moved two divisions to the support of the right wing thus threatened. These arrived before Soult had completed his offensive dispositions, when judging the allied force to be too strong in numbers and position to admit of attack, he retired on the night of the fourteenth to Lambege. In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington considering that a single division was sufficient for the preservation of Bourdeaux, recalled Marshal Beresford with two divisions, leaving Lord Dalhousie with the seventh to guard the city.

- Mar. 16, 17. During the sixteenth and seventeenth the allied army halted to give time for the junction of the Spanish reserve from Irun, and of the heavy cavalry. On the eighteenth they moved forward in two columns, one on each side of the Adour, the French retiring on their approach. On the nineteenth, the march of both columns was directed on Vic Bigorre, the one proceeding by Maubourget, the other by Lambege. At Vic, the French rear corps were found posted in the vineyards which encircled the town, and extended for a distance of several miles. It was impossible to

advance by the high road, until the vineyards, by which it was flanked on both sides, should be cleared. The third division, therefore, was ordered to dislodge them, which it effected with little difficulty, the chief loss being sustained by the light companies and the Portuguese brigade. The enemy then retreated on Tarbes, in the neighbourhood of which Soult had concentrated his whole army on the right of the Adour.

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On the twentieth they were found in position on the heights of Barbazon and d'Olent, their left resting on Tarbes, their right extending toward Rabastens. Sir Rowland Hill was in consequence directed to advance and drive the enemy from Tarbes, whilst Sir Henry Clinton, with the sixth division, supported by two brigades of cavalry, should cross the Adour between Vic Bigorre and Rabastens, in order to turn his position on the right. These movements were successful. The light troops of Sir Rowland Hill's corps entered Tarbes, and charging through the streets, drove the French from the town to the heights beyond it. The movements of Sir Henry Clinton, however, at once determined Soult to retreat, and he accordingly withdrew to a ridge of heights, nearly parallel, a

Mar. 20.

CHAP. XVI. short distance in rear, extending across the road of Tournay.

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Night closed before the arrangements had been completed for dislodging him, and in the morning, Marshal Soult was found to have retired by St. Gaudens on Toulouse, which he reached on the Mar. 24. twenty-fourth, having destroyed all the bridges. The allied army, owing to the state of the roads, and the encumbrance of a heavy pontoon train, moved more slowly, and did not reach the Mar. 27. Garonne till the twenty-seventh, when they halted on the left of the river, in front of Toulouse.

The city of Toulouse stands on the right bank of the Garonne, above the point of junction with the canal of Languedoc, by which it is covered on the eastern and northern faces. The whole western side is protected by the river, and the city is thus only accessible on the south by the space extending between the canal and the Garonne. The Faubourg St. Cyprien stands on the left bank, which is surrounded by a good wall of brick, and communicates with the city by a stone bridge. To the south is the suburb St. Michael, through which runs the great road from Narbonne. The walls of Toulouse, though old, were of great thickness, and flanked

by towers, but these defences were inadequate CHAP. XVI. to withstand the powerful resources of modern warfare. Marshal Soult, therefore, had assumed a formidable position on a range of heights extending along the space between the river Ers and the canal, on the eastern side of the town. The left and centre of the heights, which Soult considered the points chiefly assailable, were strongly fortified by intrenchments and redoubts; but towards the right where the line approached within half gunshot of the Ers, such precaution had not been deemed necessary, the river itself affording a sufficient defence. All the bridges crossing the canal were strongly guarded by *têtes de pont*, and those across the Ers, out of cannon range of the works, were destroyed. The Faubourg St. Cyprien, on the opposite side of the river, had likewise been covered by strong intrenchments, and the southern front was the only part of the *enceinte* to which no new defences had been added. For security in this quarter, Marshal Soult trusted to the width and rapidity of the Garonne, and the wretched condition of the cross roads, by which it was impossible to bring up artillery.

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On the twenty-eighth, Lord Wellington at. Mar. 28.

CHAP. XVI. tempted to throw a bridge across the Garonne at the village of Portet, a short distance above the town; but the current, owing to the recent rains, was found to be too rapid, and the attempt given up. A favourable spot was then selected, somewhat higher up, when Sir Rowland Hill's corps succeeded in crossing; but a difficulty of a different nature occurred. The recent rains had rendered the only roads, by which from this point Toulouse could be approached, impassable.

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March. Though the passage of the Garonne, above the city, would have carried with it the advantage of intercepting Soult's communication with Marshal Suchet, after these failures the attempt was resigned. On the thirty-first an endeavour was made at a point considerably below the city, where the river skirts the road from Grenade to Toulouse. Flanking batteries being established, Marshal Beresford, with the fourth and sixth divisions, effected the passage; but a sudden swell of the river broke the bridge, and the corps on the right bank was thus utterly left without support. Why Soult permitted so favourable an opportunity of attacking this isolated portion of the army to escape him, is not easily to be explained. But no attack was fortunately made,

and the river having subsided on the eighth, the CHAP. XVI. pontoons were again launched, and the Spanish corps of General Freyre, passed to the support of Marshal Beresford. The situation of the bridge, however, being inconvenient, it was removed higher up the Garonne, on the night of the eighth, for the sake of approaching Sir Rowland Hill's corps, which remained in front of the Faubourg St. Cyprien. Delays, however, occurred in the arrangements, which were not completed till the morning of the tenth, when the third and light divisions having crossed, the whole army was in readiness to commence offensive operations against the enemy.

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April. Lord Wellington then made his dispositions for attack. Marshal Beresford, with the fourth and sixth divisions, was directed to cross the Ers at the bridge of Croix d'Orade, (which had been gallantly carried on the fifth by the eighteenth hussars,) and drive the enemy from the village of Montblanc. He was then to proceed along the left bank of the Ers, till he gained the enemy's right, when he was to form and move to the attack of that flank.

Apr. 10. The Spaniards, under General Freyre, were to make a simultaneous attack on the left

CHAP.XVI. of the position, and then, by marching along the heights, to effect a junction with the left column under Marshal Beresford.

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April.

The third and light divisions were to observe the enemy in the suburbs near the canal; to threaten the canal bridge, and the town near the river.

The right, under Sir Rowland Hill, was to confine the enemy within his intrenchments on the left of the Garonne; and the cavalry was stationed at different points along the line, to check any movement of the French cavalry.

The enemy were first engaged by the column under Marshal Beresford, who carried the village of Montblanc, and then proceeded along the Ers in three open columns, flanked by skirmishers, till having gained the point of attack, the columns wheeled up and advanced in line against the right of the enemy's position. At the same time the Spaniards, under General Freyre, moved forward against the left, with great spirit, driving before them a brigade of the enemy. On approaching the intrenchments, however, they were received with so heavy a fire of grape as to throw them into considerable confusion; and the enemy taking advantage of this circumstance, made a general attack, and drove the

Spaniards down the hill with great slaughter. CHAP.XVI.
One regiment, however,—*le Tirad de Cantabria*—maintained its ground with the greatest gallantry, till recalled by Lord Wellington. To cover the retreat of the Spaniards the light division was ordered to move to its left; and thus protected, General Freyre succeeded in rallying his troops, and the enemy, who for a moment had gained a position on the right flank of the allies, were driven back.

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In the meanwhile, Marshal Beresford was more successful at the other extremity of the line. The fourth division advanced against the extreme right of the French line, while Sir Henry Clinton with the sixth moved up in front to attack the redoubts on Mount Calvinet. On the right of the centre, the face of the height was very steep and irregular, and General Clinton's division had to sustain, during every step of its progress, a severe fire from the enemy's artillery; yet, in spite of these obstacles, it steadily continued its advance, and repulsing a charge of cavalry on their flank, carried the principal redoubt on the right with the bayonet, and established themselves on the crest of the position. Sir Lowry Cole, with the fourth division,

CHAP. XVI likewise overcame all resistance, and driving the enemy from the heights on the extreme right of the line beyond the intrenchments, took up ground at some distance, on the left of General Clinton.

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A pause in the operations then ensued. From the badness of the roads, Marshal Beresford had been obliged to leave his artillery in the village of Montblanc, and it was now judged necessary to wait till it should be brought up, and till the Spaniards should be in condition to support the attack by a renewed movement on the left of the position.

In other quarters the prospects of the allies had been overclouded. The light division had made a false attack on the *tête de pont* in their front, with a trifling loss. More to the right, Sir Thomas Picton, exceeding the limits of his instructions, had converted the false attack on the bridge nearest the Garonne into a real one; and the troops having gained the counterscarp found it impossible to proceed further, owing to the formidable nature of the ditch. Under these circumstances, being without cover and exposed to a most destructive fire from the work, an immediate retreat became necessary, which was not effected

till a heavy loss had been sustained by the third division. Across the Garonne, Sir Rowland Hill drove the enemy within their works in front of St. Cyprien, and alarmed them by threatening a powerful attack in that quarter.

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Such were the circumstances of the contest, when Marshal Beresford, having been joined by the artillery, continued his movement along the ridge. Marshal Soult, observing that a considerable distance intervened between the sixth and fourth divisions, conceived it possible, by a powerful attack both in front and flank, to overpower the former, before the fourth division could come up to its assistance. With this view, he directed the division of General Taupin to move against the front of the sixth division, while the cavalry and the brigade of General Leseur was directed to charge it in flank. The situation being such that the assailants could receive no support from the fire of their redoubts, the contest on both sides was waged on equal terms. Instead of waiting to receive the meditated attack, General Clinton, moved on to meet it, and by a most brilliant charge of bayonets, in which General Taupin was killed, at once put them to the route. This success was vi-

CHAP. XVI. gorously followed up. The brigade of General

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Pack succeeded in carrying the two principal redoubts and the fortified houses in the centre. A powerful body of the enemy, however, pushed forward from the canal, and made a strong effort to regain the works thus carried, in which they were repulsed with great loss.

In this extremity, Soult changed his front, and rallying the routed divisions, took up a new line extending from the *Pont de Demoiselles* on the canal, to the heights of La Pujade. It was found impossible, however, to arrest the brave sixth division in its career of success. Supported by a corresponding movement of the Spanish troops, the enemy were driven successively from their redoubts, and forced to retire across the canal, under cover of their fortified bridges. Sir Rowland Hill had been equally successful on the left of the Garonne, and compelled the enemy to abandon the whole advanced line of retrenchments, and retire within the walls of the suburb.

The victory of Toulouse was not gained without heavy loss on the part of the allies. Above four thousand five hundred British and Portuguese were killed and wounded, and the loss of the Spanish army was also very great. The

French army, from their advantages of position, CHAP. XVI

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suffered less, but two Generals (Taupin and Lamorandiere) were killed; and three (Harispe, Baurot, and St. Hilaire) were made prisoners, with one thousand six hundred men. Only one gun was taken on the field of battle, the enemy having succeeded in removing the remainder into the town.

In the meanwhile, Napoleon, in the ebb of his fortunes and of his power, had been unable to resist the progress of the vast armies by which he was opposed. Nevertheless, with a force scarcely exceeding seventy thousand men, he adopted the boldest manœuvres, and by a rapid march on Vitry and St. Dizier, he even threw himself into the rear of the confederated armies, trusting by this movement to force them to retreat, in order to preserve their communications with the Rhine. In this expectation he was deceived. The allies pushed forward on Paris, which capitulated on the thirtieth; and on the eleventh of April, Napoleon concluded a treaty with the Allied Sovereigns, by which he solemnly renounced all claim for himself and his descendants to the throne of France.

Mar. 30.

On the thirteenth, the Count D'Artois Apr. 13.

CHAP. XVI entered Paris, and was received by the Marshals, the civic authorities, and the great officers of state, with all the honours due to his distinguished rank. On the twentieth, Napoleon left Fontainebleau for the Island of Elba, the sovereignty of which had been secured to him by the treaty.

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After the battle before Toulouse, Soult withdrew his troops within the walls of the city, and made preparations for defence. The inhabitants were in despair at the impending prospect of their city being subjected to a siege, while the presence of a large military force, prevented any public demonstration of their aversion to that cause in behalf of which they were doomed apparently to suffer. On being summoned to surrender, Soult replied that he would rather bury himself in the ruins of the city. Lord Wellington, on his part, made strenuous preparations for the complete investment of Toulouse, all egress from which was already closed on three sides. But Soult was too deeply aware of the danger of his position, to await calmly the result of these operations. Conscious that the city was not tenable, and unwilling perhaps to encounter the odium, which the destruction of so wealthy and important a

city must have raised against him, he retreated with his whole force during the night of the twelfth to Ville Franque, and, on the following day, continued his march on Castilnaudry.

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The joy of the inhabitants of Toulouse at this event was excessive. They beheld themselves at once relieved from all the fearful apprehensions which had oppressed them, and welcomed the entrance of the victorious army with joyful acclamations. The white flag was hoisted; cries of *Vive le Roi* rent the air; and the public enthusiasm was still farther excited by the arrival of Colonel Cooke, and Colonel St. Simon, with intelligence of the abdication of Napoleon, and the restoration of the Bourbons.

At Bourdeaux, Lord Dalhousie crossed the Dordogne on the fourth of April, and attacked a body of the enemy, about fifteen hundred strong, under General L'Huilier, near Etauliers. It was posted in a large open common in front of the village, and the woods on either flank were occupied by light infantry. The French soon gave way, and retired through Etauliers, leaving their scattered parties without protection. In this affair, thirty officers and about three hundred men were made prisoners.

Apr. 4.

CHAP. XVI Toulouse unfortunately was not the only scene of unnecessary bloodshed. Early on the morning of the fourteenth, a sortie in force was made from the intrenched camp in front of the citadel of Bayonne, on the position of the allies at St. Etienne. Major-General Hay, the commanding officer of the outposts for the day, fell early in the engagement, and the assailants succeeded in dislodging the allies from the village. They also drove in the piquets of the centre, where Major-General Stafford was wounded. Reinforcements, however, were brought up, the whole of the lost ground was recovered, and the piquets were established in their former posts. The loss of the allies in this affair was very serious. It amounted to eight hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Among the last was Sir John Hope, who, in bringing up some troops from the right to support the piquets, came suddenly in the dark on a party of the enemy, when his horse was shot under him, and before he could be extricated he received two wounds and was made prisoner. The loss of the enemy in this affair exceeded nine hundred men.

With this tragic episode, terminated the great drama of the war, and it only remains to advert

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Apr. 14.

to the events more immediately connected with the restoration of the Spanish monarch, before these Annals shall have reached their conclusion.

From the commencement of the present year, the military occurrences in Spain were of trifling importance. The enemy retained a force only in one corner of the kingdom, and were compelled to assume a part merely defensive, while the necessities of the war in other quarters occasioned a continual diminution of its numbers. In January the Regency and the Cortes removed to Madrid, where they were received with all the solemnity due to the national representation and government. The attempt to detach Spain from her alliance with England, by a treaty concluded with Ferdinand while a prisoner in France, having signally failed, Napoleon at length determined on the unconditional restoration of the Spanish monarch. On the thirteenth of March, Ferdinand set out from Valençay, and proceeding by way of Perpignan, on the twenty-fourth he reached Gerona, from whence he addressed a letter to the Regency written with his own hand. It contained a general assurance of his wishes to conduce in every manner in his power to the welfare and prosperity

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March.

Mar. 24.

CHAP.XVI. of his subjects, and an expression of his happiness on finding himself again on Spanish ground, amid a people and an army which had given such generous and honourable testimony of fidelity to their sovereign.

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From Gerona, Ferdinand proceeded to Zaragoza, where he was received with the most enthusiastic demonstrations of devoted loyalty. At Valencia his reception was equally flattering and enthusiastic, and, emboldened by these testimonies of public attachment, he received the President of the Regency with coldness, and declined acknowledging the restrictions which the Cortes had placed on the despotic exercise of regal authority.

The enthusiasm of the nation, however, would not be restrained. The principal nobility and clergy, and many members of the Cortes, flocked round their restored sovereign, and were unwilling, in their generous loyalty, to shackle that authority which they trusted would be directed in its exercise to promote the welfare and prosperity of the Spanish nation. Their homage was too warm to be the offspring of calculation. The monarch for whom they had poured forth their blood as water, had at length been given

to their prayers; and such was not the moment when it was probable that the cold dictates of prudence would be heard or obeyed. Ferdinand was received by his devoted subjects as a despotic monarch, and the advocates and supporters of the constitution became obnoxious to the great body of the people.

Thus supported, Ferdinand issued a manifesto from Valencia, charging the Cortes with having violated the constitution of the kingdom, and introduced revolutionary innovations utterly subversive of the regal authority. Some abuses, it was confessed, might have crept into the Spanish government, but these were not to be corrected by the rash and unprincipled proceedings of an illegal body. In order to repair such evils, the king promised he would in due time convoke the Cortes in a legitimate form, and act in concert with them for this purpose. The proclamation concluded by declaring the Cortes to be dissolved, and ordaining that all opposing the execution of this decree should suffer death.

Thus did this crowned slave display his gratitude to those noble-minded men, who, by their steadfast loyalty and persevering exertions, had

CHAP.XVI.
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May.

May 4.

CHAP. XVI. contributed largely to his restoration to the Spanish throne. If the Cortes were irregularly convoked, and elected on principles unknown to the ancient constitution of the realm, it was owing to the circumstances of the times, and to the base and pitiful truckling of Ferdinand himself to the French ruler. That the Cortes were guilty of many errors is undoubted; that their views were generally narrow and injudicious, no one who has perused the record of their proceedings can venture to deny. But when we consider the bold and unwavering front which these men displayed in times of the greatest difficulty and danger, their generous ardour in the cause of liberty and loyalty, under the pressure of every danger and every temptation, their errors, when weighed against devotion so pure and so heroic, become but as dust in the balance.

May 13. In a few days after the promulgation of this decree, Ferdinand removed to Madrid. His vengeance was first directed against the members of the Regency. The venerable Cardinal de Bourbon was banished to Rome, Agar to Carthagena, Cigar to a fortress in Catalonia. The eloquent and noble-minded Arguelles was con-

demned to serve as a common soldier; and all CHAP. XVI. who had most distinguished themselves by enlightened and generous views in the proceedings of the Cortes, were proscribed and punished. 1814.

The whole measures of the government were in barbarous consistency with those we have detailed. The liberty of the press was abolished; the Inquisition, by royal statute, resumed its hateful dominion over the souls and bodies of the people; and the functions of the monarchy were brought into full action, without a single correction of any of the enormous abuses which, in the lapse of centuries, had crept into every department of the government.

In France, the restoration of the Bourbons, not only relieved the nation from the immediate evils of invasion, but brought with it the establishment of order, of civil rights, and perhaps of as much liberty as the people were at that period prepared to enjoy. Napoleon, dwindled from the Emperor of France into the prisoner of a petty island, exhibited a memorable instance of that retributive justice which Providence is occasionally pleased to display as a lesson to mankind. The mighty spirit which had shaken

CHAP. XVI. the world like a tempest, and exercised a larger
1814. influence on the destinies of nations than any
other individual of modern times, was made to
pause a while in his career of ambition; and in
his enforced retirement, he might have exclaimed
in the words of Seneca, singularly applicable to
his condition,

Quid me potens Fortuna fallaci mihi
Blandita vultu sorte contentum mea,
Alte extulisti, gravius ut ruerem, edita
Receptus arce, totque prospicerem metus?
Melius latebam, procul ab invidiæ malis,
Remotus inter Corsici rupes maris.


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